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ABSTRACT 
 
 
My research explores critical issues involved in emergency management in a front-line, 
emergency service – the fire brigade – in Greece, Germany and Britain. It is designed to 
identify the problems in the communication conduct among fire-fighters during emergency 
responses, to examine the causes of these problems and to suggest ways to overcome them 
that should allow European countries to adopt more effective policies. It aims to make a 
contribution to the academic study of crisis management in organizations through an 
analysis of actual, real-time, responses to emergencies such as industrial fires, plane 
crashes, road traffic accidents and train collisions. Organizations such as fire services are 
seen as communication events and a platform where shared cognitive meanings and shared 
value commitments shape the actions of the interactive agents. In this vein, emergencies 
are the outworking of communicative disruption in organizations, in which fire services 
face a triple jeopardy: they have to manage other organizations’ crises (such crises include 
those arising in large chemical and oil factories), their own crises (for example, failing to 
communicate because of inadequate radio spectrum) and natural disasters (such as 
earthquakes and forest fires).    3
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
 
9/11   The attacks on the World Trade Centre on the 11
th of September 2001  
ADD Aufsichts-  und  Dienstleistungsdirektion – Organization for emergency 
planning and management 
ARES  High-ranking operations’ officer of a certain district where more than one 
fire stations operate 
ARMA  High-ranking HFC officer responsible for monitoring the whereabouts of 
the appliances deployed on-scene 
BA Breathing  apparatus 
BFRS(s)  British fire and rescue service(s) 
BT  British Telecom  
CC Control  commander 
CCC  Command and control centre or command and control room or control 
room. This is the department that receives the emergency calls and 
dispatches the organizational resources 
CFO Chief  fire-officer 
COP Control  operator 
D Dispatcher   
EB Electronic  board 
EC Electric  company 
EFRS(s)  English fire and rescue service(s) 
EM Electronic  map 
FAA Federal  aviation  administration 
FAA Federal  aviation  agency 
FDNY  Fire department, New York 
FEMA  Federal emergency management authority. FEMA coordinates federal 
agencies and departments during emergency responses providing a 
command structure. It deploys personnel to the appropriate regional office 
and the incident area but does not have its own critical response assets, 
such as buses, trucks, and ambulances. FEMA provides funding for   12
equipment and training. The role of FEMA is similar to the role the SGCP 
undertakes in the Hellenic case 
FF Fire-fighter 
FI  Fire investigator  
FO Fire-officer   
FRS(s)  Fire and rescue service(s) 
HFC   Hellenic fire corps 
HQ Headquarters   
HW  Hauptwache – central fire station 
IC  Incident commander, the highest ranking officer on the incident-grounds. 
ICS  Incident command system 
KRONOS  Operations’ officer responsible for coordinating at least two appliances 
when responding to an emergency event 
LC Lieutenant  commander 
LFB  Ludwigshafen Fire Brigade 
MCU Mobile  command  unit 
MoA  Memorandums of action 
NEADS  Northeast Air Defence Sector 
NIMS National  Incident  Management System  
NIS National  interpretation  system 
NIS National  Intelligence  Agency 
NORAD  North American Aerospace Defence Command  
NW  Nordwache, North fire station 
NYPD  New York, police department 
OPS’ Operations 
OSE  Hellenic railways organization 
OTE  Hellenic telecommunications organization 
PAPD  Port authority police department 
Pers. comm.  Personal communication is an expression used to label conversations and 
interviews with the FRSs organization-members.   13
PO Press  office 
PR Public  relations 
RTC  Road traffic collision  
SC Station  commander 
SFO Station  fire-officer 
SFRS(s)  Scottish fire and rescue services(s) 
SGCP  Secretariat general for civil protection. The SGCP is an organization that 
plans for large-scale natural or technological disasters and undertakes the 
coordination of the organizations that respond to such emergencies. 
SO Station  operator 
SOP  Standard operating procedures 
USDA  United States department of agriculture 
WTC  World Trade Centre 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Defining the problem: How I came up with my research topic 
 
 
I joined the Hellenic Fire Corps (HFC) in 2001. One day I read an advertisement in one of 
the Athenian newspapers announcing that the HFC was looking to hire a female 
Communication and Mass Media graduate. It was a public servant’s position with a 
permanent contract. I passed both the physical tests and the written examinations only to 
discover that I was not supposed to be the HFC spokesman – or, in my case, spokeswoman 
– but rather start off as a junior fire-officer and work myself up the ladder of hierarchy 
before I could put my expertise to good use.  
 
 
Since that time, I found myself often looking for a way to express my suppressed desire to 
make the most of my knowledge in Communication and the Mass Media. I presumed that 
if I found a way to do that, I would succeed in avoiding the destructive – rather than 
unproductive – feeling of boredom, a sentiment of isolation both from my environment and 
myself. At the same time, the organization might benefit from any suggestions I could 
make with regard to ameliorating some of its conduct.  
 
 
The answer came almost a year after I started working for the HFC. One day I was visiting 
the command and control centre (CCC) of the HFC, where all the emergency calls are 
received and processed. I was listening to the conversations both between control 
personnel and civilians and amongst control employees. People were shouting at each 
other. Operators were struggling to make sense of what the civilians were trying to tell 
them. Dispatchers were trying to establish communication with the operations’ units, 
mobilize them to the incident-grounds and forward the necessary information so that the 
fire-fighting teams could work out their response. At the same time, control officers were 
shouting at control operators or dispatchers to do this or take care of that. Was that where 
strategic decisions were made whilst responding to emergencies? Could those decisions 
made under such noise and pressure from the commanding officers protect the responders 
in action or effectively determine the distribution of the organization’s resources? In such 
an environment, could control employees establish an effective information exchange   15
process with other first-responder organizations? Maybe this was my chance to put my 
knowledge about communications to good use. 
 
 
My professional experience taught me that communication between first-responder 
organizations during an emergency situation could largely determine the overall result of 
the response, the most critical phase of emergency management (Hale, Dulek and Hale 
2005). Yet, at that stage I was unable to clearly define the problem. I felt that Alpaslan, 
Mitroff and Green (2004) made sense when they argued that the definition of a problem is 
often more the outcome of inquiry than its starting-point. My ‘starting-point’ was a hunch 
that something in the communicative process during emergency responses was not “quite 
right”. However unscientific, this hunch was the product of a wealth of experience.  
 
 
So, in 2004, I began to take note of how personnel interacted during emergencies and non-
emergency situations, so as to establish common patterns of behaviour. First, I had been 
struck by the extent to which, and the reasons why, communication could be distorted 
amongst participant actors. Second, it appeared to me that communication patterns during 
emergency responses seemed to connect to communication patterns during periods when 
the organization is not responding to emergency situations, often referred to either as non-
crisis periods or periods of organization “equanimity”. Colleagues from the HFC disagreed 
with this second point. During casual conversations, they all argued that communication 
during emergency responses was different from “normal” communication (Bourrier 2002). 
This view was sustained by the argument that in responding to an emergency during crises 
“common problems multiply exponentially” (Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort 2001: 18), and 
so a stress-related “change” could negatively influence employees’ attitudes towards 
colleagues, emergency co-responders and the public.  
 
 
During my visits to the control room, which had become rather frequent, I realized that 
the distance between the theoretical and the practical level was substantial. In theory, one 
may assume that the communicative interactions amongst the participant actors in 
emergency responses are instrumental. So, the communicators have a shared 
understanding of the messages exchanged and the context of the message is purely 
informational. Officers, operators, and dispatchers employed in the CCC usually receive 
information from civilians describing an emergency situation and indicating its location.   16
They then forward this information to the operations’ units initiating the necessary 
mobilization of resources on the incident-grounds. Depending on the type and size of the 
emergency, CCC personnel disseminate necessary information to other first-responder 
organizations, such as the police or the ambulance service. The operations fire-officers in 
command contact the CCC personnel for any further assistance required in the form of 
resources or additional information.  
 
 
In general, such organizational conduct becomes a “rational-instrumental entity”, whereby 
communication is held to be “a measurable and objective element of reality” (Putnam, 
Phillips and Chapman 1996: 376). This system/information theory approach perceives 
social systems as composed of “actions rather than people” (Burkart 1980: 221). 
Communication is seen as a central means of achieving the official goals of formal 
organizations that are by definition hierarchically structured (Perrow 1976 and 2002). 
Within this context, strategic management researchers usually approach organizations as 
neutral, rational and technical systems of production. Distortion in communication occurs 
when the messages exchanged within the organization contain non-informational outputs 
which may lead to dysfunctional and ineffective organization outcomes (Jacobson in 
Manning 1992; McQuail and Windahl 1981). This is how I had pictured the emergency 
conduct among the participant actors in an emergency response when I first joined the 
HFC. 
 
  
In practice, however, I realized that, first, there exist more than the “two” aforementioned 
“main actors”. The actual number of the interacting agents during an emergency response 
is the sum of the employees involved in it; those occupied in the CCC, those on the fire 
grounds, those in any other division of the fire and rescue service, and those in any other 
participant first-responder organization. When communicating, these employees filter the 
information through their on-the-job training, work experience, knowledge of operating 
procedures, general educational level and idiosyncrasies, beliefs, hopes, fears and attitudes. 
In effect, these factors may lead to misinterpretation of the information which, in turn, may 
result in incorrect assessment of the gravity of the reported emergency and affect the 
decision-making process (Kakabadse 1991).  
 
   17
So, gradually, I decided to adopt a more reflexive perspective and consider organizations 
as “communication events” (Pepper 1995: 3). As such, organizations are not only actions 
but primarily the interactions between agents (Boisot, MacMillan and Han 2007). 
Therefore, this approach is predominantly about the sentiments, the symbolism, and the 
language of the actors, as the medium through which the process of selecting, retaining, 
and rejecting environmental stimuli is realized. As Manning (1992: 41) maintains 
“communication is often as much about symbolic matters, ideas, beliefs, and assumptions 
as it is about information.” In such a context, communication becomes a transactional 
process, in which messages exchanged between the participant actors may be informational 
or non-informational, rational or irrational, deliberate or accidental, significant or 
insignificant (Rapport 2001; Manning 1992: 43; Putnam, Phillips and Chapman 1996; 
Pepper 1995; Jablin et al. 1987) and define organizations’ routines and rituals (Manning 
1992: 54; Bourque and Johnson 2008). Naturally, such an increasing complexity in the 
communication conduits may disturb the dissemination or “diffusion” (Boisot 1995) of the 
necessary information.  
 
 
Complexity increases as civilians input the initial information concerning an emergency. 
Their perception during an emergency may be distorted, for example due to stress, and this 
distortion can be communicated to the CCC and, so, it becomes the basis of the evaluation 
of the incident. After accumulating and assessing the information, the dissemination may 
encounter technical difficulties such as radio malfunction or frequency congestion. The 
inter-organizational communication between first-responder organizations may be 
problematic, since organizations do not necessarily share the same objectives. All these 
issues emerging from the communicative interactions amongst the HFC employees were 
both significant to the organization’s routine and non-routine conduct and inextricably 
related to its performance. Yet, unless someone undertook the task of describing and 
embedding them into the personnel’s routines and practices, they could not be 
systematized and become a part of the organization’s policies. And so I decided to move 
towards mapping the conduct of the various organization-members.  
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2. Defining emergencies 
 
 
Before I began, I had previously taken as self-evident: crisis and emergency. In the 
interdisciplinary literature on crisis, the extended use of the term in many fields of research 
contributed to its diverse and inconsistent conceptualization (McCormick 1978: 352; Boin 
2005: 167; Gundel 2005). Crisis is usually attributed a non-routine, unstable, less-
understood and urgent character (Kakabadse 1991; Quarantelli 1988 and 1998; Roux-
Dufort 2007). A more functional approach conceptualizes crisis as a period of 
discontinuity, marking the breaking point in a patterned process of linearity (Crozier 1964; 
Wagenaar 2000; Boin 2005).  
 
 
Crises may be events or experiences (Roux-Dufort 2007). Although crises may be spatially 
and temporally defined (Shrivastava et al. 1988: 297), events such as earthquakes, forest 
fires, problems at large chemical and oil factories, and terrorist attacks indicate that crises 
spill over from local areas into the international arena, making transbounderization 
(Porfiriev in Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort 2001: 343) an additional, intrinsic, characteristic 
of crises. As events, crises are clustered as environmental, and fiscal (Mitroff, Alpaslan 
and Green 2004: 180); or depending on their causes, as industrial and natural (Fritz 1961; 
Quarantelli 1978; Perrow 1999; Shrivastava et al. 1988).  
 
 
As experiences, crises are defined by “the manner in which the behaviour of these 
individuals is shaped by the institutions and organizations within which they act” (Turner 
and Pigeon 1997: 133). For example, fire-fighting personnel perceive crises as part of the 
organizational work, as incidents they should respond to. How these perceptions are 
shaped, as well as the distance between these perceptions and the fire-fighting personnel’s 
actions, present ruptures that may partly be the causes of crises. These causes of crises are, 
therefore, not merely external but intrinsic to the organization and tightly coupled to 
organizational structures, routines and practices (Perrow 1999, Boin 2005, Ursacki-Bryant 
et al. 2008). As Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort (2001: 348) maintain “we [may] recognize 
the simplicity of any urge to declare crisis as something ‘out there’ instead of emphasizing 
its endemic qualities.” 
 
   19
From signifying the “layers of danger” in a society largely defined by the non-random 
generation of risk (Beck 2002) to delineating situations unwanted, unexpected, 
unprecedented, almost unmanageable that cause widespread disbelief and uncertainty 
(Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1997; Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort 2001) crises come to 
indicate “a serious threat to the basic structures of the fundamental values and norms of a 
social system” (Rosenthal, Charles and ‘t Hart 1989: 10; Beck 2002; Comfort 2005). As 
the “trans-” prefix of transbounderization comes to the fore, preventing, responding to or 
mitigating crises takes on a “trans-organizational” (Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort 2001: 
297) and “multi-disciplinary” (Comfort 1994; Boin and t’Hart 2003) character, where 
crisis prevention or management cannot be achieved on the organizational level alone. 
Events which, taken in isolation, may not warrant classification as major incidents, may 
do so when considered together (Coombs 2004).
1 
 
 
The term crisis with all its semantic and practical variations constitutes only an acute type 
of event the fire and rescue organizations deal with. So, I will use the term emergency 
instead of crisis to refer to the majority of the events the FRSs manage. Fire and rescue 
organizations also encounter routine and set events (Cressey, Eldridge and MacInnes 
1985: 125-158). Routine events are incidents fire-fighters frequently respond to, such as 
kitchen or chimney fires. These events have a less unexpected character than emergencies 
and their consequences are more or less anticipated. Set events are the ones fire services 
attend, such as festivals, for precautionary reasons.  
 
 
Different fire and rescue services introduce different terms to classify the incidents they 
attend. The HFC uses two categorizations: incident, for the less demanding and rather 
routinely occurring emergencies and crisis, for the more complex emergencies that may 
require an extended mobilization of organizational resources and a multi-agency response. 
The BFRSs classify the fires they attend as primary and secondary. Primary are those fires 
that erupt in buildings and mobile homes, means of transport, storages, plants 
machineries, agricultural and forestry premises. This category also includes fires that 
require the attendance of more than five appliances, as well as secondary fires that have 
                                                 
1  Major incident response and investigation and major incident policy and procedure review, 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/enforce/mirai.pdf, accessed: 31/03/2008.    20
fatalities or casualties that require rescue operations.
2 The LFB use the term incident 
when three appliances are mobilized and the term SOS-calls when six or more appliances 
are necessary. Six is the total of the LFB professional fire-fighting units.
3  
 
 
3. From being an insider to becoming an outsider in the HFC 
 
 
When I first started to design my research on the HFC, I made three false assumptions 
based on my status as an HFC fire-officer. First, I assumed that I could easily obtain a 
secondment to examine the communicative interactions of the HFC employees during 
emergency responses. Second, I thought that obtaining a secondment would automatically 
allow me access to important information, such as recorded conversations during 
emergency responses. Third, I assumed that my colleagues would be comfortable talking 
about their professional experiences. 
 
 
Yet I misjudged the situation. The rationale of the bureaucratic processes of the HFC 
contradicted my assumptions. Despite the fact that I requested to be seconded a month 
before my matriculation as a Ph.D. student, the official reply approving my request was 
issued almost five weeks after my research began. Furthermore, in order to access the 
material I required, I had to submit an additional official request. Moreover, many of my 
colleagues were less than keen on talking freely about their interactions during emergency 
responses. These obstacles made me realize that for both the formal organization and my 
colleagues, my status had changed: I was auditing the organization-members’ performance 
rather than being one of the organization-members.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP), ‘Major Incident Procedure Manual’: July 2004; 
Fieldnotes, December 2006; March 2007 and April 2007. Note that fieldnotes also comprise of internal 
correspondence (e.g. unofficial memos without protocol numbers) among organization-members and 
correspondence between organization-members and I.  
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a. Approaching the HFC 
 
 
Although I did not realise this at the time, before I started my research, I followed the same 
initial steps William Whyte (1955) took when exploring the social structure of an Italian 
slum. I experienced that a very efficient way to examine the routines of the HFC was to be 
a part of the natural surroundings of the organization-members (Cassel and Symon 1994; 
Hammersley and Atkinson 1995; O’Reilly 2005). Being part of the natural surroundings 
meant conducting participant observation. While I was still an insider visiting the control 
room, nobody appeared to be bothered by my presence. I was an organization-member 
who was in the control room undertaking a certain task. My job was to keep track of what 
went on, so that I could inform the media. However, when I revisited the command and 
control centre as a researcher, my behaviour was under constant scrutiny. I felt eyes 
following me around the room like they never had before although I was making the same 
rounds as I had in the past. I came to realize that this was the HFC personnel’s reaction as 
they had never before experienced their interactions being constantly observed. Instead of 
the control personnel coming to terms with my being in the control room, they gradually 
became very conscious of my presence. They were even more concerned when I started 
listening to their conversations via telephone or radio that are recorded on a 24-hour basis. 
However most of them were worried about whether I was listening to their private 
conversations rather than their professional conduct. 
 
  
b. Investigating the recorded conversations 
 
 
Formally, I was not allowed to listen to their private conversations. The commander of the 
control room appointed a fire-fighter employed as a technician in the command and control 
centre in order to make sure that I was listening to the material that had been pre-approved 
by the HFC officials. Nonetheless the fire-fighter was absent for most of the time I spent in 
the recording room; so, I was the only one to censor the material I used. Obtaining 
formal/official approval was one of the first obstacles I encountered in my efforts to get 
access to the communication patterns during emergency responses amongst fire-fighters 
and between the HFC employees and other first-responder organizations. Recordings are 
classified data disclosed only when subpoenaed after being directly requested by the 
district attorney. Hence, obtaining permission was a complicated and a time-consuming   22
process. Seven senior officers, including the chief fire-officer of the HFC, had to sign two 
official documents before I was allowed any access to the recorded conversations. In order 
to precipitate the process, I decided to pursue the matter through informal channels. I was 
aware that if the chief fire-officer was positively disposed towards my request, the chances 
were that I would be able to access this material. The chances would further improve if the 
other six higher-ranking officers were on good terms with him and did not object to my 
request. According to the existing regulations, if an objection was raised, the rest of the 
senior officers should address it. That would mean more documents to be signed and 
therefore more time spent. Eventually, a veto was raised by the deputy chief fire-officer, 
who excluded documents marked as confidential. However, I was allowed to listen to the 
conversations with the consent of the CCC commander and deputy commander, as the 
vague wording of the final version of the official document signed left it to their 
discretionary power. 
 
 
When I entered the room where the recordings are kept, I felt that I was well on track with 
regard to collecting my data. What I had not realized at that point was that the recordings 
archive was just part of my data. The whole process of working in the HFC, planning and 
readjusting my research, accessing the information I considered valuable was in itself 
participant observation. So I entered the room and started searching for large-scale 
emergencies. The filing system was as good as inexistent. What I soon discovered was 
first, that the communicative interactions were all written on a DVD-recorder and unless I 
had the exact day, time, and telephone line of the conversation, it was difficult to trace the 
set of interactions I was looking for. A second issue was that major incidents were either 
dated 20 or 30 years ago, or that the few that occurred during the past four or five years 
were kept in the CCC commander’s office, away from indiscreet looks or the occasional 
careless employee who might overwrite the rewritable DVD with the conversations. So I 
had to choose amongst small- or medium-scale emergencies. Going through the 
recordings, I realised that the HFC does not engage in routinely responding to large-scale 
disasters. Hence, selecting and analysing more routine emergencies provided a relatively 
closer encounter with the organizations’ customs and practices.  
 
 
I decided to work with the largest recorded emergencies since the early 2000s. The initial 
idea was to analyze the recorded radio conversations between the dispatchers and the 
operations’ units, which I consider to be the “frontstage” (Goffman 1990) communication   23
during emergency responses. That is because communicative interactions via radio are the 
result of a “backstage” decision-making process which is conducted via the telephone – for 
which the recordings existed – or face-to-face interactions, which I occasionally had the 
opportunity to observe as a researcher. I was surprised – and so were the CCC officers at 
the time – to find out that the radio recordings did not exist. Some radio communications 
were recorded, but the entire body of the recordings was kept in the Hellenic 
Telecommunications Organization (OTE) and in order to access it I had to have special 
permission from the National Intelligence Service (NIS). I had already spent over two 
weeks seeking permission from the HFC. I located every officer who was involved in 
signing the official release of the documents. I interrupted their daily schedules in order to 
explain the significance of my research and gain their consent. The NIS is an organization 
with different routines and practices that has in the past interfered with security issues 
concerning the HFC.
4  
 
 
I thought it would be best if I examined the recorded material on three levels, as suggested 
by Shannon and Weaver (1949) and re-defined by Boisot (1995): the technical, the 
semantic and the pragmatic levels with my emphasis being on the semantic level. First, on 
a technical level, I investigated the physical characteristics of the communication that 
defined, for example, the accuracy in transmission. The second level of analysis was the 
semantic aspect of communications, namely the interacting agents, the messages they 
exchanged and their interpretation of these messages (Eco 1977, 1989 and 1990; Davou 
2000). My principal concern was to investigate the performing agents in their roles, how 
they perceived and enacted their roles in the emergency response. To this end, symbolic 
interactionism facilitated the understanding of the circumstances under which the analysis 
of the messages exchanged during the communicative processes was realized (Boden 
1990; Travers 2001). Symbolic interactionism defines the ad hoc characteristics of the 
communicative interactions among organization-members. These explanations reveal the 
existence of common patterns that govern the communication conduct prior to, during and 
after the emergency response. Symbolic interactionism emerged from recognizing the ad 
hoc character that “defined the dynamics of specific interactions” but it was also charged 
with failing to set “them in the wider context of an accepted social structure, neglecting 
social structure” (Stryker 1987: 85). In addition it was criticized for “rejecting hierarchy” 
hence underplaying the “importance of power differences”, on the grounds of focusing on 
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“the episodic and viewing life in terms of fluid, transient encounters” (Gouldner 1970: 
379-86). Therefore, this approach was not considered “capable of incorporating adequately 
the social significance (and therefore the sociological significance) of social structure, in 
particular of social class and power distributions within society” (Stryker 1987: 85). 
Despite these criticisms, in this case at least, symbolic interactionism facilitated the 
understanding of the communication conduct of organization-members. The technical 
infrastructure of the communication conduct was addressed, as well as the technological 
issues involved in facilitating or hindering the information exchange process during the 
communicative interactions of the organization-members. Finally, the pragmatic level 
offered a comparison between what the actors engaged in the emergency responses thought 
was happening and what actually took place (Mills 1963; Edgington et. al. 2004).  
 
 
Apart from the technician and the ex-senior officers of the HFC, no one else in the CCC 
knew that the software used by the recorder was not compatible with the technology used 
to operate the radio frequencies. Therefore, conversations from the time the new radio 
system was installed – in the summer of 2004, just before the 2004 Olympics – until the 
research began in April 2005, were not recorded. Previous conversations could not be 
researched because they were not electronically formatted but instead written on tape. In 
addition, there were no devices available to listen to this kind of tapes and most of the 
tapes were already destroyed due to inadequate storage. Luckily, the telephone 
communications amongst the participant fire-fighters in the emergency responses were 
recorded. Yet, not all telephone lines were recorded. The ones that had no tab on them 
were the telephone lines of the commander and the lieutenant commander of the CCC and 
therefore I could not examine the interactions in the higher layers of the command 
structure. This led me to think that the decision-making process is selectively scrutinized 
and accountability is selectively ascribed, when communication misconduct occurs. 
Moreover, the recorded material also gave me the option to study the discussions amongst 
CCC employees in the CCC. That is because, when the telephone receivers were not 
properly in place, they operated as microphones and kept on recording the conversations 
amongst the control personnel. This happened quite frequently.  
 
 
In the end, I examined ten cases, a total of 34 hours and 34 minutes. This time is net, 
without prolonged pauses and private conversations. At the same time, I read some of the 
incident reports in order to have a better understanding of the emergencies I selected to   25
examine. I also scrutinized the mobilization protocols that had to be followed so as to 
establish if they were applied or the reasons why they were overseen. In the latter case, I 
tried to arrange a number of interviews in order to verify my initial observations 
(Silverman 1995).  
 
 
c. Interviewing HFC personnel  
 
 
Interviewing HFC personnel became a complementary method (O’Reilly 2005) which I 
used to enrich or verify my observations and the results of my analysis of the recorded 
conversations. They served to compare how fire-fighting personnel thought they responded 
to emergencies with how the recorded conversations indicated they responded. The 
structure of the interviews depended on the content of the observations I intended to 
correlate and, thus, most of the time they were semi-structured. I now know that 
interviews, as a primary research method, would not have sufficed to examine 
communication processes as they only provide insight into the interviewees’ experiences 
of these processes (Oswick and Richards 2004; Samra-Fredericks 2004). In the fire-
fighting organizations there is little chance of assessing the extent to which interviewees 
are operationally experienced. A chief fire-officer of a U.S. fire service insightfully 
comments: “never assume anything. Some people may have 30 years of experience; others 
may have had only one experience repeatedly for 30 years” (Crane 2005: 89).  
 
 
The recordings provided me with the selection criterion of HFC interviewees. I chose to 
talk to more than twenty employees who were involved in the recorded cases that I 
examined: I used the incident as a starting point in order to discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of the response and continued conversing about the routines and practices of 
the organization. Moreover, the answers provided by the HFC personnel indicated the 
distance between their spontaneous reaction during the recorded emergency responses and 
their considered reaction during the interview. For example, in the recordings some 
operations’ employees depended on the control personnel in real time and were thankful 
for their contribution in the emergency response whereas during the interviews the same 
people stated that the control room’s role in the emergency response was secondary, or – as 
was the case with one of the interviewees – redundant. 
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However, interviewees were concerned with the recording device. There were three types 
of reactions towards the recording of the interview: first, there were those who despised the 
recording of the interview and made it quite explicit. Another group of interviewees 
claimed not to be bothered by the recording of the interview. There were two kinds of 
reactions within this group. Some of the interviewees commented on the recording device 
during the interview: “is this still running?”
5 To my reply on the fact that no names will be 
mentioned in the thesis, the reactions from this category of responders raised another 
interesting question: “I have nothing to fear from discussing these issues with you. 
[Anyway] this assignment of yours is going to be judged from an outside organization, 
isn’t that so?”
6 “I still have time before starting paying any price”
7 “Ah, I will be 
reassigned after this interview to serve to the borders.”
8 As soon as the interview began, 
others stared right into my eyes, a common reaction on the part of people who are giving 
television interviews and are advised as such in order to forget about the camera. This 
group of interviewees adopted a formal style of speech and a politically correct approach to 
the problematic issues faced during emergency responses, which aligned with the decisions 
made by the government. Yet, they would be blunt about those problems as soon as they 
thought they were told that the interview was over and therefore assumed that the 
recording process had ended. Finally, some of the interviewees did not seem to mind and 
spoke their minds. The interviewees’ reactions emphasized their fears with regard to their 
status in the organization if their opinions were exposed. Moreover, these reactions also 
pictured me as that person who could undermine their status. Once more, I was portrayed, 
albeit rather implicitly, as an outsider.  
 
 
Although interviews were a complementary method in the HFC, I soon discovered that, in 
some of the other fire and rescue services, they would be my primary source for 
understanding organizational behaviour (Burns 1977). This combination of research 
methods allows an ethnography of organizations, which is best known in organizational 
studies as Organizational Communication Culture (O.C.C.) designed to reveal the daily 
sense-making activities of organization-members (Bantz 1993; Johnson 1993; Pepper 
1995; Boyce 1996).  
 
  
                                                 
5 Fire-employee A, interview, April 2005. 
6 Fire-employee B, interview, May 2005. 
7 Fire-employee C, interview, May 2005. 
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4. A comparative research: The British Fire and Rescue Services 
 
 
In 2004, around the time I began my research, the 9/11 Commission Report was published 
in the US. The Report acknowledged the importance of first-responder organisations and 
the fact that whereas the police and the ambulance services had received much attention, 
fire-service practices had yet to be looked into. Furthermore, even though various disasters 
had emphasized problems such as preparedness and effective communication, cooperation 
and coordination, especially at the level of policy making, there was no existing, 
systematic, study of any of the European fire services, including efficient crisis 
management, with the exception of the Bain Report (2002) which served as the cornerstone 
for the modernization of the British Fire and Rescue Services (BFRSs). Yet, in what gets 
characterized as a risk society (Beck, 2002), fire services are crucial institutions. They are 
the first to respond to major disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, forest fires, problems at 
large chemical and oil factories, and, of course, terrorist attacks. These kinds of crises spill 
over from the local areas into the international arena, potentially claiming hundreds of 
thousands of lives and inflicting substantial environmental and financial damage to state 
and private property (Shrivastava et. al 1988; Smith 1990; Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort 
2001). So, I decided that designing a comparative research could allow substantial 
comparisons of the FRSs routines and practices on a European level.  
 
 
a. The initial encounters 
 
 
Whereas I already had a clear idea as to how to approach the Hellenic service I knew 
nothing about how fire services operated in the U.K. Once, while I was walking around in 
Glasgow, thinking about how I was going to approach the fire and rescue services in the 
UK, I literarily stumbled across one of the local fire stations. It appeared to be very quiet. I 
was tempted to ring the bell and pay them visit. Yet, my supervisor’s words were 
dominating my thoughts: “do not visit any of the fire services before you have a good idea 
about whether and how you are going to approach them or else you will contaminate your 
field.” However, I could not see how one visit could jeopardize an entire research project 
which was yet to be decided. And so, I rang the bell. However absurd, in retrospect, this 
was one of the best decisions I made. One of the on-duty fire-officers answered the door 
and as soon as I introduced myself, he let me in. I explained who I was and how I would be   28
interested in touring the facilities and have a brief conversation about how fire fire-fighting 
was organized in the UK. He agreed to show me around the station. We walked the 
training facilities, the offices, the garage where the fire trucks were docked, and the 
dormitories. The officer had some time on his hands, so we discussed about the rather 
prolonged series of strikes in 2002, the changes introduced in the fire and rescue services 
across Britain, the problems between the male and the female fire-fighters. I knew next to 
nothing about the reformation of the fire services and the relationship between the male 
and female fire-fighters made an impression on me. I always expected the BFRSs to have 
done away with the complications of having female fire-fighters in a predominantly male 
uniformed-organization. The officer talked about how whistleblowers had challenged the 
services’ attitude towards both fire-fighting personnel and ‘strangers’. It was an 
uncomplicated and very illuminating visit. I had a very good feeling about my being there. 
Yet I was rather unaware of the problems awaiting to emerge, as I tried to get permission 
to conduct my research in the BFRSs. 
 
 
A few days later, I was looking into the issues I had discussed with the fire-officer. I was 
reading about how the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) organized the strikes and how the 
negotiations between them and the government were conducted. I was also pondering the 
relationship between the male and the female employees. So I decided to start researching 
the organization through contacting the women’s representative in the FBU. I sent her an 
e-mail explaining who I was and what I was researching and she agreed to help me with 
my research. Before signing, she ended her response with the phrase “in unity”. I was 
rather struck by this expression for it was emotionally charged. I wondered why someone 
who was pursuing equality issues between fire service employees would sign: “in unity.” 
So I sent her another email not only to thank her for her support but also to ask why she 
would use such an expression. I must have insulted her in a way I was unaware of, for she 
never answered my calls or responded to my messages or the emails I sent her.  
 
 
This second approach was rather intimidating. If a representative of the union took offence 
in what I could only describe as cultural diversities between the Hellenic and the British 
services, and excluded my presence as a potential researcher of the BFRSs based on a 
simple query with regard to a communication practice, then I wondered whether his/her 
behaviour represented the usual practices of the union members; perhaps, it did. During the 
time I was researching the BFRSs, I wrote two formal letters addressed to the president and   29
vice-president of the union seeking to verify the validity of my data by requesting the 
union’s point of view. I cannot be sure whether these letters reached their destination or 
not, for they remained unanswered. After these initial encounters, I decided to concentrate 
on planning my research in the HFC. I allowed myself to be conveniently reassured by my 
supervisor that the fire and rescue services across the UK would respond promptly to my 
requests. I was yet to face some difficulties in accessing the BFRSs that not only delayed 
my fieldwork but, most importantly, challenged my commitment to my research. 
 
 
b. Attempting to access the BFRSs and to integrate in their routines 
 
 
After I finished gathering my data from the HFC, I started approaching some of the fire 
services in the UK. However, the various BFRSs reacted in different ways to my research 
request. The diversity of their responses led me to believe that there was not one unified 
“UK Fire Service”, as the Independent Review Committee maintained (Bain G., Lyons M. 
and Young A.: 2002: i), but locally organized services with diverse practices, at least on an 
administrative level. I will use acronyms for the services in order to avoid exposing these 
individuals who were very accommodating by allowing me access to observe their 
interactions. Hereafter, the acronym EFRS refers to the English Fire and Rescue Services, 
whereas the SFRS acronym is used to address the Scottish Fire and Rescue Services.  
 
 
Initially, I instigated correspondence with six BFRSs, requesting permission to be a 
participant observer of the organizations’ conduct. If I was granted such an extensive 
access in their daily conduct, I could request the examination of the recorded conversations 
during emergency responses, access documents and conduct interviews. Eventually, three 
Scottish and two English FRSs allowed me access; each of them to a different extent. 
Some allowed me to be a participant observer. Others allowed me to conduct a few 
interviews and denied me access to other archive material. The access allowed by the 
administration of each FRS I approached also affected the degree of my integration in the 
daily routines of their employees. Restricted access gave me very little chance of 
familiarising with the personnel. Hence, I was unable to establish myself as an insider and 
I remained someone who was simply doing research; someone who occasionally was 
taking up a FRS employees’ time to ask questions, forced interactions (Gergen and Gergen 
1981; Navrides 1994), as I was soon to discover. Whilst accessing the organizations, I   30
requested to interview individuals with specific qualifications and experience, in order to 
obtain an understanding about the various aspects of the organizations. I wanted my 
selection to favour “persons who are especially knowledgeable with regard to various 
activities and bodies of knowledge” (Pearsall in Filstead 1970: 346). Yet, the final 
selection of BFRSs’ employees was made predominantly by the administrations of these 
organizations. This I considered to be a manifestation of their intention to control as many 
aspects of my research as possible. So, I was not surprised when most of the BFRSs denied 
me access to their recorded conversations based on the Data Protection (Amendment) Act 
2003,
9 as well as some of their documents, such as emergency plans or incident reports, 
despite the fact that I committed myself to not disclosing any information that could 
potentially harm any of the individuals directly or indirectly involved in my research.  
 
 
These restrictions called for a reconsideration of my research methods. I realized then that 
a researcher needs to be flexible and reconsider or readjust the methods he/she intends to 
use the moment they appear to stop serving the purpose of the research. These reasons 
appear to depict the rationale of the organizations’ bureaucratic culture and the dynamics 
developed between myself and the organization.  
 
 
-  The SFRS-1  
 
 
So, for my first official approach the BFRSs, I needed sympathetic organization-members. 
That is one of the reasons why I decided to contact one of the Scottish services where a 
relative of my supervisor at the time was employed as an operational fire-fighter. This 
served as a starting point. My experience as a fire-fighter in the HFC had taught me that 
informal contacts were usually more effective than formal approaches. The SFRS-1 
employee acted as a liaison between the administration of the SFRS-1 and myself. He 
indicated that a formal letter should be addressed to the head of operations in order to 
process my request. The request would be submitted to the chief fire-officer who would 
make the final decision with regard to granting or denying me access to the service. 
Negotiations on this formal level were conducted promptly and within two weeks all the 
necessary arrangements for my six-day fieldwork were made. The second reason for 
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approaching the SFRS-1 was based on the fact that it is a large non-metropolitan fire and 
rescue service. A service of such size could offer relevant material.  
 
 
As soon as I arrived to the city where I would spend the following week, one of the fire-
officers on-duty came to “collect” me from the train station. The verb “collect” was used 
by fire-officers when picking me up and dropping me off at the fire station on their way to 
emergencies or training sessions. The use of this verb made me think that, to them, I was 
probably another task to process. The officer took me to the fire station where the 
necessary sleeping arrangements were made. I was accommodated in the fire-officers’ 
dormitories. As accommodating as these arrangements were, what I realized in retrospect 
is that I was isolated from the rest of the group, although no more than the fire-officers 
usually were. Whereas the fire-fighters were occupying the first floor of the station 
facilities, the fire-officers used the ground floor which had immediate access to the offices 
and the garage where the fire trucks were stationed. These arrangements underlined a 
status structure whereby fire-officers’ facilities in the fire stations were located next to the 
fire-engines’ garage, as if to enable the officers to display an exemplary promptness in 
responding to emergency alarms, by being provided with the opportunity to reach the 
appliances first. There was a similar rationale in the arrangements made in other fire 
stations as well as the Headquarters, where the fire-officers’ offices were always located on 
the top floor.  
 
 
On the next day, I was provided with office space and the necessary stationary. However, 
the office I was given was exactly opposite the chief fire-officer’s office and previously 
occupied by the deputy fire-officer. Both the fire-officers’ dormitory and the prestigiously 
located office were seen by the operations’ personnel as favourable treatment on the part of 
the administrative employees. This first came to my attention when, on the second day of 
my visit during tea time, one of the fire-fighters commented that I was affiliating with the 
people “next door”, as the operations’ employees usually referred to the senior 
administrative personnel. It was then that I realized that fire-fighters were not talking freely 
in my presence despite my efforts to fully participate in their daily routines. Before long, I 
detected that my behaviour was constantly scrutinized. When I missed taking my breakfast 
with one of the watches, one of the officers commented after seeing me exiting the 
dormitory only 30 minutes past breakfast-time: “This is not Greece. We start at 08:00 
o’clock, you know”, and while pointing at his watch he added with a bit of a smile: “You   32
are late.” In another case, when I missed joining another watch for tea-time, a fire-fighter 
remarked: “Are you fraternizing with the others next door?” I soon realized that in being a 
participant observer I was expected to fulfil a certain role. When I failed to respond to 
these expectations, I was reprimanded, albeit humorously. Often, I was not allowed to fail 
or, in other words, deviate from the role I had chosen to adopt. On one occasion, while 
sitting in one of the daily afternoon training sessions, watching the fire-fighters handling 
their climbing gear, in a somewhat relaxed state, one of the fire-fighters put the rope in my 
hand: “You are a fire-fighter, aren’t you? It’s your turn to do it.” “My turn”; this had never 
happened in the HFC, not even when we were receiving our basic training in the Fire 
Academy. However, in this case BFRS rules applied to everyone and training was 
everybody’s prerogative and obligation in order to achieve the degree of commitment 
necessary to develop trust amongst the organization-members. By the end of the research 
period, familiarity and acceptance were expressed by humorous remarks, such as: “So, 
which is your favourite watch?”  
 
 
This degree of integration, I believe, was not only the result of my managing my presence 
in the fire station. It was also the result of the administration’s decision to allow me access 
to the personnel’s routines. Although the administration of the SFRS-1 allowed me 
unlimited access to the fire station and headquarters’ (HQ) premises and provided me with 
a key-card to access the HQ so as to make sure that I attended to my own needs without 
constantly interrupting their daily routines, an incident temporarily impeded my efforts to 
integrate. One evening I attended a rescue operation launched due to a road traffic collision 
(RTC). During this emergency response, a fire-fighter came up to me and asked for my 
assistance. For security reasons I was wearing their uniform and the fire-fighter probably 
assumed that I was one of the retained personnel. Two things happened that made some of 
the fire-fighting personnel temporarily question my ability as a fire-fighter which in turn 
jeopardized my status as a researcher. First, I was unfamiliar with their tactics, their 
procedures and their terminology and, therefore, unable to assist. Second, the safety officer 
on-site approached us to explain that I should not participate in the operations. The 
awkwardness of the situation led to a realization that was confirmed during my visits to the 
BFRSs: first, the limits of the roles undertaken by organization-members were strictly 
observed and, second, I would not get away with being on the incident-grounds and 
looking at those who where labouring under strenuous circumstances. However different 
my role was assumed to be by the administrative personnel, in the fire stations or on the 
incident-grounds, I was not a researcher but a fire-fighter.   33
Interviews, casual conversations, listening to recorded dialogues during emergency 
responses, reading documents and the option of witnessing emergency responses were 
permitted on the grounds that I would not expose operations’ personnel to any danger or 
reveal information that would harm any of the individuals directly or indirectly involved in 
my research. All the fire-fighting and administration personnel had been informed in 
advance about my visit. Some of the higher-ranking officers offered to discuss with me. 
The chief fire-officer instigated a brief conversation, but as I had not specifically requested 
to meet with him, he could not grant me time for an interview. During the six-day period, 
numerous casual conversations took place with administrative and operations’ officers, 
control personnel, and fire crews. At the end of my visiting the SFRS-1, I was invited to 
revisit the station, if I considered it necessary.  
 
 
-  The SFRS-2 
 
 
I approached the SFRS-2 during the same time I started corresponding with the SFRS-1. 
The reason why I chose the SFRS-2 is that it is one of the largest fire and rescue services. 
Almost three months after I contacted the SFRS-2, the public relations officer requested 
that both my supervisor and I attend a meeting with three employees from the HQ: a senior 
operations fire-officer and two non-uniformed administrative employees. In essence, my 
supervisor and I were interviewed – before I was given the chance to interview – so that 
the SFRS-2 employees could decide whether and to what extent my accessing the 
organization would be allowed based on how the SFRS-2 would benefit from my research. 
As the PR officer put it: “We want to see what’s in it for us”.  
 
 
I was asked to submit a disclosure form, a formal letter from the HFC certifying my status 
as a fire-officer and, finally, put one of the SFRS-2 administrators in contact with one of 
the HFC fire-officers so that my status would be re-confirmed via telephone. I provided a 
list of names and contact numbers to facilitate the communication between the SFRS-2 and 
the HFC officers. Approximately two months after the meeting, the SFRS-2 had not 
replied as to whether permission was granted. When I re-contacted the SFRS-2, I 
discovered that they had sent an e-mail to the HFC using an address which was not 
included in the list I had provided. Consequently, no one from the HFC replied to the 
email. During our correspondence, I had explicitly mentioned that it is not typical for the   34
HFC personnel to establish communication via email and that the best communication 
avenue would be to call them. Moreover, the SFRS-2 personnel did not inform me about 
this breakdown in communication. Otherwise, I would have intervened in the process. I 
soon managed to establish contact between one of my supervising officers in the HFC and 
the administrator of the SFRS-2, who was appointed to see my research request through. 
Eventually, a telephone interview was set up, with me acting as a liaison between the 
SFRS-2 and the HFC.  
 
 
So, approximately six months after the SFRS-2 was approached, I received an email 
confirming that my requests were approved. When the second email arrived, I appreciated 
that I had to redefine the parameters of my research: participant observation, listening to 
the recorded conversations during emergency responses, and examining the emergency 
plans were denied. In addition, my liaison to the SFRS-2 requested that I sign an 
agreement according to which I was to disclose to the SFRS-2 any information I acquired 
during my interviews before I included it in my Ph.D. thesis. The existence of such an 
agreement explains why the SFRS-2 personnel did not object to my using the recorder, 
unlike what happened in the HFC. This I regarded as a very interesting development in my 
communication with the organization. I was an outsider whose intentions the SFRS-2 
administrative personnel considered wary from the very beginning of our interaction.  
 
 
Soon after our interview – meeting with the SFRS-2 personnel I was provided with a 
schedule titled: “ELPIDA_CHLIMINTZA_WORK_EXPERIENCE.”
10 However 
interesting my accessing the SFRS-2 may have been as an experience, it could hardly be 
considered as “work experience.” It felt like the organization was treating me like a trainee 
on her first day at work. Perhaps they were trying to slot me into the existing structure of 
social relationships, as they already had a place for ‘trainee’ but not for ‘researcher’, so this 
was how they tried to ‘integrate’ me and manage my presence. Nonetheless, it seemed that 
the SFRS-2 intended to create as much distance as possible between myself and the 
organization-members. That became clear when they refused to allow me to speak to some 
of the fire-fighters. The administration tried and managed to maintain my status as an 
outsider. As intensively as I tried to familiarize and identify with them during my visits in 
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the command and control centre, control personnel would not reciprocate my intentions. 
“So we have to watch what we are saying?” one of them asked me.
11  
 
During that same visit, which was one of the two visits I made to the command and control 
room, another interesting incident took place. According to the schedule that was issued 
and disseminated to these employees whom I would interview, my visits to the control 
room would last two hours. That evening, a few minutes before this period of two hours 
expired, the watch officer looked at his watch and commented upon the time left and if it 
was enough for me to conclude the conversation. I realized that it was time for me to leave. 
However, he did ask one of the employees on-duty to give me a lift home, commenting 
upon the lack of sensitivity on the part of the administration as to not making arrangements 
for my return given the late hours of my visit. During my second visit at the command and 
control centre, the watch manager appointed one of the control employees to stay with me 
in order to answer my questions with regard to the mobilization processes. However, she 
was instructed not to go into the details of the mobilization protocols. Due to this 
development, the continuous restrictions and my unsuccessful integration, I informed my 
liaison that I would not go to the third scheduled meeting with the command and control 
centre.  
 
 
The control personnel’s reluctance to familiarize with me can be justified on the grounds 
that the communicative interactions amongst organization-members during emergency 
responses are all registered in the command and control centre. Hence, the personnel are 
under constant and continuous scrutiny not only by the administration of the organization 
but also by the police. When investigating an incident in which the fire service is involved, 
the police usually requests the recordings from the control room – that is the recorded 
conversations between control and operations’ personnel and control employees and 
civilians – so as to examine the content of the information exchanged and how this 
information was assessed by the professionals in order to mitigate the consequences of the 
emergency.  
 
 
In contrast, operational fire-fighters are less preoccupied with denying access or 
obstructing integration as is the HQ personnel. Not being in the vicinity of the HQ or not 
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sharing the same routines with the HQ personnel, operations’ personnel have developed 
their own practices and have a different understanding of the everyday emergency conduct 
of the organization. Therefore, I was delighted when after being acquainted with some of 
the SFRS-2 operations’ personnel they decided to offer me the opportunity to witness a 
training session, which was not initially scheduled in my “work experience” programme. I 
also welcomed another four casual conversations. These conversations were instigated by 
operations’ personnel and were authorized by my liaison in the HQ. Generally, as is 
usually the case with high-ranking personnel, regardless of the post they occupy, their 
commitment to the formal conduct of the organization is stronger than the lower-ranking 
employees’, due to the career opportunities for advancement. Therefore they are less eager 
to expose the organization’s weaknesses.  
 
 
-  The EFRS-1 
 
 
I approached the EFRS-1 at approximately the same time as the SFRS-1 and 2. My choice 
was based on the fact that the EFRS-1 is one of the largest metropolitan fire and rescue 
services in the UK and has responded to major disasters. I thought it would be an 
invaluable experience to conduct research in such an organization. So, I requested to be a 
participant observer in one of the fire stations and listen to the recorded conversations 
during one major incident. After approximately ten months of negotiations, my request was 
denied. One of the most significant arguments during the negotiation period was that both 
my participation and the examination of the recorded conversations could potentially 
jeopardize the anonymity of the individuals involved and expose the organization. 
Eventually, the EFRS-1 granted me limited access to the organization’s conduct. They 
scheduled three interviews with a control supervisor, a non-uniformed employee and a fire-
officer, who were willing to provide me with an account of one of the latest incidents the 
service encountered. The control employee and the fire-fighter had prepared a detailed 
account of the events that occurred when the major incident took place. The non-uniformed 
senior member of the emergency management team had prepared a formal presentation 
that lasted almost as long as the interview was scheduled for. Therefore, I did not have 
much time for questions. Moreover, this employee was not prepared to answer any other 
questions except those concerning the incident. In addition, they all requested that the 
interviews would not be recorded. Both their structured narrations and their request 
virtually excluded me from actively participating in the interview process. Hence, it   37
appeared that I was provided with the information that the EFRS-1 intended to provide me 
with.  
 
 
However, there was an omission that made an impression on me. Although during the 
negotiation period it was made clear that I was not to be allowed to listen to the recorded 
conversations during emergency responses for security reasons, on the day of the 
interviews, I was not asked to provide any form of identification. The only form of 
identification I had supplied the EFRS-1 with was the formal letter of reference that the 
HFC had sent me, which I had attached to the initial letter I addressed to the service. The 
pattern behind accessing the services was beginning to feel very familiar. Both the SFRS-2 
and the EFRS-1, were large organizations with a history of ‘whistleblowers’ revealing 
misconduct in the organizations’ internal affairs, adopted a set of bureaucratic practices 
that impeded unconditional access to their stations and departments (Ruff and Aziz 2003). 
Both organizations also centralized and exercised control over their employees in order to 
scrutinize their interactions. 
 
 
-  The EFRS-2 
 
 
After encountering such difficulties in accessing the SFRSs and EFRS-1, I did not expect 
my endeavours with the EFRS-2 to succeed. The EFRS-2 was chosen on the grounds that 
in the past a couple of Greek fire-officers maintained unofficial contact with two EFRS-2 
employees they met during a conference. These connections proved invaluable. I submitted 
the research request to one of the two EFRS-2 officers, and within a few days, I was 
allowed to observe the communicative interactions between control and operations’ 
personnel.  
 
 
So, I visited the control room of the EFRS-2 and observed their interactions for three days 
before I came across, on a Saturday afternoon, one senior member of the control staff who 
was employed in the HQ. After thoroughly discussing my research with her, she suggested 
that I should visit the various departments in the HQ and get to know how the organization 
worked. By Monday morning, she had arranged a number of meetings with higher-ranking 
officers, personnel from other departments of the organization and a visit to one of the fire   38
stations. She also appointed me a guide who attended to all the details for my upcoming 
meetings and my visit to the EFRS-2 was prolonged from almost a week to eleven days. 
The administration was willing to contemplate my being a participant observer in one of 
the fire stations. However, as I was running out of time, I had to put an end to the 
negotiations.  
 
 
I stayed with the control personnel for five days. I was there in the morning and I did not 
leave the control facilities until late in the evening. The control employees seemed at ease 
with my presence and willing to answer my questions. The reason behind their friendliness 
lay in the fact that they considered it as an “honour” to attract “the interest of a person that 
does research and chose us. It is our first time.”
12 All EFRS-2 employees that I met talked 
to me about their tasks, the changes introduced in the fire services and how they affected 
both their personnel and their duties. Operations’ personnel welcomed me and most of 
them spent some time explaining how the fire station worked. They displayed their latest 
equipment and required after the HFC resources. Before I left the station, I was invited to 
participate in a volleyball game between the youngest and the older employees of the 
watch. They took pleasure in guessing my age in order to decide whether I belonged to the 
youngest or the older.  
 
  
As a participant observer in the EFRS-2, I realized that this research method facilitates the 
development of unanticipated dynamics. I also appreciated that bureaucratic processes may 
be as rigid as the interpretation of the organization-members allows them to be. Whereas 
the EFRS-2 is one of the largest non-metropolitan fire services, the administrative 
personnel attended to my every request despite the fact that they had very little time to 
come to terms with my presence there as a researcher.  
 
 
c. The efforts that did not flourish  
 
 
I approached the EFRS-3 in 2007, a year after one of the major incidents in the UK during 
the past five years. My request to access the EFRS-3 was denied by the service’s chief fire-
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officer who maintained that many of the EFRS-3 employees were involved in investigating 
the incident they encountered a year earlier and, therefore, were unable to accommodate 
me.  
 
 
Moreover, I tried to contact SFRS-3 via a contact of my supervisor. I believe that the 
reason for this unsuccessful outcome was that the contact was merely a fire-fighter low in 
the command structure. However, at a meeting with the chief inspector of the fire services 
in Scotland, I met an employee who put me in touch with a senior fire-officer in the SFRS-
3. He offered me the opportunity to conduct participant observation. However, the timing 
was unfortunate as my secondment from the HFC was almost over.  
 
 
5. An “out of the blue” development: Expanding my research to the Ludwigshafen 
Fire Brigade 
 
 
My approaching the Ludwigshafen fire Brigade (LFB) was a rather surprising 
development, mostly attributable to my supervisor at the time, who thought that because of 
my fairly good knowledge of German, I could include at least one German brigade in my 
research project. 
 
 
Before I approached a German fire brigade, my expectations were that the effort would 
fail. There were two reasons for my pessimistic assumption. First, there was no previous 
attempt made by the HFC to work with a German fire brigade on an operational level. 
Therefore, there were very few contacts established between Greek and German fire-
fighters. The second regarded the stereotypical notion that the German bureaucracy would 
be an impediment to conducting participant observation. I expected that the 
correspondence between the HFC, the University of Glasgow and any of the German fire 
brigades would be time-consuming and would exclude participant observation on the 
grounds of health and safety regulations, as was the issue in most of the BFRSs. Moreover, 
based on my experiences with one of the BFRSs, I expected that the data I collected might 
be censored.  
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The few German contacts that the representatives from the Fire-officers Union provided 
me with did not answer my formal letters and the emails that followed. I then decided to 
seek assistance from one postgraduate student from Germany I met when I joined the 
University. In one of our discussions, he mentioned that he used to be a volunteer fire-
fighter in Frankfurt and that he could mediate in case I wanted to expand my research in 
some of the German brigades. When I received no answer from the German contacts the 
union representatives had forwarded me, I turned to my acquaintance and asked whether he 
could arrange a meeting with one of the brigades he was in contact with. One of my 
acquaintance’s relatives was a politician in the state of Rhineland-Palatinate. She mediated 
and in less than a month the Ludwigshafen Fire Brigade (LFB) offered me an internship. 
Ludwigshafen is a city built by the river Rhine, near Frankfurt. It is considered a high risk 
zone due to the fact that BASF, the largest pharmaceutical company in the world, is 
located in that area. Within approximately three weeks, a schedule was set, confounding 
my initial expectations. No documents with regard to my identification were requested, and 
no disclosure forms were considered necessary.  
 
 
The LFB provided significant support for my research. Its administration was prepared to 
offer more than the opportunity to conduct participant observation. Unlike the HFC or the 
BFRSs, it incorporated me in the routines of the organization. The organization-members 
considered my attendance at the daily morning meetings with the senior officers of the 
organization and participation in fire fighting training sessions and emergency responses as 
self-evident. When senior fire-officers were on their way to meetings and our paths 
crossed, they always suggested that I join them. I was not considered merely as a “guest” 
but also as a professional fire-fighter, who would be able to attend to my own needs. I 
carefully cultivated this climate during my correspondence with the LFB, when I made 
clear that I had no intention of disrupting the routines of the organization.  
 
 
As soon as I arrived, I was asked to draft a brief note in order to inform all personnel about 
the nature of my visit to the LFB. On the administrative level, the research was conducted 
in an edifice that hosted the Headquarters, the CCC and the Hauptwache (HW: the Main or 
Central Station). Scheduled and non-scheduled meetings were attended, documents were 
examined, the CCC communication conduct was observed and casual conversations 
occurred on a daily basis during the morning and early afternoon hours.  
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However, language emerged as an impediment during my observing the communicative 
interactions between CCC and operations’ personnel. Whereas the language of the 
documents and most of the meetings was in High German, casual and informal 
communicative interactions were conducted in the local dialect. In order to overcome this 
obstacle, a fire-fighter was appointed to help me understand the language better.  
 
 
Contrary to any expectations, there was no existing schedule for interviews or activities 
especially planned for me. During the 21 days I spent in LFB I would put forward a request 
and the LFB would make an effort to address the request by arranging appointments. Visit 
to ADD (Aufsichts- und Dienstleistungsdirektion – Organization for emergency planning 
and management) the organization responsible for coordinating emergency responses on 
the level of the state of Rhineland-Palatinate and the BASF, one of the largest chemical 
industries, were arranged upon the aforementioned basis. 
 
 
On the operations level, the research was conducted in the Nordwache (NW, the North 
Station). As I was accommodated there, I joined the NW personnel for breakfast, training 
and incident responses during night-time. Consequently, I was acquainted with every fire-
fighter in all three watches and succeeded in establishing familiarity. This climate was 
further cultivated when I agreed to cook for one of the watches. Within a few hours, all 
fire-fighting personnel were informed about these arrangements and about the fact that 
every fire-fighter offered to assist. Furthermore, from that time on, the watch I cooked for 
was considered by all watches as “my watch.” This event indicated that both on the 
administrative and the operations level integration is accomplished through achieving the 
sentiment of belonging; watches required establishing belonging promptly and prior to 
engaging into emergency responses. In emergency situations where risk instigates fear, 
operations’ personnel need to have established trust so as to alleviate the uncertainty 
created by fear. Hence one has to be accepted as part of the team. 
 
  
The administrative and operations spheres appeared quite distinct and the dynamics of the 
relationships in each sphere varied. On the administrative level, the socialization processes 
occurred in a formal environment. Inclusion in the administrative procedures appeared to 
require positional similarity, behavioural reciprocity and verbally expressed respect   42
towards the chain of command. Inclusion based on positional similarity proved an almost 
automatic process based on credentials such as rank that seemed to make a greater impact 
and attributed a greater value than my presence as a researcher. I was only asked to respect 
“die Grenzen” (the boundaries), that is the behavioural and verbal constraints in the 
communicative interactions with organization-members, especially higher-ranking 
personnel. The comment that my guide made upon my first visit to the HQ before I met the 
chief fire-officer concerned the verbal expression of the forms of respect: “I have to ask; 
do you know the difference between du (you, singular form) and Sie (you, plural form)? 
After having spent more than two years in the UK I found the question rather alien to the 
routine I was used to. For a British fire-fighter, this question would sound awkward as they 
address each other by their first names. It took a few seconds to return to the Hellenic 
routines. For a Greek fire-fighter, the meaning of the question was self-explanatory, 
whereas the English language cannot provide an equivalent for these pronouns. They are 
both translated as “you.” Du is used informally to address a friend or a person one is 
familiar with. Sie is used to address a high-ranking officer or an individual one is not 
familiar with. It was the difficult pronunciation of my surname, along with my intention to 
create a climate of trust and familiarity, and my insisting upon being addressed by my first 
name that led the HQ officers to use my first name. Reciprocally, I was allowed to use 
theirs. Still, when addressing the chief fire-officer or his deputy I would use their 
surnames. This showed respect and respect reciprocates respect not merely as an abstract 
concept but as a determinate action. Respecting their practices was rewarded with trust and 
inclusion.  
 
 
In contrast, in the BFRSs, regardless of their ranks, organization-members were addressing 
each other by their first names so as to break down the old quasi-militaristic hierarchical 
structure, to create a friendlier working environment and to establish trust between 
organization-members. If I insisted on not addressing them on a first name basis, I would 
have undermined my efforts to create a climate of trust and, thus, inclusion. The only 
exceptions observed concerned older individuals, usually senior officers with a military 
background who offered to be addressed by their first name but appeared to enjoy being 
addressed by their surname. Furthermore, they enjoyed being addressed as “boss” or “sir” 
rather than their surnames. One of them made it explicit that being addressed as “boss” or 
“sir” created the right distance – “die Grenzen” – between the person whose role is to “give 
orders” and the person whose role is to execute these orders. 
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Unlike some of the other fire and rescue services, the LFB did not object to granting me 
permission to examine the recorded dialogues provided that I would not reveal the identity 
of the individuals holding the conversations. With the help of a fire employee the 
transcription and the translation of the recorded conversations was realized. However, in 
both the German and the Hellenic cases the translation of the recorded conversations for 
the purpose of researching the variations between the information exchange processes, 
appeared to be both challenging and daunting. The difficulty of translating lies in 
attributing meaning to the recorded conversations as retrieved from the archives and 
thereafter, transferring the meaning ascribed from one language into another to achieve a 
cross-cultural analysis of the researched material. The literal and metaphoric use of 
language, different in all three cases examined, may have made sense in the context of the 
FRSs independently but potentially hindered the inter-organizational communication 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Bachman and Palmer 1982). The use of signs, codes and 
systems within which signs are organized (Muller 2007) emerged as one of the most 
significant obstacles in establishing common patterns (Fiske 1990). For example, 
conversations amongst Greeks translated literally into English may have sounded 
ridiculous. Nevertheless, in their own context, they made sense of the organization’s 
environment and, occasionally, the information exchange process was effective. In order to 
address these difficulties, I found that conversation should first be examined in the 
language they had taken place before I was able to transfer the meaning into English. 
 
 
Unlike the socialization process on the administrative level, on an operations level the 
climate changes and formalities give way to familiarisation as the “watch culture” takes 
over. Comprised of fire-fighters, one or two sub-officers and an officer, the watch 
implicitly renounces the authority of the hierarchical system and engages in daily activities 
under the mere authority of an impersonal schedule that dictates their obligations. 
Inclusion in the dynamics of the watch requires both an interpersonal bonding as well as 
group interaction. Staging myself as “one of the team” took a lot of effort. Being accepted 
by the watch proved harder than being accepted by the administrative staff. The difficulties 
of interaction began on a verbal level during the necessary introductions. One of the watch 
officers in the NW introduced me as “a Greek colleague”; the officer of the second watch 
as “Madame from Greece”; the commanding officer of the third watch did not introduce 
me at all. I was put in the awkward position of introducing myself standing in front of 13 
men staring at me like an intruder. This, however surprising, was to become “my watch.” 
Although not apparent in the beginning inclusion in the watch had to do with my gender as   44
well as being an officer, a foreigner, an observer who would hardly understand their 
dialect.  
 
 
It was only gradually that the operations’ personnel in the NW started to get used to my 
presence. They started with not shutting the doors of their dormitories, asking questions 
concerning the nature of my job in Greece, the payment, and whether the PhD contributed 
to my career and finances. Quite a few of them would start inquiring where I was going 
when I was leaving the premises of the NW and why. They kept asking me whether I was 
following their conversations and whether I understood the jokes the fire-fighters were 
making. By the end of my visit, some attempted a physical contact in the form of a tap on 
the shoulder. Some of them commented: “next time you are here, you learn pfälsig [their 
dialect].”
13 On my last day I was properly greeted by “my watch” in a formal gathering 
where everyone saluted me and then most of them greeted me in an informal manner. In all 
my dealings with the watches, I was dressed in the Greek fire-fighters’ uniform just as they 
were dressed in theirs. In the few occasions that I appeared in my civilian dress, flirtation 
interfered with the interactions with the male employees which made me realize the thin 
line between familiarisation and over-familiarization.  
 
 
In the HW, the relations were similar. As I was not spending much time with them, when 
they invited me to a training session I accepted. Furthermore, I offered to assist with the 
preparations. It made quite an impression on them when, while they were looking for a 
knife to cut the ropes, I took a Swiss blade out of my pocket. They smiled and included me 
in the preparations while they started to converse with me. When the training session 
began, I was assigned to one of the units. So I started putting on my breathing apparatus 
(BA) which I hadn’t used for more than three years. The rustiness in my moves 
immediately triggered the team’s awareness: they assisted me with putting on the BA, as 
soon as I exited the training area. 
 
 
To me, the LFB experience was invaluable. Not only because I felt that was my presence 
there was appreciated, but also because I was given the opportunity to train after being 
operationally inactive for more than three years. The LFB employees were constantly 
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asking me about the progress of the research, the methods I used, and the results of my 
analysis. They implicitly raised a slight concern when they inquired whether I would like 
someone from the LFB to proofread those parts of the thesis that concerned their service. 
They also expressed an interest in obtaining the results of my research. 
 
 
6. Revisiting some of the services 
 
  
When I returned to the HFC after almost four years of absence, I went to the fire chief’s 
office, to report back on-duty, as is customary. Nonetheless, I did not wear my uniform, as 
I needed at least a week to make a new one. I thought that it would not be an issue if I 
presented myself wearing a simple suit. My judgement failed me. I was received with very 
little enthusiasm and I was asked nothing with regard to what I had done during my 
absence. After only thirty seconds I was out of the fire chief’s office again. His deputy saw 
me standing there and invited me into his office to chat about the summer 2008 forest fires. 
As soon as I had left the deputy’s office, I heard from some of the officers, that the fire 
chief reprimanded me in my absence with regard to not wearing a uniform. They were 
even smiling when they narrated the story about how displeased the chief was. I was 
overwhelmed with disappointment. I still have not written a report about what I have 
learned during these four years of absence. I still haven’t been asked for one. The only 
thing I have been asked for is to provide a form from the university stating that I have 
concluded my course; otherwise, demotion is inevitable.  
 
 
As to the LFB, I revisited the brigade almost a year after I conducted my research there. I 
was invited to attend the festivities the city of Ludwigshafen organized to celebrate the 60, 
45, 20 and 10 years of friendship between Ludwigshafen and the cities of Pasadena 
(California), Lorient (France), Dessau and Antwerpen (Belgium), respectively. During 
these festivities, I had the chance to meet many of the volunteer fire-fighters. It was during 
those three days that I had some very interesting conversations with them with regard to 
their status in fire-fighting operations. They described how some of the professional fire-
fighters were not pleased about volunteers assisting the professionals as, according to the 
professional fire-fighters, volunteers had little training and experience. What I had 
observed during my fieldwork was that, regardless of their experience, the training of the 
volunteer fire-fighters was of the same standards as the professionals.    46
I did not have the chance to revisit the BFRSs. However, the HM chief inspector of the 
SFRSs offered me the opportunity to shadow the audits of the Scottish services in the 
summer of 2008. During the two days that I joined the auditors, merely as an observer, I 
had the chance to experience how the operational preparedness of the fire-fighters and the 
administrative competency to address the current needs in emergency planning and 
promote community safety were assessed. I also appreciated why it took some time with a 
few of the BFRSs personnel to come to terms with my presence in the services. I was 
probably seen as another auditor. My suspicions were confirmed when one of the senior 
fire-officers of the SFRS-2 I had interviewed made a humorous remark about whether 
there was a chance of my intervening so the auditors would give the service a good report.  
 
 
Although I did not manage to conduct the research as I had initially planned, I was given 
opportunities to make a record of the communicative interactions amongst fire-fighting 
personnel during emergency responses and periods of equanimity as well as between 
members of the FRSs and myself. The comparisons and contrasts of the patterns of 
interaction provided me with material that helped me to establish the practices of the 
organizations.  
 
 
7. Reflections on conducting field research 
 
 
Throughout the thesis, the HFC introduced a puzzle. As a bureaucratic organization, the 
Hellenic Fire Corps should follow a certain code of practice. However, a series of events 
indicated inconsistency between the letter of the law and the actual practice. For instance, 
my labour to gain access to the recorded conversations could have failed if the commander 
of the control room had not have been favourably disposed towards my research project. 
Moreover, the episodes examined indicate that phenomena such as patronage, favouritism, 
and clientelism affect the attitudes of organization-members both on and off the incident-
grounds. Could the social, political and cultural background endorse such relationships?  
These issues upon which I shall reflect in the concluding chapter of the thesis influenced 
my perspective as a researcher. 
 
   47
Moreover, what puzzled me the most was that no matter how hard I tried to avoid 
mistakes, I kept on making them. My greatest mistake was that I took many things for 
granted and made assumptions based on either stereotypes or how other researchers and 
academic commentators had experienced cross-cultural research. One of the false 
assumptions I made in the beginning of the research was that I idealized the structure and 
conduct of the BFRSs and the LFB but because of my initial negative disposition towards 
the HFC.  Especially in the Hellenic case, I struggled to maintain the fine balance between 
objectivity and subjectivity, detachment and involvement, attributes which, according to 
Bruyn, make for a good participant observer (Bruyn in Filstead 1970: 306, 307). In the 
process of accessing the fire and rescue services and integrating in their routines, I learnt 
how to cope with the role of the participant observer. I realized that the degree to which the 
researcher integrates with the everyday surroundings of the organization-members depends 
on the researcher’s own attributes, the participants’ intention to allow the integration and 
the dynamics developed between the researcher and the participants. When I started to 
respect this balance, I began to avoid some of the mistakes I had previously made.  
 
 
Gradually I realized that the way in which the organizations reacted to my approach 
expressed the rationale of their procedures, practices and routines. The degree of 
accessibility appeared tightly coupled with the extent of my integration into the everyday 
conduct of the organization-members. That is because the administration of the 
organization introduced me to the rest of the personnel in a specific way that set limitations 
as to how I could stage myself in when trying to integrate their routines.  
 
 
My routine and choices showed me that, sometimes, spontaneous actions have a happier 
ending than a calculated approach. A calculated approach bears a set of expectations. So, 
what may seem as a well-thought-out plan may raise the hopes and expectations of the 
researcher. Yet, when it fails, the researcher experiences a disappointment that challenges 
his/her commitment to their project. However, a spontaneous act may favour both the 
researcher and the subject of the research as it allows a more relaxed approach. To 
paraphrase Robert Merton’s “serendipity pattern” (in Filstead 1970: 284), the spontaneous 
may surprise the researcher with unexpected data that can enrich and validate the research 
process. The methodology I chose was flexible enough to enable me to improvise. 
Improvisation, I found, was not only a merit in emergency responses but also a significant 
advantage in methodological approaches. Improvising proved useful when I did not know   48
what to do next and, thus, broke grounds for innovation. Before I accepted to play 
volleyball with the EFRS-2 fire-fighters, the commander of the fire-station had asked me if 
I was interested in having a chat with him about how the fire-personnel conduct emergency 
operations. I only had time for the game or for the chat. If I had decided to chat with the 
commander, I would have missed the opportunity to witness that during the game, my 
team-members were trying to avoid passing the ball on to me unless it was absolutely 
necessary. I was invited to play, probably out of courtesy, but I was not trusted enough to 
be a part of the team. When we lost the game, they hardly addressed me. That game 
offered me a unique opportunity to discover how the subjects of the research dealt with the 
presence of the researcher. Rather surprisingly, serendipity helped define how I 
approached the findings of my research. 
 
 
8. Structure of the thesis 
 
 
The chapters that follow address the communication conduct among fire-fighters during 
emergency responses in Greece, Britain and Germany. These are preceded, in Chapter 1, 
by an examination of how fire-fighting personnel dealt with two emergencies of 
catastrophic proportions in the United States, where I have relied only on documentary 
evidence. The two emergencies: 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, because of their severity, 
offer valuable transcript material and serve to throw light on the European situations. 
Ultimately, of course, my aim is to understand better the situation of the Hellenic Fire 
Corps for theoretical and practical purposes. Chapter 2 describes the five Hellenic episodes 
selected to indicate the communication practices of the Greek fire-fighters during those 
emergency responses. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provide an analysis of the communication 
conduct among HFC organization-members on and off the incident-grounds. Chapter 3 
focuses on the role of the incident commanders and on how their decisions affect the 
actions taken on-site. In chapter 4, I investigate how the rest of the participant actors 
interact during emergency responses and in chapter 5 I provide a brief overview of how 
information is managed within the command and control centre of the HFC and between 
the CCC and the operations’ personnel. Chapter 6 and 7 discuss the routines and the 
communication practices of the various BFRSs investigated and the LFB, respectively. 
Finally, in the conclusion I interweave the empirical data with theory on organizations, and 
briefly recapitulate the main points made in the preceding chapters.   49
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
CASE STUDIES FROM THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
The 9/11 and the Katrina emergency responses comprise two dramatic crises of huge 
proportions (Kellner 2002). The extreme nature of these cases helps shed light on the 
problems that surface in emergency communication among first-responder organizations. 
Some of the communication problems identified in the 9/11 and the Katrina responses are 
similar to the Hellenic, the British and the German cases; others differ. As will become 
evident from the chapters that follow, these differences in the communication practices are 
due to the cultural differences of the organizations investigated (Grimshaw 1979). 
Comparing the 9/11 with the Hellenic, the British and the German cases, will enable our 
learning from one system and facilitate our effort to apply what we have learned to another 
(Dallmayr 2005; Parker and Stern 2005).  
 
 
1.1. The 9/11 emergency response 
 
 
However tragic, the World Trade Centre (WTC) terrorist attacks offered a unique 
opportunity to study the response of the New York Fire Department (FDNY), amongst 
other responder organizations, to such a large-scale crisis. On the 22
nd of July 2004, the 
Committee commissioned by the US government to investigate the causes of the 9/11 crisis 
as well as the emergency response, published 41 recommendations in a Report that looked 
into the public sector’s infrastructure weaknesses that had led to the loss of 2,823 people in 
the collapse of the WTC. The 9/11 Commission Report was one of two reports to 
thoroughly examine the weaknesses of the fire department as well as the problematic 
nature of the cooperation between first-responder organizations. The other was the 
McKinsey and Company Report, based on research that was conducted at the FDNY 
request.  
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1.1.1. The 1993 response to the terrorist bombing of the WTC complex 
 
 
The 9/11 bombing was the second attack on the WTC. The first took place in 1993, when 
six people were killed and more than 1,000 injured by a 1,500 pound bomb detonated on a 
parking garage ramp underneath the Twin Towers. The blast caused the Towers to lose 
power and communications capability. The generators shut down and the elevators 
stopped. The emergency lighting system failed and the stairwells filled with smoke. The 9-
1-1 emergency centre was overwhelmed. The FDNY radio signals could not penetrate the 
steel and concrete floors of the buildings and all communications were conducted from one 
channel (Lipton 2004). The evacuation protocols failed because of variations every time a 
drill took place (Staff Statement No. 14 2004). These were the problems that the Port 
Authority, responsible for the complex’s safety, and the FDNY had to encounter whilst 
responding to the emergency (Kean et al. 2004). 
14  
 
 
A year later, the issue of the first-responder organizations communicating in the Towers 
was addressed. The Port Authority, responsible for the security of the WTC, decided to 
move the repeater (a device that enhances the radio signals) from their offices located in 
WTC5 to the lobby of each of the Twin Towers, so the FDNY could be wholly responsible 
for its operation (Port Authority Memorandum 2003). In 1996, an attempt was made to 
address the problem of the first-responder organizations cooperating on the incident-
grounds. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani put together the Mayor’s Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM) so as to improve the city’s overall response, especially to major crises 
(OEM Biennial Report 2007). OEM assumed responsibility for the planning and conduct 
of exercises and drills involving multiple city agencies. One of its main tasks was to 
monitor the city’s key communication channels and radio frequencies of the NYPD and the 
FDNY. Despite the objections that some of the city officials raised with regard to the risks 
entailed in placing the HQ of such an important organization somewhere in the WTC 
complex the headquarters of OEM were located in the WTC7 (Kean et al. 2004).  
 
 
In July 2001 the Mayor’s Office updated the “Direction and Control of Emergencies in the 
city of New York” so as “to eliminate conflict amongst emergency organization in areas of 
                                                 
14 See also ‘First strike: Global terror in America’, 26/02/2008.   51
overlapping responsibilities” (Kean et al. 2004: 284-285). This attempt indicated a pre-
existing problematic relationship among actors, such as first-responders, whose 
cooperation is essential in mitigating a crisis (Janis and Mann 1977; Thomas 1992; Tidwell 
2001). In the same directive, a typology of crises was offered in order to indicate the 
organization that would serve as the incident commander in each case. Despite this 
directive, “the NYPD and the FDNY each considered itself operationally autonomous. As 
of September 11, they were not prepared to comprehensively coordinate their efforts in 
responding to a major incident. The OEM had not overcome this problem” (Kean et al. 
2004: 285). 
 
 
1.1.2. The 9/11 response to the attacks of the WTC 
 
 
On the 11
th of September, from 08:46, when the first plane hit the North Tower, until 
10:29, when the Tower collapsed, the FDNY encountered a series of problems both on a 
technical and organizational level that ultimately contributed to the death of 343 fire-
fighters, amongst the 2,823 fatalities, during the collapse of the WTC1 and WTC2.
15  
 
 
Radio frequencies were scarce and congested,
16 emergency lighting systems were 
deactivated and the 9-1-1 emergency centre was congested by the number of incoming 
calls mostly from civilians trapped in the Twin Towers. The incapacity to facilitate all 
these calls was further hampered by the lack of existing protocols as to how to advise the 
civilians who were trapped in the WTC. According to standard operating procedures, the 
9-1-1 operators receive calls and depending on their context they forward the information 
to the FDNY or the NYPD dispatchers. Due to the unprecedented nature of the event, the 
9-1-1 operators did not know how to assess the incoming information, who to contact 
about that information and which channels to use in order to disseminate the information 
(Kendra and Wachtendorf 2003; Lewis 2009). The advice the majority of the 9-1-1 
operators provided to the civilians was to stay low, to remain at their place and to wait for 
the emergency responders. Some 9-1-1 operators, however, deviated from the outdated, 
existing protocols, and advised civilians to evacuate the WTC. The civilians who were 
unable to reach 9-1-1 evacuated the compromised complex. Others experienced the 
                                                 
15 See also the Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Centre Building 2008. 
16 ‘Heroes or victims? The role the fire-fighters really played.’ The Guardian, 18/02/2008.   52
indecisiveness of the 9-1-1 operators and their reluctance to assume responsibility for 
assessing the significance of a piece of information and promptly forwarding it to the 
appropriate units of responders:  
 
 
I told them when they answered the phone where I was that I had passed 
somebody on the 44
th floor injured –they need to get a medic and a stretcher to 
this floor and described the situation in brief and the person then asked for my 
phone number or something and they said they put me on hold. “You gotta talk to 
one of my supervisors” and suddenly I was on hold. And so I waited a 
considerable amount of time. Somebody else came back on the phone, I repeated 
the story. And then, it happened again. I was on hold a second time and needed to 
repeat the story a third time. But I told the third person that I am only telling you 
once. I am getting out of the building, here are the details, write it down and do 
what you should do. (Kean et al. 2004: 295) 
 
 
This was the testimony of one of the civilians that managed to evacuate one of the Towers 
that morning. He had called 9-1-1 in order to give a piece of information and had to repeat 
the same information three times. It is evident that 9-1-1 operators were unable to assess 
the importance of the incoming information since they seemed to be lacking the basis of 
such an assessment. Moreover, they were not told that roof top rescues had been ruled out 
and kept on advising civilians who were above the impact floors to remain in their places 
(Kean et al. 2004).  
 
 
The function of the emergency systems, such as the emergency lighting, was partially 
affected by the structural damages inflicted to the constructions. After the South Tower 
was hit at 09:03, the stairwells had gone dark and the evacuation of the civilians trapped in 
the building was delayed. Furthermore, the repeaters installed in the lobby of each of the 
Towers to secure communications capability in the high rise, concrete and steel 
environment of the contractions seemed to be inoperable at the time (Kean et al 2004; 
McKinsey Report 2002).  
 
 
There is an interesting difference here between the 9/11 Commission Report and the 
McKinsey Report, involving a shifting of responsibility from the FDNY – responsible for 
the maintenance of the repeater and the training of the personnel – to the employees who 
operated the repeater on the day. The former report states that the repeater in the North   53
Tower worked partially. It facilitated the transmissions from the portable radios but in 
order to be fully operable and support all frequencies used by the organizations involved in 
the response, another button was needed to be pressed by the fire and rescue personnel. 
This omission indicated that the fire-fighting personnel were either lacking the training to 
operate essential equipment or neglected to check the repeater due to stress (Kean et al. 
2004). The report also emphasized that even the repeater in the South Tower that was 
functioning properly was eventually shut down because the majority of the crews operating 
in the building were not informed that they had to use channel 7 of the repeater in order to 
be able to communicate (Kean et al. 2004). However, according to the McKinsey Report 
(2002), on the morning of the 9/11, the repeaters were not functioning.  
 
 
The major difference between the two reports on this question underlines the possibility 
that the fire-fighting personnel did not know how to operate essential equipment that 
would secure communications capability and continuity within a high risk environment. 
This inoperability led to further utilisation of a tactical channel that resulted to its being 
congested. Due to this congestion, the communication between the chief from the staging 
area located initially in the lobby of the North Tower and the units that were operating in 
the building became fragmented and therefore problematic: some of the operations’ units 
acknowledged and returned the signals, others acknowledged but were unable to return, 
others transmitted but did not acknowledge and the rest just experienced a constant noise 
due to radio traffic congestion. 
  
 
This congestion along with the lack of a Mobile Command Unit (MCU) that would receive 
all information through the various frequencies, assess and disseminate them resulted in an 
unreliable emergency communication conduct. For instance, the information that 100 
people were trapped on the 105 floor of the North Tower never reached the personnel in 
the lobby. Although a command and control van was placed on the scene, it was not the 
primary one, which on that day was in the garage for repairs and the backup was lacking 
the capability of supporting such a major incident (Kean et al. 2004).  
 
 
That morning the overall command of the fire and rescue operations was assigned to the 
chief fire-officer (CFO) of the FDNY. Tactical decisions were made by the commanders in 
the lobby of each of the Twin Towers. The highest-ranking officer was responsible for   54
communicating with the CFO. However, the command structure was unprepared to 
manage such a major crisis, especially after the CFO was killed when the WTC1 collapsed 
at 10:29. The high-ranking officers were assessing a critical situation with little or no 
information. A higher-ranking fire-officer claimed that “people watching TV certainly had 
more knowledge of what was happening a 100 floors above us than we did in the lobby” 
(Kean et al. 2004: 298). The FDNY incident commanders did not know the impact floors; 
the state of the stairwells; if there were adequate water supplies on the impact floors; what 
the behaviour of the fire due to the vast amount of jet-fuels was; what the outside view of 
the impact zone was. Seeing the impact zone from outside the compromised buildings, 
could have shaped the perception of the incident commanders, who were the actual 
decision makers, in such a way as to evacuate the Twin Towers immediately after the 
impact. That never happened. On the contrary, during the de-briefing held by the 9/11 
Commission, there was confusion as to the time the evacuation processes were initiated 
(Kean et al. 2004).  
 
 
Information was not only poorly disseminated but its content was also distorted. At least 
one call was placed by a civilian to the 9-1-1 emergency centre at 09:37, almost 22 minutes 
before the South Tower collapsed. The civilian told the 9-1-1 operator that the 90- 
something floor was collapsing. Fifteen minutes later, the operator forwarded that 
information as “the 106 floor is crumbling” (Kean et al. 2004: 304). A crucial piece of 
information that an upper floor was collapsing was processed 15 minutes after it was 
logged in the 9-1-1 centre, and misinterpreted. That is a very long period considering first 
the fact that the WTC complex had already been hit twice and second, that the existing 
technical communication difficulties inevitably slowed down the process of forwarding the 
information to the incident commanders. Moreover, information was forwarded to the 
operations’ units via incorrect channels: it was transmitted through the radio frequencies 
used in the precincts near the Twin Towers and the Special Operations Division but not via 
the congested citywide channel-1, which was the channel the incident commanders were 
using. Nevertheless, this was not the only time that information was forwarded via 
incorrect radio channels. As soon as the South Tower collapsed, an FDNY boat from the 
Manhattan River communicated this information immediately using the Manhattan 
dispatch channel. But all command posts, i.e. the command post and the communications 
van, had already been abandoned. Hence no one seemed to be listening at the other end of 
the radio.   55
The misuse of the radio frequencies revealed an organizational problem stemming from 
lack of training and the absence of standard operating procedures. Some of the higher-
ranking officers identified the problem and temporarily tried to transmit any significant 
information via more than one channel in order to get through to as many first-responders 
as possible. At least one of the incident commanders ordered the evacuation instructions 
via more than one channel, and at least three fire-fighters heard them as well as the 
information about the imminent collapse. The ones that did not hear the evacuation order 
were those whose radios were not functioning properly due to the height of the Towers; the 
ones that heard were listening on the tactical channel which was congested; the off-duty 
personnel that were not carrying radios and the re-dispatched to the South Tower fire-
fighters, who were listening on another frequency (Kean et al. 2004; McKinsey Report 
2002).  
 
 
Two minutes before the South Tower collapsed, an EMS paramedic approached the CFO 
and told him that an engineer in front of the WTC7 remarked that the Twin Towers were in 
imminent danger of collapse (Kean et al. 2004: 302). But according to the McKinsey 
Report (2002: 9), “some potentially important information on the structural integrity of the 
building never reached the incident commander.” This random information reached at least 
one of the incident commanders. At least one other incident commander falsely assumed 
that the North Tower was unlikely to collapse because the plane did not hit the corner of 
the building as had happened with the South Tower (Kean et al. 2004). None of the FDNY 
higher-ranking officers anticipated the entire collapse of the WTC towers. Deprived of an 
overall image of the incident, the commanding officers failed to re-group and re-deploy 
their resources on the incident-grounds.  
 
 
Throughout the 9/11 emergency response the command structure remained unclear. This 
fact resulted in the mismanagement of personnel and resources. At 08:49, in the intact 
South Tower, in a communication with his North Tower counterpart the deputy fire safety 
director said that he would not order an evacuation procedure until he heard “from the 
boss, from the fire department or somebody” (Kean et al. 2004: 287). The order to 
evacuate the South Tower was issued at 08:57. This lack of initiative may have jeopardized 
a number of lives that morning. In crises, initiatives are essential. The existing procedures 
cannot always foresee all aspects of an emerging crisis and provide instructions as to how 
emergency responders should react (FDNY Operational Procedures 1999). The diversity   56
of crises as well as the different types of organizations responding to them cannot always 
be bridged by a superfluous number of protocols nor can professionals retain and recall a 
vast amount of information during their responding to an overwhelming situation. 
 
  
On that morning, the lack of commanding officers to instruct the operations’ units on-site 
contributed to the death of a number of fire-fighters. Just before the collapse of the North 
Tower, a number of fire-fighters found themselves in the lobby of the building. They had 
received no instructions. Some of their colleagues who had heard about the collapse of the 
South Tower informed them about the evacuation orders issued. However, in the process 
of evacuating the Tower, they lost their lives. Others were killed when, convinced by some 
of their colleagues, they decided to re-ascend in order to locate fire-fighting personnel 
missing in action. At least one fire-fighter heard the order on the radio and responded “we 
are not fucking coming out” (Kean et al. 2004).  
 
 
Overall, the management of the available personnel and resources proved to be rather 
problematic: in those 17 minutes, after the North Tower was hit and before the South was 
attacked, 1,000 first-responders were deployed. The question of citywide coverage was not 
raised until after the second Tower was hit. After the second attack, the mobilization 
escalated. More units were requested and the FDNY dispatchers directed the dispatched 
units to report to the staging area which some units failed to do and went directly to the 
incident-grounds. As a result, those units were lacking the essential information to carry 
out their tasks. 
 
 
After the South Tower was hit, the mobilization increased. More units proceeded on-site 
when fewer were requested (Kean et al. 2004: 297). Self-dispatched units proceeded on the 
rescue-grounds to take part in heroic deeds (Schulman 1996). Since the attacks took place 
during a tour-change, the fire-fighters that were supposed to be off-duty joined the ones on 
duty. Off-duty officers were appearing on the rescue-grounds and so did fire-fighters who 
lacked a predetermined role. They were responding to the South Tower. Some went to the 
North Tower because they couldn’t distinguish between WTC1 and 2. The Brooklyn units, 
dispatched to the South Tower at 09:37, showed up at the Marriot Hotel. Both these cases 
once more emphasized the lack of training. Others couldn’t find the staging area for the 
South Tower. In addition, jumpers and debris caused some units not to reach the tower   57
from the main entrance but to find alternative entrances. Moreover, some fire-fighters 
separated from others due to the heavy personal equipment and fatigue. Overall, the FDNY 
couldn’t coordinate and account for its personnel. 
 
 
Inter-organizational coordination proved rather problematic. The first-responder 
organizations involved in the rescue operations were the OEM, the FDNY, the NYPD, the 
PAPD as well as the 9-1-1 personnel. After the first Tower was hit, the OEM contacted 
FEMA to ask for five federal urban search and rescue teams. OEM officials did not assume 
the command of the emergency response, contrary to procedures. Moreover, 9-1-1 calls 
were forwarded to the NYPD instead of the FDNY. So the FDNY, acting as the incident 
commander, did not receive essential information with regard to organizing, launching and 
coordinating the response. The responder organizations did not share information due to 
technical reasons or due to lack of a common practice designed and developed prior to the 
emergency, for example in the form of joint training (Staff Statement 13 2004). 
  
 
During the response at the Pentagon, on the same day, the first-responders’ organisations 
intervention was well coordinated. The Incident Command System operated effectively, 
there was a unified command and since they had been having joint exercises and prior 
experience working together the professional relationship between the first-responders was 
based on trust. Moreover, the fact that they did not have to operate 100 ft above ground 
contributed to the smooth development of the operations (Wood and King 2002).  
 
 
1.2. 9/11 emergency communication: The NORAD recordings 
 
 
The North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) is a military organization 
responsible for protecting the North American airspace; the Northeast Air Defence Sector 
(NEADS) is the regional headquarters for the NORAD. The short section that follows 
shows how the U.S. Air Force responded on 9/11. Michael Bronner reconstructed the 
chaotic military history of that day based on the 30 hours of never-before-released tapes 
from the control room of NORAD's Northeast headquarters, in an article published in the 
Vanity Fair magazine (August 2006). Here, I analyze some of the conversations that took   58
place that day in order to establish common patterns between the following communication 
conduct and the communicative interactions examined throughout the rest of the thesis. 
 
 
On the morning of the 11
th of September 2001, at 8:54 a.m., controllers at Indianapolis 
Centre lost radar contact with American 77, flying from Washington Dulles to LAX, and 
assumed the plane had crashed because they weren't aware of the attack in New York. 
Even though they soon realized that this was another hijacking and sent warnings up the 
Federal Aviation Administration (F.A.A.) chain, no one called the military; it was only by 
chance that NEADS got the information when one of their personnel contacted the 
Washington Centre. The following conversation took place between the NORAD 
personnel and the Boston Centre, which is the civilian air-traffic-Control facility that 
manages high-flying airliners in the wider area of New York City (Bronner 2006): 
 
 
1 NORAD  It's the inbound to J.F.K.? 
2 BOSTON  CENTRE  We - we don't know. 
3 NORAD  You don't know where he is at all? 
4 BOSTON  CENTRE  He's being hijacked. The pilot's having a hard time 
talking to the… I mean, we don't know. We don't know 
where he's goin' […] We have no idea where he's goin' 
or what his intentions are. 
5 NORAD  If you could please give us a call and let us know - you 
know any information, that'd be great. 
6 BOSTON  CENTER  Okay. Right now, I guess we're trying to work on - I 
guess there's been some threats in the cockpit. The 
pilot… 
7 NORAD  There's been what?! I'm sorry. 
8 UNIDENTIFIED  VOICE  Threat to the […] ? 
9 BOSTON  CENTER    We'll call you right back as soon as we know more info.
 
 
The failing of the telecommunications infrastructure was hardly the only or the most 
significant reason why essential information with regard to the 9/11 or the hurricane 
Katrina emergencies was poorly disseminated (Argenti 2002). The NORAD recordings 
indicate that the nature of the communication conduct among organizations was a far more 
significant factor in mismanaging the emergency response. Inconsistent narrations (4, 6), 
incoherent information (2, 4, 6, 9) randomly disseminated (8) and acquired by those 
interested not purposefully but due to a pattern of serendipity, the lack of verification with 
regard to the content of pertinent information (8), prolonged pauses (4, 6), overlapping (8,   59
9) and superfluous repetitions are a cross-cultural characteristic in the communication 
conduct among organization-members participating in emergency responses, as we shall 
see in the chapters to follow.  
 
 
Confusion is the result of the “unanticipated” character of an emergency and the cause of 
incomprehensible narrations, inconsistent and unverified information:  
 
 
Example A: 
10 NORAD1 Is this explosion part of that that we’re lookin’ at now on TV? 
11 NORAD2 Yes. 
12 NORAD1 Jesus… And there's a possible second hijack also, a United Airlines... 
13 NORAD2 Two planes? 
14 NORAD1 Get the fuck out… 
15 NORAD2 I think this is a damn input, 
17to be honest.  
 
 
Example B: 
16 NORAD1  What? 
17 NORAD2  Whoa! 
18 NORAD1  What was that? 
19 NORAD2  Is that real-world? 
20 NORAD1  Real-world hijack. 
21 NORAD2  Cool! 
 
 
Example C: 
22 NORAD  Is this real-world or exercise? 
23 BOSTON  CENTER No, this is not an exercise, not a test. 
 
 
The unexpected is difficult to penetrate the daily routines and practices of the organization-
members (12, 14, 15, 20, 21). So, prolonging communicative interactions by reiterating 
trivial information operates as a coping mechanism (16-21). Bronner (2006) adds that the 
NORAD employee’s question: “is this real-world or exercise?” (22) is heard continuously 
and nearly verbatim, during the crisis, as more employees were being briefed about the 
incident: “Powell, like almost everyone in the room, first assumes the phone call is from 
                                                 
17 Input is a simulated exercise.    60
the simulations team on hand to send "inputs" - simulated scenarios - into play for the day's 
training exercise” (Bronner 2006). 
 
 
Difficulty in adapting to exceptional circumstances increases depending on the nature of 
the emergency situation. The element of surprise, as a manifestation of this difficulty 
overwhelms and disorients the receivers of unanticipated information. The NORAD tapes 
provided the following communicative interaction where a NORAD employee places a call 
to civilian controllers at the New York Centre: 
 
 
24 NORAD  Yes, ma'am. Did you just hear the information 
regarding the World Trade Centre? 
25  NEW YORK CENTER  No. 
26 NORAD  Being hit by an aircraft? 
27  NEW YORK CENTER  I'm sorry?! 
28 NORAD  Being hit by an aircraft. 
29  NEW YORK CENTER  You're kidding. 
30 NORAD  It's on the world news. 
 
 
Information arises as an indispensable asset, an input that defines organizational 
performance. From the phase of receiving and assessing information (24-30) to the stage 
where appropriate actions are taken in order to mitigate an emergency, organization 
conduct reflects the preparedness of organization-members to manage the situation (Perry 
2004). According to the NORAD tapes, either military personnel or civilian employees 
were unable to accept the unanticipated parameters of the crisis and were, thus, indecisive 
as to how assess and diffuse the information to other co-responder organizations.  
 
 
1.3. The hurricane Katrina response 
 
 
Almost four years after the 9/11 event, similar failures occurred during the emergency 
responses launched in the southern States affected by hurricane Katrina. Over 1,300 people 
were killed and more than 6,500 were ultimately rescued in Mississippi, Louisiana, and 
Alabama over an area of 93,000 square miles, after the catastrophic passage of hurricane 
Katrina in August 2005. Approximately 80% of the city of New Orleans was flooded under   61
six to 20 feet of water (Massey 2007). In the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Katrina “battered 
the offshore energy infrastructure and forced the evacuation of more than 75% of the 
Gulf’s 819 manned oil platforms” (Townsend 2006: 1-2). Two days before landfall, U.S. 
energy companies estimated that the approaching storm had already reduced the oil 
production in the Gulf of Mexico by more than a third (Townsend 2006).  
 
 
Hurricane Katrina has been considered as the most destructive natural disaster in the 
history of the USA (Knabb et al. 2005) and its damages exceeded those of any other major 
disasters, such as the Chicago fire in 1871, the San Francisco Earthquake and fire of 
1906,
18 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992.
19 Its impact necessitated one of the largest search 
and rescue operations in U.S. history, hindered nevertheless by the fact that 
communications were largely disrupted for a prolonged period of time. Despite the efforts 
made, the response to the Hurricane did not fulfil the standards of a “coordinated effort that 
had been envisioned by President Bush when he ordered the creation of a National 
Response Plan in February 2003” (Townsend 2006: 1-2). 
 
 
Almost 2.000 police, fire and emergency medical service personnel participated in the 
rescue operations that took place in the impact zone. These professionals encountered a 
series of problems that contributed to hindering the coordinated effort (Guion et al. 2007). 
First, they inevitably encountered an intra-organizational crisis linked to availability of 
resources and command structure.
20 Due to the hurricane, a number of State and local 
public safety agencies suffered extensive damage to their facilities and equipment. Stations 
that suffered “total destruction” had to be shut down. Some emergency personnel did not 
report to work. This disruption in the organizational consistency led Warren J. Riley, 
Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department, to testify before Congress that 
“Much has been said about officers abandoning their position during the storm, and it is 
true that about 147 officers abandoned their positions. However, they are no longer a part 
of the New Orleans Police Department” (Townsend 2006: 37). Responders such as police 
or fire-fighting personnel abandoning their posts results in mismanagement. There are very 
few cases reported where emergencies were effectively mitigated when civil servants 
returned to their posts after a crisis had occurred. One such case is the 1995 devastating 
                                                 
18  Casualties and damage after the 1906 Earthquake,  http://quake.wr.usgs.gov/info/1906/casualties.html, 
accessed: 10/02/2007. 
19 Hurricane History, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml, accessed: 08/12/2005.  
20 www.usuhs.mil/csts, accessed: 19/02/2007.   62
earthquake of Combe in Japan where the government employees and the first-responders 
reported immediately to their services. Otherwise, the recovery operations would have 
been widely set back (Koketsu et al. 1998). 
 
 
Moreover, disruption in communications affected the leadership of the operations: the 
Mayor of New Orleans was neither able to effectively coordinate the local efforts nor to 
guide the State and Federal support for two days following the storm. That is because his 
Office was unable to establish reliable communications with anyone outside the hotel for 
nearly forty-eight hours. In addition, the intra-organizational crisis was burdened with 
breaches in safety conditions. Emergency responders had to operate in a hazardous 
environment involving extreme heat, chemicals, contaminated mud, downed power lines, 
and standing water. They repeatedly exposed themselves to floodwater, chemicals, 
bacteria, and debris. The storm’s surge flooded three Superfund toxic waste sites in the 
New Orleans area, and destroyed or compromised at least 170 drinking water facilities and 
forty-seven wastewater treatment works along the Gulf Coast.
21 One of the Committee’s 
recommendations on this issue was that the “Department of Homeland Security, in 
coordination with the Environmental Protection Agency, should oversee efforts to improve 
the Federal government’s capability to quickly gather environmental data and to provide 
the public and emergency responders the most accurate information available, to determine 
whether it is safe to operate in a disaster environment or to return after evacuation”.
22 
 
 
Second, first-responders encountered a technical crisis that hindered the effectiveness of 
the rescue operations via the coordination of available resources. The impact of hurricane 
Katrina incapacitated the emergency communications system. The 9-1-1 emergency centre 
telecommunications network was compromised and there were no contingency backup 
systems in place (Victory 2006: 23). The rescuers were forced to communicate in a single 
channel mode, radio-to-radio, utilizing only three mutual-aid frequencies. Some mutual-aid 
channels “required each speaker to wait his or her turn before speaking, sometimes up to 
twenty minutes” (Townsend 2006). Thus, too many responders were trying to use these 
frequencies which led to congestion. The State Senate's homeland security committee 
summed up the situation in Louisiana by stating, “People could not communicate. It got to 
the point that people were literally writing messages on paper, putting them in bottles and 
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dropping them from helicopters to other people on the ground” (Victory 2006). In addition, 
communications between the military and first-responders also suffered from lack of 
interoperability. In some cases, the military was reduced to using human runners to 
physically carry messages between deployed units and first-responders. In another case, a 
military helicopter had to drop a message in a bottle to warn first-responders about a 
dangerous gas leak. 
 
 
In essence, communications after the storm revealed inadequate planning. Both the 
primary emergency communication system and the redundant systems – when available 
and potentially operable – were either destroyed or compromised by the hurricane. In 
addition there was a lack of pre-positioned back-up equipment and coordination. The 
problem of interoperability of public safety telecommunications systems operating in 
different frequencies and with different technical standards was encountered. In retrospect, 
communication experts suggested that there were alternative communication modes that 
could have been used by the first-responders or the use of technologies that could have 
helped to restore emergency communications. Nevertheless, the lack of knowledge and 
training rendered the alternatives useless. What was eventually suggested by the reports 
was that the FCC should take several steps to develop spectrum sharing among federal, 
state and local agencies for emergency response purposes.  
 
 
Third, an inter-organizational crisis emerged. This crisis rested on the fact that too many 
federal, state or local emergency responder organizations in the impact zone both from 
neighbouring and distant states could not coordinate their operations due to the lack of 
previous experience of working with different organizations. A command and control 
structure was not established. Local emergency response officials found it difficult or 
impossible to establish functioning Incident Command structures. Members of the 
Hammond (Louisiana) Fire Department reported receiving “a lot of ‘I don’t knows’ from 
[local] government officials” (Townsend 2006); another Louisiana fire-fighter stated that 
“the command structure broke down, we were literally left to our own devices”. Moreover, 
ineffective communications between FEMA and other federal departments and agencies 
prevented available federal resources from being effectively used for response operations. 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) observed that its personnel “had 
difficulty in getting FEMA to take advantage of the resources available to them because of   64
the unfamiliarity of some FEMA employees with USDA programs” (Townsend 2006: 
531).  
 
 
1.4. Conclusion: Lessons from the 9/11 and the Katrina 
 
 
Fire-fighting organizations are one of the first agencies to respond to life threatening 
situations such as man made and natural disasters, the last best hope (Kean et al. 2004) for 
society. Their principal objective is to protect life and property when a disruption in the 
familiar patterns of everyday life occurs. Hence, they should plan for that eventuality with 
a firm commitment to preparedness so as to mitigate disasters (Waugh 2000). In spite of 
the key roles of first-responder organizations in addressing major disasters, the precise 
process of emergency management and patterns of communications between first-
responder organizations did not attract much examination until the events of September 11, 
2001. Instead, fire drills, evacuation planning, crowd control, and communications testing 
were organized and implemented reactively, in response to an actual event (Kean et al. 
2005).
23 
 
 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks sparked a wide discussion amongst fire services around Europe. 
They came to realize that they were ill-prepared organizationally to cope with such large-
scale disasters. The problems encountered by the FDNY are, in reality, every fire services’ 
problems. From the investigation conducted by them they identified six main problems as 
stated hereunder. Insufficient technological support in communications was identified as 
the primary constraint in the 9/11 and the Katrina response (Kean et al. 2004; Townsend 
2006). During the Katrina response, the radio frequencies were either so congested or 
scarce that responders were force to find alternative ways to communicate, such as 
exchanging messages in bottles. The second problem identified focused on the disruption 
in the process of disseminating information. The report highlighted the fact that, when the 
South Tower collapsed, very few people in the North Tower were aware of the incident.  
 
 
                                                 
23 ‘A litany of Failure: White House support is needed to rescue Floundering reforms.’ Financial Times, 
06/12/2005.   65
Thirdly, inter-organizational communication totally disintegrated during the response to 
this crisis. The special rescue units of the NYPD in the North Tower were aware of the 
collapse of the South Tower and the evacuation order issued for the first responders, but 
the fire-fighters later on claimed that the “cops” did not inform them on their way down 
from the Tower, or according to the police officers, when they were repeating the 
evacuation order the fire-fighters’ response to them, was: “we are not taking orders from 
cops” (Kean et al. 2004). The absence of unified command was identified as a fourth 
problem. This led to uncoordinated actions of the first responders involved in the situation. 
Each first responder organization was operating autonomously despite the fact that there 
was an agency which was assigned to coordinate their response, the OEM organized in 
1996, after the 1993 bombing of the Twin Towers. During the Katrina response, the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) that establishes standardized incident 
management protocols and procedures that all responders – federal, state, and local – 
should use to conduct their communication and coordinate their actions did not establish 
command and control structures, as expected, presumably because it had been adopted in 
March 2004 and professionals had not been trained as to how to operate according to the 
system’s parameters (Townsend 2006: 13).  
 
 
The fifth problematic area was the insubordination of units due to panic. It was later 
realised that, contrary to the orders they have been given to hold their positions, some units 
were self-dispatched on the rescue-grounds. Finally, misinformation coming from the 
emergency services’ dispatch centres contributed towards the mismanagement of the entire 
situation, which in some cases led civilians to their death. The 9/11 operators were simply 
giving them the wrong advice to stay where they were because the responders would help 
them. 
 
 
All these major constraints in an effective response to the situation have also been 
identified as such in European crises such as the ones we address in the following chapters. 
Looking through the perspective of these problematic areas identified by the 9/11 
Commission Report, the Katrina Report and the NORAD recordings, we will now explore 
the extent to which they are evident in the HFC.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THE HELLENIC FIRE CORPS AND THE EPISODES INVESTIGATED 
 
 
This chapter examines how HFC employees who are involved in responding to 
emergencies communicate amongst themselves and with other first-responder 
organizations. Five episodes dating from 2005 – 2006 are examined, compared and 
contrasted in order to establish the communication patterns emerging during the process of 
responding to emergencies.  
 
 
2.1. The HFC actors  
 
 
Mobilization is the process whereby personnel who are employed in the command and 
control centre (CCC/control room) dispatch operations’ units from their fire-stations to the 
incident-grounds as soon as the emergency is reported to the control room. The main actors 
involved in responding to emergencies are the personnel employed in the CCC and the 
operations’ units. The CCC comprises operators, dispatchers and officers. Control 
operators are usually fire-fighters. They answer the 1-9-9 emergency calls. Civilians, 
personnel employed in the control rooms of other first-responder organizations, such as the 
police or the ambulance service, or HFC employees from local fire-stations, are usually the 
ones to contact the emergency centre of the HFC in order to report an emergency in 
progress. As soon as control operators receive the information regarding an emergency, 
they either forward it to the on-duty control officers or to the control dispatchers, or to 
both. Then, they re-contact the source of information to make sure that the call is not a 
hoax or that the information provided was accurate (Grimshaw 1980).
24  
 
 
Control operators and dispatchers are two functionally distinct posts. They operate in two 
separate rooms in the CCC. During an extensive mobilization and when their assistance is 
required, operators may often assume the role of dispatchers. Dispatchers assist as 
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operators only very rarely. On the one hand, there are usually fewer dispatchers than 
operators and the number of tasks they undertake is overwhelming. On the other hand, 
dispatchers are usually slightly senior than operators and they are reluctant to undertake 
tasks reserved for lower-ranking employees.
25 
 
 
Control dispatchers are usually sub-officers occupied with assessing this information and 
with instigating the mobilization process. In order to assess the information, they rely on 
their experience. There are very few procedural guidelines entitled “The Memorandums of 
Action”
26 that suggest which actions have priority over others depending on the type of 
emergency the HFC encounters. For example, in case of a road traffic collision (RTC) that 
involves a tanker, the dispatchers should immediately mobilize four fire-engines and notify 
the on-duty officer responsible for the district where the collision occurs to proceed on- 
scene. However, when a fire erupts in the basement of an apartment building, the 
dispatchers should mobilize four fire-engines, the special unit with the respiratory devices, 
the rescue unit and then the on-duty fire-officer of the district. Nevertheless, there are no 
standard operating procedures (SOP) that indicate which type or number of appliances to 
dispatch depending on the type of emergency. For run-of-the-mill incidents, control 
dispatchers initiate the mobilization process by calling the operators of the fire-stations that 
have jurisdiction over the affected area or those that are nearest to the incident-grounds. 
The first stand-by unit – composed of two appliances – is the one to be dispatched. Control 
dispatchers also pass on information to the station operator such as the location and type of 
emergency. After dealing with this initial dispatching of appliances, they report to the on-
duty control officers.  
 
 
The mobilization process changes when the emergency appears more serious than run-of-
the-mill incidents. In such cases, dispatchers instigate the mobilization process after they 
negotiate with the control officers. Control officers assess the information and direct the 
dispatchers as to what number and type of appliances to mobilize. Control officers forward 
information concerning the incident and the initial mobilization to the commander and the 
deputy commander of the CCC. Depending on the nature of the emergency, the CCC 
commander decides ad hoc who to contact from the highest-ranking officers. He also 
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indicates whether he or one of the on-duty control officers should undertake the task of 
being in touch with the highest-ranking officers.  
 
 
Control employees receive, assess, and then disseminate the information to the operations’ 
units. When operations’ units on the incident-grounds cannot establish direct 
communication with one another, usually due to technical reasons, control employees also 
serve as intermediaries between them. Moreover, control employees keep track of the 
resources deployed on the incident-grounds. The operations’ units consist of the fire-
fighters and fire-officers who respond to the emergency. Fire-officers are those who assess 
the risk entailed in the emergency, decide on the response and coordinate the units on the 
incident-scene. Hence, in the HFC, the mobilization process is conducted in two directions: 
mobilizing the appliances and notifying the highest-ranking officers. High-ranking officers 
from the command structure plan the response and coordinate the resources on the fire or 
rescue-scenes: 
 
Table 1 
 
 
To follow a Goffmanesque analogy, this channel signifies the backstage (Goffman 1990) 
communicative interactions between the organization-members as opposed to the 
frontstage communications conducted via radio. The difference between these two 
channels of communication is that via telephone, a one-to-one interaction takes place. Via 
radio, the communication actors acquire an audience. The presence of an audience changes 
the circumstances of the communication conduct. In order to act before an audience, 
performers need to rehearse. Rehearsal requires commitment as well as constant and 
continuous training. The on-stage performance follows a set of rules. There is a script and 
a cast. The performance is under scrutiny and as such it becomes the object of potential 
criticism from the audience that is the HFC employees directly or indirectly involved in the 
action. In this case, a one-to-one interaction is less demanding and may be less formal. 
Backstage communicative interactions: How information is disseminated  
Control dispatchers  Station operators  Information Control  operators 
Control officers  Command structure: 
-  Chief fire-officer 
-  Control commander and 
deputy commander 
-  Senior operations fire-officers   69
Despite the fact that there are rules, they may be circumvented depending on the two 
communicators involved. Communication between operations’ units and control personnel 
should be conducted via radio. The content of such communication becomes potentially 
accessible to all those actors involved in the emergency response so as to be aware of the 
actions taken on the incident-grounds. 
 
 
2.2. Analyzing the material 
 
 
The reconstruction of the events that took place was based on the fragmented recorded 
conversations that I retrieved from the audio archive of the HFC, the interviews that I 
conducted with the actors in the emergency responses, the formal reports submitted by the 
control personnel and my own experience as a participant observer in the organizational 
conducts. The dialogic analysis (Goffman 1981) is intended to uncover the strengths and 
weaknesses of the HFC. Hopefully, this will lead to an effort to combine the most effective 
structural elements to create a model of good practice. 
 
 
Episode A: The train collision  
 
 
On the 8
th of March 2006, a few minutes after eleven o’clock in the evening, a commuter 
train carrying 130 passengers collided with a freight train parked in the Med
27 train station. 
The first two coaches of the commuter train derailed resulting in the death of one of the 
two engine-drivers and the injury of ten passengers. The HFC responded to the incident by 
dispatching eight fire-engines and four rescue units within the first 30 minutes of the initial 
report of the incident to the CCC of the HFC. The HFC assisted almost 30 passengers to 
evacuate the derailed coaches. 
 
 
Prior to the incident, the recorded communications reveal that control employees were 
involved in conversing with family members and friends. The audio archive does not 
indicate who notified the control personnel about the train collision. It shows that a few 
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minutes after 23:00, control dispatchers mobilized two rescue units to proceed on the 
collision-scene followed by two fire-engines and Kronos-15, the code name for the on-duty 
operations fire-officer in that district. On their way to the rescue-grounds, the majority of 
the operations’ crews of the appliances contacted the control room via telephone to ask for 
directions. 
 
 
1 Ops’  crew  Pal, from X rescue unit. Tell us where exactly is it? In which station? 
2 Dispatcher    At the station at Med. 
3 Ops’  crew  Med? 
4 Dispatcher  Yes.  
5 Ops’  crew  Ah! Ok. […prolonged pause] 
6 Dispatcher  Do you want me to give you directions via radio? 
7 Ops’  crew  Yea… 
8 Dispatcher  Ok. 
 
Before hanging up the phone, one of the crew-members commented:  
 
9 FF  Do we know how to get there? 
  
 
In their effort to mobilize all the appliances necessary for the rescue operations, a 
dispatcher contacted a fire-fighter in one of the fire-stations located near the collision-
scene: 
  
10 D    The centre. 
11 FF  Good evening. It’s Papas. 
12 D  Who? 
13 FF  Papas from the x [meaning: the x Athenian fire station], the one who is 
responsible for the cranes. 
14 D  Go on my friend.   71
15 FF  Which crane do you need? 
16 D  Me, personally, none. Your commander has asked for it. I don’t know. Which 
one is ready to go? 
17 FF  You tell me. They are both ready to leave. 
18 D  Wait a moment. 
19 FF  Do you hear me? I’ll call the “big guy” [meaning: their commander]. 
20 D  [Speaking to the control officer] Superintendent! Superintendent! We are 
taking out the big crane!?! [To the operator] the big one. 
21 FF  Ok. Bye. 
 
 
Dispatchers made a few phone calls to the station operators in order to make sure that the 
rescue-equipment of the appliances was indeed in place and operable. A number of 
conversations with the press office followed: 
 
 
22 PO  How many appliances are on their way? 
23 D    Mmmmm! The x, y, z, a, b, c… [continues numerating] 
24 PO  The total? 
25 D    Two plus two plus [continues adding]. Eight. 
26 PO  Eight appliances, right. 
27 D    Right.  
28 PO  Thanks. 
29 D    Bye. 
 
 
Between control officers and dispatchers, instructions as to how to deal with operations’ 
personnel were given: 
 
 
30 CO Call the deputy chief on the radio…   72
31 D    Yes, superintendent?! 
32 CO And instruct him how to go to … wherever [the name of the location appears 
to slip his mind]. 
33 D  Where is the deputy chief? 
34 CO He called and said he is on his way to… 
35 D  What am I going to tell him? “Where are you exactly”…? 
36 CO No, no, no. Call his driver, pal, and…  
37 D  Yes… 
38 CO Facilitate… in order to facilitate you… to help you approach the area of the 
incident. The incident is on Corinth’s street… 
39 D  Yes… 
40 CO Tell him… 
41 D  Yes… 
42 CO What is your direction so that we can facilitate you? 
43 D  Ok, bye. 
 
 
In one of the follow-up conversations with the press office, a dispatcher provided 
information about the man-power on the collision-scene: 
 
 
44 D    Register twenty. 
45 PO  Twenty what? Appliances? 
46 D  Appliances. If you want you can register more. We wouldn’t mind. 
47 PO  No, no [laughter]. [She is answering the journalist on the other telephone 
line. Then back to the dispatcher] can I ask you something, just in case you 
know? 
48 D  Yes… 
49 PO  The ambulance service. Which hospital is he taking them to? 
50 D  I heard the X. I heard it on TV.   73
The highest-ranking control officer notified the command structure with regard to the 
incident: 
 
 
51 CO  Derailment of train; we have in [location]. In the Y station in 
[location]. 
52 Kronos-15 Y station, X. 
53 CO  Yes. 
54 Kronos-15 I am on my way. 
55 CO  Ok, bye. 
56 Kronos-15   Bye. 
 
 
And the dissemination of the information continued with notifying the lieutenant 
commander of the control room. The following is only one of the at least fifteen 
conversations between the lieutenant commander of the CCC and the senior on-duty 
control officer. As soon as the latter had a conversation with one of the operations’ 
officers, he communicated the content of the conversation to the control lieutenant 
commander:  
 
 
57  CO  Yes… the commander said that he doesn’t have a phone to brief the 
hierarchy. 
58  LC  Yes, yes brief them; call [by his first name] – Mr. Z [by his last name] – 
59  CO  Yes… 
60  LC  I will call Mr. Chief and we will see what’s going on.  
61  CO  Good. I will call OSE to see what… if it is freight [meaning train] or not. 
62  LC  Yes that to see if it is freight [train]… that… 
63  CO  It had people so it must have been a train [he means a passenger train] but to 
find out whether it was the fast train. 
64  LC  Y station you said 
65  CO  Y station, Z street. Yes sir.    74
66  LC  Ok, I see. 
67  CO  Ok. 
68  LC  Only the first coach? 
69  CO  Only the first one, yes. 
70  LC  Ok, gather more information. 
71  CO  Yes. 
72  LC  And brief the commander too. 
 
 
Meanwhile, one of the control dispatchers was trying to contact the Hellenic Railways 
Organization (OSE). No provision for a direct telephone line connecting the organization 
with the HFC had been made. In order to connect to OSE, one of the dispatchers called the 
yellow pages of the Hellenic Telecommunications Organization (OTE) so as to request the 
telephone line for the customer services of OSE, where he thought he would be able to 
reach an employee of OSE. Eventually, after making four telephone calls to different 
services of the OTE and the OSE, the dispatcher reached the individual that had 
undertaken the responsibility of investigating the circumstances under which the trains had 
collided. However, whereas the dispatcher requested information as to the number of 
people riding the commuter train, and as to how they were allocated in the coaches, the 
OSE investigator abruptly intercepted the dispatcher’s line of questioning to announce that 
the OSE was not interested in this kind of information but in investigating the reasons for 
the collision. The senior on-duty officer shouted at the dispatchers to keep him up-to-date 
with regard to whether the first appliances that were mobilized had reached the site of the 
collision or not. He then called the district commander of the fire-stations in Attica: 
 
 
73 LC [addressing the Control fire-officer by his first name] 
74 CO Yes sir, Mr. District Commander. We have an OSE coach but we don’t know 
which train has been derailed. 
75 LC Are there anybody injured? 
76 CO There are none. The people are outside but I am sending a, b, c [rescue-units] 
to give us an image because I don’t have one. I am trying to get one from 
OSE.    75
77 LC If they [OSE personnel] say something send the Special Units. 
78 CO Yes sir, I will call you right away. 
79 LC Call them. 
80 CO I will. 
 
 
Then, the senior control officer, loudly ordered the dispatchers to reach OSE, to contact 
and to dispatch the Special Unit. Some of the dispatchers were heard answering in the 
background with resentment: “… heard it…”, “…doing it already…” 
 
 
81 LC Yes.  
82 CO We have a train derailment; 
83 LC Yes. 
84 CO Not train derailment; coach derailment. 
85 LC Yes. 
86 CO The first coach. 
87 LC A, ha. 
88 CO On Z street over there, nearby the Y station.  
89 LC A, ha  
90 CO You’ve pulled out the …. 
91 LC What kind of train is it? 
92 CO I don’t know; I can’t contact OSE. Now we are waiting for a police car to 
arrive and ours are on their way too.  
93 LC Regulate the traffic [incomprehensible] 
94 CO I called him now. He is not answering. Just a moment it is the district 
commander. 
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As the rescue operations focused on the two engine-drivers trapped in the engine-room, the 
senior control officer called the commander of the fire-station that had jurisdiction over the 
affected area: 
 
 
95 CO Hi my commander. 
96 SC Yes… 
97 CO How about the drivers. Are they alive? 
98 SC I am not sure. We are still making our way through. [Addressing the rest of the 
unit on the rescue-scene: “has anybody had contact with the drivers?”] One is 
dead. The other seems to be breathing. But we are not sure yet.  
 
 
In an effort to obtain a wider perspective of the collision-scene, the senior control officer 
contacted Kronos-15:  
 
 
99 CO  Hi John. OSE gave me collision. What is it that you see over there? 
100 Kronos-15 I am not sure about the collision. Things look very strange. [Talking 
to a bystander: “is that the engine-coach over there? And what about 
this then?” The rest of the dialogue is inaudible]. George, there is an 
engine-coach and a train. Yes, it is. It is a collision.  
 [follow-up call] 
101 CO  How many people have we rescued? 
102 Kronos-15 I do not know. They [the rescue teams] are working on the two 
engine-drivers. As for the rest [inaudible] 
103 CO  You need to find out, because the chief is expecting an answer on 
this issue. 
 
 
Although one of the OSE employees reassured control dispatchers that the rails had no 
power, the senior control officer suggested that they contact the SGCP to monitor any 
developments with regard to this issue. The communication with the SGCP concerning this 
matter never took place. When the SGCP got wind of the crisis, one of the on-duty 
employees contacted the HFC control room. They claimed that they knew nothing about   77
the incident until the Secretary of the SGCP called and informed them about the 
emergency. SGCP requested information and the senior control officer obliged them with 
an answer: the death of one of the engine-drivers, the heavily injured second driver, and 
the slightly injured passengers. The conversation ended with the SGCP employee asking 
after a control employee he used to know. In an effort to receive as much information as 
possible, two control officers called the same operations’ officer at the same time: one on 
the operations’ officer’s land-line; the other, on his mobile.  
 
 
During the emergency response, a number of non-HFC employees and other first-
responder organizations’ personnel contacted the control room so as to inquire after the 
progress of the response. Amongst them, a senior police officer, secretary to the Minister 
of Public Order, telephoned the CCC. He identified himself and asked the senior officer to 
reciprocate. Then he uttered a phrase with an ambivalent meaning:  
 
 
104 Police  officer  So, all well? 
105 CO  Everything is fine. 
106 Police  officer  In Med! [Uttered in a very severe style as if he was 
reprimanding the control officer]. 
 
 
Moreover, the police officer requested to converse directly with the chief fire-officer. 
When the senior control officer told him that he could not divert the land line to the chief’s 
mobile, the police officer instructed him to tell the chief to call him at the Ministry. 
Towards the end of the emergency response, control dispatchers began to track down the 
appliances they had sent to the collision-scene: 
 
 
107 D  Which appliance has gone to the incident? 
108 SO The x and … 
109 D  The x and what’s the other one? 
110 SO And that… other one….   78
111 D  Well?  
112 SO The other one [thinking hard] ehhhhh… I didn’t have time to write down the 
plate number. 
113 D  Is it the x? 
114 SO Yes, yes, yes,  
115 D  Ok. 
 
 
In the midst of the emergency response, at least two fire-officers who were not involved in 
the response contacted the control room to request information about the emergency. In the 
meantime, people trapped in elevators, minor apartment fires and a fire that broke out in a 
factory that manufactured wallpapers occupied control personnel. The wallpaper factory 
incident triggered a series of communicative interactions: a junior control officer ordered 
one of the dispatchers to mobilize a certain number and type of appliances: 
 
 
116 CO Is the A appliance there? 
117 D  The A, B, C, D, E. 
118 CO The E appliance? 
119 D  Yes, it is there; the F appliance, though, … 
120 CO What about the G appliance? 
121 D  I am telling you which appliances are there. The rest are off [to their 
stations]. 
122 CO The H? 
123 D  It’s gone [meaning back to its station]. 
[… the conversation continues in a similar way] 
Ok, let’s get it over with. TV is showing scenes from King Kong.  
 
 
The CCC is a large hall, divided into five partitions. Three partitions are reserved for the 
control fire-officers, with one each for the dispatchers and the operators. Direct visual and 
audio contact through the operators’, dispatchers’, and the commonly used officers’ 
partition, is almost unhampered. During the above conversation, the control officer called   79
the dispatcher sitting across the partition, to request an update as to the resources mobilized 
on the incident-grounds. The dispatcher turned and faced the officer while he was on the 
phone, enumerating the appliances dispatched. The officer had made a list of the mobilized 
engines; yet he had put them down in a different order than the dispatcher. So, when the 
latter started enumerating the dispatched appliances, the former interrupted him repeatedly, 
so as to ask after the status of engines according to his list. Irritated by repeating the same 
information at least twice, the dispatcher resorted to a humorous remark, to interrupt an 
ongoing, redundant conversation.  
 
 
One of the first operations’ employees to reach the fire-scene telephoned the junior officer 
to provide information on the emergency; then the junior officer loudly announced the 
content of the information to one of the dispatchers so that the latter could write it down; 
then the officer loudly ordered another dispatcher to mobilize another type of appliance on 
the fire-grounds; the press office telephoned to require further information about the fire; 
the junior officer contacted Kronos-15 to inform him about this emerging incident; then he 
asked whether there was any information with regard to the progress of the response. Then, 
the junior officer informed the senior officer about the developments and the commander 
of the control room about the explosion on the fire-scene and the request made by the 
operations’ unit to send more appliances on the fire-grounds.  
 
 
Both during and after the rescue operations were over, a few issues came to light, notably 
the completion of the reports with regard to the emergency response. A junior control 
officer found that the report produced by the first operations’ officer to arrive on the scene 
of the collision was incomplete. So she contacted the fire-station to ask the officer to fill in 
the missing details. During the conversation she had with one of the fire-fighters who 
assisted the operations, she realized that they had not obtained the necessary information to 
fill in the report properly. While on the phone with her, they were asking each other and 
their commanding officer whether they had the information she was asking for. Since they 
had been unable to obtain such information, one of them commented to the junior control 
officer: “if there is anything wrong with the report call again to let me know.” Moreover, 
when the shifts changed the morning following the collision, both the CCC commander 
and the deputy chief fire-officer telephoned the senior on-duty control officer of the 
following watch asking for an overall report with regard to the events that took place 
during the rescue operations. That control officer was unable to detail the events since the   80
briefing he received from the officer he replaced was incomplete. He then suggested that 
the commander should inform the deputy chief fire-officer. This last comment was an 
epilogue to the events of the previous day. 
 
 
Episode B: The Square Tower 
 
 
On the 12
th of February 2006, a few minutes after ten o’clock in the evening, a fire broke 
out in the basement of a large department store, “The Square Tower”, in the centre of 
Athens. In order to put out the fire, control dispatchers mobilized six fire-engines and a 
senior officer – the incident commander (IC) – for planning and overseeing the emergency 
response. The IC asserted that the emergency was insignificant and cancelled any further 
mobilization. However, some forty minutes into the response, control personnel dispatched 
more appliances on the fire-scene as the initial fire-crews and their appliances were unable 
to cope with the situation. The following account features a number of actors 
communicating prior to, during and after the emergency response to the incident. 
Conversations amongst HFC personnel, between HFC employees and other first-responder 
organizations and between the HFC employees and their family members or friends shaped 
the mosaic of the communicative interactions of the day. 
 
 
The recorded communications revealed that a few minutes before ten o’clock in the 
evening control employees were involved in discussing issues such as the outcome of a 
football match that took place earlier that evening, films shown on television and the 
forthcoming appointment of a new chief and deputy chief fire-officers in the HFC. At a 
quarter to ten, the smoke detectors alerted the night guard of “the Square Tower” in the 
centre of Athens. At 21:56, he placed a call to the control room of the HFC to report that 
smoke was coming out of one of the storage rooms in the basement. As soon as the 
operator hung up the phone, he shouted at one of the control dispatchers:  
 
 
1 COP  Hey pal, bring out loads of stuff! “The Square” department store on fire, 
Panagoulis street 45; fire in the basement. 
2 D    Panagoulis street [he is writing down the information] 
3 COP  Yes, yes, the guard called. 
4 D  Is there a fire?   81
5 COP  Eh… yes there is! In the basement. 
 
 
The control dispatcher called the operators of the fire-station that had jurisdiction over the 
affected area and the neighbouring stations and requested the mobilization of six 
appliances. Yet he encountered a number of difficulties when searching for a 15-ton water-
pump to mobilize in order to enhance the water supplies on the fire-scene. The following 
two conversations took place between the control dispatcher and two of the station 
operators he contacted: 
 
I. 
6 SO/  female   X
th [Athenian fire station]. Speaking. 
7 D  Do you have a 12-ton appliance available? 
8 SO/  female  Noooooooo… 
9 D  Ok, fine. 
 
II. 
10 SO/  female  7
th. Speaking. 
11 D  Just a moment… [He speaks on the radio: (operations’ unit): we 
are proceeding to “The Square Tower”, Brick square; (D): 
Rodger, Panagoulis 45… soon]. Do you have a 12-ton vehicle in…?
12 SO/  female    Certainly. 
13 D    Take it out for Panagoulis 45, Brick square. 
14  SO/ female   Panagoulis 45, Brick square. [ she takes a note] In what? 
15 D  Yes [he speaks to another line] kratinoy 5, kotzia square [he forgets 
the question addressed to him 
16 SO/  female    In what? Is it a specific place? 
17 D    Fire, fire! 
18 SO/  female    Ah! 
19 D    In a basement! 
20 SO/  female  In a basement. 
21 D    Quickly, quickly   82
22 SO/  female    The 12-ton, right? 
23 D    Yes, yes, yes… the number of the vehicle? 
24 SO/  female    The number of the 12-ton? 
25 D    Yes! 
26 SO/  female    [she provides the number] 
27 D    Ok, thanks 12 tonner. 
 
 
He also contacted Kronos 15, who is responsible for assuming the management of 
emergencies in the district of the city of Athens, to proceed on the incident-grounds. 
Following Papadopoulos’ (the senior control officer on-duty that evening) instructions, the 
dispatcher advised the IC not to proceed on the fire-scene before the appliances did. 
Papadopoulos suggested that an individual “running around” the affected premises with no 
equipment might damage the public image of the fire service.  
 
 
At the same time, another dispatcher requested that the emergency team from the Electric 
Company (EC) proceed on-site in order to make sure that the power in the building was cut 
off from the main power grid. Afterwards, he contacted the Gas Company (GC) to ask 
whether the gas installations ran under the affected building and if that was the case, how 
the technical crew of the GC or the fire-fighters could isolate the building from the main 
supply network. Yet, whereas there is a telephone line that directly connects the control 
room of the HFC with the emergency unit of the EC, there is no such connection with the 
GC. As a result, the dispatcher held the line reserved for providing customer services. A 
third dispatcher contacted the fire station operators from where the appliances were 
mobilized in order, first, to make sure that the fire-engines were carrying the necessary 
equipment, such as breathing apparatuses. Second, he requested the plate numbers of the 
appliances so as to register them in order to keep track of the resources on the fire scene. 
However, at least two of the fire station operators were unable to remember the plate 
numbers or access the inventory where they were kept. Instead, the station operators 
suggested that they should ask their colleagues and re-contact the control room with an 
answer.  
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Following the mobilization of the fire-engines, one dispatcher contacted the fire-station in 
order to ensure that the appliances were carrying all the necessary fire extinguishing 
equipment. At the same time, one of the dispatchers contacted the fire-investigators’ unit to 
proceed on the fire-scene so and examine the causes of the fire:  
 
 
28 D    You are on your way [meaning: to examine the cause of fire] to a vehicle, 
right? 
29 FI  On my way. [meaning: you will give me the address of the new fire-scene when 
I am on my way there] I do not have a pencil to write it down now. 
30 D  Ok then. 
 
 
Not long after the operations were launched, one of the fire-fighters was slightly injured. 
That incident instigated a set of communication conducts between control dispatchers and 
the ambulance service employees. The issue raised by the on-duty doctor for the 
ambulance service was that if the HFC had their own medical unit to respond to HFC 
personnel’s needs, why was the ambulance service required to assist.  
 
 
After the dispatched appliances were fully deployed on the fire-scene and the operations at 
their peak, control personnel encountered great difficulty contacting the operations’ units 
on radio, a dispatcher commented: “We cannot get anybody on the radio” (31). However, 
Papadopoulos, the senior CO, eventually managed to get hold of the fire investigator who 
made his way on the fire-scene before the emergency was completed and gave him some 
information about the progress of the response:  
 
 
32 FI  … It is under control… I think… But don’t go around telling people… We [the 
fire investigators] are not fully aware of what went on… But I just heard from 
a fire-fighter that the incident is controlled… Maybe even [the fire] 
extinguished. 
  
 
While control dispatchers were involved in mobilizing the necessary operations’ units to 
the firegrounds, Papadopoulos finally managed to get on the phone the operations’ officer   84
responsible for managing the emergency response and the IC. Apparently confused, the IC 
failed to give an accurate account of the situation and tried to reassure Papadopoulos that 
the incident was rather insignificant and that reinforcements were not necessary. 
Papadopoulos was puzzled but at the same time he wanted to abnegate any responsibility 
for what he saw as an upcoming mismanagement of the emergency response. So, he asked 
the IC to announce via radio that the situation appeared to be under control: 
 
 
33 CO  The phone calls are driving me crazy. All of them [the high-ranking officers] 
are worried about the incident. You have to make an announcement. How do 
you see thinks going? Optimistic or pessimistic? 
  
 
The IC was quite reluctant to respond to this question. When Papadopoulos realized that 
the IC did not know how to make such an announcement via radio, he instructed the IC as 
to how to structure his speech. The IC repeated verbatim what Papadopoulos instructed 
him to say and as soon as he did, dispatchers began to recall the appliances. Yet, 40 
minutes later, lower-ranking fire-officer on the fire-scene requested reinforcements and 
dispatchers began to re-dispatch appliances on the incident-grounds. Rather surprised by 
the progress of the response, Sotiriou, the deputy commander of the control room, 
telephoned Papadopoulos, who was clearly frustrated by what he perceived as the 
inefficiency of the IC:  
 
 
34 Sotiriou  Hey Papadopoulos. 
35 Papadopoulos Hey commander. 
36 Sotiriou  What’s going on? 
37 Papadopoulos How the hell should I know? I am mobilizing the vehicles again. 
The same ones; for the same incident. 
38 Sotiriou  Yea I can hear that. Has Kronos left the scene? 
39 Papadopoulos No, I am trying to get a hold of him but he is in the basement and 
he is not answering. 
40 Sotiriou  Yes it is turned off. Was he the one to cancel the mobilization? 
41 Papadopoulos He is the one   85
42 Sotiriou  Who is he? 
43 Papadopoulos Nikolaou. 
44 Sotiriou  What? Where… What is his [original] post? [When the IC 
occupies a post in administration, he/she becomes operational 
once every eight days].  
45 Papadopoulos I think he works at the Headquarters. I don’t know. 
46 Sotiriou  Have they managed to make their way to the fire? 
47 Papadopoulos He told me clearly it [the fire] is in an electric substation so he 
cancelled the vehicles. So I tell him that I am not cancelling the 
vehicles from up here. If you want announce that on the radio 
because I have no image, you do that. And he says ok. And he goes 
up and cancels all vehicles including the special unit carrying the 
respiratory devices. And then the 1.1 unit announces that they need 
more vehicles, reinforcements, and the special respiratory devices’ 
unit. 
48 Sotiriou  Now, are you sending the commander of the station? What have 
you sent? 
49 Papadopoulos Yes I call X at least to go over there. 
50 Sotiriou  Will he go? 
51 Papadopoulos Yes, yes, yes. 
52 Sotiriou  Ok. 
53 Papadopoulos Ok bye, bye, bye. 
 
 
After being dispatched on the fire-scene, the commander of the station placed a call to the 
control officer in order to ask directions as to how to proceed on the incident-grounds.  
 
 
54 CO  He [meaning the IC] is near the square. Where does he go from 
there? [The dispatcher shouted back the directions and the control 
officer continued his conversation with the IC:] so Z [addressing 
the IC by his first name] do you know where the Y Street is? You 
have to take that and you will have visual of the site. 
 
Shortly after, he re-contacted the control room via radio: 
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55 D    1.10; transmit.  
56 CC  It’s [the fire] in a basement. I am going down. We will not be in contact for a 
while.  
 
Papadopoulos received a telephone call from the Mayor’s office that was located near the 
affected building: 
 
57 Papadopoulos   Speaking.  
58 Mayor’s  office  Yes, good evening. Lieutenant colonel Panagiotou from the 
Mayor’s office.  
59 Papadopoulos  Yes, lieutenant colonel Papadopoulos. I am listening. 
60 Mayor’s  office  There is something… the Mayor asks about the “Square”. Is the 
“Square” on Panagoulis on fire? 
61 Papadopoulos  A power substation. It’s nothing. 
62 Mayor’s  office  Substation? Electric circuits? 
63 Papadopoulos  Yes, yes, in the second basement. It’s nothing. Our people are 
already there. There is no problem. We are waiting for the E.C. 
64   Mayor’s office  So there is no fire; nothing. It’s not worth… 
65 Papadopoulos  So what did they tell you that was burning to the grounds? 
[laughter] 
66 Mayor’s  office  That the “Square” is on fire from top to bottom. That all Hell 
broke loose.  
67 Papadopoulos  No, no, no, no. 
68 Mayor’s  office  So, nothing at all, eh? 
69 Papadopoulos  Yes, yes, yes. 
70 Mayor’s  office  Thank you very much. 
71 Papadopoulos  Bless you. 
72 Mayor’s  office  Bless you too.  
73 Papadopoulos  Bye.  
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Papadopoulos then called the commander of the control room in order to inform him about 
the progress of the response. Papadopoulos repeated the information. In addition to what 
he said to the lieutenant commander:  
 
 
74 Papadopoulos    […] although he [Nikolaou] has told me that the fire was 
located in an electric substation, now I am waiting at least for 
somebody else to report back to me.  
75 Commander  Who is that asshole? The entertainer [the IC had a degree in 
arts and, thus, he was labelled as ‘entertainer’]? 
76 Papadopoulos  We are fucked. 
 
 
A few minutes later, Papadopoulos is heard to exclaim while talking on the phone once 
more to Sitiriou: “Nobody talks to me. They are all in the basement” (77). A few minutes 
later, Papadopoulos was speaking on the phone to Arma, the manager of the appliances: 
 
 
78 Arma  What is going on out there? [He uses profanity] who is Kronos 15? 
79 Papadopoulos Never mind… 
 
 
On the way to the fire-scene, the district commander of Attica, Panou, a lieutenant general, 
called the control officer in order to ask whether the media were notified about the 
incident. As Papadopoulos was unaware about whether the media were informed by the 
press office he changed the direction of the conversation to a more practical matter: after 
retrieving and examining the blueprints of the building he found in the archives, he 
realized that there was a sprinkler system installed which was not activated. So 
Papadopoulos suggested that they activate it. But Panou pointed out that it would not be 
necessary. Papadopoulos then asked the dispatcher after the injured fire-fighter. The 
dispatcher was unaware about anything else but the station he worked in and so he 
contacted the station to find out the details.  
 
 
80 CO    [to  dispatcher] It’s Hell in there because of the water. Everything is flooded.   88
EC shouldn’t give power in the basement. 
 
 
Following Papadopoulos suggestion, the dispatcher called the Electric Company (EC) once 
more and then diverted the line to Papadopoulos in order for the latter to make the 
necessary arrangements with the Electric Company. When the emergency response was 
almost over and most of the resources were re-dispatched, Sotiriou called Papadopoulos:  
 
 
81 S  We acted foolishly from the very beginning. On the first place, he [Kronos 15] 
did not enter the basement. 
82 P  Are you serious? [continues swearing] 
83 S  He did not enter at all. If it wasn’t for the officer of the watch of the fire-station, 
Georgiou, is that it [his name]? 
84 P  Yes, Georgiou. 
85 S  We would have had a more serious problem. 
86 P  Is he [meaning: Nikolaou] insane [using profanity]? 
87 S  “I blew it”, that’s what he said. Anyway, f[…] it, f[…] it. 
 
 
On his way to the fire station, the commander of the station contacts Papadopoulos in order 
to ask after the injured fire-fighter. Papadopoulos commented that congratulations were in 
order for the fire-officer of the station who requested the re-mobilization “in time. Because 
if it wasn’t for him, we would have to face greater problems […]. Sometimes we must 
speak the truth.” Simultaneous emergencies and routine events were interwoven with the 
emergency response to “The Square Towers”.  
 
 
88 D    Colleague… 
89  Ops’ crew   Yes. 
90 D  Let’s go to Rose [area], there, at the gypsies. 
91 Ops’  crew  Rose, where exactly? 
92 D  At the school; over there.   89
93 Ops’  crew  Ah! Ok.  
94 D  The usual one; over there; you know. 
95 Ops’  crew  Ah! Ok.  
96 D  Ok? 
97 Ops’  crew  Ok. 
98 D  Thanks.  
 
 
One of the off-duty control employees called a colleague to change shifts. Personal 
communications continued during and after the emergency response with the control 
personnel that had no or very little tasks to perform engaging in private communicative 
interactions. 
 
 
Episode C: Factory on fire 
 
 
On the 27
th of January 2006, at 13:14, civilians called the CCC of the HFC and reported 
hearing explosions and seeing flames and thick black smoke coming out of the 1.000 m
2 
industrial facilities of a plastic manufacturer that was located in the centre of Piraeus. Such 
fire produces toxic smoke that, when released in the atmosphere in a densely inhabited 
area, maximizes health risks for bystanders and inhabitants. Fire in a densely populated 
area also increases the chances of the fire quickly spreading and damaging private property 
and infrastructure. The damages of such an incident could be considerable on both fronts. 
Between 13:18 and 13:59, seventeen fire-engines and five transport vehicles were 
dispatched on the fire scene. Two of the engines were immediately dispatched followed by 
another eight appliances within the next thirty minutes. During that time, the command 
structure was notified and six high-ranking officers arrived on the fire-scene.  
 
 
One hundred and seventeen minutes of recorded conversations revealed the events that 
took place from the moment the control room was informed about the fire until the time the 
emergency response was almost completed. This is how the information was transmitted   90
from the control operator who received it to the control dispatcher who instigated the 
mobilization: 
 
 
1 COP  George, take out [missing from utterance: “some fire-engines”] in Piraeus, 
Lampraki [missing from utterance: “street”] 1. 
2 D  What is it? 
3 COP  In factory [missing: “fire”]. 
4 D  In Red [name of the area]? 
5 COP  In Red. 
6 D  Is it a hoax? Because we get that a lot from there. 
7 COP  No, it was a big one from the neighbouring factory [uttered very calmly] 
8 D  What is on fire? What did they tell you? 
9 COP  The factory, they said; am not quite sure what it is, a former [missing from 
the utterance: “formerly operable”], they said etc… 
10 D  Ok, then. 
11 COP Ok… 
12 D  Ok… 
 
 
Conversations between control dispatchers and station operators: how control dispatchers 
commenced the emergency response based on the aforementioned information.  
 
 
13 D  Send your commander and the 12-ton [missing from utterance: “water-
pump”] 
14 SO  I cannot hear you [sirens in the background] 
15 D  Send your commander … [speaking slowly] 
16 SO  I am sorry, I am sorry, but I cannot hear you… 
17 D  Oh! Come on already! 
18 SO  I am sorry but I cannot hear anything.   91
19 D  Send you commander … [again uttered in dictation speed] 
20 SO  I cannot hear you. 
21 D  Do you not hear me?! 
22 SO  Now I can hear you [the sirens in the background have faded] 
23 D  Send off your commander and the 12-ton. 
24 SO  We do not have a driver for the 12-ton. 
25 D  Nothing? 
26 SO  No, nothing. 
27 D  Ok [uttered in a rather relaxed voice. But then he raises his voice] Your 
commander on the fire-scene. Do you not have another driver in [missing 
from utterance: “… the fire station?”] 
28 SO  There isn’t … [overlapping] 
29 D  Where is your superintendent? 
30 SO  Pardon? 
31 D  The superintendent responsible for the appliances. 
32 SO  Hold on… he is here, he is here. 
33 D  [raising his voice even more] Then tell him to drive the 12-ton to the incident! 
34 SO  Ok. 
 
Contacting yet another station operator: 
 
35 SO Speaking. 
36 D  The 2206 to go to Red. Lampraki 1. 
37 SO Repeat?  
38 D  [In dictation speed] The 2206 …  
39 SO Yes… 
40 D  To go to Red [speaking faster] Lampraki 1. 
41 SO To go to Red… [Taking his time to write down the information. Overlapping] 
42 D  The 2209 already! To go to Red!!   92
43 SO To go to Red you said … the rest? [Missing from utterance: “… of the 
address?”] 
44 D  Lampraki 1 [pause] for fire [missing: “…extinguishing a fire”]. 
45 SO What for? 
46 D  For fire! Lampraki 1. 
47 SO I cannot hear you well… [dictating to himself] Lampraki 1… 
(The dispatcher hangs up the phone on him). 
 
And a third one: 
 
48 SO  X
th of Piraeus, speaking. 
49 D  The Centre. 
50 SO  Yes. 
51 D  The 12-ton. 
52 SO  The 12-ton? 
53 D  Yes. 
54 SO  Where to? 
55 D  For Piraeus. Lambraki 1. 
56 SO  Lambraki. 
57 D  Yes, 1. Hey tell me: do you have a ladder or an aerial platform? 
58 SO  Yes, but I don’t have anybody to drive them. 
59 D  I don’t know what you are to do but you find drivers. 
60 SO  Me, finding drivers? 
61 D  Yes. 
62 SO  I will talk to the officer in charge.  
63 D  Now. 
64 SO  What? 
65 D  Now. 
66 SO  Yes now. When? Tomorrow?    93
[The dispatcher hangs up the phone on him].  
 
 
The same dispatcher commenting to another dispatcher: 
 
 
67 D    You watch what I am going to do to the X station […] I will file a report 
against him. 
 
Following up conversation between the same two employees, as in lines 48-66: 
 
68 D  Tell me. Did the 12-ton leave? 
69 SO  The 12-ton… you do not allow me to explain (overlapping) 
70 D  [Distressed] Do you people understand what we are telling you? Do you 
understand? 
71 SO  Yes.  
72 D  We told you to reappoint the crew for the first-response unit to the 12-ton and 
to send it over to the incident. 
73 SO  Yes, we know that. But [stumbling] 
74 D  I said [overlapping] The first-response, doesn’t it [fire appliance] have 
someone to drive it?  
75 SO  He is getting dressed now [stumbling] 
76 D  [The driver] from the morning shift. Don’t you get it already? [In a softer 
voice] from the morning shift. Don’t you get it? [overlapping] 
77 SO  Do you hear me? 
78 D  From the morning shift. Don’t you get it already? 
79 SO  Everybody has left and we are waiting for the afternoon driver to arrive. Do 
you hear me? 
80 D  Don’t have a first-response unit?  
81 SO  A first-response unit? The first-response unit has left? 
82 D  Where has it gone to? 
83 SO  Hasn’t it gone to the incident   94
84 D  The special unit for the respiratory devices has gone to the incident. Where 
are the rest? 
85 SO  Just wait a moment [confused] 
86 SO  [A few minutes later] discuss it with the on-duty station officer.  
87 SFO [A station officer – SFO – takes over the conversation]. Hello.  
88 D  Yes, hi.  
89 SFO We had one first-response fire-engine [in the station] and another one out. 
And we cancelled the first-response unit to crew the respiratory 
90 D  YOU PEOPLE! The first-response unit? Where is the first- response? 
91 SFO We cancelled the first-response to crew the respiratory. We did not have a 
respiratory in the morning.  
The conversation continues with one demanding and the other explaining the action 
they took to follow the requests made by the control room.  
92 D  I think we cannot understand each other. Ok then. Bye.  
 
 
A dispatcher requesting appliances from a fourth station operator:  
 
 
93 D  Hey tell me, do you have a 12-ton vehicle. 
94 SO A 12-ton? 
95 D  Yes. 
96 SO No. 
97 D  What do you have? 
98 SO A small vehicle. 
99 D  Don’t you have another driver? 
100 SO  No.  
101 D  What are you talking about? Are you deranged? 
102 SO  Why should we be deranged? 
103 D  Yea, ok, whatever. 
   95
 
In their effort to locate 12-ton appliances, dispatchers contacted at least five different 
stations near the affected area. One station commander, having made the necessary 
changes to the on-duty personnel, managed to form an operations’ unit so as to staff a 12-
ton appliance. He then contacted the dispatchers to inform them about these changes. The 
dispatcher who answered the call replied that it would be in the service’s best interest not 
to strip all stations from their appliances and to reserve resources for other emergencies. 
However, the station commander placed a call to the lieutenant commander of the CCC 
and repeated the exact same information. The lieutenant commander ordered the appliance 
to proceed on the fire-scene. A few hours into the emergency response, one of the 
operations’ units contacted the control dispatchers: 
 
 
104 Ops’  units  Is the fire under control? 
105 D    Your commander will let you know. 
 
 
Inter-organizational communication: How control employees conversed with other first-
responder organizations, in the following case with the EC that usually arrives on fire-
scenes so as to cut down the power of the affected building from the main power grid:  
 
 
106 D  Lambraki 1, in Red, for fire 
107 EC  [too much background noise] Speak louder. I cannot hear you at all. 
108 D  Hey EC. Lambraki 1, in Red, for fire. 
109 EC  Just a moment just a moment [addressing the personnel in the control room 
of the EC] Keep it down; keep it down [addressing the D]. Ok, tell me. 
110 D  Lambraki 1 [shouting at another control dispatcher: “Isn’t it 1?”] 
Lambraki 1 in Red. 
111 EC  Lambraki? 
112 D  1 in Red; fire in a factory [uttered fast] 
113 EC  Fire in a factory? 
114 D  Yes, yes [speaks on the radio on the same time]   96
115 EC  Lambraki 1 in Red. Ok.  
116 D  Yes, yes. 
117 EC  [whispering] Lambraki 1 … [louder]. Ok! 
The control dispatcher hangs up. 
 
 
Intra-organizational communication between a control officer and a control dispatcher: The 
control officer is forwarding the request made by one of the ICs on the fire-scene, Papas: 
 
 
118 D  Yes. 
119 CO  George, Papas said … 
120 D  Yes… 
121 CO  … To tell to the first fire-engine that will arrive to go through 
the… 
122 D  Yes… 
123 CO  …the Lambraki… 
124 D  Papas, [in a lower voice] Papas, call him and tell him that I 
cannot control the appliances from here. He needs… 
125 CO  You just say on the radio that the first appliances to arrive 
approach from Lambraki and the other from the next street.  
126 D  And how am I supposed to know which one arrive first? He is the 
one who is there and he can see them approaching. I do not have 
an image from over here. 
127 CO  Let him manage then. 
128 D  I cannot help him from over here. Call him and tell him that he 
should manage them. Arma is on its way there.  
129 CO  Ok then. Bye. 
[More discussions follow between control dispatchers and operations and station 
personnel with regard to involving the control dispatchers in managing the appliances 
on the fire-scene] 
 
   97
During the emergency response, one HFC employee who was working in the General 
Storages of the service was ordered to transport certain equipment on the fire-scene. Due to 
the fact that he had hardly used the radio in the past, he was reluctant to transmit any 
information via such channel. However, the lieutenant commander of the CCC, to whom 
he expressed his reservations, gave him the necessary instructions:  
 
 
130 LC  Centre for X vehicle, I am proceeding to the X street in order to carry the z 
material. 
 
 
Intra-organizational communication between control dispatcher and high-ranking IC (IC), 
answering to the code name Ares: 
 
 
131 IC  Please, this is not an acceptable situation. I am in the middle of the fire 
and I don’t have any appliances! Where are the appliances!? 
132 D  Ares, we are informing you that the appliances, the type that are attending 
the incident, have all gone for replenishment. They have used all their 
water supplies and they are going for replenishment. […] 
133 D  We are instructing them to return as soon as possible and we are giving 
them the nearest hydrants and different [hydrants] so as to come [and 
rejoin the extinguishing operations] as soon as possible. 
134 IC  [In a frantic state of mind, Ares screams] This is an unacceptable 
situation. I have no appliances on the fire grounds… Is anybody listening 
to Ares? [screaming, in a frantic state of mind] 
135 D  Received [roger]. 882 [type of appliance] [proceed] soon; soon. And try to 
talk [communicate]. Be in touch with Ares. 
136 IC  Centre [CCC] they will be in contact with you. Leave Ares out of it. Centre 
dispatch anything that is available in the city of Athens. 
137 IC  [To Arma] I want the water and the breathing apparatus coming in 
constantly. 
138 Arma [ To IC] They are coming commander, sir, they are coming. 
 
 
Intra-organizational communication between control officer A and operations’ officer B:  
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139 A  How is it [the emergency response] going? 
140 B   We were doing well. We are entering the burning building slowly. But the roof 
seems to be giving way… Nevertheless we are proceeding. 
141 A  Ok. Good. Bye. 
 
 
Intra-organizational communication between control officer D and operations’ officer C:  
 
 
142 D  Yes? 
143 C  John, my friend, I want you to close all the streets for me and… I need foam 
and let the higher in the hierarchy know what is going on and to proceed on-
site… many kisses. 
 
 
Intra-organizational communication between control officer A and operations’ officer C:  
 
 
144 A  How is it going? 
145 C  We need water to control it [the fire]. If we had water we would have finished 
already 
146 A  Arma must have been informed about the whereabouts of the hydrants 
 
 
Intra-organizational communication between an operations’ unit on its way to the incident 
and a control dispatcher: 
 
 
147 Ops’  unit  For Lambraki, is there access from Nikolopoulou [street]? 
148 CO  Excuse me?! 
149 Ops’  unit  From 2206. For Lambraki, is there access from Nikolopoulou? 
150 CO  [to control dispatcher] Is there access from Nikolopoulou for 
him?   99
151 D  Who?! 
152 CO  2206 
153 D  (inaudible) 
154 CO  [to ops’ unit] Yes, yes; there is access from Nikolopoulou. 
 
 
Random conversations: how fire-officers who are not involved in an emergency response 
arbitrarily contact the control room in order to seek information with regard to an 
emergency:  
 
  
155 D  Hey, Kostas. 
156  Random HFC employee  I am calling from Green [area in Athens]. I am not 
Kostas. I am Papadopoulos. Who is this? 
157 D  Speak up Papadopoulos.  
158  Random HFC employee  Is there a big fire in Brown? 
159 D  No, in Red. 
160  Random HFC employee  In Red? Where? 
161 D  There. In a factory. With plastics. 
162  Random HFC employee  Plastics? 
163 D  Yes. 
164  Random HFC employee  Ok. Kisses. 
 
 
While the control room was managing the industrial emergency, one of the provincial 
control rooms contacted the central control room to announce that a number of forest fires 
that broke out were still not under control. The lieutenant of the control room commented: 
 
 
165 LC  Tell them to wrap them up. We need an estimation of the damages. I don’t 
care if they [ fire-fighters on-site] finish what they are doing in five days… 
we just need an estimation, and they can close it in two days… they can even 
stay for 10 days, we don’t mind… as long as we avoid any malarkey… and   100
let them stay for three days even. 
 
 
Around the same time, another provincial control room announced that a fire erupted in a 
ginning house, the same facilities that were on fire a few weeks earlier, when the owner 
died in an effort to abandon the house: 
 
 
166 Senior  CO  Let the rest [of the facilities] burn and leave us be! 
167 Provincial  operator There seems to be no problem. Only smoke is coming out of 
the cotton wool.  
168 Senior  CO  That is what they said the other time as well and instead of 
those couple of vehicles they send, we eventually had to 
send 15! And a person died! 
 
 
Processing documentation is part of the routine events in which control and operations’ 
personnel are involved. After the emergency response, on his way back to the fire-station, 
the fire-officer assigned with completing the report, called the control room and asked the 
dispatchers to send him a fax with the list with the number and type of appliances 
dispatched on the fire-scene. The control dispatcher counter-proposed that on his return to 
the station, the officer should re-contact him and that he would then send the list with the 
appliances used on the incident-grounds. Moreover, during the emergency, control 
personnel were obliged to fax the newly published Service Order to the urban and rural fire 
station. Raging, the commander commented:  
 
 
169 CC  They [headquarters] have that imbecile X [the superintendent of the 
Headquarters secretariat at the time] to send off the orders. 
170 LC  Can’t the headquarters send their own orders? And they send them over 
to me now, look it’s already 14:30, on a Friday afternoon. They want to 
go away for the weekend, fuck it… And if these orders do not reach their 
destination by Monday it will be our fault. The Hell with these assholes! I 
am going to report them and I am going to send it down [to the 
Headquarters]. Ok, bye for now. 
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Episode D: Fire in a hotel 
 
 
On the 17
th of November 2005, a little after 19:30, the CCC received an increasing number 
of phone calls made by both civilians and police operators with regard to a fire that broke 
out in a hotel which was located in the centre of Athens. During that fire, an old man, who 
was trapped in one of the hotel rooms, died. On that same day, in that very area, 
approximately thirty minutes earlier, the HFC was involved in extinguishing small fires 
that erupted in the centre of Athens, which were deliberately caused by demonstrators 
celebrating the annual anniversary for the overthrow of junta. During such demonstrations, 
a number of parked cars are often set on fire and fire appliances as well as police vehicles 
and fire-engines that appear on-site are usually vandalized. Around the same time, due to 
extreme weather conditions, an increasing number of telephone calls made mostly by 
civilians alerted the control room. Sudden rainfall caused various parts of Athens to flood. 
Civilians were requesting assistance with regard to draining waters from basements or 
assisting individuals trapped in vehicles that were stuck in the middle of the flooded areas.  
 
 
The control room of the HFC was receiving contradictory information: others maintained 
that the fire broke out on the first, others on the third, floor. As a result, nobody knew 
whether the affected floor or floors were properly evacuated by the occupants of the hotel 
rooms. As soon as the dispatcher got hold of the information, he dispatched the IC on-
scene: 
 
 
1 Kronos-15  We are going to University street, to a hotel.  
2 D  Yes… 
3 Kronos-15  Information is contradictory. Either the 2
nd or 3
rd floor, the police says, 
they see smoke coming out. And so says the owner. 
4 D  Ok.  
5 Kronos-15  Ok? 
6 D    Yes.  
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The commander of the fire-station was already on the firegrounds, when one of the on-duty 
control officers called to ask for information concerning the affected building: 
 
 
7 SO Tell me, what’s on fire. 
8 CO  Hotel. The third floor. 
9 SO The third floor? The commander told me it was the fourth.  
10 CO Kronos driver told me that there were only three floors. 
11 SO  Ok, ok. What’s on fire?  
12 CO […]  
13 SO  How many appliances do we have? 
14 CO One, two, three, four… eight. 
15 SO  Eight. Ok then.  
 
 
In addition, control employees were receiving information that due to the increasing 
vandalisms the police had cut off many of the main roads in the city centre and the traffic 
was aggravated. On its way to the incident, at least three of the operations’ units called the 
control to inform them about their whereabouts: 
 
 
16 Ops’  unit  We are approaching but the traffic is heavy. 
 
 
Although the fire appliances were dispatched immediately on the fire scene, they failed to 
reach the incident-grounds promptly. Being aware of the inevitable delay, fire-fighters 
launched their operations as soon as they reached the site and temporarily cut off their 
communication with the control room as redundant. As a result, control personnel had very 
little knowledge with regard to the progress of the operations on-site.  
 
 
When the senior control officer contacted the CCC lieutenant commander to report on the 
incident, he made an inappropriate remark about the hotel being a “house of ill repute”. He   103
made an assumption based on the hotel’s location. During their conversation, the lieutenant 
commander commented that the control commander was in contact with the deputy chief 
fire-officer, exchanging information, assessing the emergency and planning the response. 
All other higher- and lower-ranking employees were on a need-to-know basis and virtually 
excluded from the decision-making process between the two high-ranking officers. The 
only HFC employees who were up-to-date about the progress of the response, were the 
personnel of the press office because of their involvement with the media.  
 
 
Not long after the IC had reached the scene, the commander of the CCC called his mobile. 
As the IC was attending to the fire-fighting operations, he had left his mobile with his 
driver, an eligible fire-fighter. According to the audio archive, the commander of the CCC 
intended to pass on information and requested details about the progress of the response. 
Nonetheless, as soon as the commander of the CCC realized that he was on the phone with 
a fire-fighter, he deliberately interrupted the information exchange and simply left a 
message for the IC to return his phone call. More than half an hour into the emergency 
response, control personnel were kept into the dark about the name of the hotel where the 
fire erupted as well as the number of floors the hotel had.  
 
 
17 CC  [to the control officer] Do we know the name of the hotel? 
18 CO  [to the dispatchers] Do we know the name of the hotel? 
19 D [amongst them] Do we know the name of the hotel? 
20 D   [to the control officer] No. 
21 CO  Ok.  
 
 
One of the control dispatchers contacted one of the fire-station operators and requested the 
telephone number of the on-duty operations’ officer of the station. Yet, the operator was 
unable to meet the request. The control officer retrieved the phone-number from his note-
pad. Eventually, one of the control officers contacted the driver of the IC and requested 
this information. The driver was unable to give them the name of the hotel but counted out 
loud the floors of the building. The emergency response was further aggravated by the fact 
that there was no unified command on the scene and different operations’ officers were   104
giving fire-fighters different, often contradictory, orders. As a result, fire-fighting crews 
were acting independently of the order they were given, which resulted in a lack of 
coordination.  
 
 
22 PO What’s going on? 
23 CO What’ going on? Mayhem. Wait. [On-radio transmission of inaudible 
information]. I will call you back. 
24 PO Can’t you tell me now? 
25 CO No it’s mayhem in here. 
 
 
As soon as the emergency response was over, one of the operations’ officers contacted one 
of the control officers and requested that some operations’ units return to their fire-stations 
in order to change out of their wet clothes. The control officer replied that he would 
contact the operations’ officer as soon as he made a decision. Then he called the fire 
station to ask whether there were any replacements for the operations’ unit. After uttering 
his request, the station operator replied: 
 
 
26 SO  And who might you be, pal? 
 
 
On another front, that of the effects of the extreme weather conditions (spade phenomena), 
a station commander placed a call to one of the control officers: 
 
 
27 CO  Speaking.  
28 SO  Hi Yannis. How are you? 
29 CO  Fine, fine, George. 
30 SC  How is it going with the incidents, there, in Red [name of area]? 
31 CO  We’ve got more than 40.  
32 SC  Yes, ok… let me tell you something… [hesitating]   105
33 CO  Yes… 
34 SC  Ehhhhhh…. One of my appliances is going… [Interrupted by Yannis but 
inaudible what Yannis is saying].  
35 CO  They [control personnel]… ehhh…. have given it [the appliance’s 
itinerary]… ehhh… but there is a person I know…. from the navy... 
ehhh… a captain, and… ehhh… I have given them [the crew of the 
appliance] the address… ehhh… 
36 CO  Wait just a moment George… Speaking [the dispatcher to Yannis: “The 
commander of the fire Academy”]  
37 CO  Yes, commander, sir, this is 
Yannis Papadopoulos. How are 
you? 
38  Commander of  
the Fire 
Academy 
Hi Yannis, how are you? 
39 CO  I am fine, I am fine and you? 
40 CFA  Who called the Academy and 
gave the order for the cadets to 
leave? 
41 CO  Not for the cadets to leave. You 
had a stand by unit, did you not? 
42 CFA  Stand-by units come and go… 
43 CO  Apart from the unit you had in 
the Academy… 
44 CFA  Yes… 
45 CO  Did you have another unit in 
Athens? 
46 CFA  Tell what was the order given? 
47 CO  My commander told me that the 
stand-by units are to be dismissed.
48 CFA  Ok. Case closed.  
49 CO  Ok? 
50 CFA  Ok, bye. 
51 CO  Ok, good bye sir. 
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52 SC  Yes. It is near the Military Academy. One of my appliances is moving 
towards that area… 
53 CO  Yes? 
54 SC  And I told them to go over there. It is Artemis street … 
55 CO  Yes, I understood, I understood. What’s wrong with him? 
56 SC  What? 
57 CO  What’s wrong with him? 
58 SC  Nothing. He flooded. 
59 CO  Has he called it in? 
60 SC  Yes he has. 
61 CO  No he hasn’t. I can’t see it in here. 
62 SC  Artemis St. 
63 CO  No it isn’t in here. 
64 SC  Where did that asshole report it? 
65 CO  No, wait. He has reported it and we have already dispatched an 
appliance. It is in progress. 
66 SC  Is it in progress? 
67 CO  Yes.  
68 SC  Ok then. 
69 CO  Ok. [The dialogue continues for a few more seconds with greetings 
between the officers]  
 
 
Due to the multiplicity of emergencies, cadets were recalled to report to their stations. 
When the recall order was over, the CCC failed to inform the cadets. Failure to inform all 
station where cadets were standing-by resulted in an increasing number of individual 
phone calls by the cadets to the CCC for this matter. After receiving an order from the 
control commander, another control officer contacted a station operator in order to 
mobilize more units to respond to the incidents caused by the spate phenomena:  
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70 CO  The commander told us not to send them. 
71 SO  Send the appliances. Send them.  
72 CO  You want to look into that?... Ah! Ok then. Send them. Thank you.  
73 SO  Have got the emergencies down? 
74 CO  I do not know. The list is with the lieutenant commander inside [his 
office]. Is it convenient for you to give them to me again in case he has 
thrown it [the list] away? The first was… 
75 SO  Look for it first and then… it a mayhem here. [overlapping]  
 
 
At another front, civilians were calling the 1-9-9 emergency-number and requesting 
assistance. The following dialogue took place between a civilian and a control operator 
during a minor emergency with regard to a fire erupting in a public building: 
 
 
76 COP  Wait a moment, please. I have to write down the address you are giving 
me (CCC of the HFC operator) 
77 Civilian  But I can’t calm down. I am panicking. 
78 COP  Yes, but I have to take down the address. So calm down and repeat it! 
 
 
In the midst of this turbulence, the operators of the CCC were involved in conversations 
with civilians who demanded to be assisted with situations that the HFC had very little or 
no jurisdiction. In at least one case, the HFC could not drain the water from the basement 
of a house. As the water level remained low despite the continuation of the spate 
phenomena (bad weather conditions), the caller who requested the assistance of the fire 
service replied with sarcasm: “You won’t come tonight to drain the water which is five cm 
then you will come tomorrow when it will be over 15 cm!” One of the CCC employees had 
explained to her that the equipment would not be of any use with such low water levels.  
 
 
On another front, the crew of the fire-engine on the demonstrations-scene contacted one of 
the control officers in order to request its re-dispatching to the station due to the fact that 
all police vehicles were removed from the scene. The officer replied that only the deputy   108
chief could give such an order but the control officer would not interrupt him, as he was 
involved in the emergency response to the hotel. And so he ordered the unit to stay put. 
After a significant amount of time went by, the former called the police in order to seeking 
information concerning the mobilization of the police units in the area where the fire-
fighting vehicles remained unguarded. On the other end of the line, the officer who 
answered the phone diverted the call to his superintendent, commenting:  
 
 
79 Police  officer  A fire person with the rank of lieutenant colonel needs to speak 
to you because he wants to make a decision. 
 
 
These simultaneous crises led the senior control officer to comment upon the inadequate 
tracking of the resources deployed: “We have lost the ball!” (80). During all this time, a 
couple of vehicles were reported to have broken down on their way to the incident. The 
way the control operators diverted the incoming phone-calls to the rest of the control 
personnel caused frustration. During another incident, the operations’ unit feared for a gas 
leak. They contacted the control and asked whether the SGCP had been notified. The 
control officer who took the call replied that they had been informed but as soon as the 
officer ended the conversation it was made clear that the SGCP had not been notified. 
Towards the end of the emergency response to the hotel and when the demonstrations 
began to settle:  
 
 
81 CO Are you going to dismiss Papas? 
82 LC Send him away. Do whatever you want with him 
83 CO He is getting on my nerves. Hotel, apartments, you name it… 
84 LC It’s not his fault. 
85 CO Whose fault is it? 
86 LC So what’s up 
87 CO I am waiting for somebody to arrive [meaning: on-scene]. Loads of 
smoke, they say… 
88 LC Ok.    109
89 CO We’ll see. I will let you know. 
 
 
Episode E: The case of the of the Cypriot 737 - 300 Boeing air crash  
 
 
On the 14
th of August 2005, at 12:06, a 737-300 Boeing of the Cypriot airliner “Helios” 
carrying 115 passengers and six crew members, crashed into a hill near Athens. It was the 
second highest death-toll for an aviation accident in 2005. The Cypriot Boeing was 
scheduled to depart from Larnaca to Prague via Athens at 09:00. It left the airport at 09:07. 
At 09:37, it entered Greek airspace. At 10:07 all communications broke off. Twenty five 
minutes later, a renegade alert was issued. At 11:20 two F16 fighters (type of military 
aircraft) intercepted the airplane and forty five minutes later the commuter aircraft crashed 
on the Varnava hill, in the area of Grammatiko, in Attica. Numerous scenarios 
overwhelmed both the emergency centres of the fire-responder organizations and, soon 
after, the media. The initial scenario of hijacking was ruled out by the Greek Ministry of 
Foreign Affaires, although an altered photograph picturing an F16 taking down the 
commuter airplane made the front pages of some of the Athenian newspapers. It is now 
believed that while airborne the plane experienced a fatal problem in the process of 
pressurization. The loss of cabin pressure generated an environment of extreme cold and 
lack of oxygen that according to the specialists may have probably led to the passengers’ 
death before the crash.  
 
 
The HFC was first notified about the situation at 11:11. A second call was made at 11:36 
before the third call alerted the control room of the HFC, a minute after the plane crashed. 
Between the first and third calls, the control room had two operations’ units standing by in 
the wider airport area. In the meantime, the HFC emergency centre notified the control 
room of the ambulance service about the potential emergency. After the plane crashed, it 
took the operations’ units 30 minutes to locate the remains and proceed on-site. Between 
12:04 and 17:50, thirty one fire-fighting appliances and seven rescue units were mobilized. 
Fifty-eight operational and transport vehicles spread over the crash-scene searching for 
survivors, accumulating body-parts and putting out the fire that was rapidly burning across 
the nearby forest area maintained by the jet fuels. 
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During this episode, civilians were contacting control personnel; control personnel were in 
touch with other first-responder organizations and HFC employees were contacting each 
other. These internal communications took place among employees of the control room, 
between operations and control employees, control personnel and employees from the 
regional and local, urban and rural fire stations, between control personnel and the press 
office employees, and between control personnel and employees working in the 
headquarters. Between an individual – later identified as one of the fire-fighters employed 
at the airport fire station – and one of the control operators: 
  
 
1  Fire-fighter from the 
airport fire station 
(FF) 
Yes, hello. I am calling from the Eleftherios Venizelos 
airport… 
2 COP  Yes… 
3 FF  We were notified by the tower that two fighting aircrafts 
are flying next to the airplane right this moment… and 
they are seeing the pilots in the cock pit wearing masks 
and leaning forward… and there is lack of communication 
(overlapping)… 
4 COP  Hold on a moment. I will connect you to the officer in 
charge… Wait a moment. 
5 FF  Yes, yes… 
 
 
The call was diverted to one the on-duty control officers, one of the actual managers of the 
information: 
 
 
6 FF Hello. I am calling from Elefterios Venizelos. Can I have your name? 
7 CO Officer Yannou. 
8 FF We were notified by the tower that two fighting aircrafts are flying next to 
the airplane right this moment… and they are seeing the pilots in the cock 
pit wearing masks and leaning forward… and there is lack of 
communication. 
9 CO Have you contacted us before for this incident? 
10 FF  Yes, yes, we called earlier [pause]  
An airplane flying to Athens from Larnaca… 
11 CO  Yes… 
12 FF  …is experiencing lack of communication and problems with the cooling 
system 
13 CO  Is the plane flying right at this moment? 
14 FF  Yes, yes. 
15 CO  And there came… went… the fighters… 
16 FF  Yes, and they are right beside it.   111
17 CO  Yes? 
18 FF  And there is no communication with the tower.  
19 CO  And what do they see? You mentioned something concerning the pilots. 
20 FF  Yes, they [the subject remains undefined] said that the pilots are leaning 
forward. 
21 CO  How many passengers was/is that carrying? 
22 FF  121. It’s a Boeing (overlapping) [then they pause for a few seconds before 
the control officer asks what kind of plans they are laying out]. 
23 FF  Eh… nothing we are just sitting here… waiting… 
24 CO  Have you told your commander? 
25 FF  Yes, yes, yes. 
26 CO  He knows, eh? 
27 FF  Yeah, sure… 
28 CO  Ok, do you want something from us? 
29 FF  No I am just letting you know. 
30 CO  Very well, very well… 
31 FF  Ok? 
32 CO  Thank you very much. 
33 FF  You are welcome. 
 
 
Intra-organizational communication between one on-duty control officer and the lieutenant 
commander A of the control room:  
 
 
34 CO  Serious problem at Spata [pause]. A Cypriot airliner is approaching with 
serious damage in the cooling system [pause. Then addressing another CO] 
Yannis, what else did the … [he forgets who gave the information to Yannis] 
tell you? 
35 A  What is the nature of the damage and what does the airport needs from us to 
do? 
36 CO  [he repeats almost verbatim what Yannis told him] 
37 A  And they [the pilots of the fighting aircrafts] saw the pilots [of the Boeing] 
unconscious? 
38 CO  Two fighting aircrafts. From the sides [meaning: both fighters flying from 
each side of the commuter plane]. Ours. 
 
 
One of the control officers informs a station commander: “There must be a very serious 
incident […] it concerns a plane crash” (39). Intra-organizational communication between 
one on-duty control officer and the press office of the HFC: 
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40 PO  Hey there! Is everything fine? Do we have something at Venizelos? 
41 CO  We have something rather serious… wait the superintendent just contacted 
them… [overlapping, loud laughter and noise in the background]  
42 PO  Tell me what exactly is it about so I can tell them [missing: the journalists] 
43 CO  What have you heard? 
44 PO  Nothing. They [the journalists] just telephoned me and asked me if there is 
something. He [the journalist] doesn’t know anything. What is it? 
45 CO  [Puts the press office on hold and addresses the senior CO] Should I tell the 
press office superintendent? Excuse me Mr X [his “superintendent”]. What 
I told you did he himself tell you, as well? [This does not make much sense 
in Greek either. What, after a careful examination of the dialogues, appears 
to have happened is that this officer asked his superintendent whether his 
superintendent was given the same this junior officer had provided a little 
while before this conversation took place. What develops here is a 
conversation within the conversation: seeking advice to inform the press 
office and on the same time seeking verification about what the junior had 
said to the senior a few minutes before. Then the officer provides the same 
information almost verbatim to the press office employee]. 
The 2
nd follow up call: 
46 PO  There is no vehicle on-site, isn’t that so? 
47 CO  What on earth are you talking about? It is really high up! 34.000 ft up! The 
plane is in the air. 
48 PO  A! It is flying! I thought it was down! And you said that two more passed 
by… aircrafts? (Overlapping). And said that they have fainted? 
49 CO  Military aircrafts yes… they have fainted. Leaning forward, anyway. 
50 PO  I got it. Ok. Done. 
51 CO  We don’t know what… 
52 PO  Ok. Ok. 
In the 3
rd conversation, the distortion continues 
53 PO  Were they our Canadair that went by and saw them? 
 
 
Communication between senior fire-officer and the operator of a fire station located in the 
area near the crash-site: 
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54 D  Haven’t you had a call [yet] concerning a plane crash? 
55 SO  Us! No for God’s sake! 
 
 
Communication between a senior A and a junior B control fire-officer: 
 
 
56 B  Commander, sir. 
57 A  Yannis, have you notified the SGCP about this incident? 
58 B  … For this incident, no. 
59 A  Look into that, look into that! 
60 B  Right away, right away. 
61 A  Let them know as well. We have notified the Secretary GCP. But the Secretariat, 
their CCC… the people should know. 
62 B  Right away, right away. 
63 A  Do it now! 
 
 
Control employees neglected to inform the SGCP about the information they received and 
the plans they laid out. They had, however, informed the Secretary GCP, who was a former 
fire chief. After the plane-crash, a conversation between one CO and two employees of the 
SGCP took place: 
 
 
64 SGCP-A  Secretariat GCP, speaking. 
65 CO  Hello fellows. From the CCC. 
66 SGCP-A  Hello, [this is] Georgiou [speaking]. 
67 CO  Hello. It’s officer Papas. 
68 SGCP-A  Yes. 
69 CO  Eh…eh…eh… I imagine that you have been informed about the plane, 
isn’t that so? 
70 SGCP-A  Yes, yes, we have and we have contacted the airport.   114
71 CO  Eh…eh… Will you need anything from us? 
72 SGCP-A  Not at the moment, as [the plane] is in the process of landing. 
73 CO  It has crashed, they said… 
74 SGCP-A  It’s DOWN?... Hey Zeus [Georgiou talks to his superintendent off the 
line], it’s down … [to officer Papas] Who told you that? I have spoken 
[the object of the verb was not identified] a little while ago. Who has 
told you that? 
75  CO  [Papas is speaking to someone in the CCC] it was seen by one of the 
ops’ units in the area, right? 
76 SGCP-A  Wait a moment, wait a moment… [confusion about who is talking to 
whom] 
77 CO  Unfortunately, we have just been told by one of the units that the plane 
crashed.  
78 SGCP-A  Ah! Mr Zeus, the CCC of the HFC says that the plane crashed 
[Georgiou talking to somebody in the SGCP again]. 
79 SGCP-B  Yes, can you hear me? [Now Zeus is continuing with the 
conversation]. 
80 CO  Of course. 
81 SGCP-B  I spoke to the police, it is just a minute ago, and they told me that it 
[probably meaning the airplane] is in communication with the tower 
e…e…e… the plane and that it is in the process of landing. (Civil 
Protection)  
82 CO  It has crashed in Grammatiko so they say… 
83 SGCP-B  Between Grammatiko and Varnava?  
84 CO  Yes… 
85 SGCP-B  Who are you?  
86 CO  Lieutenant Papas. 
87 SGCP-B  Mr. Papas? 
88 CO  Now I, too, am lost.  
89 SGCP-B  What do I know? I lost my mind… well… ok, we will communicate 
again. Hang up.  
90 CO  Yes, yes, thank you very much. 
91 SGCP-B  Yes, yes, bye, bye, bye.  
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After the crash, numerous other communications take place, between a control officer and 
HFC doctor: 
 
 
92  CO  [After introducing himself and greeting the doctor] To inform 
you. He [meaning: the lieutenant commander] asked us to send a 
doctor on-site [crash-site]. We are facing an incident concerning a 
plane that crashed; I don’t know if you know anything about it. 
93 Doctor    I just heard. 
94 CO  So you heard. Mr. Andreou and the fire chief are on-site. 
 
 
Meanwhile, the highest-ranking on-duty control officer contacts the lieutenant commander 
of the CCC: “The commander of the airport fire station will arrive on-site shortly and then 
we will have a better image of what’s happening” (95). During the emergency response, 
one of the HFC engineers contacted the CCC so as to request details with regard to the 
incident.  
 
 
96 CO  Kronos 14 is going on-site. If I need you I will call you. 
97 Specialist  Ok [then]. What kind of an airplane is it? 
98 CO  It is a Boeing 737 from a Cypriot airline. 
99 Specialist  Hey, now … [I] need to go [she addresses the CCC officer by his first 
name]. It is a subject I am very keen on. 
100 CO  I’ll talk to the command structure and I will call you back. 
 
 
Kronos-14 is the code name of the field officer who supervises the sector where the plane 
crash occurred. When the specialist fire-officer contacted the CCC, the officer was 
appointed to supervise another sector. The specialist suggested being reassigned to the 
crash-site. However, no procedures indicate that a specialist fire-officer should be on the 
incident-grounds, despite the logical expectations to the contrary. The topic of the 
conversation that took place between the control officer and the control commander was 
the request of the specialist:   116
 
 101 CO  Kronos 12 is [the name of the officer]. Can [the officer] go over there? 
102 CC  Who else is there? That is out of [the officer’s] jurisdiction. 
103 CO  I know it is. But because… because of [the officer’s] specialization. 
104 CC  What does specialization have to do with this? No. And that’s final. Bye. 
 
 
After contacting the CCC commander, the CCC officer forwarded the commander’s reply 
to the specialist’s request. Once more, when answering the call, the specialist addressed the 
senior CCC officer by his first name, whereas he addressed the specialist in a rather formal 
way: 
 
 
105 Specialist Now, in my opinion, the service has one qualified expert and I should 
be on my way there. But now I am going back to [the specialist’s 
sector] Mr. A [the chemist fire-officer who gave the information about 
the wings of the plane containing uranium] is a chemical engineer. 
He has no connection to airplanes. […] I could have been replaced by 
Z [Kronos 14] here [the specialist’s sector] and I could have gone 
there [the incident-grounds]. That is MY job. There will be one 
accident in my career for me to help with … Anyway… it is the chief 
who has to order this now [she expresses her feeling that the chief 
wouldn’t agree with her being on-site] […] Anyway, I will be talking 
to [another aeronautical engineer] so as to get all the necessary 
information [verify the risks presented by the aircraft to the 
operations’ personnel].  
 
 
Communication between a control officer and an operations’ officer, when conversing with 
regard to the wings of the airplane containing uranium: 
 
 
106 Ops’  officer  It would be best for us to let the people working on the wreckage 
know so as not to do anything without protection. 
107 CO  We have informed our superiors repeatedly. 
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In the meantime, one of the control officers contacts the specialist so as to reply to her 
request:  
 
 
108 CO  Ms [first name]. 
109 Specialist  Tell A. (she is calling him by his first name even though she 
shouldn’t because she is a captain and he is a lieutenant colonel) 
110 CO  You are not to go. 
111 Specialist  Good. Then I remain in my sector. 
112 CO  Yes, yes. 
113 Specialist  A, has it crashed on land or in the sea? 
114 CO  (he gives the location) 
115 Specialist  There are no survivors (?). Do we know such things? 
116 CO  I do not know, I do not know. Don’t know about these things. 
117 Specialist  The TV is saying that it was hijacking? 
118 CO  I do not know, I do not know. 
119 Specialist  Ok. 
120 CO  This is not in my preoccupation, at the time being. What I am 
interested in is to mobilize my units. 
121 Specialist  Ok, right. If the helicopter is needed, the Super Puma is good to 
go.  
122 CO  Ok, have a nice day. 
123 Specialist  Ok bye. 
 
 
In the meantime, one of the control officers contacted one of the senior operations’ 
commander on-site, to verify the resources the latter mobilized:  
 
 
124 Commander  Orders [EMAK commander] 
125 CO  How many people are going on the site, Mr. […]   118
126 Commander  17 
127 CO  Commander [?] 
128 Commander  17, 17 
129 CO  […] 
130 Commander  17 people are going on-site 
 
 
During one of the conversations the senior on-duty control officer had with the ambulance 
service, he was stunned when a male operator with an effeminate voice answered the 
phone. The CO addressed him adding both female and male suffixes to the nouns and the 
pronouns. At some point he also addressed him as “madam”. In addition to this 
linguistically expressed confusion and whilst waiting to be connected to one of the 
managers in the ambulance service, he made insulting remarks about the sexuality of the 
operator. He shouted his comments to one of the dispatchers, unaware that in many 
occasions when the call is being put on hold, that doesn’t necessarily mean that the voice 
of the person who is being put on hold is not heard by the one that puts him/ her on hold. 
At that precise moment the ambulance service operator picked up the line again only to 
hear the last few mockeries of the control officer. As soon as the CO realized the situation, 
he decided to address the operator as “colleague” in order to redeem himself. The operator 
diverted the phone call to his superintendent. The CO introduced himself as the “fire-
officer of the CCC” even if he was one of the five fire-officers working in the CCC at the 
time. Similarly, the ambulance service’s superintendent announced: “I am the vice 
president of the emergency health services.” The rest of the conversation took place as 
follows: 
 
 
131 CO  As far as the body bags are concerned… 
132 Manager    What about them? 
133 CO  About the body bags. Can you provide them? 
134 Manager  But, yes… who else [would]? Are you there yet? 
135 CO  We are there. We are trying to reach the site.  
136 Manager  Tell me, please, because I have 30 units on the way, how can I get 
them there sooner?   119
 
When a police officer contacted the HFC CCC to ask about the number of the bodies 
retrieved from the crash-scene, his request was processed as follows: the police officer 
contacted a control operator. His call was then diverted to a junior control officer. The 
latter, not knowing the answer contacted the senior control officer who referred him to the 
control commander. The junior control officer called the commander, who replied to his 
question. Then the junior control officer contacted the police officer to provide him with 
the information he requested. Only then did the police officer inform him that he had 
already contacted the deputy chief fire-officer. Between the lieutenant commander of the 
control room and a senior control officer: 
 
 
137 CO  Yes commander (although he is the lieutenant commander) 
138 LC    Is The Special Forces Unit calling in more people to assume 
duties? 
139 CO  No, they didn’t tell me anything like this. 
140 LC  Call them to call more people in. To call people in. We need more 
people in. 
141 CO  Yes, do we need seasonal employees? 
142 LC  NOOOO!!! What’s their business [involvement with the 
professionals]? 
143 CO  Bye. 
144 LC  Bye. 
 
 
Commenting about the forest fire that erupted because of the plane-crash, one of the senior 
control officers conversed with the lieutenant commander of the HFC control room: 
 
 
145 CO  I think it was caused by the kerosene. 
146 LC  Bullshit. We went… they went to the gully, where the fire began 
to burn. And while we needed one cubic litre of water more [in 
order to put it out], the vehicle that was sent on-site to provide 
that water fell over the cliff. After that, no other vehicle could go 
through that place. And the first one runs out of water. And that   120
was the reason why the fire was out of control. And it took the 
fire planes a long time before they could take off and try to reach 
the fire from another side. As a result 300 square meters were 
destroyed. The media representations were good and everybody 
that spoke. Everything went well. These things are never going to 
go away. Every time something will happen that will make it go 
bad, what can we do? 
 
 
During the emergency response, the on-duty operator of one of the fire stations involved in 
the response had a brief conversation with one of the senior fire-officers with regard to 
whether they had collected all the body-bags available in the fire station to transfer on the 
rescue-grounds. The following were the introductory lines in the brief discussion that 
followed. The conversation ended with a 2-minute and 11-second chat about their holidays, 
their activities during their vacation, their future vacation, gossip about those who were 
getting married and divorced, and the plane crash:  
 
 
147 SO  What is it you want… you black cat… you faggot… you 
asshole… you even crashed an airplane! 
148 CO  It was meant to be. 
149 SO  What was meant to be? 
 
 
Towards the end of the mobilization, one of the control officers contacted the operations’ 
officer by the code name Arma so as to account for the appliances on-site. In order to show 
his efficiency in keeping track of the fire-engines and the rescue appliances during the 
pandemonium of the response, the latter added:  
 
 
150 CO  Eh! Like an old whore walking the streets! 
 
 
However, not all operations’ units were accounted for. One of the senior operations’ 
officers on the rescue-scene telephoned one of the control officers so as to find out where 
some of the units under his command were located: 
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151  Ops’ officer   Where the hell are they? The mother loses her child and the child 
loses its mother out here! 
 
 
During the rescue and recovery operations, control personnel had to deal with a number of 
other simultaneous emergencies, mostly forest fires, erupting in various parts of Greece. In 
one of those forest fires, an operations sub-officer in a southern province, responsible for 
fire-fighting operations, requested a water-bomber helicopter. The control officer was 
surprised when he realised that the sub-officer was unaware that that province had a 
helicopter at the local fire service’s disposal and that the Athenian control room did not 
mediate the communication between the chopper and the operations’ units on-site: 
 
 
152 CO  My God! 
153 Sub-officer  Listen here I am just a sub-officer! 
154 CO  That means that you shouldn’t know… 
155 Sub-officer  I have called my superintendent [overlapping] 
156 CO  But you are in charge now. What does that mean? That you 
shouldn’t know how to deal with this? 
 
 
In the meantime, one of the other control officers was dealing with a routine call. A 
military officer requested a fire-engine to be present in the landing of a military carrier in 
the barracks. So, the control officer contacted the nearest fire station to request a unit to 
this end: 
 
 
157 CO  An appliance to the Brown [the name of the base]  
158 SO  Where? 
159 CO  Brown. 
160 SO  Brown? 
161 CO  Brown in Red [the name of the area where the base is located] 
162 SO  [While writing it down he dictates to himself] Brown…   122
163 CO  Isn’t it in Red? 
164 SO  Yes… 
165 CO  Eh? 
166 SO  Yes. 
 
 
An incident involving a gas leak alerted one of the control officers when he realized that 
the fire-fighters were not fully aware of how to manage the response. So, he commented: 
 
 
167 CO  Don’t you light any Marlboros there! We should be careful, ok? 
When you get there, I want to talk to the officer in charge 
 
 
This remark referred to an incident that occurred on the 28
th of June 2001, when a seasonal 
fire-fighter died when during refilling the fire-engine he was boarding, he put on his lighter 
near the fuel tank so as see if it was filled.  
 
 
During a forest fire in a Greek island, a local politician called 1-9-9. The politician 
introduced himself and began to describe the situation. He provided directions using 
landmarks, which only the local people could understand. He was unaware that his call was 
diverted to the Athenian control room so he assumed that the person he spoke to was 
familiar with the location and the topology of the place. However the control officer had 
apparently not understood who he was talking to and kept on listening to the information 
provided without interrupting his communicator so as to clarify the situation. More than a 
minute passed before any of them realized that they had misunderstood each other. 
Towards the end of the conversation, the control officer commented that there was nothing 
they could do since they were attending the crash incident. After the conversation ended, 
this senior control officer appointed a junior officer to monitor the progress of the 
aforementioned forest fire. Yet when the commander contacted the senior control officer 
and requested about the progress of the response, the latter mentioned that the other officer 
was following the progress of the emergency response. However, the commander, who had 
apparently developed a negative disposition towards the junior officer, commented:  
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168  CC   [Talking about the junior officer and addressing the senior control 
officer:] He is incompetent […] he sleeps like a horse: standing on his four 
feet. 
 
 
The above conversation was followed by another one between the control commander and 
the senior control officer, who has previously diverted the politician’s phone call to the 
commander: 
 
 
169 CC    Don’t ever patch me through to a politician again, I am going to hung you 
upside down […] where did he know me from, eh? Have we ever had coffee 
together? […] he has been busting my balls. 
 
 
On a second telephone line, the operations’ officer in charge of the fire-fighting operations 
requested additional fire-fighters to put out the fire. He communicated his request to the 
senior control officer, who spoke about it to the CCC lieutenant commander who decided 
with regard to the reinforcements. The senior control officer then called the operations’ 
officer but was unable to reach him. In the meantime, the lieutenant control commander 
contacted the operations’ officer. The senior control officer was not informed about this 
conduct so he called the lieutenant commander once more to request the whereabouts of 
the operations’ officer. It was only then that the lieutenant commander informed him about 
the contact he had already had with the operations’ officer.  
 
 
These episodes illustrate the individual and collective performances of the fire-fighting 
personnel and the other first-responders during major and minor emergencies. They also 
show how multiple and simultaneous emergencies affect the performance of the 
organization-members. The conversations detailed above demonstrate the distortion in the 
communication conduct and the causes of this distortion that potentially hamper the 
decision-making process and the management of the emergencies at hand. The following 
two chapters provide an analysis of the five episodes described that serve as a basis for 
comparing the BFRSs and the LFB routines and practices.    124
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
ROLE-SET AND EXPECTATIONS: 
THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM AND ITS PROTAGONISTS 
 
 
A closer look at the five Hellenic cases helps us to understand the patterns emerging from 
the communication conduct, with an emphasis on the problematic conduct, of the HFC 
personnel during emergency, routine and set events. One way to shed light on the 
significance of the communication conduct is by applying the concept of the role-set that 
Merton introduced in Social Theory and Social Structure (1965). Merton offered a 
formalistic account with respect to the patterns of interaction in the social structure. His 
account reveals that a role is a performance and that it is in the performance that one 
understands how organizations operate (March and Simon 1993; Schulman et al. 2004; 
Mackenzie 2006). Roles and the role-set are diagnostic tools and the transcripts provided 
in the previous chapter illustrate how the process operates in action. Henceforth, I shall use 
the principles of the Incident Command System (ICS), as the matrix for the role-set 
developed by the fire and rescue organizations, primarily during emergency responses 
(Perry 2003: 152-153).  
 
 
3.1. The new version of an old idea: The ICS as an emergency bureaucratic 
mechanism 
 
 
The ICS is a set of guidelines developed in the 1970s by the U.S. forestry service to 
manage rapidly spreading wildfires across state borders. Such disaster management 
required a multi-jurisdictional and multi-agency response (Comfort 1994; Hardy and 
Phillips 1998). Prior to the introduction and the development of the ICS, agencies involved 
in responding to wildfires dealt with problems such as the different structure and practices 
of the organizations involved in the emergency response; the different objectives and 
terminology used by those agencies; the lack of reliable incident information; the 
increasing number of people reporting to one superintendent; the unclear lines of authority; 
the lack of structure for the coordination amongst the agencies involved in the response 
and the inadequate or incompatible communication channels (Litwak and Hylton 1962).    125
From the early 1980s onwards, both academic and non-academic commentators on the 
subject have emphasized the development of the ICS as an emergency management tool 
that systematizes the communicative interactions and the role-playing of responding 
organizations to emergencies and, hence, consolidates a structured authority in five areas: 
command, planning, operations, logistics and, finally, finance and administration (ICS: 
All-Hazard Core Competencies 2007). Simply put, the ISC is a set of “who” and “what” 
and their communication conduct on the incident-scene: who is in charge of what; with 
whom he/she communicates and how. The basic goals of the ICS are: clear communication 
and accountability. This organizing system is based on the principle of the organization-set 
introduced by Thompson (1967). Thompson expanded Merton’s concept of the role-set 
developed between individual actors within organizations to the roles organizations 
undertake on a macro-level.  
 
 
I chose to discuss the ICS as a matrix for analysis principally for four reasons: first, this 
system was developed to provide a command structure during emergency responses with 
clear line of authority for each actor involved. This clarity of role cannot but provide an 
ideal action planning where order is the main principal. Second, this matrix may be used as 
a common denominator to compare the actions of responders – Greeks, British, Germans, 
and Americans – because the British and the American first-responder organization have 
predominately emphasized the significance of the ICS as an emergency tool and use it 
systematically during major disasters. Third, it provides us with a tool to classify and 
analyse the large amount of data provided by the episodes examined. Finally, although it 
enables the comparison between the various FRSs, it is not a universal blueprint and, 
therefore, it cannot be regarded as a totally objective measure against which to evaluate 
performances. So, my empirical work also offers a critique of the ICS as a general code of 
practice.  
 
 
The ICS was conceived and developed as an ideal tool. However, the basis of its 
conception proved rather problematic. Since the ICS was originally designed to facilitate 
the inter-agency cooperation on the incident-grounds, the ICS-designers assumed that each 
organization involved in the emergency response operated according to a set of rules 
governing its practices on the incident-grounds. The ICS-designers took into account these 
distinct practices so as to introduce an integrated practice according to the complexity and 
demands of the emergencies. Thus, the ICS became a pattern “of shared basic assumptions   126
[…] as it solved problems of external adaptation and internal integration” (Schein 2004: 
17).  
 
 
So the system is built on the assumption that organizations involved in emergency 
responses have a predetermined structure followed by the organization-members. 
Nonetheless, what the Hellenic episodes reveal is that there is a distance between what is 
proclaimed to be the formal practice of the organization and how the organization-
members, that is the agency, actually behave. The HFC has yet to resolve issues such as 
the span of control, lines of authority, ineffective command structure, and lack of reliable 
incident information. The system-designers also expressed the certainty that because it is 
just guidelines, and therefore flexible, when implemented with professionalism, the 
emergency response may reach ideal standards. How accurate can these assumptions be 
and what are those elements in the organization’s culture that may hamper the ideal 
conduct amongst the participant actors? 
 
 
The analysis of these five episodes based on an ideal system depicts not only the on-scene 
practices but the off-scene organizational environment that leads to the actions taken on 
the incident-grounds. Interestingly, these guidelines apply in a completely different way to 
the BFRSs or the LFB, as we describe them in the following chapters and reveal the 
different rationale of these rather distinct bureaucracies examined. So, the ICS becomes a 
standardized on- and off-scene incident management tool that regulates the communicative 
interactions of the emergency participants and their tasks. Table 2 describes the incident 
command structure, the tasks each of the participant actors undertake and an assessment 
with regard to which of the tasks were performed during the five episodes examined. Table 
3 shows who or which HFC department undertakes which task and whether the actors are 
located on- or off- the incident-grounds.  
 
 
3.2. The ICS role-set: The case of the incident commander 
 
 
There are certain expectations from each actor participating in emergency responses. 
Although the ICS simplifies the roles on-scene and the set of communicative interactions, 
in the Hellenic case the communication conduct amongst the participant actors in the   127
Table 2: The application of the ICS to the Hellenic episodes examined 
 
ICS/ EPISODES    A B C D E 
Provide unified command  F  F  F  F  F 
Establish immediate priorities of 
responders  S F F F F 
Manage resources effectively  F  F  F  F  F 
Set  objectives  S F S S S 
Set  strategy  S F S S S 
Set  tactics  F F F F F 
Monitor  progress  F F F F F 
Incident commander 
Reprioritize  - S  - - F 
Information 
officer 
Disseminate information to 
media/ others  S S S S S 
Liaison  officer  Coordinate activities between 
the IC, the HFC and other 
responders 
S S S S S 
Command staff 
Safety officer  Develop safety plan on-scene  -  -  -  -  - 
Operations  On-scene  action  S S S S S 
Planning Collecting/evaluating/disseminat
ing incident information  S S S F F 
General staff 
Logistics Finance/administration/cost 
analysis  - - - - - 
S: success (point addressed; yet occasionally inadequately);  
F: failure (point not addressed);  
-: point not necessary to be addressed or not addressed at that specific occasion.   128
Table 3: ICS actors: Titles and names; positions and settings 
 
ICS/ Actors  Titles and names   Positions and settings  
Kronos-12, Kronos 13, Kronos-14, 
Kronos-15, station commander, Ares.  
On-scene 
Incident commander 
Control administration/ control officers  Off-scene 
Incident commander  On-scene 
Control   Off-scene 
Information officer 
Press office  Off-scene 
Incident commander  On-scene  Liaison officer 
Control   Off-scene 
Command staff 
Safety officer  THERE IS NO SAFETY OFFICER ON-SCENE 
Operations Operations  units  On-scene 
Planning Control    Off-scene 
Station operators  Off-scene 
General staff 
Logistics 
Control   Off-scene   129
emergency responses is complex. Table 4 indicates the main the actors involved in the 
emergency responses in the episodes examined. 
 
 
The IC is the individual who directs an emergency response. The role of the IC creates a 
set of expectations and presupposes certain patterns of action; for example, to position 
appliances on-scene, to instruct and coordinate the efforts of the responders, to relieve the 
operations’ units from their duties, when the response is over. The ICS suggests that the IC 
ensures a unified command. He/she establishes the immediate priorities on-scene that is 
the safety of responders and civilians. Moreover, he/she decides the type and volume of 
resources that are necessary on the incident-grounds and manages them when they arrive 
on-site. The IC also sets the objectives, lays out the strategy and defines the tactics 
according to a predetermined action plan or the parameters of the emergency at hand. 
He/she monitors the progress of the response and reprioritise the objectives, if and when 
necessary. The IC may also assign these tasks to operations’ officers, who should report 
back to him/ her.  
 
 
This casting determines what the expectations from an incident commander are and define 
his – or her, which is a rather rare case in the HFC – authority on the incident-scene. The 
ICS sanctions the omnipotence of the incident commander on-scene as it suggests that the 
decisions are not made “by committee” as “time is of essence” (National Response Team 
1997: 13). The ICS assumes that the incident commander is a well trained decision-maker 
or a charismatic leader. How unreal is this assumption on which the principles of the 
system are based? The following descriptions of how the ICs acted throughout the five 
episodes depict the Hellenic experience.  
 
 
3.2.1. “What is it that you see over there?” (A, 99) 
 
 
The IC is predominately a decision-maker. He/she has an overall image of the progress 
made on the different fronts of the emergency response and he/she constantly reviews the 
incident plan (Gasaway 2008). The evening of the response to the train collision (episode 
A), a unified command was not achieved. None of them had explicitly assumed the 
command of the incident.   130
Table 4: Categories of emergency actors 
 
EPISODES  CATEGORIES OF EMERGENCY ACTORS  PARTICIPANT AGENCY 
A B C D E 
Control  operators  X X X X X 
Control dispatchers   X  X  X  X  X 
Control on-duty officers  X  X  X  X  X 
Control lieutenant commander  X  X  X  X  X 
Control employees 
Control  commander  X X X X X 
Station telephone operators  X  X  X  X  X 
Station  commanders  X X X X X 
Drivers of fire-engines  X  -  -  -  X 
Fire-fighters, members of the operations units  X  X  X  X  X 
Chief fire officer  X  X  X  X  X 
Deputy chief fire officer  X  X  X  X  X 
Ares X  X  X  -  X 
Arma X  X  X  -  X 
Kronos-14  - - - -  X 
Kronos-15  X X X X X 
Operations personnel 
Special Forces personnel  X  -  -  -  X   131
 
 
Press office  Fire-fighters  X X X X X 
Fire Investigation Unit    - X X X - 
HFC Ambulance Service     X    X 
Provincial fire stations  Operators     X    X 
Random       X    X  High-ranking officers from other departments 
Purposeful       X  X 
Secretariat General for Civil Protection    X - - X X 
Military personnel    - - - -  X 
Officers  X - - -  X  Police  
Operators    - - - -  X 
Ambulance Service    X X  - X X 
Electric Company    -  X  X  -  - 
Gas Company   -  X  -  -  - 
Hellenic Railway Organization  On-duty  official  X - - - - 
Hellenic Telecommunications Organization  Random operator  X  X  -  -  - 
State representative    X  X  -  -  X 
Civilians     X X X X X 
Private conversations    X X X X X 
Note: X marks the actors participating in each of the episodes examined   132
Rather than monitoring the progress of the efforts made by the rescue units that were 
dispatched on-scene at least two of these officers were themselves involved in rescuing the 
engine-drivers who were trapped in the engine-coach. When contacted by one of the senior 
control officers (A, 95-103), none of had an overall image of the progress of the 
emergency response. At least two of them had to repeat ad hoc the control officer’s 
question to the rest of the responders around them in order to provide an answer. The 
impromptu character of this process bears the risk of acquiring and providing inaccurate or 
unreliable information: “I am not sure about [whether it is a] collision [or not]” (A, 100). 
Although the immediate priority of an IC is to make sure that the responders working on 
the incident-grounds and the bystanders are safe, the senior officers on-site had neglected 
to appoint someone from the operations’ units to ensure that civilians were safely removed 
from the collision-scene. At least one of the senior officers actively engaged in rescuing 
one of the trapped engine-drivers, and answered, when asked by a control officer whether 
the ambulances had arrived on site or not, that he was unaware of their arrival. The 
objective was to release those trapped in the derailed coaches and immediately offer them 
medical care. Nonetheless, the senior officer did not have an overall image of the response 
as he was personally engaged in it. He had failed to establish contact with the ambulance 
service and, thus, he did not know whether medical care could be instantly provided to the 
injured individual.  
 
 
3.2.2. “What’s going on out there? ... Who is that ‘asshole’? … We are ‘fucked’” (B, 
78, 75, 76) 
 
 
When the fire was initially reported to the control room, dispatchers mobilized Kronos-15, 
Nikolaou, to the firegrounds, as the IC. In turn, Nikolaou reached the scene before any of 
the fire-engines appeared on-site. The decisions he made the minute he exited his vehicle, 
hampered the emergency response until he was replaced by the higher-ranking commander 
of the fire-station that had jurisdiction over the area. Nikolaou should have waited for the 
appliances to arrive on the incident-grounds; however not for the reasons Papadopoulos 
suggested: a fire-officer “running around” with no equipment damaging the image of the 
fire service. Intentionally or unintentionally, Nikolaou cut off all communications with the 
control room when he entered the basement. The signal was too weak to allow him to 
receive or to make phone-calls. Moreover, he went in the basement without carrying a 
breathing apparatus, which allows fire-fighters to operate in an area affected with smoke.   133
Furthermore, Nikolaou was not carrying a portable fire-extinguisher that could have 
contributed to creating an escape-route for him, in case he was surrounded by fire. 
Therefore, he could have been injured or killed in case of a flashover that is the 
simultaneous ignition of all combustible material in an enclosed area. Nikolaou refused to 
communicate his assessment of the emergency via radio and requested that only a few fire-
engines remained on-scene and the rest returned to their stations. It took Papadopoulos 
some effort to convince him to follow a standard operating procedure (B-33). Nikolaou’s 
decision to re-dispatch the reinforcements back to their stations left very few fire-fighting 
personnel on the firegrounds. Moreover, when Nikolaou entered the basement, he did not 
appoint a fire-fighter that would liaise the operations’ personnel to the control room and 
hence, virtually no one answered the radio transmissions.  
 
 
So, the IC wrongly assessed the gravity of the situation. Thus, he failed to establish the 
objectives of the response, to set the strategy and the tactics of the fire-fighting operations 
to follow. He ordered the control room to re-dispatch the bulk of the appliances – they had 
by that time mobilized on the firegrounds – back to their stations. That decision 
jeopardized the safety of the fire-fighting personnel and the civilians on-site, the immediate 
priority of an IC. In order to avoid being reprimanded about his professional performance, 
he impeded the process of the disseminating incident information: first, by making himself 
unavailable to control officers, who were requesting an update on the progress of the 
response; second, by avoiding diffusing incident information via radio. His reactions cut 
off control employees from the emergency response (B, 31, 77) and led them to seek 
information from anybody else available to provide any kind of information, whether that 
individual was eligible to answer the control personnel’s question or not (B, 32). 
Furthermore, the IC breached the principal of achieving a unified command. His failure to 
re-prioritize the gravity of the emergency led another junior operations’ officer to make the 
decision with regard to requesting additional fire-engines on the firegrounds. But foremost, 
he lied about entering the basement in order to assess the emergency (B, 81-87). Thus, he 
deliberately misled control and operations’ personnel and knowingly hampered the 
response. 
 
 
In addition to the erroneous assessment of the emergency, the mismanagement of the 
resources and, eventually, the exposure of the lie broke the trust between control and 
operations’ personnel and amongst operations’ employees on the firegrounds. It is evident   134
that before a senior operations’ officer was dispatched to the firegrounds, a junior officer 
circumvented the authority of Kronos-15 and requested the remobilization of the resources. 
The inability of Nikolaou to respond to the requirements of his statutory role and the 
expectations of the employees undermined his status as IC and led the on- and off-scene 
personnel to question his authority, which, in turn, resulted into the collapse of the 
command structure on the incident-grounds. When there are very few standard operating 
procedures or the existing procedures are, either deliberately or unintentionally, not 
followed on the incident-grounds, then operations’ personnel rely on the competence of the 
incident manager to deal effectively with the emergency. If the HFC-employees cannot 
trust the IC, then the system breaks down (Crichton et al. 2005): junior officers assume 
control of the operations’ units in sight or operations’ units that are left on their own 
somewhere on-site and they start acting independently, as is also the case in the bulk of the 
major and minor incidents examined. 
 
 
The IC is a symbolic figure. He/she is what the position he/she is assigned to dictates. In 
that position, he/she is expected to perform certain tasks. When he/she is unable to fulfil 
his duties, he/she is deprived of the prerogative the authority of his position offers him/her. 
He is no longer Kronos-15, he is Nikolaou. As Nikolaou, he is mistrusted and gradually 
degraded. His past career and his current actions are scrutinized. Eventually, he is 
marginalized and replaced (B, 34-53; 78-79). If the “greatest enemy of authority is 
contempt and the surest way to undermine it is laughter” (Lukes 1986: 65), Nikolaou was 
laughed at by the control employees when they replaced him, and the junior officer, when 
he disregarded his authority and ordered the re-mobilization. 
 
 
Nikolaou was not debriefed. So HFC personnel failed to clearly identify what went wrong 
and why. Moreover, Nikolaou was not formally reprimanded for deliberately distorting the 
facts with regard to his actions on the firegrounds. A series of misjudgements occurred and 
the only attention this mismanagement attracted was the brief overall evaluation of 
Nikolaou’s actions provided by the control commander (B, 81-87). Disciplinary procedures 
dictate that personnel who fail to fulfil their duties are liable to punishment. Nikolaou was 
neither formally reprimanded for the initial mismanagement of the response nor otherwise 
punished for intentionally distorting the facts. The HFC regulations were evidently 
circumvented.  
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The operations’ officer who assumed Nikolaou’s duties as the IC was the commander of 
the fire-station that had jurisdiction over the area where the fire erupted. Although he was 
operating in his area of jurisdiction, he asked for directions as to how to proceed on-scene 
(B, 54) and whilst on the firegrounds he cut off all communications when he announced his 
decision to enter the compromised building (55-56), as Nikolaou had done before him. As 
the station commander he should have known his area of jurisdiction; as the IC he should 
have made sure to secure communication with the operations’ units. If Nikolaou was held 
accountable for the initial mismanagement, the second IC should have been held 
accountable for not knowing his area of jurisdiction and cutting off communications with 
the control or the operations’ personnel on the firegrounds. Overall, the HFC chose not to 
hold the managers of the response accountable for their actions. Thus, the organization 
failed to learn from the mistakes of the organization-members.  
 
 
3.2.3. “Is anybody listening to Ares?” (C, 134) 
 
 
Ares is the commanding officer for the districts of Athens and Piraeus and assumes the 
role of the IC as the highest-ranking officer on the firegrounds. During that response, Ares 
realized that he was left with very few fire-engines that did not suffice to extinguish the 
rapidly spreading fire. He expressed a plea (C, 131) in a very distressed and irritated tone. 
That plea was transmitted via radio and addressed predominately to the control 
dispatchers.  
 
 
As opposed to the IC’s, the dispatcher who answered the radio transmission (C, 132) used 
a calm and formal tone. Despite the dispatcher’s effort to appear calm, the repetitions of 
the word “replenishment” as a justification for the appliances being absent from the 
firegrounds, revealed his own anguish. The first mistake was made clear: all appliances 
appeared to be off-scene simultaneously. As the dispatcher continued the transmission, a 
slight irritation in his voice was detected (C, 133). The explanation he provided to the 
distressed IC was that the bulk of the fire-engines arrived on the firegrounds almost 
simultaneously. Thus, they went for replenishment at approximately the same time. Since 
no one assumed control of directing the appliances to different hydrants, they all lined up 
at the ones nearest to the fire-scene, at least two of which were reported to be out-of-order. 
Arma, the officer responsible for tracking and deploying the fire-engines, was on-site but   136
failed to identify the problem immediately. When the IC asked if “anybody” was listening 
to him, he stirred the dispatcher’s emotional reaction. Under such pressure, the dispatcher 
made an effort to abnegate responsibility for the mismanagement of appliances and 
decided to circumvent the standard operating procedures (C, 135). He instructed via radio 
all available fire-fighting resources on-scene to report to Ares, not to Arma who was 
predominantly the officer in charge of managing the resources on-site. Ares (C, 136) 
pointed out the unnecessary circumvention of procedures and reinstated the authority 
Arma had over the management of the resources on the firegrounds. However, after 
pointing out this mismanagement, the IC initiated yet another incorrect process that could 
possibly breach the citywide coverage (C, 136). He ordered all the available appliances 
from the neighbouring fire-stations to be dispatched to the firegrounds.  
 
 
Foolproof citywide coverage was at the verge of being breached due to temporary resource 
mismanagement. Control personnel are well aware that the city coverage cannot be 
compromised and that they, therefore, cannot give such order. However, in some of the 
cases examined, citywide coverage was jeopardized. When hierarchy creates fear and 
submissiveness, transgression of procedures is likely to occur. Violating SOP appears as 
one of the most significant weaknesses of the HFC. Transgression occurs as the result of 
higher-ranking personnel instigating a blame-game, transferring responsibility to lower-
ranking personnel. Existing procedures serve to set the boundaries and the responsibilities 
of the roles of personnel on both the administrative and the operational level (Smith 1990). 
They also set barriers between what has been calculated or proven as good practice and 
what is perceived as good practice at the time of the emergency.  
 
 
However, directly involved operations’ personnel do not take into consideration how the 
pressure exercised on control employees may result in a compromising of organizational 
resources and a breaching of citywide coverage. When Ares contacted the control room 
again and asked for information, in order to facilitate his request but contrary to his role, 
the control deputy commander acted as a dispatcher. Occasionally, senior officers consider 
it beneath them to converse with fire-fighters or sub-officers, even if providing 
information to the operations’ units is in the dispatchers’ role description. As the 
emergency response progressed despite the latest order he had given the CCC that the 
appliances should be in contact with the control or the Arma, the IC started 
communicating with the appliances himself. Violating procedures on top of the already   137
circumvented ones created an environment of uncertainty as to how to proceed with regard 
to the mobilization and the monitoring of the appliances on-site.  
 
 
Evidently good practice was not achieved. Emotionally charged communication instigated 
by the IC, due to a temporary lack of resources on-site, raised a request which breached 
SOP. Control personnel implicitly denied the request, providing, at the same time, the 
necessary explanations for the lack of appliances on the firegrounds. The IC rejected the 
explanation and reiterated the request. Complying with the request put forward, control 
personnel allowed the breaching first, of communication procedures between control and 
operations’ units and, second, of citywide coverage. The unclear authority on the 
firegrounds resulted in lower-ranking personnel disobeying orders. At least one of the fire-
engine drivers proceeded to the nearby hydrant without notifying the control. Another one 
disagreed with the alternative provided by the dispatchers: “If it [the hydrant] is not 
working I will go to another.” Due to Arma’s failure to effectively address the 
replenishment process and the CCC’s inability to manage such a process from afar, the 
appliances started to communicate with one another about which hydrant was operable and 
provided the best water pressure. So the appliances proceeded to the hydrants suggested by 
other operations crews and the control, deprived of a clear mental picture as to the conduct 
on-site, was excluded from monitoring the whereabouts of the fire-engines. 
 
 
Evidently, the urban infrastructure contributed to the mismanagement of the emergency 
response. Hydrants’ operability was a highly problematic phenomenon. Allocation and 
operability of the hydrant network may be considered as a problematic inter- and intra-
organizational issue. As far as the former is concerned, the allocation of hydrants and the 
inspection of their operation are vested in HFC personnel.
55 However, when requested the 
placements of hydrants in the locations designated by the HFC as well as the necessary 
repairs are undertaken by the Municipalities. Local Authorities are responsible for 
maintaining the urban infrastructure, i.e. streets, hydrants, draining systems, and any 
negligence in maintaining the infrastructure hinders first responders’ operations. Scarcity 
of water supplies constitutes one repeatedly emerging obstacle to fire-fighting operations 
and jeopardizes the lives of the fire-fighting personnel on the incident-grounds. One of the 
first ICs on the firegrounds contacted the CCC to ask for “more water” (145-146). Both the 
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pattern of communication and the context reveal a controversy. The CCC cannot provide 
water as such. It can provide appliances and information concerning the allocation of the 
hydrants nearest to the incident-grounds. Furthermore, by the time the operations’ fire-
officer contacted the CCC, the appliances that could have been dispatched on-site were 
already there. Though some were either out of order or dysfunctional their crews had 
already been notified about where the hydrants were located. The operations’ officer’s 
hypothesis appears to have served as an excuse for not completing the emergency response 
sooner. The CCC officer who answered his call commented that the “Arma may have been 
informed about the whereabouts of the hydrants”, so they should have had water sooner. 
“May” reveals an uncertainty, an assumption. Was Arma aware of the whereabouts of the 
hydrants or not? The CCC officer did not verify his assumption by requesting verification 
either by the dispatchers or from the Arma. Verification was in order, because there was a 
substantial distance between what should have been done and was done. It is the CCC task 
to provide all information available for the incident and it is the operations’ units’ duty to 
make use of the information. And it appears that when something goes wrong, the CCC 
blames the operations’ personnel and vice versa. Nevertheless, operational mistakes are 
rarely assessed. The CCC had to receive another phone call from one of the drivers of a 
12-tonne vehicle who stated first that a number of hydrants were either out of order or 
without sufficient pressure to speed up the procedures of the replenishment, and second 
that police presence was necessary in order to divert the traffic, so the fire-fighting 
vehicles could move more quickly from the hydrants on-site.  
 
 
In addition, the intensity of the fire and the tension caused by the vast mobilization and the 
constant re-establishment of command may have created the impression that the hydrants 
were inoperable although they were in fact functional. At the end of the third emergency 
response, a fire-officer checked at least one of the hydrants reported “out of order” or 
dysfunctional only to discover that it was actually operating properly. When asked, his 
assumptions were that, during the emergency response the levels of stress caused by the 
intensity of the incident and the constant pressure deriving from the command structure 
hampered the fire-fighters’ ability to operate calmly so as to achieve “a successful 
operational outcome.”
56 Dysfunctional hydrants, along with the poorly managed 
mobilization of the appliances during all cases examined, emerged as an additional reason 
for breaching citywide coverage. Many of the Athenian or Piraeus fire stations engaged in 
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emergency responses were operating with just their station commander. Although water 
storages have been created in areas that have been risk assessed
57, these storages are not 
adequately maintained. In reality, they are often inoperable. Moreover, although the 
inadequate water pressure of the hydrant system has been identified as a problematic 
phenomenon, it has not yet been addressed by the Municipalities. 
 
 
Before Ares undertook the management of the incident, the first high-ranking officer on-
site was automatically the IC. He delegated the authority of managing the appliances on 
their way to the incident-grounds to the control dispatchers (C, 118-129) or suggested that 
the police undertook the task of diverting the fire-engines from streets less congested. This 
constituted an irrational decision on his part. That was the starting point of the temporary 
mismanagement that affected the interaction between control and operations’ employees 
and among operations’ personnel. It was the same high-ranking officer who, a few hours 
into the response, made a decision that jeopardized the safety of the responders on-site: he 
ordered the entrance to the burning building although the roof appeared to be giving away 
(C, 139-140). The control officer did not object or discuss what appeared to be an irrational 
decision. “Good” (C, 141) was the control officer’s reply to the operational tactics of the 
high-ranking officers.  
 
 
During the extended emergency response, high-ranking officers were operating 
independently on the firegrounds. At least one high-ranking officer requested that control 
dispatchers send him additional resources. According to procedures, he should have made 
his request to the IC or the Arma who were in charge of monitoring the resources on the 
incident-grounds. This undetermined span of control, it affected the consistency of the 
authority on the firegrounds and, thus, the discipline of the operations’ units. 
 
 
3.2.4. “We’ve lost the ball” (D, 80) 
 
 
Fire breaking out in a hotel, extreme weather conditions, demonstrations; distinct incidents 
require different ICs. Nevertheless, the deputy chief fire-officer appeared to be the IC on 
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both the demonstrations’ scene and the hotel firegrounds. The fatality in the hotel increased 
the intensity of the emergency response. At the same time, on the demonstrations-front, the 
vandalisms increased. The police units retreated, leaving at least one fire-engine 
unguarded. The operations’ unit contacted the control room in order to request immediate 
re-dispatching to a different and more secure location. The control officer who took the 
call commented that the deputy chief fire-officer who was directly responsible for 
managing the mobilization of the resources on the scene was involved in the hotel fire. The 
officer expressed his regrets for being unable to re-dispatch the unit but he had no authority 
to do so and he did not wish to disturb the deputy (D, 79). In this case, the centralization of 
the decision-making process along with the submissiveness of the lower-ranking fire-
officers jeopardized the organizational resources on the incident-grounds. 
 
 
On a third front, the spate of phenomena increased the workload of the control room. 
Control employees, and especially control dispatchers, become the IC and undertake the 
responsibility of distributing the resources in the areas affected by the bad weather 
conditions. To this end, they prioritized the calls according to the type of incidents reported 
by civilians, and appointed specific appliances to respond to specific incidents. Usually, 
fire-engines attend to draining water from the lower parts of public and private buildings, 
cutting down trees or removing debris from public places. Nonetheless, in at least one case, 
a station commander instructed one of the appliances to proceed to a different incident than 
the one the operations’ units was assigned by control personnel. The reason provided for 
such interference was to accommodate an acquaintance of the station commander. The 
records show that this individual was already on the CCC’s list of incidents, interference of 
such sort only delayed the progress of the appliances responding to those otherwise minor 
incidents (D, 27-36, 52-69). The commander who interfered with the task management 
arranged by the control, appeared reluctant to disclose his interference (D, 32; 34; 35). His 
elliptic utterances and the constant repetitions emphasize his reluctance.  
 
 
On the hotel firegrounds, before the deputy chief fire-officer assumed control, was Kronos-
15. The IC Kronos-15 left his mobile with his driver, who was unable to accurately reply to 
any of the questions control officers asked him. He had to loudly count the floors of the 
hotel in order to answer the control officer who called Kronos-15 mobile. Although fire-
fighters driving appliances are instructed to communicate any necessary information 
between the control and the operations’ personnel, those fire-fighters who drive the   141
transport vehicles of the high-ranking operations’ officers are not usually instructed to 
follow the progress of the response so as to be eligible to diffuse the necessary incident 
information to and from the incident-grounds. Furthermore, when the control commander 
called Kronos-15 mobile he expressed no intention of passing information on to the IC’s 
driver, a fire-fighter. This phenomenon may occasionally become an obstacle to diffusing 
incident information. Some high-ranking officers refuse to accept or provide assistance 
from or to lower-ranking personnel, as was also the case in episode C. 
 
 
Centralization of command and unified command are not synonymous. Unified command 
was breached when the deputy chief fire-officer assumed command of two distinct 
incidents. The HFC regulations sanction the centralization of the decision-making process 
regardless of the nature and the number of emergencies. The IC may be proficient to deal 
with more than one incident responses. Nonetheless, there are other parameters in the HFC 
culture that may impede the aforementioned process. When the operations’ unit from the 
demonstrations-front contacted the control in order to be immediately re-dispatched due to 
the imminent vandalism in the area, the senior control officer refused to interrupt the 
deputy chief as long as he was involved in the hotel fire. In the first case, the deputy chief 
jeopardized the management of the second front he was in charge of. He should have 
delegated his authority to another operations’ officer or to the control. In the second case, 
the mistake was made by the control officer. It is often the case in the HFC that, when a 
lower-ranking officer takes initiatives that may positively contribute to the effective 
management of an emergency response but are not sanctioned by higher-ranking officers, 
then the lower-ranking officer may be relocated or refused promotion. Therefore, lower-
ranking officers avoid such actions that may jeopardize their advancement in the 
organization.  
 
 
Inadequate and unverified incident information presented an additional obstacle to the 
decision-making process during the emergency response (D, 3; 7-11). This was followed 
by a deliberate interruption of the communications between operations and control. The IC 
did not make provisions to establish minimum communication with the control. At least 
half an hour into the response, the control employees were unaware of the name of the 
hotel on fire.  
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3.2.5. “Every single time something will go wrong” (E, 146) 
 
 
The incident management in the control room indicated that no action plan was 
implemented by the administration of the control despite the fact that since 1947 twenty 
deadly aviation accidents occurred in the Hellenic territory, seven of which were in or near 
the city of Athens.
58  
 
 
The announcement of a potential accident almost an hour before the plane crashed revealed 
that there was no strategy as to how to deal with aviation accidents. The on-duty control 
officers were improvising while the emergency was unfolding (E, 56-63). For the first hour 
after the crash was reported, at least two of the on-duty control officers were involved in 
locating and accumulating bodybags from the Athenian fire-stations. This was an 
unnecessary task for control personnel. The ambulance service was responsible for 
providing the bodybags (E, 134). Nonetheless, after the conversation with the senior 
manager of the ambulance service (E, 131-136), in an effort to establish the HFC 
premiership as a first-responder organization on the crash-scene at least one officer was 
instructed by the administration of the control room to keep on collecting bodybags from 
the fire-stations. 
 
 
In the meantime, incidents were erupting throughout Greece. On-duty control officers 
realised that they were unable to monitor the progress of the multiple emergency responses 
unless each control officer followed the progress of a set number of incidents. However, 
the administration of the CCC implicitly obstructed this task management (E, 168). 
Favouritism became an obstacle to evenly distributing the tasks performed by control 
officers despite the workload of the control personnel: “You’ve trusted him to monitor the 
progress of the response? He is incompetent. He sleeps like a horse […]” (E, 168). Trust 
became the pretext of favouritism. The officer was not trusted; thus, he was not 
appreciated. The employee became conscious with regard to the disposition of the control 
administration towards him. As a result he made a constant effort to establish trust. He 
repeated verbatim the information about the potential crash in order to avoid falsifying the 
content of the information he was given by the fire-fighter employed at the airport fire-
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station (36); he interrupted his conversation with the PO employee to ask his superordinate 
whether the information he had given him earlier was the same information his 
superordinate received directly from the control tower (E, 45).  
 
 
As a result of favouritism, the span of control became wide and every control officer was 
eventually involved in monitoring the progress of every emergency reported to the control 
room. The monitoring of the emergency responses became even more complicated due to 
the fact that different control officers were receiving fragments of the information 
concerning an incident. These fragments were only gradually brought together in order to 
provide an overall picture of the progress of the emergency response. The environment in 
which this set of unruly conduct took place was further aggravated by the bullying of the 
employees (E, 168-169).  
 
 
Particularism also obstructed personnel management on the incident-grounds. It was made 
clear from the beginning of the operations that the on-duty HFC personnel did not suffice 
to respond to the incident-grounds and provide citywide coverage at the same time. One of 
the on-duty control officers suggested that they could engage the seasonal employees either 
in the response or in providing citywide coverage (137-144). Seasonal employees are 
individuals employed on a temporary basis for no more than five months per year, from the 
1
st of May until the 31
st of October. They amount to 1/3 of the organization’s personnel 
capability. Seasonal employees assist the professional fire-fighters with the “unforeseen 
urgently emerging and transient in nature needs of the HFC”,
59 as they participate 
principally in forest fire-fighting operations. Nonetheless, they receive minimal training. 
Their essential personal equipment is provided with delay. At least once, seasonal 
employees were provided with their personal equipment after the period for which they 
were hired to work in the HFC (Rizospastis 31/01/2008). This occurred following the 2007 
forest fires in which 75 people were killed. In the HFC, seasonal employees are not 
considered by their professional counterparts “well trained, knowledgeable, physically and 
mentally fit professional fire-fighters” (Tipos tis Kiriakis 24/07/05) eligible to participate 
in fire and rescue operations. This symbolic invention operates by creating spheres of 
inclusion and exclusion based on what are marketed as intrinsic characteristics of 
organizational members that others do not have or cannot acquire. The exclusion of 
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seasonal employees is sanctioned by the terms of their contracts. Seasonal employees are 
not allowed to conduct night shifts or do overtime. Therefore, when employed in fire-
fighting and rescue operations, ICs and control personnel need to make provisions to 
relieve them of their duties without breaking the conditions of their employment contracts. 
Therefore the institution of seasonal employees in the HFC is considered “incompatible” 
with its principal objective of “securing the lives and properties of the civilian population” 
(Tipos tis Kiriakis 24/07/05: 74). Thus, the administration of the control room firmly and 
positively ruled out their involvement either in the response or by replacing the 
professional fire-fighters who were involved in the emergency in the fire-station.  
 
 
During the Helios response the preferential treatment provided to lower-ranking personnel 
with expertise revealed that particularism breached the safety of the responders on-site and 
one of the primary objectives of the ‘ideal type’ of bureaucracy, impersonality. At least one 
of the operations’ officers specialized in aircrafts was inadequately consulted (E, 96-100; 
105; 108-123). Specialists are individuals employed by the HFC as fire-officers so as to 
address emerging operational or administrative needs such as forest or chemical fire-
fighting or organizational finances and logistics. 
 
 
The specialist who was appointed to supervise a sector that was not affected by the crash 
asked to be reassigned to the crash-site. However, permission was not granted. There were 
three impediments to bringing this about: first, the fact that there were no SOP. Thus, it 
was at the discretion of the IC to decide on the engagement of the specialist. Second, the 
specialist was already assigned to another sector. Hence, replacing and reassigning this 
officer may have increased the workload of the CCC officers. Third, HFC employees 
maintained that in the past, this specialist had undermined the authority of higher-ranking 
officers and, often, circumvented the command structure.
60 During the conversation 
between the specialist and the on-duty control officer, the expert addressed the higher-
ranking control officer by his first name instead of the customary use of the surname or the 
positional title (E, 96-100). He also employed the imperative mode (E, 109) to prompt their 
conversation. The imperative mode introduces an abrupt sequence of requests and replies 
and it is therefore usually used by high-ranking officers when their orders must be 
executed forthwith by lower-ranking personnel. That is why dispatchers use the imperative 
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mode with stations operators. In order to counterbalance the abruptness of the imperative 
mode, those who use it usually resort to adding: “please”, “pal” or “friend”. This was not 
the case with the expert. The specialist further undermined the control officer’s authority 
by demanding to be re-assigned to the crash-scene rather than suggesting it. In contrast, the 
control officer addressed the specialist in plural. Although “expert and bureaucratic 
authority” (Salaman 1980: 59) are not incompatible, under the aforementioned 
circumstances, “the expert, it seems, [cannot] win the complete trust and acceptance of his 
company’s highest authorities and tends to be kept at arm’s length from the vault of 
power” (Gouldner 1964: 225), even when responders’ lives are at stake. Thus, 
organizations intentionally fail “to retain the valuable individual capabilities for which its 
employees were recruited, and maintain specialist sub-units with specialist knowledge of 
the world necessary for organization’s survival” where they “must” have succeeded 
(Turner 1976: 136). “What does specialization have to do with this? No; and that’s final! 
Bye” (E, 104). This reply-statement made by the control administration raises a question: 
what does “this” mean? Does “this” refer to the noun “specialization” (E, 103), to the 
response or to the overall disposition towards the behaviour of the expert?  
 
 
When questions such as whether the wings of the plane contain uranium or not are raised, 
specialization has everything to do with this. It is not merely a matter of “trust”, as 
Gouldner introduces it, whether the specialist is included or excluded from the decision-
making process. The opinion of this specialist did matter and that is why the specialist was 
eventually asked to confirm the information. It is more of a matter of transgression of 
authority. This issue was not only detected by the control lieutenant commander who 
strongly refused the specialist’s involvement. It was also raised by one of senior 
operations’ officers, who received the information with regard to the possibility that the 
wings contained uranium by another expert, specialized in chemistry. The operations’ 
officer made the irrational request not to call the specialist to verify this information. If the 
specialist had indeed been reassigned on-site, the operations’ officer would have had to 
cooperate with his colleague. In order to avoid such encounter, he consciously made a 
choice that could have impacted on the safety of personnel working on-site. When the 
specialist was contacted to verify the information, he began to reply by emphasising his 
unique status within the organization. He continued by indicating how the control 
administration should have decided on his involvement in the response and how he was 
marginalized in a “sector” with very little to do. Then, he disregarded and discounted the 
expert who raised the issue with regard to the wings containing uranium. He continued   146
with reintroducing the issue of his involvement arguing that it was “MY job.” Then he 
commented on the frequency of this kind of accidents occurring and the possibility of 
something similar ever happening again during his career. Finally, he informed the control 
officer about the status of the individual he would contact in order to verify the 
information.  
 
 
In such crises, a direct answer would have been less time-consuming and, therefore, more 
helpful. However, neither the control administration nor the expert showed any interest in 
acting as part of a team with specific objectives, strategy and tactics. The expert’s 
monologue revealed that he was merely interested in establishing his own status rather than 
offering an answer to an important question. He was criticising the decisions made and 
undermined the authority of those who made them. Eventually, he complied with the 
decision endorsed by the HFC chief-fire-officer. However, in a final effort to indirectly 
engage in the process, before complying with the decision, he asked for details with regard 
to the crash (E, 113-123).  
 
 
During the response, very little information was diffused to the control personnel. 
Information was exchanged on the higher echelons of the command structure. As a result 
the lower-ranking officers were unable to assist representatives from other responder-
organizations. They had to reach the higher-ranking officer and then re-contact the 
representatives. In this sequence of communication conduct none of the communicators 
informed the other about what was taking place. Therefore they were engaged in a time-
consuming process which indicated: first, that significant incident-information is not 
shared at least amongst those employees who may use it. Second, it revealed that there is 
no predetermined span-of-control: all actors involved may contact all other actors engaged 
in the response. Finally, it raised the issue of secrecy: why did not the police officer inform 
the control officer that he would contact the control administration to get hold of the 
information he wanted? The control employee would have probably prevented the police 
officer from contacting the control administration, as it was his duty to inform the police 
officer.  
 
 
Simultaneous incidents across Greece indicated that issues such as unified command, span-
of-control, effective resource management obstructed the emergency responses. At least   147
one emergency response launched to deal with a rapidly spreading forest fire was 
hampered by an inexperienced sub-officer who assumed the duties of the IC with very little 
knowledge of the command system and the fire-fighting resources at his disposal (E, 152-
156). When the control officer who was monitoring the progress of the response realized 
the ignorance of the IC, he exclaimed with surprise. Yet, this is not an infrequent 
phenomenon in the HFC; neither is how the employee tried to justify his ignorance with 
regard to managing an emergency response: “I am just a sub-officer” (153). He abnegated 
his responsibility with insolence: “look here […]”. His attitude resulted from the habitual 
centralization of authority. It is the fire-officers, and not sub-officers, who are allowed to 
predominately manage emergency responses. They are the ones to receive training, when 
training is offered. The role of the rest of the personnel is underplayed. They are 
considered as “soldiers who receive orders and execute them.”
61 Thus, the administration 
of the organization deprives the bulk of organization-members to access the knowledge 
resources via formal or on-the-job training. When lower-ranking personnel are deprived 
access in the learning process, they gradually express their exclusion by being indifferent 
and abnegating any responsibility predominantly attributed to higher-ranking employees. 
The ultimate lack of auditing personnel performance results into perpetuating phenomena 
such as indifference or negligence and, therefore, further mismanagement of emergencies. 
 
 
Occasionally, control administration recapitulates the events and reflects on the 
management of the response, after the operations are over or nearly over (episode B). A 
brief reflection replaces a formal debriefing. During this reflection period, the employees 
involved negotiate the distance between theory and practice. The control administration 
acknowledges the details of the failures on the incident-grounds. In two of the cases 
examined (B, 81-87; E, 145-146) the control administration instigates the conversation by 
criticising the operational conduct. In the first acknowledgement, the lieutenant 
commander blamed all actors involved in the response (B, 81). In the latter, he distanced 
control personnel from the mismanagement of the operations’ units (E, 146). He corrected 
the initial “we” that included at least the actors engaged in the conversation, with the 
pronoun “they”. In this second reflection, the anger of the control administration became 
more explicit as the lieutenant commander used foul language to criticise the response. 
These acknowledgements – that sounded like confessions on the recorded material – stirred 
by either remorse (B) or anger (E), counterbalance the lack of formal audits. Problematic 
                                                 
61 Fire-officer, pers. comm., 8 May 2006.   148
conduct is informally, temporarily and secretly recognized and documented. Ostensibly, 
the burden of those actors who identified the misconduct is released. The purpose of the 
reflection is served. To learn from the event so as to lessen the likelihood of recurring 
misconduct during an emergency response is evidently not an objective. So, post-
emergency, performance and preparedness are underplayed (Balamir 2002).  
 
 
3.3. Conclusion: The domino effect – How ICs affect the actions of the operations’ 
personnel  
 
 
The IC’s actions on the incident-grounds evidently define those of the rest of the 
emergency personnel. The IC has authority over the emergency response that derives him 
from his statutory role as a fire-officer (Crane 2005). When the IC fails to respond to the 
expectations of his role in the command structure, his authority is questioned by both high- 
and low-ranking personnel and his status is diminished. Personnel mistrust him, criticise 
him and disobey his orders. They identify the individual with the position. Thus, they 
become suspicious of his successor and the mistrust is extended to the legitimacy of the 
post rather than the person. The meaning of discipline is eradicated and unruliness governs 
the response until the incident command is assumed by a different individual who will 
prove his/her efficiency (Kostaras and Schuh 1990). In the meantime, personnel and 
appliances on the incident-grounds begin to self-dispatch, each according to their own 
evaluation of the emergency. If the IC delegates his authorities to other officers on-site, he 
succeeds in clearly defining the span-of-control, monitoring the mobility of the resources 
and attributing accountability.  
 
 
These episodes indicate that when authorities are centralized and not delegated, personnel 
undertake the least of responsibilities on the incident-grounds and attribute accountability 
for operational misconduct to the individual who has the overall command of the incident. 
ICs rarely delegate their authority to the rest of the employees involved in the response 
either because they mistrust personnel or because they reckon that undertaking the 
responsibility to manage all aspects of the mobilization process provides them with a better 
understanding of the conduct on the incident-scene.
62 Often, according to this rationale, the 
                                                 
62 Fire-fighting personnel, pers. comm., 28 April-8 May 2006.   149
ICs are personally involved in handling the lines (water-pipes) on the firegrounds or 
entering the debris to rescue or recover a trapped individual. Nonetheless, their personal 
involvement hampers the overall perception they have about the incident (Turner 1978). 
Occasionally, as was the case with the expert officer or the seasonal employees when the 
IC exhibits a favourable disposition towards some of the personnel then he breaches one of 
the main principles of ideal bureaucracy: impersonality and, thus, impartiality.  
 
 
The IC is also the key actor in initiating and sustaining communication among operations’ 
personnel and between the control employees and the operations’ personnel. When he 
deliberately or unintentionally disrupts these communication processes, he allows 
unverified or fragmented information to affect the response. Unverified or very little 
information creates uncertainty with regard to the progress of the response and forces the 
participant actors to engage in superfluous communication conduct. Thus, it diverts the 
attention of the actors from managing the actual emergency conduct to dealing with the 
affects of the misconduct.  
 
 
The information acquires a symbolic power: it empowers its beholder. Moreover, 
information is attributed different value when exchanged among fire-fighters, or between 
fire-fighters and junior fire-officers, among senior fire-officers, or between junior and 
senior fire-officers. In horizontal communication (McQuail and Windahl 1981), that is 
communicative interactions amongst individuals of the same rank, information is diffused 
rather unhampered. However, in vertical communication the dissemination of information 
becomes rather problematic. When directed upwards, either fire-fighters to junior officers 
or junior to senior fire-officers, information appears to be communicated unhampered. 
Downwards diffusion of information, on the contrary, seldom occurs as senior fire-officers 
do not communicate information to lower-ranking personnel. Moreover, formal language 
appears to be used in two occasions during the information transaction: first, when senior 
are talking to junior fire-officers depending on whether the former intend to keep the 
symbolic distance between them and the latter; and second, when junior officers address 
senior ones. 
 
 
Overall, the attention to the status of the organization-members impedes communication 
processes as it raises obstacles to the disseminating of essential information. The process of   150
dissemination is consciously disrupted by senior fire-officers. As indicated above, it is not 
unusual for higher-ranking officers of the HFC to regard themselves as omnipotent and 
omniscient organization-members, rather than actors assigned to perform a certain task as 
part of the overall emergency command structure. The transgression of the boundaries of 
the roles organization-members assume, or should assume, during emergency responses, 
along with non-existent SOP, transfer the overall control of an emergency response to the 
highest-ranking officer on-site. The empowerment and the absolute, unchallenged and 
unlimited authority of the highest-ranking officer in an autocratic organization (Gouldner 
1952) may prove problematic (Winsor 1996). The outcome of an emergency response is 
reduced to training, the experience, the management skills and style (McIntyre and Salas 
1995), the ideals (McConnell and Drennan, 2006) and attributes, such as the ability to stay 
calm in a crisis, and personality variables such as willingness to take a leadership role, 
emotional stability, self-confidence, and self-awareness (Flin 1996) of the IC. However, 
the IC may lack some or most of these skills and attributes. In such case, the symbolic 
power of the higher-ranking personnel takes on a material character and the actions of the 
higher-ranking officers are sanctioned by the official hierarchy of the organization (Perrow 
1976; Manning 1992). As a result, in both administration and operations, two implications 
emerge: first, the span of control, as a significant parameter in task management, becomes 
uncertain and undetermined under the authority of the omnipotent commander. Second, the 
senior officers as decision-makers make decisions which they fail to implement.    151
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
THE ICS ROLE-SET: THE COMMAND AND THE GENERAL STAFF 
 
 
As I have already indicated, the incident commander (IC) is the corner-stone of the 
incident command system (ICS). I have also pointed out that disruptions in disseminating 
incident information, lack of coordination on the incident-grounds and failure to assure the 
safety of the responders on the incident-grounds contribute to jeopardizing the well-being 
of the responders and consequently the overall outcome of the response. Thus, it is 
essential for the IC to be supported by three other actors: the information, liaison and 
safety officers. This chapter will examine the roles and responsibilities of these three 
actors. 
 
 
4.1. The command staff 
 
 
In this first section, I will address the roles of the press office, the liaison officer and the 
security officer. The press office personnel diffuse organizational and incident information 
to the public. The liaison officer makes sure that the first-responder organizations 
effectively coordinate their actions on-scene and the security officer ensures that all the 
precautionary safety measures are in place.  
 
 
4.1.1. Securing the diffusion of the incident information 
 
 
The information officer is responsible for the diffusion of incident information amongst 
HFC employees, between HFC employees and other first-responder organizations and 
other agencies involved in the response as well as the media. The role of the gatekeeper of 
incident information is undertaken by more than one individual. In order to ensure the flow 
of information amongst HFC employees and between HFC employees and other 
responder-organizations, one should examine how information is initially received, 
interpreted, assessed, forwarded and registered. The information exchange process   152
indicates the ability of HFC employees to handle the information so as to coordinate their 
own actions as well as those of other responder-organizations on the incident-grounds.  
 
 
In intra-organizational communication, the role of the information officer is undertaken by 
the control employees. They accumulate, register and display incident and organizational 
information, e.g. the type and location of the incident as well as the status of the 
organizational resources and the progress of the response. When other responder-
organizations are involved in emergency responses, the task of informing them is assumed 
by both control employees and operations’ officers. Control employees initially inform 
them about the type and location of the incident; operations’ officers coordinate their 
efforts on the incident-grounds. The media are informed by the press office (PO).  
 
 
a. The role of the PO  
 
 
The PO undertakes the role of disseminating incident information to the media, civilians 
and other organizations. Prior to 2001, this role was shared between control employees 
located in a northern suburb of Athens and personnel employed in the public relations 
office (PR) administered by the HFC headquarters and located in the centre of the city. 
The different administrative authorities and the spatial dispersion of the HFC employees 
engaged in the same task hampered the development of a common strategy. When 
journalists contacted either the control centre or the PR office, unless they requested by 
name one of the on-duty employees, they received information from the individual who 
picked up the receiver. Depending on whether HFC employees were updated, they would 
provide some information concerning the incident. There was very little consistency in the 
content of the information diffused to the media. Nobody was explicitly assigned to deal 
with and, thus, monitor, such communication. Furthermore, the PR employees, located 
elsewhere, were informed about the progress of the emergency responses via telephone. 
The communication between the control and the PR personnel was neither continuous nor 
consistent. Thus, the content of the information they provided to the journalists was, 
occasionally, outdated. 
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In 2001, the chief fire-officer at the time decided to put together an office that would 
exclusively handle the communication between the HFC and the media. This office was 
administered by the headquarters and located in the same building as the control room. 
The initial thought was that, if spatial dispersion was eliminated, then the flow of 
information between the PO and the control would be continuous and consistent. The 
spatial dispersion was eliminated, and new communication techniques that served the HFC 
interactions with the media were developed. Nonetheless, the HFC administration did not 
introduce any standard operating procedures and, therefore, the practices between the 
control and the PO remained unclear. Despite the fact that the PO was officially 
administered by the headquarters, as soon as the PO occupied the first floor of the building 
which traditionally belonged to the CCC, the control officers were under the impression 
that they could interfere with the conduct between the PO and the media.  
 
 
The PR employees, who staffed the PO, objected first to their being transferred to a 
different location and second, to the newly issued guidelines on how to communicate with 
the media. Over the years, they had developed a certain pattern of communication that they 
were not willing to discard. New recruits were sought but very few remained for longer 
than three months in the beginning of the press office’s operation. As a result, training was 
taking place constantly. Moreover, the control employees found it difficult to relate to the 
temporary PO staff. The austere and rigid formal relationships between control and PO 
personnel could not develop into the familiar, relaxed and comfortable informal contacts 
that HFC employees prefer. In addition, the re-location of this branch of the PR office 
estranged the control employees who viewed the newly set-up PO as a threat to their 
popularity with the media (Castells 2007), that is, as a threat to a part of their role in 
emergency responses. Thus, they imposed a silent information embargo upon the PO. The 
embargo raised conflicts between PO and control as well as between PO and the media. 
Journalists who were dissatisfied with the service provided by the PO chose to contact the 
CCC instead of the press office. The provisional, informal operation of the PO continued 
for more than a year. According to the service orders at the time, the control was still 
responsible for managing the flow of information to the media. Yet, depending on the 
interpersonal relationships cultivated between the PO and the control employees, the 
embargo was occasionally raised.  
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b. The quid pro quo information dissemination policy 
 
 
PO employees have four sources of information to use in their communication with the 
media. PO employees listen to the radio transmissions amongst HFC operations’ units in 
order to acquire different information with regard to the type of incident, the number of 
resources, the progress of the mobilization etc. When essential incident information is 
communicated via telephone rather than via radio, PO employees lack the overall image of 
the operational conduct. Control officers are expected to forward any information acquired 
via telephone to the PO personnel. It is usually the officers who undertake the task of 
liaising with the PO employees as the gatekeepers of the incident information. Yet, it is not 
specified which officer undertakes this task in each shift. They contact the PO randomly 
and, thus, officers conveniently rely on the assumption that someone else has contacted the 
PO before them. Moreover control operators from the peripheral control centres 
throughout Greece are obliged to contact the PO either by fax or by telephone about all 
incidents erupting in their districts. Finally, PO personnel contact the higher-ranking 
officers on the incident-grounds when they require details about the progress of the 
response.  
 
 
Nonetheless, the flow of information is neither constant nor consistent between the PO 
employees and their information sources unless the PO engages in continuously contacting 
the control and the operations’ personnel in order to be brought up-to-date. Even in this 
case, diffusing information to the PO is the outcome of negotiations between control and 
PO personnel. In episode E we listen to the conversation between a PO employee 
(Giorgos) and a control officer (Yannis) (40-45). Giorgos asked Yannis whether 
everything was “fine” before introducing his main request whether “we have something” 
at the airport (40). The first request and the use of “we” revealed that Giorgos expected 
Yannis to inform him if an incident had occurred.  
 
 
The second successive request regarded the verification of the information Giorgos 
received. Yannis’s answer indicated that although he was expected to inform the PO with 
regard to an emergency, a “serious” (41) one, he failed to fulfil a part of his role. Yannis 
was uncertain whether such “rather serious” information should be communicated to the 
PO. So, he tried to buy some time (41) in order to contemplate whether to forward the   155
information or not and began to negotiate with Giorgos (43). When he did not reach a 
decision, he delegated the responsibility of replying to Giorgos’s request to his 
superintendent: “Should I tell […]” (45). And so he repeated the information almost 
verbatim. But Giorgos misunderstood the information Yannis gave him. When Yannis 
repeated the information, the fire-fighter forwarded to him earlier that morning, he 
reproduced the same circumstances that made him struggle when he tried to understand 
what the fire-fighter was telling him. So, when he gave the same information to Giorgos he 
did not provide a wider context for the PO employee to comprehend the details. Giorgos 
understood that the plane had crashed. Yet, if the plane had crashed, Giorgos would have 
heard it on the radio, and would have suspected that a large mobilization was taking place. 
A few minutes after their first conversation, Giorgos contacted Yannis again (46-52). 
Yannis was rather surprised by Giorgos’s misunderstanding of the information so he 
clarified the situation. But Giorgos missed the important information that military aircrafts 
were flying next to the commuter plane (49). Yannis tried to clarify yet at least another 
point (51) when he was abruptly interrupted by Giorgos, who claimed that he had “got it” 
(50).  
 
 
The third time Giorgos called (53), Yannis was very irritated both by the abrupt 
interruption and the negligence Giorgos displayed throughout the second and third calls. 
As a reply to his question, Giorgos received more information that he anticipated. This 
amount of information was not clearly contextualized and, thus, he was unable to process 
it. Moreover, Giorgos was engaged in communicating with at least two individuals almost 
simultaneously. His attention was, therefore, divided, and he missed some of the 
information communicated to him. What he lacked in attention, he made up in tacit 
knowledge. When there is a discussion among HFC employees about aircrafts, it usually 
regards water-bombing vessels. So Giorgos falsely assumed that the aircrafts Yannis 
referred to were water-bombers. In a rush to respond to the media, Giorgos missed the 
overall picture of the potential emergency.  
 
 
PO effectiveness largely depends on the control’s cooperation. The PO’s dependency 
empowers the control room. Control employees express their power over the PO in various 
ways. During episode D, control personnel refused to reply the PO employee’s questions 
with regard to the progress of the mobilization in the different fronts (D, 22-23). 
Nonetheless, the control employee did not merely refuse to give to the PO. The former   156
mocked the latter by repeating verbatim his question (D, 23) and by providing him with a 
self-evident and, therefore, useless assessment of the incidents: “mayhem.” During at least 
three of the episodes examine (A, C, E), control officers instructed PO personnel to go 
upstairs, observe the control personnel’s conduct and listen to the telephone conversations 
in order to accumulate incident information as the officers claimed that they had very little 
time to inform the PO personnel. However, due to the fact that there are usually two fire-
fighters employed in the PO responding to five telephone lines, if one of them goes 
upstairs to “observe” the other is unable to deal with communicating with more than one 
line at a time. The PO employees, usually lower-ranking personnel, comply with the 
instructions of the control officers. Their refusal to comply would disrupt the flow of 
information and constitute an act of insubordination.  
 
 
Episode B reveals that there is an additional reason why control officers avoid 
communicating information to the PO. Usually, the highest-ranking officers on the 
incident-grounds generously share information with the PO. Occasionally and despite 
being lower-ranking personnel, PO employees acquire more information than control 
officers. When the district commander reached the “Square Tower” (episode B), one of the 
control officers suggested operating the sprinkler system. Yet, rather than operating the 
automatic fire-extinguishing system the commanding officer was more interested in 
whether the PO had contacted the media. The control officer was unaware whether the PO 
had been informed about the progress of the response. 
 
 
The control personnel’s experience in communicating with the media as well as their eight 
year experience in cooperating with the PO, allow them to know what information the 
media are usually interested in and, thus, the kind of information the PO seeks. 
Nonetheless, they often provide different information to that requested. For example, at 
least two episodes (A, C) indicate that when PO employees requested the number of the 
appliances on the incident-grounds, control dispatchers began to loudly numerate the 
license plates of the fire-engines and occasionally mentioning the type (i.e. A, 21-29). The 
dispatcher took his time when answering the PO’s question. Nine successive requests and 
replies (A, 21-29) indicated that the dispatcher was dawdling. During episode A (44-50), 
the dispatcher’s elliptic utterance (44) revealed that the PO failed to comprehend that the 
number 20 referred to the amount of appliances on-site. Ellipses are a time-saving 
linguistic trope of referring to objects or situations absent from the actual settings of the   157
discussion between at least two communicators. Nonetheless, what may be perceived as 
self-evident by the communicator who uses elliptic utterances may not be equally self-
evident to the receiver of the information and may, therefore, result in misunderstanding 
the content of the information (E, 40-53).  
 
 
c. A brief overview of the diffusion of the incident information  
 
 
The flow of incident information is often deliberately obstructed by the control employees. 
Information appears to empower those who attain it. After the approximately six thousand 
forest fires that erupted in Greece in 2007 and destroyed almost 269.000 hectares of forest 
land and tillage
63 the control administration granted the PO permission to access part of the 
software system control employees use to register the information. PO personnel were 
allowed to view the table that displayed the forest incidents across Greece: where the 
forest fires erupted, when, the resources engaged in the response and the progress of the 
response classified as ongoing, contained, under control, extinguished. Nonetheless, the 
control administration denied the PO personnel access to view the table that displayed the 
urban incident in progress. If access was granted, the PO employees would have 
minimized their communicative interactions with the control officers and, thus, their 
immediate dependency upon them. Therefore, the control would have lost their power over 
the flow of information. Next to the deliberate obstruction of the flow of the incident 
information, the unintentional disruption of the process is provoked by the carelessness of 
the employees. The few formal procedures that dictate the obligations of control 
employees towards the PO are not always applied. Under these circumstances, 
communication becomes personalized. In order to accomplish their tasks, PO personnel 
contact specific control employees, with whom they affiliate and who they trust. This 
long-lived practice reveals that the informal interactions overpower the formal 
relationships developed amongst HFC employees. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/forestfires_el_2007.htm, accessed: 03/12/2007.   158
4.1.2. Liaising HFC with other responder-organizations 
 
 
First-responder organizations do not engage in frequent communicative interactions during 
non-crisis situations and, therefore, during emergencies, they fail to identify the other 
organizations’ obligations, routines and procedures. Lack of awareness on an operational 
level reflects lack of strategic decision-making on an administrative level. Whereas 
meetings do take place between the HFC and other emergency co-responders, these 
meetings are routine encounters of organizations, rather than substantial accounts of their 
procedures, their capabilities, such as availability of resources and degree of emergency 
preparedness. Fire, rescue, ambulance services and the police are the predominant first-
responder organizations. Depending on the type of the emergency encountered, local 
authorities’ services, electric and gas companies, military units and other organizations 
such as environmental agencies may also be involved in emergency responses. The 
missing link between the co-responder organizations is the liaison [officer], who should 
serve as the primary contact for supporting agencies assisting in an incident (Argenti 
2003). 
 
 
a. Cooperation with the police: “Colleagues” and “comrades” on a need-to-assist 
basis 
 
 
Communicative interactions between the HFC and the police occur on a need-to-assist 
basis and, generally, after the senior fire-officer in charge on-site requests police 
assistance. According to a set of informal procedures titled Memorandums of Action 
(MoA)
64, the CCC dispatchers may notify the police during fire incidents in “basements, 
industrial facilities and refineries” in order to intercept or divert traffic. MoA provide 
consultative guidelines to communicative interactions undertaken by control dispatchers, 
rather than taking the place of SOP. Hence, it is in the CCC dispatchers’ discretion to 
follow the steps recommended. However, MoA fail to prioritize the calls according to the 
minimum number of dispatchers or operators employed in the CCC: i.e. 1
st call to 
mobilizing the appropriate type and number of appliances; 2
nd notifying and/ or instigating 
the mobilization of the ambulance service or the police and so on. Even as the MoA are 
                                                 
64 The MoA document is not an official service order but written guidelines used by the control personnel. A 
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drafted, notifying the police is the lowest of the dispatchers’ priorities, with the role of the 
police considered as auxiliary. So, the HFC is neither constant nor consistent in its 
communicative interactions with the police. HFC employees do not even inform the police 
about an emerging incident they attend. This however may result in the police being unable 
to provide immediate assistance when requested by the HFC (episodes C, D). The former 
may need some time to re-direct police patrols to the incident-grounds and the volume of 
traffic may not allow their immediate access to the incident-grounds.  
 
 
Lack of coordination was also manifested in episode D. The fire-engine was left on the 
demonstrations-front while police headquarters removed the patrol units away from the 
raging demonstrators without informing the HFC control about their decision. When one 
control-officer contacted the police headquarters to ask about their operational tactics, the 
police officer who answered the phone (D, 79) diverted the call to a higher-ranking officer 
while commenting: “A fire person with the rank of lieutenant colonel needs to speak to you 
because he wants to make a decision.” The indifference towards the caller is expressed 
with the phrase “a fire person”, although the control-officer had identified himself and 
stated his request. While diverting the call, the police officer did not put forward the 
request made by the HFC employee but his rank. The use of “need” indicated that the HFC 
actions depended on the police decisions.  
 
 
The actual independent decision-making of the responder-organizations on the 
demonstrations-grounds indicated that there was minimal cooperation between the two 
organizations on a formal level. When the control-officer initiated the conversation with 
the senior police officer, the former addressed the latter as “colleague”. Lack of 
predetermined procedures sustain the development of informal relationships and empower 
the role of its organization-members, off-and on-site (Selznick 1952; Hofstede 2005; 
Schneider and Barsoux 2003). As a result, responders affiliate by inclusion: the police are 
the HFC “comrades” or “colleagues”, as often addressed in the recorded conversations, due 
to the fact that they are employed by the same Ministry.  
 
 
The police are quite often the source of incident information. They contact the HFC control 
in order to forward information received by civilians with regard to emergencies the HFC 
attends to. However, police rarely provide the name or number of the caller so as to   160
facilitate the HFC control personnel to verify the information or to request additional 
information in order to plan and instigate the mobilization. Occasionally, they may not be a 
valid source of information. According to SGCP officials, not only were the police 
unaware of the plane crashing in Grammatiko, but they informed the SGCP that the plane 
was in the process of landing (E, 81). 
During episode C, one of the control dispatchers contacted the police in order to verify the 
information one of the police operators had forwarded to the HFC control. The police 
officer who answered the call was unaware of the information. So, he commented: “wait 
just a moment so I can ask the one who recorded it […] he is a bit dumb […] [meaning the 
police operator who logged in the information]?!” and called him by his name while he 
was on the phone with the CCC dispatcher, thus revealing his identity to a third person. 
This phrase encapsulated a cultural and a technical issue. On a technical level, the 
information in the CCC of the police was not accessible via a software system; it was the 
operator of the system who had to access it in order to retrieve the information requested. 
On an organizational level, a voluntary breaching of the organization’s consistency took 
place. A criticism was passed on one of the organization-members and communicated to 
another organization.  
 
 
b. The ambulance service: A problematic co-actor  
 
 
In the cases examined here, the relationship between the HFC and the ambulance service 
personnel was even less collegial than the relationship between HFC and police 
employees. During the fire that erupted in the “Square Tower” (episode B) the medical 
doctor of the ambulance service who was on-duty that evening contacted the control to 
complain with regard to why the HFC dispatchers had requested an ambulance unit to 
proceed to the firegrounds: “doesn’t the HFC have its own ambulance?” The HFC provides 
an ambulance and a team of doctors and paramedics to care for the HFC employees off- 
and on-site.
65 If necessary, until ambulances reach the incident-grounds, this team may also 
provide first-aid to civilians during emergency responses. Nonetheless, the ambulance 
service is obliged to provide assistance when requested. Yet, the medical doctor negotiated 
the ambulance service’s assistance on the firegrounds. In the midst of an emergency 
                                                 
65 Presidential Decree 210/1992, article 113, paragraph 14; P.D. 122/1990, article 2; P.D. 426/1991, article 
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response, the existent standard operating procedures failed to define the limits of inter-
agency cooperation.  
 
 
Failure to identify the role of the responder-organizations on the incident-grounds is also 
depicted in episode E. The rescue and recovery operations that followed the plane crash 
required a well orchestrated set of actions on-scene by the responder-organizations. Yet, 
many of the conversations conducted between dispatchers and officers, and between 
control personnel and fire-station operators, concerned the accumulation of bodybags. HFC 
personnel were engaged in retrieving bodybags from the fire-stations and sending them on-
site; a task officially performed by the ambulance service. The first twenty-four hours of 
the response portrayed the conduct between the control and the ambulance service.  
 
 
What in the beginning appeared as a displaced preoccupation with bodybags soon became 
an obsession. Following an initial conversation with the vice-president of the ambulance 
service, a series of communication conduct between the CCC dispatchers and officers, and 
the fire-station watch officers and operators, was realized to accumulate as many bodybags 
as possible, despite the reassurances of the ambulance service with regard to attending to 
the matter. Introductions between the CCC and the fire-station personnel involved in the 
bodybags accumulation process soon became redundant as they instantly recognized each 
other’s voices over the phone. The personnel’s insistence with locating the bodybags 
revealed mistrust between co-participants in the emergency response organizations. The 
ambulance untimely responses had created a precedent that cultivated a climate of doubt 
and suspicion. Additionally, the expectation of both the media and the public was that the 
fire service would be able to cope effectively with the disaster. These expectations were 
explicitly emphasized as rescue and recovery operations after the plane crash were 
compared to the rescue operations launched after the earthquake, in Athens, in September 
1999, when the prestige of the HFC as an effective emergency responder acquired a heroic 
profile (Chlimintza 2002), thus enhancing the HFC status among other responder-
organizations. Therefore, the HFC personnel felt they had to cover all aspects of the 
emergency response in a solo performance. That is one of the principal reasons for 
assuming the role of the SGCP. 
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During the conversations between the HFC control and the ambulance service power 
related issues became apparent. Organizational resources appear to belong to the officer or 
the official in charge of the organization: “I have 30 units on the way […]” (E, 136). 
Moreover, the process of familiarization was rapid. By the third time one organization was 
contacting the other, positions held in the command or the managerial structure of the co-
responders did not appear to matter to the communicators. They were addressing each 
other as “friend” or “mate”. This transition from formal – where status was explicitly 
stated – to informal interactions is a habitual practice in the HFC. Informal interactions 
allow tolerance with regard to tactical or operational misconduct amongst emergency co-
responders. Tolerance is almost always reciprocated: those who were tolerated will 
tolerate. Yet, these informalities occurred on an interpersonal level. On an organizational 
level, the mistrust continued until the accumulation of bodybags reached an end. This 
ending came when the fire-stations ran out of such resources. 
 
 
c. The undermined SGCP 
 
 
Seldom is the SGCP contacted on time about issues the organization should attend to 
(episodes A, D, E). The protagonist role of the HFC on-scene allows very little space for 
this newly developed organization to assume the role for which the agency was destined. 
Episode A indicates that the SGCP was not notified about the derailment of the train by the 
control. The SGCP officer was informed about the incident by the Secretary GCP, who 
was a very popular former chief fire-officer. It appears irregular for the director of an 
organization to access incident information before the control room that deals with 
emergencies. The control administration contacted the director, who in turn notified the 
SGCP control. The disseminating of information revealed the priorities of the organization-
members. Higher-ranking HFC officers chose to inform the director rather than the 
emergency unit of the organization. The prioritization indicates that next to its practical use 
the information acquires a symbolic power. When the SGCP personnel got wind of the 
incident, they placed a call to receive information about the progress of the response. As 
soon as the SGCP employee received the necessary information, instead of ending the 
conversation, or reprimanding the control about their negligence or discussing the potential 
involvement of the SGCP in the response, the SGCP employee asked after a control 
employee he used to know.  
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This transgression of formal procedures and the simultaneous effort to informally affiliate 
with control personnel, once more reveals the extent to which informalities have penetrated 
the sphere of the formal. Towards the end of episode C, an operation unit on its way to an 
incident asked the control whether the SGCP was notified. The incident appeared to be 
insignificant and the control officers had not notified the Secretariat. Nonetheless, the 
control officer answered the operations’ unit that they had notified the SGCP in order to 
avoid any reaction on part of the crew.  
 
 
A few minutes after the mobilization began to take place, during the plane-crash event, one 
of the senior control officers remembered (57-59) to contact the SGCP and instructed one 
of the junior officer to do so. As it would be a simple announcement rather than a 
meaningful cooperation, for that senior officer this was a secondary task. From the 
beginning of the conversation and after the initial necessary introductions were made (64-
71), it became clear that the HFC and SGCP representatives lacked communication skills 
and training. It is at this point that one finds it crucial that, through their policy makers, the 
governments should understand the importance of making an investment to provide 
necessary training to first responders’ organisations in crises situations. The SGCP officer 
A sounded certain with regard to the events that were taking place (70). He announced the 
source of his information so as to validate its content. Under those circumstances, the 
control officer thought it unnecessary to further engage in the conversation as he assumed 
that the SGCP officer was aware of the events unfolding. Before he hung up the phone, he 
asked, out of courtesy rather than standard procedures, whether the SGCP required 
something in particular (71) from the HFC. Luckily, the SGCP officer conveyed the 
information he had about the incident: the plane was in the process of landing (72). From 
the following part of the conversation (73-78) it can be deduced that the source of 
information plays a vital role in the reception of the information. The validity of the 
information depends on the skills, experience and rank of the person or the organization 
that delivers it. The information may be regarded as “problematic” when delivered by 
lower-ranking personnel with little experience and no reputation.  
 
 
Moreover, in this conversation, more than two minutes are wasted on who is the keeper of 
the correct information rather than on the response, which should have been a priority. 
Frustration governs the discussion and then another round of conduct with regard to who   164
received valid information from whom, was initiated (79-81). The communication was 
once again distorted. The information was mis-communicated either when it was received 
by the police after contacting the air traffic control tower or during the Secretariat’s 
communication with the police. Either the police made a mistake in transmitting the 
information or the Secretariat in receiving it. Towards the end of the conversation, and 
before expressing his frustration (89), the second SGCP officer required the identification 
of the source of information (85). Repetitions revealed that both communicators were still 
preoccupied with the news about the crash to the point that they could not plan their next 
move (90-91). 
 
 
In the cases examined, communicators rarely pay attention to the content of the 
information one is conveying to the other. They have formed a certain mental picture 
about the unfolding events that they maintain throughout their conversations. Evidently, 
their picture comprises a rather rigid matrix with predetermined structures that the holders 
are not easily willing to let go while engaging in an information exchange process. As a 
result, disbelief and mistrust obstructs the process of establishing cooperation in view of an 
emergency in progress.  
 
 
d. Occasional emergency responders with an auxiliary role 
 
 
Cooperation between the HFC and co-responders such as the Electric and the Gas 
Company or the Hellenic Railways Organization is achieved to different degrees. The HFC 
regularly cooperates with the Electric Company. The HFC frequently requests the EC to 
cut off the power in affected buildings on the incident-grounds. The frequency of their 
interactions led to establishing a direct communication via a reserved telephone line. The 
use of the reserved telephone line indicates who instigates the communication process. 
Thus, no introductions are required.  
 
 
During episode C (106-117), the dispatcher forwarded the necessary information as soon 
as the EC employee answered the telephone: location and type of incident. The dispatcher 
neglected to mention the use of the compromised building. The background noise 
obstructed the dissemination of the information and the dispatcher repeated was requested   165
to repeat the message verbatim (107-108). Yet he put forward a brief greeting that 
indicated the urgency of the situation interwoven with the increasing irritation of the 
dispatcher. The dispatcher did not use the words “pal”, “friend” of “colleague” but a 
metonym that depersonalized the communication conduct and kept it formal and 
instrumental: “Hey EC.” In order to hear the message the EC employee shouted at his 
colleagues to reduce the noise and prompted the dispatcher to repeat his message for the 
third time. The dispatcher was simultaneously involved in mobilizing the operations’ units 
and giving different instructions to different responders involved. His being over-involved 
in the mobilization process made him confuse the information he knew very well. He 
thought he forgot the number in the address and requested another dispatcher to verify it 
(110). Following the request of the EC employee who was noting down the address rather 
slowly the dispatcher announced the incident, repeated the same information another three 
times (108, 110, 112) and verified the same information another two times (114, 116).  
 
 
On the incident-grounds getting in touch with the EC emergency team was an ordeal. In 
the midst of the chaotic environment by numerous fire personnel who were loudly 
communicating amongst them, the IC was unable to contact the EC unit. The unit also 
failed to establish contact once on the firegrounds. So the IC was forced to instruct control 
dispatchers to contact the EC emergency room to instruct their unit on the firegrounds to 
contact the IC, a task that the unit could have performed once on-scene.  
 
 
The initial contacting of the Electric Company emergency room was a rather easy task to 
perform by control dispatchers due to their regular interactions. This, nonetheless, was not 
the case with the Gas Company or the Hellenic Railways Organization (OSE). The 
irregular cooperation between the HFC and the Gas Company did not result into 
establishing direct contact through a reserved telephone line. The use of gas as an 
alternative source of power did not alert the HFC with regard to establishing similar 
methods of communicating to the Electric Company (episode B). Eventually, an operator 
answered the control dispatcher only to inform him that there was no active network in the 
affected building.  
 
 
The OSE was a rather difficult organization to access. The control personnel appeared 
ignorant at to how to establish communication with the OSE. They were unaware of the   166
organization’s structure and, therefore, of who to contact in order to request information 
with regard to the trains that collided. No provisions were made so as to establishing a 
direct telephone line with one of the largest public and freight transport organizations in 
Greece. In order to establish communication with a representative of the organization, the 
CCC dispatcher, contacted OTE which provided the CCC dispatcher with a 24-hour line 
open to the public where the CCC personnel could reach an employee of OSE. 
Communication was not established from this initial effort made by the HFC.  
 
 
Eventually, the control located one of the representatives of the OSE who went on-scene so 
as to investigate the causes of the collision. The OSE representative was on-scene before 
the control personnel located him. Yet, he had not been in contact with the HFC 
operations’ units on-site. When one of the control employees requested the passengers’ 
lists and asked whether the rail-tracks had electricity, the OSE employee abruptly 
interrupted the conversation commenting that their line of questioning was of no interest to 
him. Nonetheless, he did answer the question with regard to the tracks but he did not 
provide the passengers’ list. Evidently, OSE failed to establish communication with the 
rescuers on-scene, and to provide answers to assure their safety and to assist the HFC units 
to safely remove all passengers from the collision-scene.  
 
 
e. A brief commentary 
 
 
As Allan McConnell (2003) maintains “crisis response are rarely neat. Often they are a 
product of a series of intra- and inter-agency conflicts covering a wide range of 
governmental and non-governmental bodies.” Different degrees of cooperation are 
achieved between various emergency co-responders. Reserved channels for 
communicating incident information are not always in place. The incident information is 
communicated orally and it has to be repeated in order for the recipient of the information 
to properly register it.  
 
 
The different modus operandi and objectives of the co-participant organizations result in 
organization-members acting independently on the incident-grounds. Complexity in 
cooperation increases as organizations’ weaknesses and particularities are diffused on the   167
incident-grounds. However solvable the problems within organizations, when these 
interact on the incident-grounds they may hamper interoperability. Therefore, it is 
important to identify organizational culture, potential problematic areas, before drafting or 
attempting to implement standard operating procedures. Otherwise, an organization’s 
peculiarities will be projected as the other organizations’ weaknesses that will produce and 
reproduce disruption in communication on and off the incident-grounds. 
 
 
The lack of knowledge, training and trust generated doubt and suspicion among 
organizations involved in the incidents (Weick 1993). The absence of a risk register 
resulted in a lack of existing emergency planning, which would allow the introducing and 
the implementing of standard operating procedures. SOP in turn would clarify the 
distribution of responsibilities on and off the incident-grounds. Consequently, 
communication between the organizations involved in the incident was occasionally not 
established and unified command was not achieved.  
 
 
4.1.3. Securing personnel on the incident-grounds 
 
 
The safety officer monitors the conditions of the fire- and rescue-grounds and develops 
measures for assuring the safety of all responders on-scene. This is an unusual practice for 
the HFC. During the Helios plane, the IC’s instructed operations’ units to proceed in the 
compromised buildings (C, 139-141); they decreased the number of fire-fighters on the 
incident-grounds based on erroneous assumptions (B); they provided contradicting orders 
to the operations’ units on-site. The units self-dispatched and the officers in charge lost 
track of the appliances and, thus, track of what the responders were doing on-scene (A, B, 
C, D, and E). Overall, working conditions were not monitored and the safety of the 
personnel was not assured on the incident-grounds. There was at least one case of injury 
reported during episode B. A volunteer fire-fighter approached the incident-grounds with 
no precautionary measures, such as a breathing apparatus, either because there were no 
spare apparatuses in the appliance or because he neglected to use such apparatus. He was 
poisoned by the toxic smoke generated from the fire.
66  
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4.2. The general staff: The practices of the operations’ personnel  
 
 
As shown from the cases examined, two of the most frequently emerging problematic 
issues on an operational level are, first, the phenomenon of self-dispatching; second, the 
fact that operations’ personnel, either higher- or lower-ranking employees, are frequently 
unfamiliar with their area of jurisdiction.  
 
 
4.2.1. Self-dispatching: Unruliness on the incident-grounds  
 
 
On the actual operational level self-dispatching, if one uses the American term – or self-
deployment and self-involvement, the English versions – reveals an unruly habitual 
practice. Self-dispatching is usually defined as the decision of operations’ units or 
personnel to proceed on the fire or the rescue-grounds on their own initiative. Two 
additional aspects to self-dispatching that emerge from the Hellenic episodes examined 
that have not yet been identified as such are, first, on-duty personnel being deployed on the 
incident-grounds according to their judgement and regardless of the orders they receive by 
the operations’ officers and, second, withdrawing or intending to withdraw from incident-
grounds without permission (C, 105). In both these cases, self-dispatching equals 
insubordination and breaches the safety of the personnel working on the incident-grounds. 
Self-dispatching can be a significant obstacle in managing emergencies. A British senior 
fire-officer eloquently described self-dispatching during one recent major disaster:  
 
 
We had to restrain people from self-deployment […] their [on-duty] colleagues 
were phoning them on mobile phones: ‘oh, here is great come and join us […]’. 
The mobile phone was almost the biggest enemy at the incident because they 
were phoning each other back and forth were taking pictures of people trapped 
that was shocking […] they should be kept somewhere in the room.
67 
 
 
However, in the Hellenic episodes examined, such phenomena did not emerge. Self-
dispatching is the result of mismanagement on the fire- or rescue-grounds: the unclear 
command structure, the inability of the IC’s to manage the resources, the population of the 
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emergency co-responders and the chaotic circumstances of the emergency. Thus, in the 
course of the emergency response, the operational role of the crews and their appliances 
remains unmapped and their status uncertain. 
 
 
Often, control employees realize that dispatched resources have gone missing. These five 
episodes alone indicate that this is not a coincidental consequence resulting from 
occasionally mismanaging emergency responses. This phenomenon stems from how the 
organizational resources are categorized, ordered, dispatched, and, eventually tracked and 
recovered. Resources are defined as operations’ units (personnel, appliances and 
equipment), supplies and facilities, potentially available to support emergency responses. 
All the episodes examined indicate that, as soon as control dispatchers get hold of 
information with regard to an emerging incident, they start contacting the station operators 
in order to dispatch the necessary number and type of appliances to the incident-scene.  
 
 
Categorization of resources should occur prior to emergency responses, when planning for 
these events. The decisions for distributing organizational resources on the various fire-
stations are made based on the risks entailed in the area of the fire-stations’ jurisdiction. 
The higher the potential risk presented in an area, the closer the appropriate resources to 
mitigate an emergency are located. Different appliances may carry different equipment 
designed for specific fire-fighting or rescue purposes. Therefore, as soon as they become 
part of the stations’ resources, they are given a plate number and a number that indicates 
the role the appliances assume when they become part of operations’ units. For example, 
the first-response unit is comprised of two appliances. When dispatchers mobilize the 
“first unit” of a fire-station they refer to two appliances - the “first [appliance] of the first 
[unit]” or “1.1” and the “second of the 1.1”. The commanding officer mounts the first 
appliance that leads the response. Both the first and the second appliances are usually 
dispatched simultaneously but they can be mobilized separately, depending on the type 
and the extent of the emergency. Classifying the appliances according to their type and 
role in emergency responses is a significant part of the mobilization process.  
 
 
Confusion during emergency management emerges when dispatchers track the appliances 
not based on the plate number which is unique for each appliance, but based on how they 
are classified (episodes C, D, E). For example, the first response unit from the first   170
Athenian station is named 1.1. So is the response unit from Piraeus. When contacting the 
CCC, the crew should state whether it is the Athenian or the Piraeus pump. During training 
courses, it is explained to fire-fighters that, in their conduct with the CCC, they should 
state the area in which their station is based. This is not always done. The reasons for this 
omission may be attributed to the inexperience of the fire-fighting crew or the stressful 
state under which a crew is operating when responding to emergencies. Such misconduct 
is considered minor by organization-members and it is, therefore, rarely reprimanded. 
Minor, as opposed to major misconduct, bear little significance for the mobilization 
process, as communicators’ experience and actions help to overcome any misapprehension 
in the content of the information exchanged. For example, the dispatchers are aware which 
appliance they mobilized and, therefore, they assume that the operations crew contacting 
them is from the engine they have dispatched on-site. The problem, however, can be 
detected during a response in which both appliances are used. In such case, due to an 
extensive workload, the dispatcher may have in mind which appliance should be re-
dispatched to its station. However, if the crew provides incomplete identification, he/she 
may re-dispatch the incorrect one.  
 
 
The ordering of the appliances begins when control dispatchers are informed about an 
emerging incident. The number and type of appliances mobilized depends on the existent 
emergency plans or the dispatchers’ experience, in case there are no plans available. The 
ordering continues according to the needs of the operations’ units. Following the initial 
ordering of the resources, the dispatchers place a call either to the station operators or to 
the operations’ units so as to verify whether certain equipment necessary on the incident-
grounds is functional and on board the appliance and (episodes A, B, C, E).  
 
 
The fire-station operators are commissioned to register the activity of the fire-stations’ 
resources. In emergency responses, changes in the distribution of crew and appliances are 
bound to happen due to the type and intensity of the emergency. Operators frequently fail 
to update their inventory concerning changes in the schedule, and to familiarize themselves 
with the code names of the appliances as well as their plate numbers. The operators’ 
inability to immediately report the vehicle’s number reveals the level of organizational 
preparedness to regroup its resources during an emergency response or reorganize in view 
of simultaneously emerging incidents. 
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Tracking and recovering fire and rescue resources begins as soon as operations’ units are 
directed to proceed on the incident-grounds and continues until they return to the fire-
stations. Tracking and recovering resources results in accounting for losses and regrouping 
capability. In all cases, the larger the mobilization and the larger the size of the FRS, the 
harder it is to monitor fire and rescue operations’ units on the incident-grounds, and in the 
CCC. The objectives of the FRS are to promptly deploy their resources, and account for 
them at any given time during the operations, so as to be able to redeploy them instantly. 
However, these objectives are often not met by organization-members either on-site or in 
the CCC. 
 
 
HFC real-time communication indicates that tracking and recovering resources on and 
from incident-grounds depends on a set of verbal communicative interactions amongst 
participants in the emergency, both on the fire or rescue site and in the CCC. “We’ve lost 
the ball”, a metaphor that can be interpreted as “things have completely fallen apart”, is the 
phrase that often emerges from the communication conduct of fire-fighters on the incident-
grounds and in the CCC. The usual practice to avoid “loosing the ball” is for all actors 
involved to fulfil the tasks prescribed by the role. For example, as soon as the operations’ 
units are mobilized, the senior crew member of each appliance is responsible for contacting 
the CCC in order to log in any change in the status of the dispatched unit. Control 
dispatchers should be notified: first, when the unit is leaving the fire-station to proceed to 
the incident-grounds; second, the moment it reaches the incident-grounds; third, when it 
proceeds for replenishment; fourth, when it assumes operational status after the 
replenishment; and, finally, in any other case when the status of the unit, as previously 
declared to the CCC, changes.  
 
 
In a similar way, the station operators are obliged to register any changes in re-assigning 
personnel from one appliance to another or to make a note of which appliances are leaving 
the station, where they are deployed and at what time (e.g. A, 107-115). The control 
dispatchers keep records of which appliances they mobilize, where they are dispatched and 
at what time. Nonetheless, either by ignorance or negligence, crew members do not always 
engage in these regulated communicative interactions. They are not adequately trained nor 
are they disciplined when they fail to comply. Their actions are subject to little evaluation 
or supervision, and so neither ignorance nor negligence is rectified. What HFC employees 
fail to realize, due to this gap in supervision, is that an omission on their part when they   172
engage in an emergency response creates an anomaly (Manning 1992; Perrow 1999) that 
not only affects them but the entire network of actors participating in the emergency 
response, both those on the incident-grounds and those in the CCC.  
 
 
Tracking the resources becomes more complicated when the multiple actors involved in 
the process engage in power-games. During the rescue operations launched on the 
collision-scene, control personnel made an effort to account for the appliances on-site (A, 
116-123). Officers and dispatchers labour independently so as to accumulate the same 
information. This absence of coordination continues as officers choose to engage in 
superfluous and time-consuming communication conduct with the dispatchers, to verify 
the information they have gathered, instead of requesting, for example, a copy of the 
dispatchers’ records. During the aforementioned conversation, the officer made use of his 
status to impose his mental picture of the mobilization on the dispatcher, by requesting the 
information he needed in the sequence that he chose, disregarding the dispatcher’s 
sequence of conveying the information requested. 
 
 
4.2.2. Seeking directions: Unfamiliarity and embarrassment 
 
 
Throughout the episodes examined, operations’ units and higher-ranking officers were 
heard asking for directions on how to proceed to the incident-scene. They sometimes 
contacted control personnel via telephone so as to ask for directions; they sometimes 
requested directions via radio. Usually, they understood and followed the directions the 
control dispatchers and officers provided them (B, 88-98); occasionally, they did not (A, 1-
9).  
 
 
The operations’ personnel ask for directions when they are dispatched away from their 
area of jurisdiction, providing assistance to a neighbouring fire-station. In this case, they 
require assistance to reach the incident-scene promptly (A, 1-8). Each engine is equipped 
with a map of the city. Operations’ units also ask for directions when this map is old, 
poorly preserved, has missing pages or missing altogether from the appliance. The third 
case the operations’ units ask for directions is when they are unaware of their area of 
jurisdiction (B, 54). Such unfamiliarity with the area of jurisdiction also reveals that   173
personnel are ignorant with regard to the risks involved in the same area, such as the 
location of factories or industrial facilities. A routine event (E, 157-166) revealed that the 
operations’ units were unaware of both their area of jurisdiction and their practices.  
  
 
In the majority of the cases studied, operations’ personnel request directions via telephone. 
According to procedures,
68 dispatchers are obliged to communicate messages via radio. 
Yet the procedures are rather vague as to the content of the messages exchanged. So 
dispatchers may provide directions via both channels. After the freight and commuter 
trains collided in 2006, at least four appliances and three high-ranking operations’ officers 
requested directions via telephone, in order to proceed on the site where the collision took 
place. The already scarce control personnel dealt with responding to every one of the calls 
made so as to facilitate the appliances to reach the scene promptly. However, when 
dispatchers provide directions via radio, all the operations’ units mobilized may access the 
same essential information.  
 
 
Nonetheless, the main reason why operations’ personnel (A, 1-9; C, 147-154), and 
especially high-ranking officers (A, 30-43; B, 54; E, in at least five cases), seek directions 
via telephone is to avoid embarrassment. After the freight and commuter trains collided in 
2006, the operations’ units dispatched on the rescue-scene asked the control employees for 
directions on how to proceed on-site. A dispatcher briefly explained the route they were to 
follow. The crews acknowledged the dispatcher’s transmission and replied that they were 
on their way. However, before they hung up, one of them was heard saying to another: “do 
we know how to get there?” First, they should have asked the dispatchers to provide them 
with page number of the map, and, second, they should have acknowledged that they did 
not understand the directions. However, asking for directions repeatedly has generated 
conflicts between the operations’ units and the control employees, on the grounds that 
crews should know their area and should, therefore, be able to immediately comprehend 
the information. In cases where appliances are mobilized outside their area of jurisdiction, 
they should at least be able to read maps and follow the instructions provided by the 
control. The recordings have indicated that writing down the directions, when transmitted 
by the control, takes the crew a lot of time and is still not enough because transmitted at 
dictation speed. Senior officers appear to have problems reading maps when proceeding to 
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incident-grounds. This recurring phenomenon underlines the necessity of more appropriate 
training. In the Hellenic Fire Academy, trainees are not taught how to read a map. Despite 
the evidence provided to the contrary, reading a map is still considered self-evident. Senior 
CCC dispatchers argued that a significant number of fire-fighters either do not know how 
to “read a map” or “get bored” and avoid searching for directions on the map. 
 
 
Instead of using the radio to interact with CCC dispatchers, high-ranking officers generally 
use their mobiles to contact CCC officers. These officers labour under the 
misapprehension that engaging on a one-to-one communicative interaction spares them the 
embarrassment of formally admitting their ignorance to lower-ranking personnel. 
Therefore, they occasionally contact not the control dispatchers but the control officers (B, 
52). However, it is not the task of CCC officers to provide directions. This task is reserved 
for CCC dispatchers, who have both the experience and the software to correctly direct 
operations’ personnel to the site. When CCC officers are contacted, they assume the role 
of the mediator between the operations’ officers and the dispatcher, as indicated by the 
above communicative interaction. Hence, what appears as a simple transaction becomes a 
time-consuming requesting and receiving process, which may affect the context of the 
information exchanged. Inaccuracy may be the result of the information reaching its 
destination through long and indirect channels. During the “Square Tower” fire, the IC 
contacted the CCC dispatchers requesting directions as to how to reach the site. Generally, 
the IC’s vehicle is equipped with a map. A fire-fighter, who should be familiar with the 
area of the station’s jurisdiction, is appointed to drive the IC’s vehicle. The IC should also 
be familiar with the station’s jurisdiction. As is frequently the case in the HFC, and 
specifically in this case, none of the above conditions were met. During episode A, on his 
way to the incident, the chief fire-officer contacted the CCC on the radio to ask for 
directions as to how to reach the incident-grounds. According to procedures, he stated his 
code name and asked for directions. Befuddled by such unusual practice, the dispatcher 
sought advice from the control officer as to how to reply to the CFO’s request. The 
officer’s instructions indicated how power is sustained by the communicative interactions 
between lower- and higher-ranking personnel.  
 
 
Despite the fact that senior officers should be familiar with the area of their jurisdiction, 
when this knowledge is limited and they need to contact the CCC for information, they 
resort to a mode that minimizes their embarrassment: humour. In one of the emergency   175
launches in 2006, the commander of the station that had jurisdiction over the area placed a 
call to the CCC to ask how to proceed to the fire grounds. After receiving the necessary 
directions he commented to the CCC dispatcher: “It is a critical situation”, referring not to 
the actual crisis but to the selection process for the new leadership in the HFC, the 
Hellenic Police, the Coastguard and the Military. Wordplays or questions concerning the 
personal life of the communicator on the other end of the telephone line occur frequently. 
They are used, first, to conceal deficiencies and, second, to cultivate a climate of 
familiarity. Familiarity is achieved when humour and teasing counterbalance an 
emotionally charged situation.  
 
 
4.2.3. Radios and mobile telephony 
 
 
In the Hellenic cases examined, misconduct of radio communications due to human error 
is a significant issue. Operations’ personnel use certain frequencies though having been 
instructed to use different frequencies. Interferences in each other’s frequencies lead to 
communication mismanagement and superfluity in communication conduct. 
 
 
Mobile telephones have by and large replaced the radio network. One the one hand, the 
means justify the ends. Radio devices are not installed in all HFC transport vehicles 
belonging to the HFC (episode E). Therefore, in at least two of the major incidents 
examined, the mini-buses carrying fire-fighting personnel on- the firegrounds did not have 
radio transmitters installed. Moreover, portable radios are reserved for the ICs. There is no 
interconnection between operations’ officers and operations’ units. In cases where fire-
fighters enter a compromised building without their fire-officer, the latter, may not be able 
to track their whereabouts. In both cases, the rest of the personnel rely on their personal 
mobile phones. On the other hand, it gradually becomes a habitual practice. In the HFC, 
the unofficial extended use of personal mobile phones during emergency responses 
deprives the fire service of its formal character and its official objectives. This unofficial 
way of conducting emergency communication in an official context affects two substantial 
principles in the operation of organizations: responsibility and accountability. 
Responsibility and accountability can be denied on the basis of performing outside the 
legal boundaries of the organization and hinders organisation members’ performance. 
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Telecommunication coverage presents an additional obstacle in emergency 
communications. In certain spaces mostly in urban areas, such as basements and high-rise 
buildings, and remote rural or mountainous areas, telecommunications are either frequently 
disrupted or unattainable. In the cases examined, fire and rescue operations in basements 
present a high risk due to disruption in communications. Although this is identified as a 
problematic area, operations’ personnel generally enter the reception-free zone without 
establishing contingency communication plans. Occasionally, a few officers contact 
control personnel to inform them about their actions (B 56).  Even mobiles may have 
problematic connectivity in the basements. When organization-members intentionally 
ignore the weaknesses in the technical infrastructure and act without introducing 
alternative routes of action, such technical issues become to organizational ones.  
 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
 
 
What I realized while trying to coherently classify and analyse the data according to the 
ICS-matrix was that such a system is incompatible with the Hellenic experience. Whereas 
the ICS provides a list of actors involved in emergency responses and divides the tasks on 
and off the incident-grounds, the Hellenic scene allows its actors to undertake numerous 
roles simultaneously and interfere with each others tasks.  
 
 
Common patterns emerge from both major and minor emergency responses. Routine 
conduct reinforces the findings from the analysis of the organization-members’ interactions 
during emergency responses. For example, processing documentation is one of the most 
common practices of organizations. In the HFC Service Orders, debriefing operations’ 
personnel, filling in and filing reports are usual tasks performed during, after and in 
between emergency responses. Debriefing is a process that rarely takes place. Apart from 
the reflection – or in other words, “confession” – tactics that some of the organization-
members have developed, higher- or lower-ranking personnel are usually informally 
reprimanded with regard to misconduct but debriefings as to the reasons that led to the 
misconduct are not held. Thus, the organization fails to effectively identify the 
organizational weaknesses and to consequently seek solutions. Furthermore, filling in and 
filing reports is a rather problematic process. Occasionally, reports are inadequately filled   177
in (i.e. episode A) and the HFC personnel responsible for completing them do not comply 
with the requirements of the task.  
 
 
Another case indicated that conflict is unavoidable when roles are transcended. Control 
personnel works on a 24hour shift patterns and has, therefore, been assigned to distribute 
the Service Orders that the secretariat of the HFC, with an 8hour shift pattern, issues. So, 
control personnel feel that in addition to their workload, they process the tasks that other 
departments of the organization should have undertaken. The conversation between the 
control commander and lieutenant commander (C, 169-170) reveals something more than 
the strong feelings against the superintendent of the HFC secretariat. When the system 
fails, it is not the system that the employees usually blame. Blame cannot be assigned to an 
impersonal structure and is, thus, personified. The blame then is attributed to those 
individuals who are identified with certain functions of the organization, especially when 
they remain in the same post for a long period of time.   178
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE ROLLERCOSTER OF THE INFORMATION DISSEMINATION PROCESS: 
CONCLUSION TO THE HELLENIC CASE 
 
 
The most significant contribution of the control personnel is that they dispatch appliances 
to the incident-grounds directly after they receive information about an emerging incident 
and they mediate the communication of the incident information amongst responders on- 
and off-scene (figure 1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: The role of the command and control centre 
 
 
In this chapter I focus on how control operators receive the incident information and how 
information is communicated, first, to the control dispatchers, second, to the station 
operators so as to dispatch the organizational resources, and, finally, to the command 
structure of the HFC. The majority of these communicative interactions indicate the 
practices of the organization-members during emergency responses. 
 
 
Dialogues from case studies were selected and transcribed, so as to present the information 
exchange process through the communicative interactions of organization-members during 
this initial stage of the mobilization phase. The selection of these dialogues was based on 
the variety of the type of incidents; the risks entailed, e.g. health risks from the smoke 
generated by fires or an explosion of flammable materials that had not been previously 
identified and could potentially endanger the lives of first responders; the range of the 
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interacting organization-members, i.e. senior and junior, male and female employees in the 
CCC or on the incident-grounds, communicating so as to coordinate the mobilization 
process. Therefore, a variety of incidents, combined with a diversity of communicators, 
provide the opportunity for sociolinguistic comparisons from which to establish similarities 
and differences in the communicative interactions. 
 
The HFC control room is compartmentalized (figure 2). The operators are virtually isolated 
from the officers’ and the dispatchers’ partition. Their isolation coincides with their role in 
the information exchange process. Operators are merely assigned to extract the information 
necessary to instigate the mobilization process. The control officers have the operators’ 
room in vision but they directly oversee the dispatchers’ cubicles and the EM. The 
officers’ interest lies not in the initial incident information but in the assessment and the 
conversion of incident to organizational information.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Positions and settings in the HFC control room 
 
 
Analysis of the communicative interactions during the initial phase of mobilization reveals 
a number of problematic issues. These issues indicate that intra-organizational crises arise 
as the organization strives to manage extra-organizational crises. Power related issues 
distort the information dissemination process and the management of the organization’s 
resources. The lack of standard operating procedures (SOP) leads to a pre-crisis 
mismanagement of the information disseminated during the communicative interactions of 
organization-members. During the negotiation processes and centralization of the decision-
making processes this lack results in conflict.  
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5.1. The initial incoming incident information: How control operators engage in 
essential and trivial conduct with civilians 
 
 
The management of the incident information at an early stage of the emergency response 
reveals the organization’s intention to engage in the response process, the protocols of 
engagement and the actual engagement that depends on the individuals who undertake the 
role of the control operators. Operators are those organization-members who receive, 
assess and communicate the initial incoming information either to control dispatchers or to 
control officers or both. Operators engage in eliciting as much information as possible, 
such as what has been witnessed, where, when, and who is involved. This practice is 
conditioned by a set of standard operating procedures, and the operators’ on-the-job 
training and experience.  
 
 
The first step in emergency communication is to communicate the emergency. To report an 
emergency, civilians dial three distinct emergency numbers: 1-0-0 for the police, 1-9-9 for 
the fire and rescue service and 1-6-6 for the ambulance service. The 1-1-2 number is also 
used European-wide to report emergencies from either a fixed or a mobile line. Some 
countries use it as their primary emergency number, whereas others direct the 1-1-2 calls to 
the local emergency numbers. In the HFC control room, when all the available telephone 
lines are occupied, civilians are either put on hold or asked to re-dial or contact the CCC of 
the police, in which case, the police contacts the HFC control and forwards the incoming 
incident information.  
 
 
According to procedures, control operators are instructed to request essential information 
such as the type (i.e. fire in an apartment or road traffic collision) and the address or the 
approximate location of the incident. When more than one call is placed to the control with 
regard to the same incident, operators are instructed to register those calls and inform the 
callers that the HFC has received the information and is attending to the incident. SOP fail 
to indicate whether operators should or should not engage in eliciting possible additional 
information with regard to the reported emergency from the calls that follow the initial 
announcement. A usual conversation between control operators and civilians is conducted 
as follows (episode C): 
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COP  Fire service. 
Civilian  Yes, there is a fire at Lambraki Street, a factory. 
COP  Yes we are informed, madam. We are on our way. 
Civilian  Thank you.  
COP  You’re welcome. 
  
 
The control operator, who answered the telephone call, did not request any additional 
information with regard to the incident that had already been reported to the control. 
Nonetheless, recorded conversations indicated that the initial incident information was 
incomplete (C, 7; 9). The control operator who received the initial information with regard 
to the fire erupting in the factory was certain only about the location of the incident. So, 
requesting additional information may have provided a more detailed image of the 
incident. Yet, another call was placed by the police: 
 
 
Police  Hi we are calling from the police centre. We have a fire at... 
COP  We have been informed. We are on our way… 
Police  Oh good. Bye. 
 
 
The control operator assumed that the police were about to announce the same fire 
civilians had communicated to the control. The control operator abruptly ended the 
conversation, against procedures. According to Service Orders, he was obliged to request 
the name and number of the person who contacted the CCC of the police control with 
regard to the incident. However, not only did the HFC operator failed to request the type of 
information indicated by the SOP but also he appeared uninterested in the type of 
information the police may have been in position to provide. Since the emergency was out 
of their jurisdiction, the police complied. 
 
 
Verifying or seeking additional information is an essential time-saving process. Civilians 
who contact the control room about an incident may have perceived the emergency in 
different ways. “Risk perception is not an objective judgment of dangers […] [it] does not 
have the same affect on – and it is not perceived in the same way by – all people” 
(Vazquez and Marvan, 2003: 62). Episodes B and D indicate that at least four civilians 
provided contradictory incident information. The callers appeared certain that the 
information they provided was accurate.   182
Furthermore, civilians are not always calm when they contact the HFC control and, thus, 
they are unable to provide precise information. Despite the fact that it turned out to be a 
minor incident, the smoke generated from a fire that erupted in a public building alerted the 
employees, clients and bystanders (D, 76-78). The civilian’s impatience was caused by the 
witnessing of the imminent danger. Civilians’ perceptions rise even when low-probability 
risk is concerned (Weick 1988) or if the discussion between them and the control personnel 
consists of re-assurances about the likelihood of harm (Alkahami and Slovic 1994; 
Sunstein 2007). So, experiencing an emergency is likely to increase irritation that may 
obstruct the communication between civilians and the HFC personnel (episode D).  
 
 
Occasionally, civilians contact the control not to provide incident information but to 
request information about an emergency usually when the emergency is intense. 
Paraphrasing Le Breton (1995) and Slovic (1999), the perception of risk entailed in an 
emergency is an amalgam of the value the parties in the emergency attribute to the 
symbolic or practical affects as well as the potential consequences of the incident to their 
routines (Alston 2003). Drawing upon differentiation in perceptions, interactionist theorists 
such as Lazarus and Launier (1985) have introduced the concept of coping strategies: 
when civilians are in immediate danger, they either seek assistance, support, information 
from experts, which is considered as an active coping mechanism, or freeze, cry, make 
jokes, downplay the importance of the situation, try to evade the emergency themselves, 
which is characterized as a passive coping mechanism (Pearlin and Schooler 1978; Davou 
2000). In all episodes examined, civilians contacted the HFC so as to make enquiries with 
regard to their exposure to the dangers of inhaling smoke and actions they should be taking 
in order to minimize the risks of exposure to the smoke. The following conversation took 
place between a control officer and a civilian who lived in an apartment building where a 
supermarket was operating on the ground floor. The civilian was worried about what 
would happen if the supermarket was on fire.  
 
 
FO  CCC, speaking 
Civilian  Good morning 
FO  Good morning 
Civilian  With regard to the incident, fires etc, etc; oh! I didn’t wish you merry 
Christmas! I am sorry, and have a quiet shift; I am living in the ground floor 
of an apartment building […]. There were some violations with the urban-
planning, but let’s leave this out for the time being. That means that if 
something happens, we will explode with all the quantity of petroleum we keep   183
downstairs. You understand my anxiety.  
FO  Look, you can reach the number so you can ask for the fire safety department 
and they can let you know what you can legally do about it. 
Civilian  We fought for that a lot, madam, because there are lots of interests lying there 
[goes on, more info about embezzled funds and construction fallacies] 
FO  [The CCC officer repeats her previous reply]  
 
 
As an introductory part of a conversation greetings are employed to cultivate a climate of 
familiarity and lessen the impact of the disruption the communication conduct between a 
civilian and a control employee has on the routines of the organization. If the impact is 
lessened it is believed that the CCC personnel will empathise with the civilians’ concerns 
and therefore the information provided to the latter by the former will be more accurate. 
 
 
After having bridged the disruption and the routine, civilians introduce their concern. They 
provide as many details as possible, however trivial they may appear to the CCC 
personnel, so as to establish a shared value, inclusive of the objectives of both the 
organization and themselves. Yet what civilians generally overlook in their effort to 
establish their concern so as to make it worth addressing by control personnel is the 
workload of the CCC of the HFC. The communicative encounter with the CCC personnel 
instigated by civilians is triggered by an external emergency. However, the CCC 
employees are usually preoccupied with managing the emergency response and, therefore, 
civilians’ enquiries overlap with what could be a stressful period for control personnel. As 
a consequence, control employees will address these disruptions hastily. Their hasty 
response may in turn stir further elaboration by providing background details unrelated to 
the organization’s objectives.  
 
 
It appears that the personal involvement of civilians affects their perception of the crisis 
that in turn aggravates the circumstances under which control operators try to elicit the 
necessary information in order to instigate the mobilization process. Especially when they 
are involved in continuously answering phone calls during emergencies control operators 
occasionally neglect to ascertain via the subsequent callers the information they have 
elicited from the initial source. Moreover, civilians cannot be held responsible for the 
content of the information they provide to the control operators as they are not expected to   184
know the type of information control personnel seek. Control operators are responsible for 
eliciting such information so as to initiate the HFC response.  
 
 
5.2. How the information is communicated to the control dispatchers by the control 
operators 
 
 
This communication conduct emphasizes the standard practices of communicating 
information in order to launch the response. These practices indicate the role-playing 
amongst the control actors, the expectations they have of one another, and how the 
information is evaluated, registered and acted upon.  
 
 
The information is communicated either shouting or via telephone, as it is usually the case 
in the newly constructed control centre of the HFC and, more rarely, via a recently 
introduced software system. Shouting the content of the incoming information to the 
control dispatchers was a common practice before 2004, when the control room was a 
large hall shared by control operators, dispatchers and officers. Just before the 2004 
Olympic Games in Athens, the CCC was renovated. The room was redesigned to meet the 
needs of the new technical equipment and to accommodate a plethora of employees. The 
newly constructed command and control centre, is a large room, divided into five 
partitions. Three partitions are reserved for the control fire-officers, with one each for the 
dispatchers and the operators. Direct visual and audio contact through the operators’, 
dispatchers’, and the commonly used officers’ partition, is almost uninhibited. However, 
between the operators’ and the dispatchers’ partition stands the officers’ chambers. So, 
when the operators need to contact the dispatchers they either stand in their doorway and 
shout the information to the dispatchers or they telephone them (figure 2).  
 
 
Via the mobilization software the information becomes accessible by the bulk of the 
control employees involved in emergency responses. Just before the 2004 Olympics, a new 
telecommunications and software system was introduced in the CCC. The software system 
allowed control personnel to register incident information they received from civilians, co-
responder organizations, HFC responders and organizational information: how many and 
what type of appliances they mobilize, when and where they mobilize them, the time they   185
leave their stations, the time they return. Nonetheless, the habitual practices of the past 
caught up with the newly introduced strategies of the present and so control employees 
were not consistent in logging in any incoming or outgoing information. A few of the 
operators still write the information on a piece of paper before they register it electronically 
and the dispatchers still keep an inventory where they note the resources mobilized for an 
incident before they log it in the system. Nonetheless, whereas the computer software 
system offers a formal and a neutral avenue for disseminating incident information, verbal 
exchange invites interpretations from all communicators involved in the information 
exchange process, produces constant repetition though successive requests and replies, 
and, thus, creates actual noise. 
 
 
After having communicated the initial information orally, the operators generally log it in 
the system. Somewhere between shouting it (point A) and logging it in (point B), the 
mobilization of the appliances begins. In between points A and B, the dispatchers have no 
“physical contact” with the information: they cannot see it on their monitors, hence they 
usually start asking each other about bits and pieces of the information to refresh their 
memory. The time period between A and B varies. If the CCC is congested with incoming 
calls concerning the emerging incident, operators may not be able to log-in or update the 
information. They find it easier to write the incoming information on a piece of paper 
rather than type it in the computer software.  
 
 
The non-automatic interference of the human factor – that is the “shouting” control 
operator – between the incoming information and the initiation of the mobilization usually 
obstructs the information dissemination process. In at least one emergency examined, the 
incident was reported as “over” by a civilian after the mobilization of the appliances and 
before they reached the grounds. However, the control operator – for unclear reasons – 
failed to inform the dispatcher promptly. As a result, the appliances reached the site and 
only when the crews contacted the CCC to request further information about the incident, 
did the dispatchers forward the information concerning the cancellation of the HFC 
assistance and re-dispatched the vehicles back to their stations (episode A). 
 
 
The information reported to the control centre may be an emergency (B, 1-5), an alleged 
emergency (C, 1-12) or a potential emergency (E, 1-33). Operators should report any   186
information to the dispatchers. Operators play the role of the intermediary between the 
incoming information and the organization’s response to that information. It is clearly 
defined by the rules of the control room that the operators take the 199-emergency calls, 
make a note of the details with regard to an emergency and forward these data to the 
dispatchers. However, episodes B and C indicate that control operators undertake a far 
more serious role than the one cast to them. Operators receive via a technical channel, 
mentally reconstruct and verbalize whilst transmitting via another channel the information 
received (figure 3). So operators do not merely communicate facts; they provide advice. 
They occasionally replace dispatchers in their absence. So when operators assume their 
duties, they tend to merge two distinct roles: the operator’s with the dispatcher’s. This 
merger explains the distance between what the rules dictate and how the operators act. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The diffusion of the incident information 
 
  
In both B-1 and C-1, it is unnecessary for the communicators to identify themselves. 
Operators introduce the information they intend to transmit by addressing the dispatcher: 
“pal” or “George”. “Pal” is a friendly way to address a “colleague” and it is very often 
used amongst co-workers, especially when they want to soften the advice that follows, 
which is frequently expressed abruptly. The operators’ advice is grammatically an order: 
the verb is used in imperative mode and resembles a colloquial expression related to 
commerce. In the past, merchants would use a similar expression to advertise their 
merchandize. When control operators have provided their advice, they then transmit the 
essential information for initiating the mobilization of the organizational resources. Thus, 
the confusing of the boundaries between the roles of the control operator and the control 
dispatcher confuses the priorities the operators should have when transmitting the 
information.  
 
 
The degree of accuracy of the information received and forwarded by the control operators 
changes the nature of how repetitions are used in the conversations between operators and 
dispatchers. In B, repetitions indicate the operator’s impatience to end the conversation. 
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Moreover, in order to put an end to the conversation, the operator identified the source of 
information: the night-guard as a witness is more reliable that an automatic alarm system, 
especially in the Hellenic cases. Automatic alarms may be faulty and alert the fire service, 
yet the companies that install the alarms are not fined. Therefore, they neglect to correct 
their systems and as a result the systems continue to malfunction. In C, however, the 
operator either did not received accurate information or he did not comprehend the 
information provided and, thus, the use of repetition becomes essential to reconstruct the 
content of the information. 
 
 
The dominant linguistic characteristics of the C 1-12 conversation between the operator 
and the dispatcher are the elliptical construction of the utterances and the inconsistent 
narration of the content of the information. Ellipsis in this conversation is linguistic, 
semantic and pragmatic. Ellipsis on the linguistic level is almost anticipated by the 
communicators and does not frustrate or irritate them as the content of the information is 
gradually revealed through a succession of questions and replies. The elliptical 
construction of the utterances reveals that tacit knowledge is used as the basis for 
communicating. Communicators know that “Lampraki” is a street as they know that “take 
out” refers to appliance. On a semantic level, the operator answers the question “What is 
it?” by revealing not the type of incident: “it is a fire”, but the risk: “in a factory” (C-3). 
Tacit knowledge, as the accumulated experience from the employees interacting in the 
workplace, contributes in assessing the content of the information forwarded. It shapes the 
linguistic choices of the organization-members and facilitates the understanding of the 
context of the messages exchanged. What usually happens – “we get a lot of hoaxes from 
there” – is a tool that personnel use to assess the validity of the information: is the 
information a hoax? The operator has no means of verifying the validity of the information 
before the appliances reach the fire-scene. However he ascertains that it isn’t and, in 
addition, he claims that the fire is “big.” What is the source of his certainty? The 
inconsistent and incoherent narration that follows indicates uncertainty rather than 
certainty. The operator is unable to answer most of the dispatcher’s questions. Yet it seems 
from the words he so inarticulately utters that the civilian provided him with some details 
with regard to the incident that he is unable to recall. The operator may have also neglected 
to ask questions necessary to the mobilization while conversing with the civilian. Either or 
both of the aforementioned reasons provided to explain the operator’s inability to describe 
the emergency reported constitute a pragmatic ellipsis.  
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Information requires a longer time to reach its “final” destination, those people who 
manage the information and convert the external stimuli – the data provided by civilians or 
organizations – to organizational performance (figure 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The roles of the actors involved in the dissemination of the incident information 
 
 
Moreover, when actors are cast more than one role, they tend to confuse them. Such 
confusion affects their priorities when they undertake certain tasks. The extent of this 
confusion depends on the nature of the emergency as well as the experience of the 
operators engaged in the process as it appears to depend less on the existing rules of the 
control room. 
 
 
5.3. The communicative interactions between the dispatchers and the station 
operators 
 
 
The interactions between the control dispatchers and the station operators are essential to 
mobilizing the organizational resources. Station operators are the intermediaries between 
the information received by control employees and the action taken on the incident-scenes 
(figure 5). Control dispatchers convert the incoming information with regard to what is 
happening and where into how many appliances and what type. The parameters of this 
conversion are a set of informal operating procedures, such as the memorandums of action, 
and the dispatchers’ experience. As a result, in at least three of the episodes examined, the 
network of land telephony was either incapacitated or malfunctioning. Thus, dispatchers 
were unable to either contact the station operators or, when they managed to contact them, 
the noise hampered the reception of the message. The mobilization depends primarily on 
the verbal communication between dispatchers and station operators. 
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Figure 5: Incident and organizational information: The route of conversion 
 
 
The content of the communication conduct between control dispatchers and station 
operators is standardized: the control requests resources and the stations mobilize the 
available appliances. This transaction acquires certain characteristics: the exchange takes 
place between actors that represent their departments. Control dispatchers are engaged in 
the process as control; station operators as the fire-stations they are employed in (B, 6 and 
10; C, 48). Dispatchers, who instigate the communication process, seldom identify 
themselves. They consider themselves to be a higher-authority than the station operators 
(C, 59; 63; 65; 68; 70). When station operators answer the telephone calls made by control 
dispatchers, they identify themselves by providing the number of the fire-station: “9
th”, that 
is: “This is the 9
th fire-station”. The metonym deprives the communicator of his/her 
individual identity and the ellipsis signifies the economy in the speech that indicates the 
instrumental and impersonal character of the exchange. Both communicators know that the 
number “9” refers to the station. Station operators neglect to identify the fire-station when 
dispatchers utter their request as soon as the operators pick up the receiver (C, 13); it is 
evident that first, the transmitter is aware of who the receiver is and, second, who has 
authority over whom.  
 
 
Repetitions as well as ellipses emerge as a rather frequent linguistic pattern. Repetitions are 
used when he/she who receives the information cannot clearly hear the message 
transmitted (i.e.: C, 13-34) or fails to understand the content of the message (C, 35-47). It 
is also the case that the receivers of the message – in this case the station operators – 
prolong the conversation by repeating the message or parts of the messages exchange so as 
to avoid the misunderstanding of the content of the message forwarded to them due to the 
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fact that often dispatchers may simultaneously contact more than one station operator and 
are engaging in radio transmissions (B, 10-27). This multitasking disorients dispatchers. 
When station operators repeat their questions in order to re-engage the multitasking 
dispatcher to their conversation, the dispatcher usually re-enters their dialogic abruptly (B, 
17) by repeating the type of the incident rather than providing an answer to the station 
operator’s question. The dispatcher is in a rush to communicate the information to all those 
he is about to engage in the emergency response. So whenever he is asked a question, his 
hastiness is expressed via the repeating of his answer. On the other hand, the station 
operators appear to be more relaxed. They do not share the same responsibility as the 
dispatcher, who is obliged to communicate with a number of station operators via 
telephone and operations’ crews via radio simultaneously especially in the beginning of the 
mobilization process.  
 
 
The use of repetitions is also utilitarian. When dispatchers are repeating the answer 
provided by station operators, they are buying time to think about alternative solutions. 
The repetition of the word “nothing” (B 61-68; C, 23-28) served the dispatcher to buy time 
to think about his next move. Finally, station operators repeat the information to 
themselves in dictation speed so as to take it down. Nonetheless, this process appears time-
consuming and causes irritation to the dispatchers who are in a rush to conclude their 
conversation.  
 
 
Temporal adverbs are frequently used by dispatchers as means to describing the mode of 
action that operations’ units should take: e.g. rapid (B, 21). Their use has a phatic function 
(Jakobson in Barthes 1981) with a metalinguistic value (Barthes 1981). Phatic, because 
temporal adverbs are used as ‘filler phrases’ that serve to establish, prolong or discontinue 
communication. Dispatchers forward a piece of information concerning an emerging 
incident and employ adverbs to issue an order with regard to how operational fire fighters 
should react, i.e. promptly (episode D). The context of the adverbs used assumes an 
additional metalinguistic value. It indicates the tacit knowledge that dispatchers acquire 
over a period of working in the HFC with regard to some operations’ units taking their 
time to leave their fire stations after having been alerted to attend to an incident.  
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Shortage in personnel, such as the lack of eligible drivers to operate specific type of 
appliances or fire-fighting personnel to staff the fire-engines, and the carelessness of the 
station operators to provide the CCC personnel with valid information, resulted into an 
aggravation of the climate in which the conversations primarily between dispatchers and 
station operators were conducted (C, 48-66). The dispatchers’ irritation resulted into a 
breach of the set of rules that define the roles of the participant actors in emergency 
responses (C, 59). 
 
 
Nonetheless, control dispatchers’ authority over station operators is fictitious. Both have a 
certain role to perform in the mobilization process; neither is responsible for the scarcity of 
resources. The dispatcher requests resources, the station operator does not have any 
available resources to provide. He is not responsible for managing the resources, therefore, 
he cannot be held accountable for not providing them. So, when a dispatcher threatens to 
“do something” to a station operator, he cannot really do anything but bully him (C, 60-66; 
67; 68-86). Rules do exist to alleviate the tension but they are not applied because nobody 
monitors the communicative interactions of the actors involved in the emergency response 
and therefore the tensions remain unidentified and unaddressed. 
 
 
The carelessness or negligence of station operators to provide dispatchers with valid 
information challenges the attitude of dispatchers towards them (e.g. A, 107-115). They 
usually mistrust them and, thus, they re-contact them to make sure that their instructions 
were followed by the station operators. Episode C reveals the extent of the unilateral 
mistrust: the dispatcher anticipated that his request to mobilize a 12ton appliance would 
have been processed (C, 68-85). So, he called to verify that the appliance had left. 
Nonetheless, the dispatcher’s request was not processed. A chain of insults began. The 
dispatcher repeated his request and thought he provided a viable solution to the main 
problem: the lack of drivers (C, 72). The station operator was lost for words. He attempted 
an explanation that failed to convince the dispatcher. He then conveniently pretended that 
there was noise in their communication channel (C, 77). However, the recordings indicated 
that the telephone line was clear. The station operator tried another explanation, which 
underlined another problematic issue: the process of changing shifts. The employees are 
relieved from their duties only when their replacement is ready to assume these duties. 
That day, one of the on-duty drivers left earlier and his replacement had not at the time 
assumed his duties. Moreover, the station operator clearly frustrated by the conversation   192
appeared unaware with regard to the whereabouts of the appliances missing from the 
station. Eventually, the station operator called the on-duty officer to continue the 
conversation with the dispatcher. Officers are usually the ones to manage the station 
personnel and it is expected that dispatchers – being sub-officers – would not raise their 
voice to an officer. This was not the case during episode C (90). The climate had already 
been aggravated and the dispatcher did not intend to let such misconduct go. 
 
 
5.4. The role of the control officers 
 
 
One of the principles of the ICS is the unobstructed flow of information among the 
responders on- and off- the incident-grounds. The Hellenic episodes indicate that the status 
difference between the lower- and the higher-ranking officers interfere with the 
dissemination of the incident and the organizational information.  
 
 
The habitual HFC practices show that as soon as on-duty control officers receive the 
incident information, they communicate it to the control administration; the control 
administration indicates who to contact from the command structure, e.g. district 
commanders, deputy chief and chief fire-officer; and, finally, they instruct the dispatchers 
as to what resources to mobilize based primarily on the instructions provided by the 
highest-ranking officers (A, 76-77) and secondarily on the emergency protocols, where and 
when they apply. 
 
 
During the emergency responses, control officers contact the operations’ officers or units 
on the incident-grounds so as to monitor the progress of the response. When control and 
operations’ officers are of the same rank, the customary polite greetings between 
communication actors appear to become redundant. The dialogue may often be an 
unadorned and laconic exchange of the initial necessary information (i.e. A, 51-56). 
Moreover, when control officers are on the phone with operations’ officers of the same or 
lower rank they usually interrupt their conversation to accept the phone calls placed by 
higher-ranking officers (D, 36-52). 
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The use of pronouns along with the positional title of the higher-ranking officers 
corroborates the submissiveness of the lower-ranking personnel (e.g. A, 95). It also reveals 
the intention of the lower-ranking to familiarize with the higher-ranking officers. The latter 
keep the distance between the lower and the higher. At least one of the senior officers 
addressed Yannis, a high-ranking officer, by his first name when he instructed one of the 
lower-ranking control officers to contact Yannis. He then immediately corrected himself 
and after uttering Yannis’ first name he also added his surname: Mr. Z (A, 58). So, the 
shift in addressing the senior fire-officer from his first name to his surname maintained the 
symbolic distance created by the distribution of power in the existent hierarchical system. 
The status of the rank-holders is clear. The deputy commander of the CCC contacts the 
chief fire-officer whereas the lower in the command structure of the CCC watch officer 
contacts the lower-ranking operational fire-officers (episode A).  
 
 
High-ranking do not feel obliged to report to lower-ranking officers. Thus, they do not 
forward any incoming information with regard to the progress of the response. 
Occasionally, lower-ranking officers indulge such practices (A, 79). High-ranking officers 
contact lower-ranking personnel when they request them to undertake certain tasks in the 
mobilization process (A, 77) or when they wish to be informed about the progress of the 
response (B, 34-53).  
 
 
In most of the conversations between lower- and higher-ranking officers the content of the 
information is gradually revealed. The transmitter is waiting for the receiver to 
acknowledge that he/she has understood the information transmitted (A, 81-94) and, thus, 
repetitions are deliberately used to verify the correctness of the content of the information 
exchanged (A, 64-69). As in the equivalent ‘yeah, yeah, yeah’ in English and as the abrupt 
‘ya’ in German, in the Hellenic case, the constant use and repetition of the word “yes” is 
not always employed as an affirmation. Its occasional phatic function contributes to 
prolonging a conversation and it may be used either as a greeting, or to acknowledge 
comprehension or to emphasize the information exchanged (B, 37).  
 
 
The nature of the conversations between the on-duty control officers and the administration 
of the CCC is slightly different. When the on-duty officers contact their superordinates 
they use the positional titles and the customary greetings but they may also use foul   194
language to express their criticism with regard to the decisions made on the incident-
grounds (B, 37), which they normally would avoid when addressing the higher echelons of 
the command structure. On the one hand, the use of profanity is the systematic deformation 
of the forms of rituals and the expressive accomplishment that allows the slanderer to 
ridicule his opponent (Bourdieu 1999: 105; 1991: 113). On the other hand, in the Hellenic 
case, it is also a pattern that indicates the transition from a formal to an informal way of 
affiliating; a form of intimacy, affection and friendliness. Profanity facilitates the 
manifestation of familiarity that derives from the constant cooperation among on-duty 
control officers and the administration of the CCC. 
 
 
The majority of conversations reveal that when the initial information is verified, 
communicative interactions become more instrumental (A, 81-88). Requests and replies 
are laconic and precise. When the content of the incident information is not verified, the 
narration becomes inconsistent (A, 81-94; E, 34-38). Control officers avoid replying 
directly to the questions posed by their communicators (E, 37-38). In their effort to be 
precise they interweave certainty with uncertainty within the context of one sentence (A, 
74). When control officers have failed to comprehend the incident information they resort 
to repeating verbatim what they are told (E, 3; 8; 36). 
 
 
The lack of coherence intensifies the mystery of the potential crisis (E, 39). From “there 
must be a very serious incident” to the actual announcement of the “serious incident”, the 
control officer asked the high-ranking commander with whom he was conversing if he had 
heard “something” about the incident from other sources. These choices of revealing 
significant information disclose that the transaction of information among higher-ranking 
officers acquires a different value from the transmission of information among lower-
ranking personnel. In the Hellenic case, officers operate on a quid pro quo basis, whereas 
lower-ranking employees, such as sub-officers and fire-fighters, simply forward any 
incoming information. This inconsistency in the flow of incident information indicated 
first, that the control officer who communicated the incident information to the control 
administration lacked communication skills. Second, it revealed that the various scenarios 
with regard to the plane-crash (e.g. terrorist act and hijacking) were interwoven with the 
facts. So, the content of the information was both factual and fictional: a certain plane 
crashed at a certain place and certain number of people perished. At the same time, “it is   195
said that” it may have been an act of terrorism etc. “It” marks the absence of a valid source 
of information and draws away from reality.  
 
 
What emerges from the conversations examined during the HFC emergency responses is 
the large number of mediators between the initial information received and the action 
instigated by control employees. The existence of numerous mediators obstructs the 
decision-making process with regard to the mobilization of the fire-fighting resources and 
the timely response, due to a superfluity of the communicative interactions. The command 
structure is notified even when the notification of higher-ranking officers is not essential to 
the mobilization process (episodes A, B). Thus, as indicated in the selected cases, each of 
the mediators expresses their opinion concerning the mobilization as they add their own 
assessments with regard to what is “necessary” to dispatch. This phenomenon, that may 
hinder the initial mobilization processes, emerges more during the full-deployment phase 
of the mobilization as operations fire-officers, deliberately or unintentionally, undermine 
each other’s decisions on the incident-grounds. 
 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
 
The communication conduct between control employees and operations’ personnel 
indicate that tacit knowledge overpowers the existing SOP. The material discussed here 
shows that the dissemination of information lies upon the interacting agents usually 
unmediated by technology and un-objectified. When the information is not registered in a 
commonly accessed inventory, such as a software program, the context of the information 
may be altered or lost and its flow confused. Next to the distorted context and the confused 
streaming, when the source of information is unclear, the processing and assessing of that 
information is delayed. Furthermore, it appears that information in the HFC, acquires a 
symbolic value reflected in the status of the organization actors engaged in the streaming 
of information; occasionally explicitly expressed (E, 95). 
 
 
The volume of communication nodes: the control operators, dispatchers, and officers, the 
station operators and the command structure, as well as the untimely, inaccurate and 
incomplete registration of information, may also disrupt the communication processes and   196
distort the meaning of the information. The interaction between the dispatchers and the 
station operators is an ongoing negotiation process. The rules of engagement in these 
negotiation processes are either non-existent or unclear. These processes are aggravated 
due to the absence of regular performance auditing. Only at this stage are the 
communicative interactions between organization-members rather brief, striving to attain 
an instrumental character. However, it is the conversations per se that are brief, not the 
background communication conduct that take place in between the conversations with the 
station operators.  
 
 
The lack of SOP favours the hierarchical system. In turn, the decision making process is 
centralized and the posts lower-ranking personnel hold are degraded. This unofficial, yet 
habitual, undermining of roles leads the lower-ranking personnel to being less interested in 
the tasks they perform. Moreover, managing the resources of the organization proves rather 
difficult due to pre-existing problems. Lack of personnel, training and unattended technical 
problems hinder the mobilization process. The unreported capability of the fire stations 
contributes to this. 
 
 
These routines and communication practices developed among the control personnel and 
between the control and the operations’ employees indicate that power is authoritarian 
rather than negotiated. Lower-ranking officers comply with the instructions of the higher-
ranking employees; station operators conform to the requests of the control dispatchers. In 
Weberian terms, the legitimate holders of power are not the set operating procedures – how 
things should be done – but what the higher-raking officers or, more generally, the 
personnel holding a higher status, dictate as what will be done. As indicated in the 
preceding chapter, if the structures of the organization allowed power to be negotiated, 
employees with expertise would have a different status on both an administrative and an 
operational level. If this were to happen it is reasonable to suppose that greater 
effectiveness in organizational performance would be accomplished.    197
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
THE CASE OF THE UK BRIGADES 
 
 
The British Fire and Rescue Services (BFRSs) communication practices differ from the 
HFC emergency conduct. This chapter examines the BFRSs actors’ involvement in 
emergency responses and the exchange of incident information as a means to managing 
fire and rescue operations effectively.  
 
 
6.1. How the emergency communication is instigated  
 
 
Civilians are aware that in order to report a disruptive incident, they should call the 
emergency number 9-9-9. The call is then forwarded by the British Telecommunications 
operator to one of the first-responder organizations: police, fire or ambulance services, 
depending on the type of the incident reported (figure 6). When all the available lines in 
the BFRSs CCC are occupied, the calls are directed to the police CCC. Moreover, when a 
non-English speaker dials either 1-1-2 (the European emergency number) or 9-9-9 (the 1-
1-2 in the UK dials as 9-9-9), the operator initiates a conference call with a qualified 
translator provided within a minute by the national interpretation service (NIS). This three-
way conversation initiated by pushing the NIS button on the operators’ monitors is 
introduced to address the “needs of the ethnic minorities in [Britain] that use their own 
languages.”
69 First-responder organizations and the BT Group have developed the 
technical infrastructure in order to ensure that the flow of the incoming incident 
information is not interrupted either by congestion or by the cultural idiosyncrasies of 
those who communicate the emergency information. 
 
 
In the small-sized BFRSs, the roles of the control operator and the control dispatcher are 
merged. Operators/dispatchers receive incident information and attend to instigating the 
mobilization process. In the large-sized BFRSs, operators receive and register incident 
                                                 
69 Control fire-officer, pers. comm., 23 March 2007.   198
information and usually one – or more, depending on the number of the radio frequencies 
used – designated dispatchers instigate and monitor the mobilization process. The large-
sized services regularly attend to numerous simultaneous incidents and therefore they 
divide the tasks undertaken by the operators who deal with the extra-organizational 
communication and the dispatchers who monitor the intra-organizational emergency 
conduct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The dissemination of the initial incident information 
 
 
The control room “assembly-line” functions as follows: as soon as control employees 
receive and register the incident information, their software system indicates the type and 
number of appliances to dispatch to the incident-grounds (figure 7). Through the software 
system the operators instigate a set of automatic notification procedures that have replaced 
interpersonal communication, thus introducing a degree of objectification in the process of 
disseminating the initial incident information. The alert in the fire station(s) is set off, the 
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voice of a control operator announces via a loudspeaker the type and the location of the 
incident, and the available incident information is faxed over while operations crews are 
preparing and mounting their appliances. The appliances transmit an electronic signal that 
signifies: their departure from their fire station(s), their arrival to the incident-grounds, 
their departure from the incident-grounds and their return to their fire station. Between 
arriving to and leaving the incident-grounds, the IC delegates a fire-fighter, usually the 
driver of one of the appliances, to hold the communication with the control personnel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The incident information exchange process after the initial mobilization 
 
 
The electronically registered standard mobilization procedures – namely the type and 
number of appliances required to respond to a certain type of emergency – are designed 
based on: the number, the type, the location of the fire-engines as well as the risks entailed 
in a specific geographic area, for example nuclear plants, oil depots etc. Control personnel 
do not negotiate the number and type of the fire-engines necessary to proceed to the 
incident-grounds. Neither do they negotiate whether the appliances carry the necessary 
equipment they are assigned with. Control employees assume and expect that all fire-
engines are accounted for and in stand-by mode unless operations’ personnel indicate 
differently. Thus, the element of uncertainty with regard to the fire and rescue services’ 
capacity in organizational resources is minimized.  
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One of the most significant tools towards managing organizational resources is the 
electronic map (EM). This board facilitates BFRSs control personnel to visualize the 
location of the fire stations and the status – mobilization and demobilization – of the 
resources: assigned appliances, available resources and the out-of-service engines. The first 
category refers to the fire-engines deployed on-scene under the direction of a supervisor. 
The second indicates those appliances that are stationed and ready to be deployed. The 
third, designates those fire-engines that are in the process of re-supplying, or experiencing 
a shortfall in staffing, or their operations crew is resting or they are damaged, and, thus, 
inoperable. All three status categories are differently coloured when pictured on the EM. In 
one case (EFRS2) that the electronic system was out-of-order, the control employees were 
confused: “I am lost without it.”
70 Control employees were unable to quickly and easily 
detect which appliance from which station was at what incident, and what the status of the 
appliance was, i.e. stand-by, responding, etc. This, however, indicates, first, that control 
employees need to create a mental picture so as to be able to visualize the mobilization 
process (Weick 1993; Bigley and Roberts 2000). Second, it reveals that they experience 
difficulty in adapting to non-customary circumstances. 
 
 
So, control employees expect the operations’ personnel to signal their status and every 
successive change in their status as soon as it takes place, and to inform the control 
employees with regard to the conduct on the incident-grounds and any change that takes 
place during the emergency response. If the aforementioned expectations are not fulfilled, 
then the assembly-line breaks down, communication is disrupted, incident information is 
incompletely exchanged, and conflicts between control and operations’ personnel arise.  
  
 
The following drawings (figure 8) indicate the position of the communication actors within 
the command and control centre of the BFRSs studied. Their position in connection to each 
other and the EM reveal the control actors roles in the information exchange and the 
decision-making process, as well as the exercise of control over incident and 
organizational information and between superordinates and subordinates. 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 Control supervisor, pers. comm., 14 April 2007.   201
 
SFRS2 
 
 
SFRS1 
 
 
EFRS2 
 
 
EFRS1 
 
Figure 8: The positioning of the control employees in the BFRSs control rooms 
 
 
In both the EFRSs and the SFRS2, the largest fire and rescue services studied, the control 
superintendents oversee the control operators, the dispatchers and the EB. The dispatchers 
have limited or no sight of the incident and the organizational information on the EB. They 
are primarily preoccupied with registering the information the appliances forward to the 
CCC and with allocating and re-allocating the resources according to the emerging 
incidents. The operators usually have sight of the EB. Their role appears to be significant 
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as they elicit, register and assess the initial incident information so as to retrieve the 
respective mobilization protocols from their electronic archives. The dispatchers appear to 
be mediators between the incident information and its conversion to organizational 
information. In the SFRS1, one of the smallest FRSs investigated, operators/dispatchers are 
circularly allocated. Their positioning in the control room shows that they share a similar 
professional status. The circular arrangement also indicates intimacy and direct decision-
making rather than a multi-level filtering of incident and organizational information. In all 
the BFRSs examined, the supervisors’ or officers’ room establish visual control over both 
the employees and the incident information (table 5). 
 
 
Table 5: The significance of the positioning in the control rooms  
 
 
6.2. How the CCC interacts with civilians 
 
 
“What happens” and “where it happens” is the basic incident information necessary for the 
fire and rescue services to start dispatching their appliances to the incident-grounds. 
Control personnel are trained to deal with eliciting essential incident information from 
civilians. They do not receive the same training as operational fire-fighters. They are 
specialized in managing the communications conducted via the command and control 
centre of the fire and rescue services. One of the main priorities of the control employees is 
that they persist and insist on extracting as much information as possible from civilians. 
 Supervisors/ 
Officers  
Dispatchers   Operators  Allocation  
of personnel 
EFRS1  Oversee personnel 
and EM 
No direct visual of 
EM/ isolation.  
Some of the operators 
have no direct visual of 
EM. 
Quasi-circular 
EFRS2  Direct control over 
EM. 
Direct control over 
EM. 
Direct control over EM.  Pyramid 
SFRS1  Direct control over 
EM. 
Direct control over 
EM.  
Direct control over EM.  Circular 
SFRS2  Direct control over 
EM. 
No direct visual of 
the EM/ isolation 
Direct control over EM.  Quasi-circular   203
The following examples illustrate how the communication conduct between control 
operators and civilians usually take place.  
 
 
BFRSs operators receive the call that the BT operators forward to the control. On their 
monitors, information such as the telephone number, the address and the name of the 
individual under which the number is registered are shown. Case A illustrates that a 
civilian contacted the 9-9-9 in order to report that a cow was trapped in mud created by a 
heavy rainfall. The conversation between the control operator and the civilian was 
recorded as follows: 
 
 
1 Civilian   Hello. 
2 COP  Hello there. [The CO asks where the place is] please. 
3 Civilian  Z. Do you know where the [he is describing the area near his farm]? 
4 COP  Yes [uttered with reluctance]… 
5  Civilian  [Brief repetition of description] back of there. 
6 COP  Right [the CO had time to locate the area on the map]. So is that on 
the back road to the [here the operator mentions the name of the 
road] road? 
7 Civilian  Yes. 
8  COP  [The CO goes on naming another couple of places nearby so as to be 
certain of the range within which the fire-fighters can look for the 
farm]. It is just a single cow it is trapped. 
9 Civilian  Just a single cow, yes. 
10 COP  … that’s trapped in some mud. 
11 Civilian  Yes and there is no way I can get [illegible] near it. 
12 COP  Right, ok, that’s fine. There is no water or anything round about. It’s… 
13 Civilian  Yes [illegible] it’s in mud and water. 
14 COP  Right. Is there a river or anything within by or is it because of the rain 
that… 
15 Civilian  It’s because of the rain. 
16 COP  Right that’s fine. 
17 Civilian  Tricky grounds you see. 
18 COP  That’s fine. We’ll certainly send something out to rescue. 
19 Civilian  [illegible] 
20  COP  [The CO repeats that “the boys will be coming”] 
21  Civilian  [Exchange of acknowledgements]. 
(Source: SFRS1, December 2006) 
 
 
Case B depicts the conversation between a control operator and a civilian just after a fire 
erupted in a two-storey dwelling: 
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1 Civilian  We have a fire at [location], Y [Street], Z [area] 
2  COP  [She asks for the address again] [SFRS CCC operator] 
3  Civilian  [He repeats and adds the post code] 
4 COP  Can you spell that for me please? 
5  Civilian  [he spells the name] 
6 COP  And where was that? 
7  Civilian  [He provides the rest of the address] 
8  COP  [She repeats the name of the road] 
9  Civilian  [He adds the name of the area she hasn’t repeated] 
10 COP  And what’s on fire? 
11 Civilian  It’s a house; there are a couple of explosions in the bedroom. [illegible] 
12 COP  That’s fine. Did everybody get out [the tone of her voice picks up]? 
13 Civilian  Yes, we are all outside [his voice is reassuring] 
14 COP  Right. If you stay out and the fire brigade will attend. 
(Source: SFRS1, April 2003) 
 
 
Case C reveals the communication conduct between a civilian and a control operator a few 
moments after a fire started in a dwelling.  
 
 
1 Civilian  [Illegible;  coughs]  the house is on fire in Z. 
2 COP  I am sorry? 
3 Civilian  [More  concentrated] the house is on fire in Z. 
4 COP  Z, where is that? 
5  Civilian  [He gives the name of the area]. 
6 COP  Is that the farm Z? 
7 Civilian  Yes, aye. 
8 COP  And your house is on fire? 
9 Civilian  [Coughs]. 
10 COP  Is everyone out of the house already? 
11 Civilian  Aye I’ve got everybody out now. 
12  COP  [the line of questioning continues] 
(Source: SFRS1, December 2006) 
 
 
Case D indicates the communication conduct between a control operator and a civilian 
who was panicking due to a chemical fire that erupted in a garage.  
 
 
1 COP  I am calling from the fire brigade. 
2 Civilian  Yes [panicking; out of breath] 
3 COP  What’s the address [of the incident]? 
4 Civilian  X [almost illegible]. 
5 COP  [Illegible] sir you phoned the fire brigade.   205
6 Civilian  Yes [illegible]. 
7 COP  What’s the address? 
8 Civilian  X. Y garage. 
9 COP  And what’s on fire? 
10 Civilian  Chemicals 
11  COP  [Illegible, he is breathing heavily trying to say something. The CO is 
repeating the location given] You know what kind of chemical [she 
asks twice]. 
12  Civilian  [He is not answering. Out of breath] they are resins. 
13 COP  Resins? 
14 Civilian  Yes. 
15 COP  Ok [she repeats the location given and what is on fire] ok. That’s fine 
[the rest illegible]. 
(Source: SFRS1, April 2006) 
 
 
The following extract is one of the following up calls placed to the control room of the 
SFRS1 with regard to the garage fire. 
 
 
16 2
nd caller   Has it been reported? 
17 COP  It has. 
18    [CO asks but the caller had nothing more to add] 
19 3
rd caller  It’s a big fire; I am not quite sure whereabouts it is. There is a lot of 
black smoke […]. It’s exploded. It’s behind the park in Z [name of the 
area]. 
20 COP  Is it near Y [name] garage? 
21 3
rd caller  Oh, yes… [the caller is asked but has nothing more to add] 
(Source: SFRS1, April 2006) 
 
 
Case E illustrates the conversations between a civilian announcing a fire in an unoccupied 
building that used to host a school. 
 
 
22 Civilian  I think there is something at School, Y road, [his name]; there is a lot of 
smoke and I have seen flames. 
23 COP  You know what’s on fire? 
24 Civilian  Sounds like the house […] Looks like the house. 
(Source: SFRS1, October 2006) 
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Case F shows the communication conduct between a civilian witnessing a road traffic 
collision and a control operator.  
 
 
1 Civilian  I need the fire brigade, the ambulance and the police. 
2 COP  What’s the problem? 
3 Civilian  There’s been a car accident… oh! The police and the ambulance are just 
arriving… between the and Y road  
4 COP  Where about is this? 
5 Civilian  I don’t know where […] 
6 COP  Is anybody trapped? 
7 Civilian  George?! Anybody [illegible] Aye. 
8 COP  You want me to give you my mobile. 
9 Civilian  We’ll call the control and get the details. 
(Source: SFRS1, November 2006) 
 
 
Control operators focus on: first, establishing the exact location of the incident in order to 
minimize the time of intervention. Second, they are interested in the type of the 
emergency, e.g. fire in factory, road traffic collision etc., so as to give operations crews 
time to consider the tactics they will follow once on the incident-grounds. Third, control 
personnel intend to make sure that civilians have safely evacuated the affected premises by 
the time of the call. So, control operators repeat the location provided by civilians, verify 
the civilians’ replies by using their electronic maps and repeat the verification of the 
location before moving on to discuss the type of the emergency reported (A, 2-8; B, 1-9; C, 
1-7; D, 1-8 and 11 and 15). In case D, the COP repeated the location two times more than 
the usual repetitions because the civilian appeared to be in a state of panic. After the 
incident-ground is effectively located on the EB, the COP requests information with regard 
to the type of the emergency (A, 8-9; B, 10-12; C, 8-9; D, 9-15). A succession of requests 
and replies follows with regard to the circumstances under which the emergency occurred 
in order to make sure that the fire-fighters be prepared for the equipment and plan their 
response according to the facts reported by the civilians (A, 10-16).  
 
 
Repeat calls provide the control operators with the opportunity to verify the location of the 
incident that previous callers have provided and to make sure that the caller is not referring 
to a similar incident located in a nearby area, which did occur in two of the SFRS1 cases. 
When a control operator contacted the on-call officer in the morning with regard to fire 
that erupted in a dwelling, the officer replied: “You are joking!”, a comment that reflected   207
his surprise, frustration and fatigue about the fact that he was attending an emergency 
response throughout the night in an area that had the same name as the location where the 
fire erupted the following morning. 
 
 
Repetitions emerge as a useful pattern in establishing visualization and realization. The 
concept of visualization refers to creating a mental picture with regard to the emergency. 
Control operators try to fit the pieces of the puzzle that is the fragmented information 
provided by civilians. D11 and D13 indicate that control operators’ persistent questions 
with regard to the kind of chemicals involved in the fire shifted the civilian’s attention 
from the picture of the burning building to the specifics of the fire. From visualizing the 
emergency to realising the response, control personnel aims at extracting as much 
information as possible from civilians. And so they insist on asking questions and 
repeating civilians’ answers. Depending on the burning chemicals, the CCC personnel of 
the fire and rescue service assess the gravity of the situation in different ways: they either 
mobilize the regular appliances and advise operations’ personnel to proceed with caution, 
wearing their regular uniforms and carrying their breathing apparatuses; or advise the 
personnel to proceed wearing special chemical suits; they may also advise them to use 
either water or specific types of foam. After conversing with specialists or officers on-site, 
control personnel may even mobilize a decontamination unit and evacuate the area in close 
proximity to the incident-grounds. Therefore, naming the burning substance is a critical 
factor in assessing the type and number of appliances mobilized on the incident-grounds, 
the resources used, and the tactical mode of responding to the incident.  
 
 
At the end of this sequence, instructions are occasionally provided by control operators so 
as to ensure the safety of the civilians in close proximity to the incident-scene. The length 
of the conversation between control operators and civilians is usually 15 lines of 
successive standardized and repetitive requests – replies. This type of standardized 
transaction contributes to avoiding a potentially unstructured narration on the part of the 
caller. Control operators provide a brief description in a tightly controlled communication 
conduct, in order to construct a mental picture (Weick and Roberts 1993). In the BFRSs, 
the majority of set procedures indicate the organizations’ intention to minimize their 
dependence upon civilians as the initial source of information. However, despite the 
detailed mobilization procedures, control operators methodically engage in extracting as 
much information as possible from the public.   208
Yet as “crises cannot be separated from the viewpoint of the [ones] who [are] undergoing 
it” (Habermas 1975: 58), civilians fail to meet the ends of the fire and rescue services. F1-9 
clearly illustrates these intentions: “I need”; perceptions, priorities, expectations and 
requests between civilians and control personnel are different. “What is the problem?” 
control personnel need to create a mental picture based on the visual contact the caller has 
with the incident. This picture facilitates the assessment of the incoming information so as 
to select the mobilization protocols and initiate the dispatching processes. “There has been 
a car accident”. This phrase reveals an initial information that provides the operator with a 
blurred image. No further information is mentioned concerning the number of vehicles 
involved, individuals trapped, whether there is a fire in progress, etc. This initial 
information is insufficient for assessing the gravity of the situation and thus the scale of the 
mobilization. However, no further information is requested by the control operator, due to 
the fact that the caller was not equipped to answer questions concerning medical and safety 
issues. Additional information is received after contacting the police so as ascertain the 
exact location of the collision. Initiating the existing protocols on the basis of the 
information received is the next step to be taken by the CCC operators. Hence, incomplete 
information appears to be time consuming for both CCC personnel and operations’ units. 
 
 
Control operators instruct civilians that are in close proximity to a compromised location, 
to move away from an endangered area (B, 12-14; C, 10-12). It is part of standard 
operating procedures not to re-contact the caller on a land line near the incident-grounds, 
but on a mobile, if available, so as to avoid the caller turning round in order to answer the 
phone. Civilians learn to comply with such safety procedures introduced by the BFRSs. 
The relationship between the BFRSs and the civilians is systematically shaped prior to 
emergencies, on the level of prevention. These practices prove to be fruitful. For example, 
during a major incident managed by one of the SFRS, civilians would avoid contacting the 
CCC of the FRS unless necessary, as they were aware that the FRS was engage in 
managing the response to the incident: “Those days were the quietest days they had in the 
Fire Control. People wouldn’t call unless it was an emergency. People knew that the 
Brigade was busy […] and they left us alone.”
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71 Senior fire-officer 2007, pers. comm., 15 March.   209
This phenomenon emerges as a result of the community service rendered by fire-fighters. 
The BFRSs have initiated a more interactive relationship between fire-fighting personnel 
and civilians. The “modernization of the fire and rescue services” (Bain et al. 2002)
72 
entailed a shift of focus from intervention to prevention, so as to achieve community 
preparedness, “to drive down fatalities, injuries, loss of property and damage to the 
environment to negligible levels” (Bain et al. 2002: ii). Moreover this shift of focus was 
facilitated by the argument that fire-fighting personnel, if not engaged in emergency 
responses, had a lot of spare time that could be used in promoting community safety. 
Maximizing service provision, on the level of both intervention and prevention, instigates a 
dynamic interaction between fire-fighters, as service providers, and civilians, as service 
seekers, that leads to identifying each other’s needs and priorities. Fire-fighters address 
questions along the lines of how to avoid a fire from spreading, how civilians should 
evacuate the compromised premises in case of emergency, what the behaviour of the fire 
and the smoke generated is, or what the risks present in their house or workplace are. This 
line of questioning presents fire-fighters with the opportunity of indicating to civilians 
what kind of information is necessary to the FRSs for a timely response to an emergency 
situation. 
 
 
6.3. The analysis of incident logs  
 
 
Incident logs are the transcripts of the recorded conversations between, on the one hand, 
control employees and operations’ personnel and, on the other hand, BFRSs personnel and 
other emergency co-responders. Control personnel register the communication conduct 
with the operations’ personnel and the emergency co-responders in order to provide a 
detailed archive with regard to the decisions and actions instigated by the FRSs.  
 
 
The initial incident information provided by the caller is logged in as “general 
information” or “incident type” followed by “additional information”. In both cases, a 
                                                 
72 The Fire Services Act 2004 sanctioned the government’s modernization agenda (Fitzgerald and Stirling 
1999; Pyper 2003) that introduced structural changes to the BFRSs in order to further enable them to respond 
to Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) deliberate and malicious acts of terrorism, industrial 
accidents, and natural disasters. Such changes included the establishing of reliable communication networks 
(Freedman 2005) among first-responder organizations and the regionalization of BFRSs control rooms, i.e. 
the merger of the 48 CCC operating in England and Wales into nine regional CCC with a compatible 
technical infrastructure.   210
short phrase refers to the type of the incident such as, in the “general information” case, 
“explosions in bedroom”, “chemical resins”, “possibly house on fire” or “Road Traffic 
Collision involving car and tractor, persons trapped, near at top of Southfield”. On some 
reports, nothing is mentioned under “general information.” However it appears to be 
unrelated to the significance of the emergency. In the “incident type” and “additional 
information” case, the former part is filled in by descriptions such as “fire in bedroom” and 
the latter, “person on balcony.” In both cases, the transcription is not the exact description 
provided by the caller but an abstraction, as conceived by the operator. Interestingly 
enough, it is the operators’ re-coding of the conversation with civilians that is logged in as 
“transcription” and not the actual conversation, unlike what happens with the operations’ 
personnel. Apart from the brief description of the incident provided under the labels 
“gen[neral]. info[rmation]” or “incident type” and “additional info[rmation]”, there is also 
a “summary”, provided in the first case only, which is not formed according to the initial 
information, as expected by its place in the report, but as a result of the reports provided by 
the operations’ personnel during or after the emergency response. The analytic categories 
included in the formal reports indicate that it is the professional’s view that is taken into 
consideration rather than the layperson’s – the civilian’s – perception.  
 
 
Communication with the public assumes a different value than communication conduct 
with the operations’ personnel, other first responders and specialists. Initial information 
appears to be very general or inaccurate and, therefore, the importance of logging it 
secondary. The only case where the conversation was transcribed or, rather, described was 
when a civilian’s inability to communicate the incident information caused delays in the 
process of mobilization: “caller did not pass address to operator called … number to get 
address and ascertain what was involved.” On another occasion: “caller stated the police 
and ambulance had just arrived on scene. Caller did not know exactly where he was so fire 
control contacted police control for exact location before mobilizing.” Operators may use 
the registered information as a safety valve to avoid responsibility in case of a mobilization 
and operational misconduct.  
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6.4. How control employees interact with operations’ personnel 
 
 
In the Hellenic case, I presented the interactions between control operators – dispatchers, 
operators/dispatchers – officers, and officers – control administration/ command structure. 
The UK FRSs have a different modus operandi. Control personnel undertake three tasks: 
first, they establish communication with the operations’ units usually through codes. 
Control operators then instigate communication with other emergency co-participants and 
on-call officers. In order to present the parameters of the communicative interactions 
amongst the aforementioned actors, I use transcripts from the SFRS1 and compare them 
with what I observed during my fieldwork, from the interviews and the casual 
conversations I had with BFRSs organization-members.  
 
 
6.4.1. Communication with operations’ units 
 
 
When control personnel begin to communicate with the operations’ units on the incident-
grounds, they use a set of codes or the non free-spech policy. Non free-spech may be a 
term introduced by the SFRS1 but it is a practice commonly used among the BFRSs 
personnel to describe the linguistic patterns used to communicate information between the 
control personnel and the operations’ units. Such practice contributes to avoiding distortion 
in communication. Such distortion occurs when the messages exchanged within the 
organization contain non-informational outputs which may lead to a problematic 
organizational conduct (McQuail and Windahl 1981; Jacobson in Manning 1992; Glaister 
2006). Whilst responding to an emergency, control personnel require a constant, 
continuous, precise and time-saving incident information transaction. In all the BFRSs this 
transaction is materialized through the use of six types of messages: holding, assistance, 
informative, stop, and detaining service. The holding message signifies that operations’ 
units are unable to provide an accurate image of the emergency as soon as they arrive on 
the incident-grounds. So, they acknowledge their arrival on-scene and request more time 
before reporting back to the control. The usual format of the message is (table 6):  
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Table 6: The format of the messages exchanged during emergency responses 
FROM  
AT 
REASON FOR HOLDING  
ACTION BEING TAKEN 
 
 
The  assistance message has priority over all other transmissions. It indicates that 
operations’ units necessitate reinforcements on the incident-grounds. Assistance messages 
acquire the following format (table 7): 
 
 
Table 7: The format of the assistant message 
PRIORITY 
FROM  
AT 
HELP REQUIRED 
REASON 
ASS MESS FROM ADO DOE CAN YOU REQUEST 
ATTENDANCE OF AMBULANCE FOR 2 FIRE SERVICE 
PERSONNEL AND INCREASE PUMPS TO 4 TO INCREASE 
NUMBER OF FIRE SERVICE PERSONNEL. 
(Source: SFRS1, case: explosions in bedroom) 
 
 
Through informative messages operations’ units communicate any information with regard 
to the emergency response to control personnel (table 8).  
 
 
Table 8: A transcription of an informative message 
INF MESS FROM ADO DOE THIS IS A 2 STOREY DWELLING HOUSE APPROX 
10M X 10M FIRE IN UPPER FLOOR AND ROOF AREA 2 HRJ AND 2 MAIN 
BRANCHES IN USE FIGHTING FIRE FROM OUTSIDE ALL PERSONS 
ACCOUNTED FOR FFS FERRYING WATER FROM SURROUNDING AREA. 
(Source: SFRS1, case: explosions in bedroom) 
 
 
Control personnel require informative messages to be transmitted at intervals of about 20 
minutes in order to maintain communication with the incident-grounds even in cases where 
emergency responses are smoothly conducted. The stop messages indicate that no more 
assistance is required and the emergency is effectively managed. The detaining message 
transmitted after the stop message indicates that a number of resources are required to 
remain on the incident-grounds due to the nature of the incident. The most frequent   213
messages exchanged during an emergency response are the assistance and informative 
messages. A different grammatical structure between the informative and the assistance 
messages indicate their varying function in the communication process.  
 
 
Table 9: Example of informative messages 
INF MESS FROM ADO DOE THIS IS A FARM BUILDING APPROX 30M X 20M 
MIDDLE SECTION MEASURING 12M X 20M IS WELL ALIGHT FFS ENGAGED IN 
FINDING WATER SUPPLIES FOR FIGHTING FIRE TM DEFENSIVE A11 IS 
COMMAND PUMP. 
(Source: SFRS1, case: hayshed) 
 
 
In informative messages, the type of message is explicitly mentioned before its context is 
revealed: “informative message”. Then, the source of information is stated followed by the 
verb ‘to be’ in the present tense and the indicative mood, in order to describe the present 
state of the fire-fighting units on-site and their future deployment. In turn, the actions taken 
and the results of these actions follow the conjugation of the verb ‘to be’. The speech 
pattern developed for these messages allows the use of participles and infinitives. 
However, there are hardly any pronouns employed as objects, and subjects. The use of 
present tense, the absence of pronouns, and the simplified syntax, achieve a seemingly 
objectified description of the actions taken on the incident-grounds. When information 
messages are communicated to the control not by the delegate fire-fighter but by the IC, 
the messages are no longer labelled as INF MESS (table 10). 
 
 
Table 10: Example of informative messages 
MESSAGE FROM AM DOE TO SAY THAT HE HAS SPOKEN TO SM BROWN ST 
THE INCIDENT AND BETWEEN THEM THE ABOVE RELIEF ARRANGEMENTS 
HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED 
(Source: SFRS1, January 2007) 
 
 
Conversations between control personnel and officers become a free-speech transaction of 
information with a specific linguistic structure: subject – verb – object/ predicate with 
dependent and independent clauses, welcoming the use of pronouns. This syntax allows the 
focus on individual actors – the officers/managers – rather than the actions themselves, as   214
appeared to be the case when information messages were transmitted by delegate fire-
fighters. Verbs such as “to contact” and “to confirm” are used to indicate that officers 
verify the information exchanged ascribing a slightly different – higher – status to the 
officers on-scene. Unlike control employees’ practices with the BFRSs personnel on-scene, 
CCC does not transcribe verbatim the communication conduct with other organizations 
involved in the emergency responses. They merely mention the context of the information 
exchanged that may affect the actions taken on the incident-grounds by the FRS: 
 
 
Table 11: Example of the information exchange between the BFRSs and the other responder-
organizations 
SEPA INFOMED 
SEPA CONTACTED AND ALL DETAILS PASSED ON TO JOHN 
(Source: SFRS1, January 2007) 
 
 
The linguistic structure of assistance messages is quite different:  
 
 
Table 12: Example of assistant messages 
ASS MESS FROM ADO DOE MAKE PUMPS 04 
(Source: SFRS1, January 2007) 
 
 
The communicators use the imperative mood rather than indicative and the verb employed 
is ‘to make’ rather than ‘to be’. Such syntax forms a brief standardized order, forwarded to 
control employees by operations’ personnel. This standardization intends to instigate a 
prompt response and to allow an order to be processed without insulting the control 
personnel who processes the request. Thus, the standardization balances the distribution of 
power between the communicators. Such practice accords with the transition from a quasi-
militaristic Brigade to a role-oriented
73 service (Fire Services Act 2004)
74 and reflects the 
change in the communication conduct of the BFRS personnel: there are no longer orders 
                                                 
73 Fieldnotes, April 2007: ‘Management Structure’, Jan 07.doc 
74  http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts2004/en/ukpgaen_20040021_en_1, accessed: 08/12/2006; 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/acts2005/en/aspen_20050005_en_1, accessed: 08/12/2006; ‘The 
Future of Fire Service Control Rooms in Scotland,’ Mott MacDonald: Brighton 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/consultations/justice/ffscr.pdf, accessed: 31/01/2004.   215
but procedures, a decision-making process, occurring during emergency response and 
promoting participation (Lewis et al. 2006).  
 
 
The BFRSs SOP do not endorse the use of abbreviations (e.g. ass mess, ffs) and acronyms 
(e.g. ADO, HRJ) in the communicative interactions during emergency responses, unless 
they are widely recognized by the personnel involved in the response. Abbreviations and 
acronyms are used more lavishly by the large-sized brigades as a time-saving effective 
practice, especially during the communications conducted via telephone rather than via 
radio.
75 The application of codes on the other hand, that is, a combination of numbers used 
to indicate the type of emergency encountered, the status of the appliances, the location of 
the appliances and the status of the response for the fire control to recognize the source of 
information, the type of incident, the degree of risk involved, the necessity of assistance 
and so on is widely used by the FRSs (table 13).  
 
 
Table 13: Example of how messages are codified  
Emergency special service, aircraft, aircraft landed safely, 
is transmitted as: Code 14, type 0, aircraft  
(Source: EFRS2, DP#5127 v6 Jan2007) 
 
 
These codes, however, vary from one BFRS to another. If it is necessary for the control 
rooms to interface during an emergency response, they cannot use their codes as they do 
not operate under national standards. Operations’ personnel maintained that it is difficult 
for them to remember all the codes, abbreviations and acronyms, apart from those that they 
use on a daily basis. Control personnel nonetheless argued that operations’ personnel 
“don’t even know what the HAZ(ardous) MAT(erial) officer stands for.”
76 Generally, the 
smaller the BFRS the more strict the implementation of procedures and the more rigid the 
linguistic patterns followed during emergency responses. Control personnel exercise 
control over their conduct with a smaller number of responders. If the span-of-control 
remains narrow, the control becomes manageable.  
 
                                                 
75 Fieldnotes, April 2007: ‘Standard Abbreviations used by ECFRS Control’, #19956 CON036 (October 
2006). 
76 Control operator, pers. comm., 17 April 2007.   216
6.4.2 Communication with on-call officers 
 
 
BFRSs control operators undertake the task of communicating incident information to all 
organization-members involved in the response regardless of their rank. The following 
examples were selected and transcribed in order to depict the dialogic practices between 
control personnel and on-call officers. In the BFRSs, on-call supervising officers are senior 
fire-officers, who have formerly worked in the fire stations but are employed in the 
administration after reaching a certain rank. Depending on the intensity of the emergency, 
control personnel inform on-call officers who proceed to the incident-grounds and decide 
whether to assume control of the response as ICs. The more acute the emergency, the more 
likely it is for the higher-ranking officers to assume the coordination of the emergency 
response.  
 
 
Case A: rescuing a trapped animal  
1 COP  Well, just let you know that we are going out to a cow trapped in mud at 
road X; you know [she is providing details so as to create a mental picture 
about the area where the rescue operations will be deployed, but these 
details and the names provide are illegible]. 
2 FO  Aye. 
3 COP  Right behind it is a cow trapped in mud. 
4  FO  [Asks about the appliances, judging from the answer but rather 
incomprehensible]. 
CO: Right, no problem [the use of ‘no problem’ is a rushed reply to a 
potential “cheers” from the FO; it appears that she wants to end the 
conversation as there is no more information to forward]. 
5 COP  We are just sending one pump and the [another type of appliance]. 
6 FO  Ok. 
7 COP  Ok? 
8 FO  Is this 1
st message? 
9 COP  Right, no problem [the use of ‘no problem’ is a rushed reply to a potential 
“cheers” from the FO; it appears that she wants to end the conversation 
as there is no more information to forward]. 
10 FO Cheers. 
11 COP  Ta. 
(Source: SFRS1, December 2006) 
 
 
Case B: fire in a cottage 
1 FO  Hello. 
2 COP  Hello. 
3 FO  Explosions in bedroom [note: the fire-officer was apparently listening to   217
the radio transmissions and heard about the mobilization]. 
4 COP  Yes, [she states the location; she provides the exact address; finally she 
names the area] [incomprehensible] make pumps three and requested the 
aerial platform. 
5 FO  Hm… hm… 
6 COP  And they’re… there now. 
7 FO  Right … any messages? 
8 COP  The only message I have got was [incomprehensible] that it is a two stories 
dwelling house [incomprehensible] two [incomprehensible] fire-fighters 
with BA [breathing apparatus]. Building well alight [incomprehensible-
speaks fast and rather unclear] make pumps three [note: she apparently 
reads the informative message the operations’ units transmitted to the 
Control over the radio as soon as they were on-site]. 
9  FO  [Appears to ask whether the tenants are out; the details of the question 
are rather unclear]. 
10 COP  At the time of the call, [they were] all out of it. 
(Source: SFRS1, April 2003)  
 
 
Case B, 2
nd example 
11 FO  Hello. 
12 COP  Hello it’s X. We have a house on fire. 
13 FO  Whereabouts? 
14 COP  In Y [location spelled slowly], Z Street, A [name of the area]. 
15 FO  Aha, aha… 
16 COP  There’s been reported there was an explosion in the bed room […] the 
occupants are out. 
17 FO  Ha, ha [he probably adds that he will go there]. 
18 COP  Ok then. 
19  FO  [He repeats address and location verbatim]. 
20  COP  [She repeats verbatim]. 
21 FO  [He  repeats  verbatim]. I’ll make it across; maybe get directions on the way 
across. 
22 COP  Ok-do-key. 
23 FO  Thanks. Bye now. 
(Source: SFRS1, April 2003) 
 
 
Case C: fire in a dwelling. 
1 FO Hi; its X. 
2 CO Oh, right. Just let you know that we are mobilizing two pumps from X and 
one from Z [X and Z being the area where the fire stations are located] to 
report at a house fire at Y farm at A [location]. 
3 FO You are joking [the officer was attending another incident nearby almost 
all night before this emergency erupted early in the morning].  
4 CO No. 
5 FO Eh, eh, eh… Y [farm], eh? 
6 CO Aye.    218
7 FO Ok.  
8 CO Ok? 
9  FO  [he asks something, incomprehensible] 
10 CO  Ok then. 
11 FO  Ok; ta. 
12 CO  Ta. 
13 FO  Ta. 
(Source: SFRS1, December 2006) 
 
 
Case C: follow up call; 2
nd example 
14 FO  V tell I will take that call because Y [the name of the other on-call officer] 
is still on [incomprehensible, but it appears he is saying that the other 
officer is engaged in another incident]; what is it?  
15 CO  It’s [name of the store, name of location, address, directions by providing 
landmarks]; ok? 
16 FO  Ok; what you are mobilizing? 
17 CO  CO: [she provides the numbers of appliances] 
18 FO  Ok; thanks very much. 
19 CO  That’s fine. 
(Source: SFRS1, December 2006) 
 
 
Case D: fire in a garage 
1 FO  Hello. 
2 CO  Hey Tommy; I am telling you because you are closest. I know you are not 
[she refers to knowing that the emergency was out of his area of 
jurisdiction] I can tell the other officer, just let me know. We are going to a 
chemical fire at [name/location]. 
3  FO  [He repeats verbatim]. 
4  CO  [He repeats verbatim]. 
5  FO  [He repeats verbatim]. 
6 CO  Yes.  
7 FO  He is over there [incomprehensible] 
8 CO  Right. I find him on his phone then; 
9 FO  Ok? 
10 CO  Ok, no problem. 
11 FO  Ta. 
12 CO  Ta. 
(Source: SFRS1, April 2006) 
 
 
Case D: follow up call; 2
nd example 
13  FO  [He answers the call by stating his name] 
14 CO  Hello [cheerfully]; just to [incomprehensible] that we have a chemical fire 
in shop in Y location; we have got [mentions the appliances dispatched on   219
the incident-grounds]. 
15  FO  [He asks for further information and she replies]  
16 CO  We don’t have the details [the rest of the discussion is incomprehensible]. 
17 FO  There are two pumps, one contamination unit and two officers, [location] 
you say? 
18 CO  Yes, X. 
19 FO  Alright. 
20 CO  Thank you. 
21 FO  Thank you. 
(Source: SFRS1, April 2006) 
 
 
Case G: fire in hayshed stored in an agricultural building.  
1 FO Hello. 
2 CO It’s Control. 
3 FO Hiya. 
4 CO Just wanna let you know that we are mobilizing three pumps to 
[incomprehensible] hay shed sack fire [she speaks extremely fast] at the 
farm at [she provides the location]. 
5 FO FO: Hold on to get my… [Incomprehensible] a wee pen.  
6 CO Aye [she spells the word in dictation speed]. 
7  FO  [He repeats what she has said]. 
8  CO  [She repeats the name altogether and the location]. 
9  FO  [He repeats the location]. What is it on? Is it on the main road? 
10  CO  [She replies providing directions, creating a mental picture: “… off the 
main road, half a mile…”]. 
(Source: SFRS1, December 2006) 
 
 
These conversations are the initial interactions between control operators and on-call 
officers. Control personnel provide on-call officers with the initial incident information. 
The length of the aforementioned conversations is almost the same, ten (in most cases) to 
thirteen lines. The follow-up calls may be briefer due to the fact that on-call officers have 
been informed with regard to the emergency but request additional information (case C). 
The almost equal length of the above conversations indicates that the succession of 
requests and replies between control personnel and on-call officers is rather standardized 
despite that fact that “control uses free-speech with everybody else but the crews.”
77 Free-
speech denotes that patterns are not intentionally introduced in the communicative 
interactions between control personnel and on-call officers. Nonetheless, the recorded 
conversations reveal that patterns do develop. The transmission of incident information is 
standardized. Control operators communicate the type of incident (e.g. C2; D2; G4); they, 
                                                 
77 Control employee, pers. comm., 1 December 2006.   220
then detail the location where the incident is reported (C2; D2; G4). After reporting the 
initial incident information, the process of confirmation begins. On-call officers initiate a 
series of request-replies whereby they intend to make sure that they have completely 
understood the information the control operators communicated (C5-11; D3-6; G7-10). 
Then the operators may or may not provide information with regard to the mobilization 
process depending on the intensity of the incident and the interest of the on-call officers. 
Usually, such information is provided when the on-call officers decide to attend and take 
charge of the emergency response (C14-19).  
 
 
Casual greetings – “hiya”, “hi”, “hello” – and identification of the communicators are 
usually the opening lines of the communication conduct between control personnel and on-
call officers. In small-sized services, such as the SFRS1, the identification of the control 
employees who initiate the communication process is unnecessary. The communicators 
usually identify one another by their voices (e.g. cases A and B; C14). In all BFRSs, the 
telephone number of the command and control centre shows on the on-call officer’s mobile 
or pager, and, thus, the process of identification begins before the verbal communication is 
instigated. In smaller-sized services, when control employees identify themselves, they use 
either their first name (B12) or the term “control” (G2). In the larger-sized services, control 
personnel usually use both the term “control” and their names and ranks. The term 
“control” is a metonym. It is a single word used to describe a group of individuals 
performing similar tasks. The BFRSs appear to identify individual actors according the 
role they assume as organization-members. “Control” is not the dispatcher who initiates a 
communication or instigates the mobilization of the appliances. It is the department that 
undertakes the task of launching the emergency response. Metonym indicates that the 
effectiveness of the communication relies on the performance of the bulk of the 
organization-members – the play (Goffman 1991) – rather than the individual roles each 
actor undertakes. On the other hand, when the communication conduct is instigated by the 
on-call officers, they are obliged to identify themselves (C1).  
 
 
Cases A, C, D, and G indicate that the control operator initiated the communication 
conduct. The first example of case B indicates that the control officer was listening to the 
radio transmission and he contacted the control asking for the available information, which 
occasionally occurs, although control employees make an effort to maintain a practice 
whereby they are the ones to initiate the interaction when they decide according to SOP   221
that the on-call officers need to be notified or their assistance is sought by the operations’ 
officers on the incident-grounds. Yet, some on-call officers “can’t keep their nose out […] 
or contact the officers at the incident.”
78 In other words, some of the fire-officers disregard 
SOP and engage in communicative interactions with the operations’ personnel, while 
neglecting to log-in, through the control room, information exchanged during their 
communication conduct. Information necessary to the assessment of the emergency 
situation, to the decision-making and to the information dissemination process, for which 
the CCC is responsible, is not registered: “there is not much need to contact each other but 
to contact us.”
79 Moreover, “some” of the fire-officers contact the control room more 
frequently than what control regards as necessary. According to control personnel and the 
recorded conversations analyzed, all on-call fire-officers are notified as soon as the 
operations status changes on the incident-grounds and the change is communicated to the 
control employees through the informative messages sent by a fire-fighter, usually 
appointed by the IC. 
 
 
Also, case B indicates that as soon as the on-call officer heard a message on the radio 
reading “explosions in bedroom” he repeated the exact information he heard to the control 
operator (B, 3) without using the interrogative form and he expected the operator to 
acknowledge and elaborate on that piece of information. The officer’s instrumental 
approach triggered her instrumental response: she repeated verbatim the information 
registered electronically. 
 
 
“Verbatim” is a term that indicates that information exchange practices are standardized 
even when and where free-speech applies. Control personnel literally recite the information 
that is logged into their computer systems, off their monitors. On occasions, they forward 
the information at dictation speed (G6), a practice commonly applied during the formal 
communication conduct between operations crews and control personnel. The verbatim 
repetition of a message is a beneficial practice. Control operators avoid restructuring the 
message anew. The incident information is registered in the system according to categories 
such as location of the emerging incident, type and specifics of the emergency. When the 
control operator contacts the on-call officer, he/she recites the information filled in each 
category. On-call officers have learned from experience how to create a mental picture of 
                                                 
78 Control employees, pers. comm., 23 and 27 March 2007. 
79 Control supervisor, pers. comm., 1 December 2006.   222
an emergency based on these categories. Therefore, this practice facilitates the 
understanding of the message and reduces the likelihood of misinterpreting some or the 
whole of the content of the message. For example, table 14 is part of the transcript of the 
incident report as registered in the computer system of the SFRS1:  
 
 
Table 24: Transcript of an emergency report 
Location  REDFIELD, GORDON ROAD, SOUTHERNSVILLE, POST 
CODE  
Type of emergency  EXPLOSIONS IN DWELLING  
Specifics of emergency  2 STOREY DWELLING HOUSE APPROX 10M X 10M. 2 FFS 
IN BA. BUILDING APPEARS TO BE WELL ALIGHT. 
MAKE PUMPS 3. 
FFS: fire-fighters  
BA: breathing apparatus 
 
 
Lines B4 and B8 indicate that the aforementioned information was forwarded as such – 
location, type, specifics – by the control operator to the on-call officer. Furthermore, 
control employees make an effort to be precise with regard to diffusing the facts. 
Information such as the type and the location of the incident is transmitted with accuracy: 
“At the time of the call […]” (B, 10). Due to the dynamic nature of the crisis, the 
circumstances under which the emergency response takes place may suddenly change and, 
thus, the initial incident information may be altered. For example, the fire in a two-storey 
dwelling erupted at 21:31(case B). At 21:46 the intensity of the fire forced the IC to 
request a third appliance on the firegrounds. At 22:36, the IC requested a fourth fire-engine 
and an ambulance as two of the fire-fighters were injured during the response. Therefore, 
control personnel make an effort to accurately disseminate the incident information at 
hand. Moreover, control personnel intend to be brief. Case A indicated that the control 
employee intended to end the conversation as soon as she transmitted all the available 
information (A, 4; 7; 9). So, in the BFRSs, precision and brevity are two parameters in the 
information exchange process that are satisfied by the verbatim repetition of the content of 
the message. The verbatim exchange does not signify that the receivers have not 
understood the message but that they have understood it correctly, unlike what usually 
happens in the HFC. The epilogues of the conversations between control operators and on-
call officers also sustain that the free-speech practices bear patterns of standardize 
communication (table 15). 
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Table 15: Endings of communicative interactions between control operators and ops’ personnel using 
free-speech and non-free-speech policies 
Informal: 
telephone 
Patterned succession   Formal: 
Radio transmission 
Important definition
80 
 
Free-
speech 
  Non free-spech   
Ok.  Initial  acknowledgement  Over    “An answer is expected or 
required” 
Ok?  (re)Verification  Over   “An answer is [STILL] expected 
or required” 
Ok.  Final (re)acknowledgement  Out   “Control  radio  operator 
completes transmission”  
 
 
Observation has also indicated that BFRSs employ modes of introducing a piece of 
information without alarming the receivers in the communication conduct: “Hello Z (fire 
station); it is (name and post of the Control employee). It is not an emergency […]” and 
then she continues on transmitting the information to the receiver. The phrase “it is not an 
emergency” shows that when communication occurs between the CCC and a fire station 
the preliminary assumption is that a response to a crisis will be requested. Furthermore it 
indicates the CCC employees’ knowledge of this assumption as a predetermined mode of 
communicating information concerning a crisis. Finally, an organizational style of 
avoiding confusion by stating the reason of the contact is introduced. This display of 
instrumentality, as far as communications are concerned, becomes obvious in the routine 
conduct of the organization between the CCC and the fire stations. 
 
 
In the BFRSs forms of politeness are integrated into daily communication conduct. “Being 
polite” equals “being professional”. The fact that people address each other by their first 
names does not imply that they are being impolite (e.g. B12; C1; C14; D2). Even higher-
ranking officers insist on being called by their first names so as to establish a climate of 
familiarity. This climate appears necessary in order to re-establish the balance between the 
higher- and the lower-ranking personnel after the introduction of role- rather than the rank-
system. The only exceptions observed concerned older individuals, usually senior officers, 
with a military background, who would offer to be addressed by their first name but appear 
to enjoy being addressed as “boss” or “sir” rather than their surnames. During my fieldtrip 
in the SFRS1 and EFRS2, at least two higher-ranking officers made it explicit that being 
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addressed as “boss” or “sir” rather than their first name created “the right distance”
81 
between the person whose role is to “give orders” and the person whose role is to execute 
these orders. 
 
 
Usually, procedures are followed in order to fulfil the expectations of each of the actor’s 
roles on- and off-scene. Under certain circumstances standard operating procedures may be 
breached (D2). When such practices take place, the on-call officer is briefed with regard to 
the reasons. For example, in case D, the proximity of the on-call officer to the firegrounds 
would eventually allow a timely response instigated this diversion from SOP. Although the 
officer was assigned to another district, he accepted the call and proceeded to the 
firegrounds. Other cases (e.g. B) indicate that on-call officers consent to assisting one 
another when multiple crises emerge in one district and they are assigned in different areas 
(C14).  
 
 
6.5. Random conversations 
 
 
BFRS control personnel diligently see that incident information is diffused to those actors 
directly involved in the response. Occasionally they receive phone calls from off-duty 
personnel who seek information with regard to an emergency. Often, it is the fire-officers 
who pry in situations that are “none of their business.”
82 The following example shows the 
disposition of control personnel towards individuals who disrupt the emergency 
communication process:  
 
 
1  COP  [she states the name of the fire and rescue service] 
2  FO  [he states rank, name and post] 
3 COP  Hah, hah… 
4 FO You had a call [he mentions type of incident location], have you? 
5 COP  We have; yes; hah, hah. 
6 FO You… 
7 COP  Hah, hah… 
8 FO It’s X [location]? 
9 COP  It is X, yes. 
10 FO  It’d be more than one pumper? 
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11 COP Yes, it’s a two pump. 
12 FO  [asks  after  who  went] 
13  COP  [answers who was sent] 
14  FO  [he states the reason why he called: “struggling for a crew”; the rest is 
incomprehensible] 
15  COP  [she answers who are on their way] 
16  FO  [Goes on about the mobilization and describes what goes on at that 
moment; she becomes more talkative when he states his business calling]. 
17 COP Ok?  
18 FO  It’s well alight?! 
19 COP Yea; ok? 
20 FO  Ta.  
21 COP Ta.  
(Source: SFRS1) 
 
 
Random conversations are considered as noise in the emergency communication process: 
“yes; hah, hah […] Yea; ok?” BFRSs control personnel appear reluctant to communicate 
information to fire-fighting personnel who is not involved in the emergency response (lines 
5; 9; 11). The control employee is laconic. Without being impolite, she avoids replying the 
communicator’s requests.  
 
 
6.6. How BFRSs control personnel interact with other co-responders: The emergency 
command structure 
 
 
Inter-organizational communication patterns are reproduced during emergency responses. 
Communicative interactions between co-responder organizations during an emergency 
response should be structured a priori rather than be the concurrent outcome of the 
synergistic interactions on-site (Perrow 1999: 98; Manning 1992; Hardy and Phillips 
1998). If the organization aims at the development of a common platform for 
communication and at ensuring the effective cooperation of different organizations that 
will consequently achieve their interoperability (Comfort 1994), an understanding of the 
routines and practices of first-responder organizations is necessary.  
 
 
In the British cases, the association of the first-responders is instigated on an administrated 
level. On the incident-grounds, inter-operability is achieved on a strategic, tactical and 
operational level. When responding to major incidents, three stages of decision-making are   226
put into motion. First, the top tier of the emergency management command structure is the 
Gold command in which delegated representatives from the responder-organizations set 
the strategic aims of the response. Second, the Silver command which, in drawing upon the 
strategic aims already established in the previous stage, manages the organizations’ tactics, 
i.e., the ways in which the organization deploys its resources and, therefore, the course of 
action on incident-grounds. Finally, the Bronze command directly supervises operations 
on-site. 
 
 
On the administrative level, familiarisation with the participant actors is attained prior to 
emergencies, even from the phase of planning and executing joint exercises. Exercises are 
the avenue towards identifying the needs of the participant actors. BFRSs administrative 
personnel maintain that all FRSs personnel are well acquainted with the SOP. In contrast, 
operations’ personnel argue that there is very little time to rehearse protocols and 
procedures.
83 These contradictory statements underline the fact that obstacles emerge on an 
intra-organizational level even before organization-members realize that their interactions 
affect inter-organizational cooperation (Turner 1976). 
 
 
In the BFRSs, the planning, on an administrative level, and the implementation of these 
joint exercise plans, on an operational level, involve predominantly higher-ranking 
personnel. Generally, joint exercises improve communication conduct between 
organization-members on a strategic or tactical level (Gold and Silver command, 
respectively) without necessarily extending this improvement on an operational level 
(Bronze command). This type of interoperability encourages affiliation among the same 
individuals. Yet this constant recycling of the same participant actors does not establish the 
know-how of inter-organizational communication amongst the majority of organization-
members. Gold and Silver Command affiliate with emergency co-responders while 
operations’ personnel do not become aware of the communication conduct occurring. 
Hence, managing operational units becomes an intra-organizational issue directly 
influenced by intra- and extra-organizational parameters.  
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6.6.1. The BFRSs and the police 
 
 
I have identified the significance of the information sharing as a key factor in effective 
communication and, thus, cooperation (Vaughan 1996; Tamuz and Lewis 2008). In the 
following paragraphs, I address the patterns and the techniques the BFRSs develop when 
they communicate with other first-responder organizations on the incident-grounds. 
 
 
The police assume a significant role on-site. Generally, they facilitate the fire and rescue 
operations by establishing a perimeter (the outer cordon) within which fire-fighters and 
rescuers are deployed (the inner cordon) and may operate undisturbed. They manage the 
traffic near the incident-grounds and any disturbances caused by the public, such as 
civilians’ self-involvement in the incident. Finally, they set the crime scene in order to 
conduct their investigation, as soon as fire or rescue operations are over. As far as the 
context of information is concerned, police and fire investigators may work alongside each 
other, yet independently, in order to identify whether, and, if so, how a crime has been 
committed. On the level of the CCC of the BFRSs and the British police, the latter due to 
the multiplicity of incidents they encounter, and in contrast to, for example, the ambulance 
service, employ a bureaucratic style of listing, prioritizing and enumerating the incoming 
incidents. With the aim of maximizing efficiency, they provide the CCC of the BFRSs with 
a reference number which the CCC uses every time they contact the police, in order to seek 
or provide information regarding the incident.  
 
 
The communication conduct between the EFRSs, the SFRSs and the police varies. 
Interactions between the SFRSs and the police during emergency responses have two 
constituent dimensions: they are constant and consistent. The FRS control personnel begin 
interacting with police control personnel when the former receive information concerning 
an emerging incident. As soon as the SFRSs control personnel dispatch the necessary 
appliances on-site, they forward the incident information to the police along with the 
mobilization information. Occasionally, control personnel notify the police with regard to 
an emergency before they inform the on-call officer and after they have mobilized the 
necessary resources on the incident-grounds. The SFRSs control employees also contact 
the police with regard to the progress of the operations and the status of the fire-engines.   228
The SFRSs control personnel argue that their commitment to systematically disseminating 
any information concerning the emergency, as well as their organizations’ course of action 
on-site, should be attributed to their intention to emphasize their contribution to the 
response and, at the same time, abnegate any responsibility with regard to misconduct 
occurring on-site by other co-participant organizations.
84 The EFRSs communicative 
interactions with the police are frequent without being as systematic as the SFRSs. 
Information disseminated concerns the mobilization of the organizations’ resources and the 
progress of the emergency response.  
 
 
The one-way systematic dissemination of information, directed from the BFRSs to the 
police reveals the degree of the fire and rescue services’ dependence on the police. In this 
‘hierarchical transactional structure’ (Boisot 1995: 247), the police become a well-thought-
out bureaucratic control mechanism, the constituent organization in the incident command 
structure. A constant and consistent, well-codified dissemination of information indicates 
that the police are the last recipient that acts as the higher authority among emergency co-
responders. Stability in this command structure is achieved through the centralized one-
way dissemination of information (Boisot 1995; Schneider and Barsoux 2003). When 
researching British organizations, Hofstede maintained that organizations are decentralized 
and organization- members are generalists, entrepreneurial, flexible. They delegate 
authority and coordinate their actions through informal personal communication (Hofstede 
1994 and 2005; Schneider and Barsoux 2003). However, Hofstede’s ‘village market, 
Anglo-Nordic model’ does not apply for inter-organizational communication in all the 
British cases examined. Whereas the decision-making process is flexible and delegation 
occurs according to each of the emergency co-participant organizations’ obligations, 
coordination through informal personal communication does not generally apply. In 
contrast, where familiarity is accomplished between BFRSs and police organization-
members, it facilitates their formal interactions rather than substituting for them. Moreover, 
the fire-fighting organizations examined do not act as free agents; rather they report to a 
coordinating authority. 
 
 
Attaining familiarity serves as a significant parameter in affecting the outcome of an 
emergency response. The success of the emergency response operations launched after the 
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explosion and collapse that occurred at the premises of the Stockline Plastics Factory in 
Glasgow on the 11
th of May 2004, was attributed, amid other reasons, to familiarity 
developed during joint exercises among first responder organizations: “The beauty of this 
particular incident [was that] the major ICs from the three services [i.e. police, fire and 
rescue as well as ambulance services] knew each other. They have worked together […] 
before. […] When I was in the Police Headquarters […] because of my past experience 
working in that environment […] I knew almost everyone I was dealing with. […] and […] 
that is the essence of why I worked so well.”
85 
 
 
When the issue of familiarity emerged during conversations with the BFRSs personnel, it 
was unanimously argued that familiarity was an avenue towards “know[ing] yourself”, 
“getting more information”, and “ask[ing] people in a much easier way how [something] 
works.”
86 This self-awareness – knowing one’s levels of stress and fatigue – appeared to 
derive from “team awareness” – anticipating and addressing the needs of other responders 
(McLennan 2006: 32) when FRSs personnel observed how other participant organizations 
were operating on the incident-grounds. Some BFRSs employees perceived this 
comparison as an effective tool of empirical performance measurement, whereas others 
expressed an implicit antagonism between the emergency-responder organizations: “the 
police think they run the incident; the fire service knows they run the incident; and they let 
the ambulance think they run the incident.”
87 The language of both the police interviewees 
confirmed the senior fire-officer’s statement: “[…] what [it is] that the fire service would 
do for us.”
88 Therefore, self-awareness, as defined by various organization-members, 
cannot provide an accurate measurement for performance.  
 
 
Furthermore, formality is not bypassed by familiarity. On the contrary, formal procedures 
may facilitate or be facilitated by familiarisation. Familiarisation of the participant actors 
in an emergency response does not necessarily facilitate the information exchange process 
unless there are SOP to lay out the process. A contradiction emerged whilst conversing 
with BFRSs employees: while it was being argued that information exchange is facilitated 
through familiarisation, it was also maintained that, generally, police reveal information on 
a need-to-know basis. The BFRSs personnel claimed that plans laid out or efforts made to 
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join the CCC of the police and the FRSs, were obstructed by the police’s unwillingness to 
reveal information that would not directly involve the fire service. 
 
 
Although the BFRS personnel mostly argue that technical problems, such as the 
incompatibility of telecommunication systems, hinder inter-organizational communication, 
organizational routines also hamper communicative interactions. For example, the CCC of 
the BFRSs do not engage in communicative interactions with one another and, therefore, 
are unaware of each other’s routines. They do not know how other FRSs codify 
emergencies, although they are sharing similar software technology. 
 
 
6.6.2. The BFRS and the ambulance service 
 
 
As is the case with different organization structures, the ambulance service operates under 
different protocols than those of the BFRSs. Generally, before proceeding on-site, the CCC 
of the ambulance services provides the caller with a series of questions, in order to 
complete a wrap-sheet. If the ambulance operator is not provided with the necessary 
information, including an exact address, the ambulance services do not proceed on-site. 
Moreover, the difference in the perceptions of the organizations is delineated through the 
language they use to describe an incident (Whorf 1956). For example, a “trapped person” 
for both the police and the fire service is an individual in need of assistance to move away 
from a compromised area. For the ambulance services, however, a person is perceived as 
“trapped” when physically unable to move because, for example, he/she is covered with 
debris. Therefore, first-responder organizations assess and act differently before – based on 
the initial incoming information – and after – based on their own observations – arriving 
on the incident-grounds. Thus, “it’s always a bit of rivalry when working with them [the 
ambulance service].”
89  
  
 
In the EFRS2, a CCC employee was accused by an ambulance operator of not providing 
adequate information to enable the mobilization of the necessary ambulance units. Despite 
the CCC employee’s efforts, she was unable to reach any of the officers on-site in order to 
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attain and then forward the information requested by the ambulance operator. She was 
“terrified” when he filed a complaint, accusing her of being rude and uncooperative. After 
a careful examination of the recorded conversations, she was found not to have acted in an 
unprofessional manner. The recordings functioned as a safety valve in a blame-game 
instigated between organization-members. The information dissemination process was 
hampered by the circumstances surrounding the incident. Operations’ personnel were 
unable to take the CCC employees calls or provide her with the information she requested. 
The ambulance operator could not mobilize any of the organization’s resources unless he 
was given the requested information. Between the demand for assistance and the inability 
to offer the requested support, an inter-organizational conflict arose. The difference in the 
organizations’ modus operandi and the unwillingness to identify the problem, assess the 
situation and possibly circumvent SOP resulted in miscommunication.  
 
 
Thus, BFRSs’ operations’ personnel generally make an effort to provide ad hoc solutions 
to any problems they encounter on the incident-grounds. The administrative personnel, on 
the other hand, assert that resolving problematic issues ad hoc may be effective in the 
short-term, but ineffective in the long-run. When problems on incident-grounds are not 
reported, they are not adequately resolved. If they are to be addressed, fire-fighting 
personnel should report them regardless of whether some employees “were able or lucky to 
solve them […]; others may not be [or have been] able to manage.”
90 Interoperability 
misconduct should be addressed so as to integrate a solution into the standard operating 
procedures of the co-participants in emergency organizations.  
 
 
One of the obstacles that emerge while operations’ personnel are on the incident-grounds is 
the time of intervention. In the British case, the ambulance service gives priority to the 
incoming calls concerning rescue operations. Nevertheless, when responding to major 
incidents, untimely response may cause delays in establishing the incident command 
structure. During one major incident the ambulances arrived on-site several minutes after 
the fire service and the police had set up their Mobile Command Units. The command 
structure could not be completed until all emergency co-participants’ units co-located. 
Paramedics’ role as pacemakers of rescue operations leads to disruption of the fire 
service’s operations on site. Their authority on the rescue or recovery grounds is rarely 
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disputed and fire-fighters operate under the paramedics’ direction. Therefore since fire-
fighters may be asked to reprioritize their actions and re-set their tactics and equipment on 
the incident-grounds their untimely response hampers the operation. 
 
 
Incorporating the ambulance services to the FRSs is presented as a solution to the different 
structures and operating procedures in the BFRSs as well. As one of the chief fire-officers 
maintain: “Politics [are] above true concern for the public. If they had true concern and 
they wanted the very best for the public they would have one brigade tomorrow; one health 
service; one police force.”
91 However, fire operations’ personnel assert that centralization 
of ambulance services across the country indicates its failure. The ambulance service used 
to perform better when it was administrated by the local government, rather than after 
centralization: “Nowadays, now it can take them up to hour to arrive on the fire or rescue-
grounds.”
92 Although the government might find it easier to monitor the progress and 
viability of the industry if the chain of command is more uniform, the operations’ 
personnel find it a lot harder if “something runs all over the country.”
93 
 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
 
 
Saussure argued that it is not only the space that defines language but the language that 
defines the space (Saussure in Bourdieu 1999: 59). Bourdieu claimed that language serves 
the needs of the market (1999: 92). In both cases, language serves as means to identifying 
the characteristics of the BFRS organizations. On the one hand, free-speech applies in 
routine and informal communication. On the other hand, non free-spech applies in formal 
communication during emergencies and regularly when specific channels are used, e.g. 
radio. What becomes clear from the analysis is that even free-speech develops patterns that 
reinforce the practices introduced by the non free-spech. Both these practices indicate that 
organization-members affiliate based on specific patterns either during formal conduct or 
informal interactions.  
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Moreover, the CCC is based on roles and operators inform operations’ units regardless of 
their rank (figure 9). Information becomes an organizational asset rather than an exclusive 
prerogative of the senior fire-officers, as is the case in the HFC. In the BFRSs, the 
information is logged into the software system and so it becomes accessible to all 
personnel involved in the response. This infiltration of the technological systems deprives 
information of the symbolic power ascribed by the HFC practices.  
  
 
 
 
Figure 9: The actors engaged in the process of disseminating information on and off the firegrounds 
 
 
This attributes an “instrumental” character to the incident transaction process that 
facilitates dissemination of the initial information without a personal assessment or 
assumptions about an emerging incident. Incident information is an organizational asset. 
The extent to which information is deprived of its symbolic power is indicated by the fact 
that sometimes incident information is diffused to emergency co-responders before the on-
call officers are notified depending on the type and the intensity of the incident.  
 
 
The instrumentality introduced in the information exchange processes by the BFRSs 
indicates the organizations’ intentions to shift power from the communication actors to the 
process itself. Yet, it is the control employees who undertake the task of registering and 
diffusing the information and who, ultimately, become empowered. The BFRSs control 
personnel exercise control over the operations’ units, “you are in control; you tell them 
when to go [to an incident]; they don’t tell you […] Fire Control are in charge of 
mobilization and, with the information they gather from the caller, they make the decision 
of what goes. Sometimes the station does not agree with the decision and they will make a 
call […] [She advises the Control personnel:] Just say I am busy right now. Don’t go into 
any arguments with them.”
94 Moreover, in at least two of the BFRSs, during the 
assessment meetings that followed the response to a significant emergency, the control 
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personnel discussed the operations’ personnel’s attitudes towards them during the 
response, when it is perceived as “unprofessional.”
95  
 
 
Control and operations’ personnel are expected to fulfil certain roles that have rather clear 
lines and, thus, the information exchange process is fragmented. As such, according to 
his/her role in the emergency response, each actor scrutinizes the section of the information 
transaction assigned to his/her position; they do not acquire an overall control which would 
enhance the status of one actor and demean the role of another. They register the incident 
information in the system so the system is empowered. Therefore, the process of assessing 
and disseminating information essential to the response is decentralized and less time-
consuming. This attitude towards managing information is the outcome of a series of 
practices adopted on an administrative level.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
BETWEEN THE HELLENIC AND THE BRITISH FIRE SERVICE MODELS:  
THE LUDWIGSHAFEN FIRE BRIGADE 
 
 
The communication conduct among the LFB members bears similarities and differences 
with regard to the interactions of the HFC and the BFRSs personnel. This chapter details 
the patterns developed when the LFB organization-members interact during emergency 
responses; how civilians contact the LFB to report an emergency and communicate the 
incident information; how the control employees diffuse this information to the operations’ 
personnel and, finally, in what ways the LFB personnel communicate with other fire-
responder organizations involved in the mitigation of emergencies. These communication 
patterns reveal the nature of the organization conduct.  
 
 
7.1. The incoming incident information 
 
 
The starting point of the differentiation between the various FRSs investigated is the 
emergency number dialled in Germany; the 1-1-2. The German and the European 
emergency numbers coincide so as to simplify the communication practice between the 
distressed civilians and the responder organization. When civilians dial 1-1-2 from the 
rural areas, the call is answered by the CCC of the ambulance services. When 1-1-2 is 
dialled from the urban areas, the call is diverted to the CCC of the fire services. Depending 
on the content of the message, the personnel employed in the CCCs forward the call to the 
respective organization. When major incidents take place, the technical infrastructure 
supports conference calls between the fire, the police and the ambulance services. 
 
 
In the LFB control and command centre, the roles of operators and dispatchers are 
integrated. The LFB operators/dispatchers receive the call, register the message either by 
writing the information on a piece of paper or typing it directly in the computer, initiate the 
mobilization process according to the brigade’s standard operating procedures and log the   236
incident information they exchange with the operations’ units during the emergency 
response in their computer system. 
 
 
In the control room, the LFB employees are facing each other in an almost circular 
formation (figure 9). At the same time, they all maintain a visual contact with the EM. The 
circular arrangement of the operators/dispatchers’ positions indicates intimacy and direct 
decision-making. It also shows that the operators/dispatchers share the same status. In all 
the other fire and rescue services examined, the supervisors’ or officers’ room oversee both 
the control employees and the incident information presented on the EM. In the LFB, 
however, the supervising officers occupy their own space without overseeing the actions of 
the control personnel. This spatial isolation of the supervising officers from the concurrent 
emergency conduct indicates that they are not directly involved in the conduct of the 
control personnel during emergency responses, unless requested by the control employees. 
They attend to the problems either technical or organizational emerging from the daily 
function of the control room but they do not engage in it its daily routines. So their offices 
are isolated from the daily action. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: The positioning of the control employees in the LFB control room  
 
 
The incoming information with regard to an emerging incident is usually provided by 
civilians and automatic alarm systems installed in private or public buildings. When 
civilians contact the LFB, operators/dispatchers request certain information. The following 
example I selected from a range of communicative conduct between the LFB control 
personnel and civilians to indicate how civilians – LFB control interact:  
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1 Civilian  There may be a fire. I can see smoke. I am living in the building next 
to the X hospital, the one that is reserved for the personnel. 
2 Dispatcher    What is the address? 
3 Civilian  ….. [It is unclear. He is speaking very fast]  
4 Dispatcher    Repeat slowly and tell me which floor. 
5 Civilian    ….. [Address]; the 6
th floor. 
6 Dispatcher    Are there people trapped? What is your name? 
7 Civilian    I don’t know. Maybe. My name is [spelling] 
(Source: LFB – recorded conversations: fire in a hospital building, August 2007) 
 
 
8 Dispatcher  What is the location of the fire in the building?  
9 Civilian  The fire is somewhere on the roof. I saw smoke when I was in the 
neighbourhood. It is the Z building.  
10 Dispatcher  Units are already on their way.  
(Source: LFB – recorded conversations: fire in an apartment building, August 2007) 
 
 
The incoming incident information was incomplete (1) due to the fact that the civilian who 
was the initial source of information appeared to be upset because of his witnessing the 
emergency (3). He stated where he was at that moment, but he neglected to mention that 
the compromised building was the one he was calling from. The dispatcher requested 
information about the location of the building (2). Although the caller seemed distressed, 
the dispatcher literally ordered him to repeat the message (4) and made an additional 
request at the same time. The caller was breathless and the information he was providing 
was so incomprehensible that the German employee who assisted me with the translation 
of the recorded conversations had to listen to the tape at least two times before he grasped 
the content of the information. After receiving answers to both requests the LBF operator 
asked the distressed civilian another two questions successively (6). Moreover, the LFB 
operators did not make an effort to elicit as much information as possible from the follow-
up calls placed with regard to the already reported emergency (8-10). In another occasion 
during a fire that erupted in an apartment building (August 2007), one of the LFB operators 
received a phone-call placed by a civilian who knew very little German. The dispatcher 
was unable to understand what the civilian was trying to communicate and after listening 
to his colleague receiving calls from other civilians with regard to a “major fire”,
96 he hung 
up the phone on the first non-German speaking caller assuming that this was the incident 
the caller intended to report.
97 
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The aforementioned conversations as well as the attitude towards non-German speaking 
civilians indicate how the LFB dispatchers address civilians who call the 1-1-2 to report an 
emergency. LFB dispatchers aim at instantly extracting the information necessary to 
mobilize their resources. In the process of extracting this incident information they 
disregard the human element: how involved the civilians are in the emergency, how their 
involvement shapes their perception of the incident and, thus, whether they are able to 
provide reliable information.
98 When LFB operators have extracted the incident 
information necessary to instigate the mobilization of their resources, they cease listening 
to the caller, which increases the risk of not obtaining information that may be essential. In 
contrast to the BFRSs control personnel and in a similar way to the HFC, LFB control 
employees are trained as fire-fighters and occasionally LFB operations and control 
personnel rotate. The fire-fighters’ training involves courses in physics, chemistry, 
mechanic engineering, fire-fighting techniques and first-aid.
99 Communication with 
civilians is an issue that has not yet been addressed by the LFB and the skill of 
communicating remains underdeveloped. When fire-fighters are taught that their primary 
task is to engage in fire-fighting operations, communicating with civilians becomes a 
secondary task, often considered as a chore.
100  
 
 
When German-speaking civilians contact the 1-1-2, they may not be able to communicate 
incident information coherently. There are significant obstacles when communicating in 
one’s own language: idiolect, accent, narration, coding and decoding processes according 
to the cultural background of the communicators. The non-German speaking civilians face 
an additional difficulty: to communicate incident information under abnormal 
circumstances in a foreign language; that is, in this case, German. LFB operators, who are 
usually not fluent in any language other than their own, are often unable to deal with 
foreigners. When LFB operators communicate with civilians who do not speak German, 
first they request the caller to seek assistance from German-speaking individuals in the 
proximity. Second, they ask their co-workers whether they speak the language of the caller. 
Third, they resort to an automatic translation system embedded in their software system, 
which usually proves effective. Fourth, they focus on extracting the address of the incident 
reported in order to send an appliance to inspect the location. Finally, the LFB operators 
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may hang up the phone if the communication is impossible.
101 Thus, the LFB has 
developed a set of standard operating procedures so as to minimize their dependence upon 
the incident information civilians report.  
 
 
On the other hand, the automatic fire-alarm systems provide instant, accurate, 
unambiguous, and non-verbal information with regard to an emerging incident. In the 
Hellenic case, it is civilians who are a more reliable source than control automatic alarm 
systems (see chapter 5). In the LFB, the content of the fire-alarm ‘message’ is straight-
forward: there is smoke (or heat, depending on the type of the alarm system installed) 
generated at the X location, in the Z building. When the LFB personnel access the plans of 
the Z building, they establish that the fire is on the B floor, in the C partition, for example 
the main corridor or the rest room, in the Y office with the main computer systems etc. 
There is a designated point outside the premises, where the fire service can access the keys 
along with the schematics of the compromised building. 
 
 
For the fire-alarm systems to provide reliable non-verbal information, the responsible 
parties of the industrial buildings where these automatic alarm-systems are installed – e.g. 
owners or civil engineers – are legally bounded to submit the schematics of the buildings 
and update the brigade with regard to any re-adjustments made during the buildings’ 
operation.
102 The LFB trusts that this condition is met. Trust is perceived as the result of 
legitimization. Those who breach the trust (Vidal 2006), that is those who do not comply 
with the existing legislation are fined for instigating the unnecessary re-actions of the fire 
service. Evidently, the reliable information provided before an emergency occurs is as 
significant as the information provided during the emergency response. Developing a 
relationship between the pre-emergency and the emergency communication establishes the 
possibility of dealing with an urgent situation as if it was a routine event. The LFB SOP 
lead to this direction. For example, when an alarm system is set off, LFB personnel have a 
detailed plan according to which they inform certain officials depending on the intensity 
and the duration of the emergency. Whereas in the HFC the magnitude of the emergency is 
one of the main factors contributing to the disruption of the information exchange process, 
both in the BFRSs and the LFB the regulated communication conduct between control 
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personnel and operations’ units attempt to minimize its interference with the information 
exchange process.
103 
 
 
7.2. Communication during emergency responses 
 
 
As soon as the necessary incident information is registered, LFB operators begin to process 
it. In the LFB, the communicative interactions between control dispatchers and station 
operators have been replaced by a loud-speaker announcing the type and the location of the 
incident, as well as a fax line that transmits information while the crews are preparing to 
mount their appliances. At the same time, in the fire-station, a designated fire-fighter 
inspects the content of the fax transmitted and accesses the dossier that contains 
information about the compromised area or building and the tactical mode the fire crews 
need to follow depending on the risks entailed in the area or the building affected by the 
fire.
104 The dossier is kept in the appliance that the on-duty officer is assigned to, until the 
response is over. Whereas the appliances are not equipped with maps of the area of the 
stations’ jurisdiction, a map with the directions and all the available information 
concerning the emergency is provided by fax before the fire-engines leave their stations. 
The frequent training the LFB personnel receive facilitates the familiarization with the area 
that the fire-stations have jurisdiction over. These automatic notification procedures 
replace interpersonal communication, thus introducing a degree of objectification in the 
process of the disseminating of the initial incoming information. 
 
 
Once the operations’ units are on the incident-grounds, control personnel interact with the 
operations’ officers via the IC in minor incidents or the Mobile Command Unit (MCU) 
during major incidents (figure 11). The MCU is a mobile command and control unit, a 
vehicle equipped with a computer system to serve the needs of the operations’ personnel 
on the firegrounds, such as to enhance telecommunications during the response. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 Service Order: ‘Ausbilderheft: Lehrgang Sprechfunker’: LFKS Rheinland-Pfalz, Stand: 01/2004. 
104 Service Order: ‘Einheiten im Löscheinsatz’: Feuerwehr-Dienstvorschrift FwDV 3, Stand 2005.   241
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Communication practices between control and operations personnel 
 
 
Operations’ officers act according to the IC’s instructions. The IC rides with the MCU 
along with a fire-fighter who drives the vehicle and mediates the communication between 
the IC and the CCC. When the MCU is not mobilized then the communication is 
conducted between the on-duty operations’ officer and the control. The following example 
presents a usual communication conduct during emergency responses: 
 
 
11 Control  This is a fire in the building of the personnel of the BGUK [name of 
hospital] and it is on the 6
th floor. There is no incoming automatic alarm 
from the hospital. 
12 MCU  Understood. 
13 IC  Which units are coming to the incident? 
14 Control  The command vehicle and both platoons. 
15 IC    Understood.  
… 
16  Control  [To the MCU] the automatic alarm is now incoming to the operations 
room. 
17 MCU  Understood. 
… 
18 Control  Situation report! 
19 IC  There is a fire on the 6
th floor; not an open fire; it’s a fire without flames 
and a lot of smoke and the fire is located inside the kitchen. More details 
are coming soon. 
20 Control  Understood. 
… 
21 MCU  Support from platoon 1 is not necessary at the moment. 
22 Control  Confirm.  
23 MCU  Support from platoon 1 is not necessary at the moment. 
24 Control  Ask platoon 1, to stand by. 
25 MCU  Understood. 
… 
26 Control  Do they need the B.A. vehicle. 
27 MCU  Confirmed. 
28 Control  Confirmed. 
… 
29  MCU  [We have now] confirmed that the fire was an empty flat where no one is 
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living and that the kitchen was completely burned. Smoke ventilation 
trial. 
30 Control  The fire was an empty flat where no one is living and that the kitchen was 
completely burned. Smoke ventilation trial. Appliance on its way.  
… 
31 MCU  At the moment, they have one small nozzle in use.  
32 Control  Understood.  
… 
33 MCU  Fire under control. 
34 Control  Fire under control. Understood.  
… 
35 MCU  Fire extinguished. 
36 Control  Fire extinguished. Understood.  
(Source: LFB – recorded conversations: fire in a hospital building, August 2007) 
 
 
37 MCU  Complete burning of a roof apartment. Units are preparing now to attack 
from the inside and the outside. There is already one civilian outside the 
apartment on the street and another one inside alive.  
38 Control  Understood.  
39 MCU  Both platoons are working and need support from another fire service so 
as to have city coverage.  
40 Control  Confirmed; shall I ask the BASF to stand-by? 
41 MCU  You should check this with the division chief.  
42 Control  How long the will the incident response take because the division chief 
wants to know so as to arrange the city coverage. 
43 MCU  Confirmed. We will give you the information asap. […] approximately 2 
hours. 
… 
44 MCU    Platoon 2 is only for support [meaning on the firegrounds; that means 
that they are available to attend any other incident].  
45 Control  Understood.  
… 
46 Control  Do you need the power company [meaning on the firegrounds; the 
power company is responsible for cutting the power off the entire 
building. Cutting the power in one of the apartments is the LFB 
responsibility]? 
47 MCU  We will re-contact you control. 
… 
48 MCU  We need the power and the gas company [in the State of Rhineland- 
Palatinate it is a joined service provided by the municipality and called 
TWL]. 
49 Control  Confirmed. 
… 
50 MCU  We need the BA unit. 
51 Control  Understood. 
… 
52  MCU   [To the BA unit] where is your location? 
53 Unit    Directly behind the TWL. 
54 MCU  Where is that exactly?   243
55 Unit    X [location]. X [location]  
56 MCU  Understood.  
… 
57 MCU  Report to control: 2 flats are burned, 1 person out on vacations. For the 
other we must call the Z. [this is the name of a special service provided 
by the municipality for people who are in need for an apartment for a 
few days in case, for example, their apartment has been destroyed by a 
fire]. 
58 Control  Understood. We were informed that the police have notified the 
department [that provides this special service]. 
(Source: LFB – recorded conversations: fire in an apartment building, August 2007) 
 
 
In the LFB, the instrumentality of the communication conduct among the participant actors 
in an emergency response is primarily located in the nature of the exchange and, 
secondarily, in the structure of the speech used by the actors involved in the response. The 
interactions between the actors engaged in the response are preset and brief: the one 
requests and the other replies. The actors do not communicate systematically but on a 
need-to-know in order to-assist basis. Communicator A requests, communicator B replies 
and A confirms the reply (e.g. 18-20; 21-25; 26-28). Two words appear frequently during 
the emergency communication episode between the LFB personnel: understood  and 
confirm(ed). Understood is used to acknowledge first, that the message is received and, 
second, that the content of the message is accurately decoded by the receiver. The first 
point refers to the functionality of the channel: the radio signals are clear and noise does 
not obstruct the transmission of the message. The second point depends on the tacit 
knowledge of the personnel created by their habitual practices along with the 
implementation of the LFB standard operating procedures. The phrase: “there is no 
incoming automatic alarm from the hospital” (11) indicated first, that the operations’ units 
had to search the premises so as to locate the fire. Second, if the fire emergency was 
intense, the automatic alarm would have signalled the control. Finally, the incident 
information the civilian reported was probably unreliable. The transaction of line 16 
contradicts the content of line 11 and indicates that the fire-alarm high reliability system 
verified the information provided earlier by the civilian.  
 
 
The terms confirm or confirmed relate to the verification process. The verb to confirm in its 
imperative mood – confirm! – instigates the verification process. The participle confirmed 
signals the completion of the process. The verb to confirm connotes certainty. Once the   244
information is confirmed, it becomes undisputed. The undisputed information is the basis 
for organizational action. It catalytically affects the decision-making process.  
 
 
As in the Hellenic and the British cases, repetitions are an essential part of the verification 
process (21-23; 29-30; 33-34; 35-36). The communication actors repeat terms such as 
understood or confirmed, or the entire content of the message reported. Thus, repetitions 
contribute to enhancing the certainty that the actors require to make their decisions during 
emergency responses. Repetitions are also used as an instrument that expresses remorse 
with regard to miscommunication. At least one conduct indicates that when a control 
operator requested that the head of the B.A. operations’ unit, dispatched on the incident-
grounds, reported their exact location, the reply he received was that the unit was just 
behind the TWL. Nonetheless, the TWL unit is not managed by the LFB and, thus, the 
control had no way of knowing the exact location of the TWL when the operators 
contacted the LFB BA unit (42-46). The answer the head of the BA unit provided was 
obscure and on that realization, the fire-fighter in charge of the unit repeated their location 
twice. To further achieve instrumentality, LFB personnel avoid the phatic use of language. 
In order to be precise and laconic, their utterances bear a certain meaning. They are not just 
used as filler phrases. Thus the actors’ requests are often bluntly uttered (e.g. 18).  
 
 
The aforementioned cases indicate that each of the actors engaged in the emergency 
response according to their role scrutinize the section of the information transaction 
assigned to their position in the emergency communication process (e.g. 3-4). Therefore, 
the process of assessing and disseminating information essential to the response is 
decentralized and less time-consuming. This attitude towards managing information is the 
outcome of a series of practices adopted on an administrative level. Roles and procedures 
are prescribed and, generally, accurately performed under the authority of the IC who 
assures the implementation of the procedures. 
 
 
The instrumentality introduced in the information exchange processes by the LFB reveals 
the intentions of the organization to shift power from the communication actors to the 
process itself, similarly to the BFRSs. Yet it appears that the “custodians” – the control 
employees – effectively themselves become powerful. As impersonalization appears to 
lead to disempowerment, in effect power is redistributed among organization-members;   245
control employees become the empowered actors. It is often the case that the LFB control 
personnel lock the Headquarters officers out of the control room. Higher-ranking officers 
employed in the HQ start flocking in the control room as soon as an emergency occurs in 
order to “satisfy their curiosity.”
105 The LFB control personnel indicate that they need a 
quiet environment and therefore they occasionally isolate the control room (figure 9). 
Moreover, operations’ units do not generally disregard the orders issued by control 
personnel. However, the transcripts of the communication conduct between control and 
operations’ personnel are incomplete. Control employees register only that piece of 
information they consider significant to the emergency response process, according to their 
standard operating procedures.  
 
 
7.3. Inter-organizational communication 
 
 
The instrumentality of the information exchange process and the role-oriented control of 
the incident information are revealed in the inter-organizational communication as well. 
The LFB affiliates formally with emergency co-responders in order to maximize its task 
performance. For example, the supplier of power, i.e. gas and electricity, the Hausmeister, 
disconnects the power supply outside the compromised buildings in emergency responses. 
The fire service is responsible for disconnecting the power inside the building, unless “they 
say please”
106 to the supplier, in which case they facilitate the service. 
 
 
59 Control    We are going out to an incident at X street; we have a fire in the 
roof. 
60 Police    Confirmed; we are also coming. 
… 
61 Control    We are going out to an incident at X street; we have a fire in the 
roof. 
62 Ambulance  Confirmed. Units are on their way. 
… 
63 Police    […] the flames are one meter high. 
64 Control    Confirmed. On our way. 
(Source: LFB – recorded conversations: fire in an apartment building, August 2007) 
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According to procedures, the LFB reports to the co-responder organizations their 
participation in an emergency response. Their interactions are brief and confirmation is 
provided as soon as the information is received (59-64).  
 
 
In charge of the LFB incident command system is the chief fire-officer (figure 12 and 14). 
He oversees the actions of the operations’ personnel, the control employees, the officers in 
charge of the various divisions involved in the response, the management of resources and 
finances. He also monitors the information that the organization diffuses with regard to an 
emergency to the local media or national press and he makes sure that the technical issues 
that surface during emergency responses, such as malfunctions in radio networks and 
mobile telephony etc, are being adequately addressed.  
 
 
 
Source: The LFB control manual 
Figure 12: The LFB ICS 
 
 
Figure 13 indicates how the LFB circulates incident and organizational information that 
supports the decision making process during emergency responses.  
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Source: Ludwigshafen Fire Brigade, slide from the material presented in a seminar and addressed to City Hall employees in April 2004. 
Figure 13: The flow of communication prior, during and after emergency responses 
 
 
Emergency planning illustrates the processes adopted during the fire and rescue operations. 
After each operation, an investigation takes place so as to assess the response. Misconduct 
or effective initiatives outside the prescribed processes are tested and adopted by the 
organization so as to update the existing emergency planning.  
 
 
7.4. Affiliations with the police and the ambulance service 
 
 
The LFB engages in an initial communicative interaction with the police in order to inform 
them about an emerging incident. According to the LFB standard operating procedures, as 
the emergency response of the Brigade progresses, the police may be contacted if the IC 
considers the police assistance necessary. The police are obliged to report any incident 
information to the LFB. When they are present on incident-grounds, they always wait for 
the fire service to complete their operations and give them permission to launch their own 
investigation. In the Ludwigshafen institutional command structure, when the LFB is the 
predominant responder the police assume an auxiliary role. The LFB usually functions as   248
the leading part of a committee that decides on the action taken by the first-responder 
organizations on emergency grounds (figure 14). 
 
 
In the LFB case, affiliations result from internships. Exchanging personnel facilitates the 
learning of the organization’s routines. For the LFB, good practice is sustained by creating 
inter-organizational co-operation in an intra-organizational context. Police officers are 
offered a two- to four-week internship in the fire service and vice versa on an 
administrative rather than an operational level, so as to achieve a better level of 
understanding intra-organizational communication. LFB personnel maintain that, by 
exchanging this type of implicit knowledge, both the police and the fire service are 
gradually able to cooperate with minimal friction.
107 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: A detailed incident command system plan 
 
 
On the emergency-scene, the communication between the LFB and the police is formal. 
They experience a lesser degree of interdependency than the HFC on the incident-grounds. 
Once they are there, the police patrols interact with their CCC about the progress of the 
emergency response. This may present an obstacle when communicating during major 
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incidents. In order to achieve inter-operability and overcome the existent information 
exchange process, the organization proposed to create a joined CCC. The LFB claimed that 
plans laid out or efforts made to join the CCCs of the police and the fire services, were 
obstructed by the police’s unwillingness to reveal information that would not directly 
involve the fire service, as was the case with the BFRSs.  
 
 
The LFB falls into the description that Hofstede (1994; 2005; in Schneider and Barsoux 
2003) provides for the German model presented as a ‘well-oiled machine’. The LFB 
disseminates the type of information necessary for the police to launch their own 
operations. Therefore, they interact based on the tasks necessary to undertake according to 
the organizations’ obligations. These interactions are based on rules and procedures that 
have turned into routines. Their routines very rarely change and, if a need for change is 
identified they undergo testing and numerous discussions in order to draft, introduce and 
implement changes which will eventually result in structural solutions. Furthermore, the 
decision-making on the incident-grounds is compartmentalized and police do not act unless 
the fire and rescue service consent.  
 
 
The ambulance services present the LFB with a structural obstacle. Although the 
ambulance services time of response does not exceed the maximum time necessary to 
resuscitate a victim, LFB personnel considers the immediate presence of an ambulance on-
site as imperative to achieving good practice. Nonetheless, the organizational structure of 
the ambulance service and their standard operating procedures differ from those of the fire 
service. Ambulance services are provided by private organizations and their minimum time 
of responding to emergencies as agreed between them and the government varies from the 
time of intervention established for the fire service. 
 
 
In order to bridge such differences in the emergency modus operandi of the organizations, 
the LFB asserts that by the end of 2010, the CCCs of the brigade and the ambulance 
services will be integrated, although incorporating the emergency health services into the 
brigade is their intention.
108 In this planning, the ambulance personnel will fill the 
operators and dispatchers positions in the CCC from 08:00 until 16:00, which according to 
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the statistics are the prime time of calls requiring their skills.
109 Ambulance personnel will 
also be provided with basic fire fighting training. In the long term however, the LFB 
maintains there will be reduction in costs both economically and organizationally. As to 
the latter, the fire and ambulance service were provided by the LFB until the early 1980s, 
when, for political reasons, they were divided. Hence, the fire personnel have previous 
organizational experience in this type of structure (Weckesser 2003). 
 
 
7.5. Conclusion 
 
 
The LFB attempts to accomplish instrumentality in all aspects of the communication 
conduct during emergency responses. First, the organization decided to adopt the 1-1-2 
European emergency number in order to achieve on the one hand technical standardization. 
The call no longer has to be re-routed, as is the case with the 9-9-9 emergency number 
answered by a BT operator or the Hellenic case that operates on three distinct emergency 
numbers: 1-9-9 (HFC), 1-0-0 (police), 1-6-6 (ambulance service). On the other hand, 
dialling one emergency number simplifies the communication conduct between civilians 
and the emergency services.  
 
 
Second, organization-members minimize and depersonalize their communication conduct 
during emergency responses. When the appliances from both the central and the north 
station are mobilized, control employees communicate with the operations’ units on the 
incident-grounds via the MCU. Moreover, the LFB personnel underplay the role of the 
non-LFB personnel, such as civilians, in the organizational communication conduct. When 
inaccurate, civilians’ input is perceived as interference with regard to the organization’s 
decision-making process and actions on-scene.
110  
 
 
Finally, the LFB is in the process of redefining its standard operating procedures. The 
existing SOP are general guidelines of action that apply to the majority of the emergency 
responses: how fire-fighting personnel mount the appliances, how the mobilized units 
proceed on-scene, how the fire-engines are positioned on the incident-grounds, how the 
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crews are deployed once they are on-site. The LFB intends to introduce more detailed and 
thorough procedures.
111 The main reason for initiating such changes is not the inadequacy 
of the existing SOP: “they work just fine because they are the very rational steps you need 
to take in an emergency response.”
112 If and when the high-ranking officers are content 
with testing the details of the updated procedures then the changes will be introduced 
because “the thoroughness in the procedures will define who has responsibility of the 
potential misconduct during emergency procedures.”
113 So the reason for such 
thoroughness is to hold organization-members accountable for their actions and punish 
them for the operational misconduct rather than to facilitate the collaborative action on the 
incident-grounds.
114 From a task-oriented representative bureaucracy (Gouldner 1954) 
bearing some of the characteristics that apply to an organic organization (Burns and 
Stalker 1961) such as the flexibility the action based on information and the focus on the 
ends rather than the technical means (table 17: 273), the LFB is welcoming parameters 
from what Gouldner defines as punishment-centred bureaucracy (table 20: 280). In order to 
become a punishment-centred bureaucracy where rules are enforced by the LFB officers 
who receive the status gains, the organization requires a more mechanistic function (Burns 
and Stalker 1961) that necessitates a more elaborate set of rules, specialization and 
isolation with regard to the actions taken by the operations’ units on-scene (table 17: 273).  
 
 
Furthermore, intra-organizational routines presuppose an inter-organizational code of 
practice. The case of the LFB has emphasized the fact that the actions of one organization 
are taken for granted in order for the other organization to deploy its resources to 
accomplish a joined task. The LFB fire-fighters plan their operations according to the 
building schematics provided to them either on paper or electronically. Fire-fighters trust 
that what they access is updated and reflects reality. Schematics are replaced whenever the 
status of the building changes, unlike the Hellenic or the British case. For example, in the 
British cases, the central government deregulation policies have preoccupied fire 
investigation departments due to the fire employees’ inability to control whether safety 
standards are adequately adopted in the constructions. That is the difference between 
Britain (deregulation, up to private initiative) and Germany (regulation, followed and 
punished when not) and Greece (regulation, rarely followed and rarely punished). So, 
when the alarm-systems malfunction, the responsible parties for installing or preserving 
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them are fined. The responsible parties are also fined when they fail to report the structural 
adjustments of the buildings and not re-submitting the renewed schematics of the premises. 
The interconnection between prevention – offered, for example, by the installation of the 
automatic alarm systems – and intervention may cause or sustain extra- or intra-
organizational crisis (Rosenthal et al. 2001; Rosenthal et al. 1989: 445-447). 
 
 
The LFB tends to introduce elaborate procedures, minimize the input of non-LFB 
organization-members, such as civilians, and render the mobilization processes automatic 
in an effort to maximize the effectiveness of the organization when responding to 
emergencies. The primary task of the LBF, and the HFC, is to enhance intervention rather 
than engage in servicing the community on the level of prevention, as the BFRSs do. This 
tendency of the fire and rescue organizations towards adopting more elaborate and 
thorough action plans and uniformed practices relate to the concept Porfiriev (in Rosenthal, 
Boin and Comfort 2001: 343) introduced: transbounderization. We have presented this 
concept early in the introductory chapter as an additional, intrinsic characteristic of crises. 
As crises attain similar characteristics, responding to crisis develops similar techniques. 
Thus, emergency plans tend to acquire similar ‘steps’. Yet, how these steps are followed 
depends on the discretional power of the various organizations that take them.    253
CONCLUSION 
 
 
BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCES IN THE FRSs 
 
 
Organizations such as the fire services are seen as communication events (Pepper 1995) 
and a platform where shared cognitive meanings and shared value commitments shape the 
actions of the interactive agents (Manning 1992; Hofstede 2005). Perrow (1999), Turner 
and Pidgeon (1997) argue that crises are the outcome of communicative disruption in 
organizations. Such ruptures (Lagadec 1993) result from the dynamic relationship between 
structure and agency (Goffman 1990; Weick 1993). This relationship develops on a stage 
(Goffman 1990) where the roles may be defined (Merton 1965; Thompson 1967) 
according to a set of rules and procedures (Burns and Stalker 1961) and improvisations are 
necessary (Schneider 1992), likely or bound (Perrow 1999) to occur. 
 
 
8.1. Communicating in the fire and rescue organizations 
 
 
The fire and rescue organizations are bureaucracies. Fire service personnel have official 
duties and specified jurisdictional areas. They usually operate according to a set of rules 
intentionally established, i.e. the standard operating procedures (SOP) and the emergency 
plans. The FRSs officials are subject to orders issued either by the Ministry of the Interior 
(HFC), the Fire Authority (BFRSs), or the City Hall (LFB). The fire and rescue 
organizations have divisions with a specified sphere of authorities, such as the CCCs. 
These divisions follow the principle of hierarchy: operators receive calls, dispatchers 
mobilize the organizational resources, superintendents monitor the progress of the 
mobilization, and senior officers (HFC/LFB) or managers (BFRSs) address issues 
emerging from the daily operation of the control room directly or indirectly related to 
launching and monitoring emergency responses. The chief fire-officers of the 
organizations are appointed by a superior – usually the political – authority. Other high-
ranking officials are appointed ideally according to their technical qualifications, often by 
affiliation with the political authority (Mouzelis 1971 and 1978; Charalambis 1989).
115 
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Their promotion depends on seniority in the HFC, or primarily on achievement in the 
BFRSs
116 or both on seniority and achievement in the LFB.
117 In all cases, advancement 
depends on how the higher-ranking assess the performance of the lower-ranking personnel. 
FRSs employees are usually compensated according to their rank and their working hours. 
In this context, emergency management as the primary objective of the fire and rescue 
organizations becomes a bureaucratic process with the incident command system serving 
as its supreme model of effectiveness.  
 
 
Do the FRSs bureaucracies adequately manage the emergency, routine and set events they 
encounter almost on a daily basis? If not, what other way(s) of dealing with these events 
could be more effective? On the one hand, the US reports usually titled ‘Lessons learned’ 
recommend that the best way to deal with emergencies is to develop and infallibly practice 
the ICS, as an ideal bureaucratic procedure. Was a flawless practice of this system ever 
achieved in any of the episodes examined throughout the thesis? I believe not. On the other 
hand, others may argue that an organic structure may be more effective than the 
bureaucratic approach, as British professionals suggest (Bain et al. 2002) but have not yet 
achieved in practice. So, what did the episodes examined indicate about the organizations 
involved? 
 
 
The empirical data analyzed indicate that the FRSs face a triple challenge: they should 
manage other organizations’ crises (such crises include those occurring in large chemical 
and oil factories) as well as natural disasters (such as earthquakes and forest fires), and, at 
the same time, they must deal with their own crises (for example, failure to communicate 
because of power-related issues, lack of operating procedures or inability to adapt to the 
unanticipated circumstances of the emergency). 
 
 
The management of emergencies as intrinsic characteristics of organizations is the object 
of two significant theoretical approaches. The first asserts that organizations are unable to 
prevent human error. Perrow (1999: 369) emphasizes that “no matter how hard we try we 
will still have accidents because of intrinsic characteristics of complex systems.” The 
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inevitability of error leads to a search for the conditions that will cause a crisis. This 
approach sees the management (Turner and Pidgeon 1997), the rationally organized 
bureaucracy, the tight-coupling in technology (Perrow 1999) and the environmental 
pressures (Sagan 1993), that is the external emergencies in the case of the fire and rescue 
organizations, as culprits. More optimistically, high reliability theorists develop a second 
approach through which well-designed organizations are understood as being capable of 
absorbing human errors and external pressures (Rochlin 1996). Both approaches consider 
“bureaupolitics” and resource management (Boin and ‘t Hart 2003), dilemmas created 
under severe stress, uncertainties as to how to launch an emergency response due to lack of 
or inaccurate information, faulty initial classifications, and changes in the nature of crises, 
as major problematic areas (Kouzmin and Jarman 1989; Turner 1992). 
 
 
The episodes examined indicate that intrinsic ruptures (Lagadec 1993) are unavoidable. 
FRSs are not tightly-coupled systems (Manning 1992; Perrow 1999) with little or no “slack 
or buffer or give between two items” (Perrow 1999: 90). They are human organizations 
that develop a structure and a culture. Often, the choice of structure and the negotiation of 
this structure on a daily basis amongst the organization-members offer sufficient cause for 
ruptures, as I intend to discuss shortly. Fire and rescue organizations are complex systems. 
They combine human interactions with occasionally tightly-coupled technical systems and 
they necessitate that organization-members perform on multiple stages at the same time.  
 
 
The episodes investigated emphasized that emergency performances are made possible via 
communication. Each “performance” is a game  (Goffman 1990) of regulated 
improvisation. As games, performances are governed by rules. Emergency plans, for 
example, are intended to regulate the actions of the organization-members on- and off-
scene. In addition, unanticipated circumstances during emergency responses require 
innovative initiatives, namely actions that are not prescribed in the existing procedures. 
 
 
During the initial stage of the mobilization process whereby control personnel mobilize the 
organizational resources, communicative interactions between organization-members are 
“linear”. Linear interactions “occur [in an] anticipated production sequence” (Perrow 1999: 
77-78). The seemingly uncomplicated linearity in the information exchange process 
implies simplicity in the communicative interactions. Yet these interactions are not   256
‘simple’ processes but rather complicated conduct that may affect the deployment of the 
command structure and the decision-making process on the incident-grounds.  
 
 
Linearity is generally breached by lack of, or failure to, understand and follow SOP. These 
are formalized routines directing the interactions of organization-members under various 
foreseen or unforeseen circumstances. They arrange the information flow between 
organization-members across positions and ranks in the FRSs. What appears to impede 
emergency responses is either the absence of set procedures or the intentional or 
unintentional lack of implementation of these procedures. SOP are part of the formal 
structure of the organization and, as such, they define its rationality. The more prescribed 
the procedures, the more formal the organization and the more elaborate the role system 
appears to be, as is the case in the BFRSs and to a lesser extent in the LFB. If SOP are 
imperative rather than indicative, initiative as a dynamic component of reaction on the 
incident-grounds may be obstructed. For example, when managing emergencies in the 
BFRSs control employees search for and implement the protocol that matches the 
circumstances surrounding the emergency. Nonetheless, rigidity of SOP should be avoided 
as prognosis or prediction is limited by past experiences (Perrow 1999; Beck 2002) and 
circumstances surrounding the emergencies at hand may differ substantially from the ones 
described in the procedures.  
 
 
Both intentional and unintentional breaching of SOP emphasizes the meanings attributed to 
these set procedures by organization-members (Weick 1993). The intentional breaching 
underlines, first, the resistance of organization-members to formalization and power 
distribution as defined by the command structure of the organization. In this context, self-
dispatching, for example, is an act of mutiny that takes place on the incident-grounds. 
Second, intentional breaching of SOP emphasizes the reluctance of organizational 
members to embed a set of procedures that may have proven ineffective. Often, emergency 
plans are outdated and thus organization-members need to redefine their conditions as the 
operations progress. Finally, the intentional breaching emphasizes the actors’ 
unwillingness to adopt practices whose rationale has not been explained to them by those 
organization-members who have introduced or reproduced these practices on a strategic 
level over the years.  
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Unintentional breaching reveals the relation between agency and structure. Agency is the 
action of organization-members and the understanding they achieve with regard to the 
organization’s routines and practices. When an unintentional breach in the prescribed 
procedures occurs, it becomes apparent that there is a gap between, on the one hand, the 
meaning the administration of the organization that is involved in reproducing the formal 
structures intends the procedures to have and, on the other hand, the actual meaning 
attributed by the actors in practice (Scott 2004: 25-33). The agents interpret and reproduce 
the structure of the formal organization constantly and continuously. 
 
 
Linearity in the information exchange process is replaced by increasing complexity after 
the initial stage of the mobilization. According to Perrow, complex interactions occur 
outside “the normal production sequence either by design or not by design” (1999: 77-78) 
and can be both linear and non-linear. In the case of the FRSs, however, this complexity 
does not occur outside the “production sequence.” It is part of this “sequence.” Complexity 
emerges from the unanticipated outcomes of the communication conduct among 
organization-members. Whereas SOP exist to minimize the impact of the unexpected on 
the actions and the reactions of the organization-members when engaging in emergency 
responses, and, hence, simplify the ‘production sequence’, there are variations from this 
‘ideal’ standard. This element of the unexpected, that potentially complicates the 
organization’s performance, derives from the attitudes organization-members develop 
when they interact on a daily basis. Habitual practices may penetrate the command 
structure in the rank-system of the HFC and the LFB, or the role-system in the case of the 
BFRSs, and impose their own regularities over the formal procedures. For example, one of 
the BFRSs control personnel maintained that, despite SOP, they would not wake up “the X 
and Y in-duty officers in the middle of the night, no matter what the rules said, unless 
absolutely necessary, because they would not go back to sleep and they had to come in to 
work again next morning.”
118 This means that, if an unexpected development occurred in 
the emergency response, the decision-making process would have been delayed.  
 
 
Moreover, both the distribution of power amongst the interactive agents and the symbolic 
power of information shape the attitudes of the actors and defines the frequency of their 
communicative interactions. For example, in the HFC, it is habitual and not regulated 
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practices that indicate that senior officers should be hierarchically informed – the lower-
ranking inform the higher and the higher notify the highest-ranking personnel – at all times 
about major incidents occurring. So, interactions become more complicated as 
uncalculated cultural issues intervene in the ‘production sequence’. These issues are a 
process and a product of communication (Geertz 1991; Bantz 1993; Pepper 1995; Turner 
and Pidgeon 1997), a substantial part of an organization’s culture. Culture provides an 
understanding of the environment produced and shared by the organization-members (Deal 
and Kennedy 1982; Conrad 1983; Smircich 1983; Sathe 1985; Pace and Faules 1989) and 
“the means to accomplish the organization” (Putnam, Phillips and Chapman 1996: 375-
408; Wright 1994). Cultural issues interfere with the rational mechanistic – or bureaucratic 
– production sequence. In the HFC, senior officers seek information relevant to emerging 
incidents, especially when these incidents – whether major or minor – attract the attention 
of the media. Demonstrating to their super-ordinates that they are well aware of the 
organization’s conduct, higher-ranking officers become the protégés of the highest-ranking 
officers, hence achieving an advantage over their ‘non-knowledgeable’ counterparts with 
regard to their advancement. Although knowledge is the organization’s indispensable asset 
and the “knowledge worker” appears as “the single greatest asset” (Nonaka and Takeuchi 
1995: 7; Bourdieu 1999), the episodes investigated indicate that the worker does not 
necessarily serve as a basis for organizational stability and performance.  
 
 
In the case of the BFRSs, attaining such knowledge does not entail the same value in the 
organizations’ conduct. Relevant information concerning emergencies is equally accessible 
to every employee involved in the emergency response and it is distributed according to 
procedures, unlike what happens in the HFC, where, as indicated earlier, the dissemination 
of information is disrupted or its content fragmented or altered. In the LFB, officers are 
task oriented and therefore predominantly interested in attaining the information necessary 
to achieve a successful outcome with regard to their assignment.  
 
 
Nonetheless, bearing in mind that “individuals attempt to realize ends other than those of 
the concern as such” (Burns and Stalker 1961: 98), I draw upon Crozier (1964) to remark 
that each group of organization-members can be seen to have a certain amount of control 
over strategic information, valuable to other groups that can define the organization’s 
performance (Hofstede 2005). The power of each group depends on the uncertainty the 
group can create within other groups, by controlling essential information; thus, one group   259
may be able to control something that another wants. If the action taken on the incident-
grounds depends on the timely dissemination of accurate information crucial to the 
response, then one can appreciate the importance of the information exchange process. 
Then, it becomes clear that power and control can be exercised through distorted 
communication (Conrad 1983; Deetz and Kersten 1983).  
 
 
Agents’ perceptions reveal how the formalities of organizational structure and the 
formalized role-playing determine the distribution of power amongst organization-
members and how these employees react to this flow. Vertical (upward or downward) and 
horizontal communication indicates that the power flows across specific networks 
(Serafetinidou 1991): across ranks, superior and subordinates; across administration, 
managers, and watches, and, finally, across watches and control personnel. It may either be 
overt in the case of the formal command structure or covert in the communicative 
interactions between male and female employees, or operations’ units and the CCC. There 
are indications that the power exercised between the interactive agents may be coercive – 
the fear of punishment – or referent – the appreciation of the powerful (Etzioni 1961). 
Expert power is a form of power that may instigate a discourse with the traditional 
hierarchical structure of the FRSs quasi-militaristic regimes. Related to power, blame-
games and whistle-blowing represent a form of exercising overt and covert control over 
organizational conduct, as in the case of the Weberian “secret sessions” (Weber 1947). 
Covert control is linked to informal networks operating outside the boundaries of formal 
procedures, with the intent of disclosing wrongdoings. The existence of power, control and 
conflict reveals the interdependency of organization-members along with the 
incompatibility of the organization-members’ intentions. Communication is a means of 
transmitting these intentions. 
 
 
Therefore, the stakes emerging from exchanging incident and organizational information 
as the fundamental process for making critical decisions and taking actions on the incident-
grounds are the rules, the regulations and the procedures of the organization – the formal 
structure – and how they are practiced by organization-members. The mechanistic or 
organic system (Burns and Stalker 1961) that defines the character of the management – 
the decision-making process and the action taken on the incident-grounds – cannot be 
defined only by what has been regulated as the formal structure of the organization but also   260
by how this structure is perceived, interpreted and practiced by organization-members in 
their daily conduct. 
 
 
8.2. Agents in action 
 
 
Emergency communication conduct indicates that internal ruptures affect the management 
of external emergencies. Ruptures often occur in the role-set. Organization-members in 
each of the FRSs investigated have distinct status- and role-sets. Each status- and role-set 
creates certain expectations and as “given social front[s] [they tend] to become 
institutionalized in terms of the abstract stereotyped expectations to which it gives rise and 
tends to take on a meaning of stability” (Goffman 1990: 34). Status- and role-sets in the 
various FRSs create different expectations amongst the agents directly or indirectly 
participating in emergency responses. Failure to respond to these expectations affects the 
action off- and on-scene.  
 
 
When a fire-fighter disobeys evacuation orders or units self-dispatch, or the incident 
commanders decide to disregard procedures and not pass on any information to the control 
room or even interfere with the control room’s tasks, or when the operating procedures 
vary between the fire and rescue organizations involved in emergency responses, then 
actions on the incident-grounds may be jeopardized. The rest of the agents acting on-scene 
have less than the essential information to operate safely on the incident-grounds. 
Consequently, they are not confident that their co-actors are fulfilling their duties or that 
the information they are being given is accurate.  
 
 
The above ruptures are related to how organization-members involved in the response 
interpret and reproduce the formal proceedings of their organizations. Formal 
organizations are challenged by agency (Goffman 1990), the daily interactions of the 
organization-members. During these interactions, actors interpret the formal structures in 
light of their own sentiments and aspirations. Thus, formal structures are partially re-
invented each time a fire-fighter explicitly or implicitly refuses to follow the instruction of 
his/her commanding officer on-scene and continues with what he/she perceives as the best 
move in a given situation.    261
Formal organization dictates the ‘should be’ action of the organization-members. The 
trichotomy of can, shall and must was first introduced by Ralf Dahrendorf (1968: 38-44), 
who used these concepts to define permissive, preferential and mandatory social action 
respectively. The ‘should be’ is the script, the rules that are in place to act as symbols 
(Clarke 1999) and to govern the organizational action. The ‘should be’ also contains the 
notion of the ‘could be’. The latter represents how the organization distributes its resources 
to respond to its objectives. Does the X fire service have enough fire-engines to respond to 
an industrial disaster in the nearby power plant or would they require the assistance of the 
neighbouring fire service Z? The emergency plan, as a rational aspiration of the 
organization, takes this parameter into account in order to dictate the necessary steps to 
deal effectively with the emergency. There is also the ‘to be’ action. The ‘to be’ is what 
actually takes place: a successful implementation of the emergency plan, a 
misunderstanding due to differences in emergency procedures or the disobeying of orders. 
The practice is the outcome of agency, the daily interactions of the organization-members. 
The notion of the ‘must be’ is a more complex concept. It may identify with the ‘should be’ 
or instigate an action completely different to the one prescribed by the scripts. It can be 
considered as the intermediary phase when the organization-members negotiate the formal 
procedures and decide how to act during emergency responses. Goffman (1990) also refers 
to an ‘ought to be’ action that is instigated by the moral obligation of the individual’s 
actions due to his/her aspirations and his/her commitment to the organization.  
 
 
The  ruptures introduced in between the aforementioned phases are the “the source of 
disturbance [and] instability” (Merton 1965: 368-384) in the role-system that defines the 
structure of the organization. I do not imply that deviating from formal procedures creates 
ruptures. It is often the procedures that interfere with the potential initiative and innovation 
of organization-members in their dealings with the unanticipated parameters of 
emergencies.  
 
 
The first set of ruptures occurs when the agents negotiate the formal rationality of the 
organization and the second is due to the distribution of power both between the status-
occupants and between the members of the role-set (Merton 1965: 372-384). In order to 
investigate the first set of ruptures, I shall refer to how language is used in 
communications. The structure, the ‘should be’, specifies that actors should use the 
appropriate formal language when contacting communication via radio or telephone.   262
However, the ‘to be’ action indicates differently. For example, in the HFC actors may, 
first, use the formal language on radio responding to the expectations of the formal 
organization. Second, they may also use casual language on radio: “Hey Geoooooorge!”
119 
was the calling cry uttered by one of the highest-ranking operations’ officers in the 
command structure of the HFC to another officer on the firegrounds. On another occasion, 
during a mobilization a lower-ranking officer on some firegrounds replied as follows to the 
control dispatcher who radioed him in order to request whether the presence of a higher-
ranking officer was necessary: “He’d better; that is what he is getting paid for.”
120 In the 
first case, the highest-ranking officer was not reprimanded for his inappropriate cry 
whereas, in the second case, the lower-ranking employee was formally reprimanded for 
having replied in a dismissive manner with regard to a higher-ranking employee. Third, 
fire-fighting personnel may use formal language during the front-stage communication and 
informal language during the backstage communication. In this case, the informal network, 
created by the background interactions, undermines or supersedes the formal rationality 
(Bourdieu 1999). Moreover, the boundaries of the roles undertaken by the various actors 
are often unclear. In the HFC, a dispatcher’s role is often undertaken by officers, when the 
control personnel contact the higher-ranking officers on-scene.  
 
 
Finally, the command structure and the formal procedures raise obstacles to the decision-
making process in the case of emergencies where the existing protocols do not suffice to 
deal with their unanticipated parameters. Often, inadequate formal procedures interfere 
with the ad hoc effective management of emergencies. For example, the 9/11 Commission 
report details the deposition of the deputy fire safety director in the South Tower who was 
in communication with his North Tower counterpart. The South Tower director said that he 
would not order an evacuation procedure until he heard “from the boss, from the fire 
department or somebody” (Kean et al. 2004: 287). The ‘should be’ prevailed over the 
‘must be’ confirming what Hannah Arendt (in Lukes 1986: 61) asserted: “bureaucracy or 
the rule of an intricate system of bureaus [is a formidable form of dominion] in which no 
men, neither one nor the best neither the few nor the many can be held responsible and 
which could be properly called rule by Nobody.” The mechanistic organization interfered 
with what could have been a more effective approach to the management of the crisis 
(Schneider 1992). 
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Power issues emerge from the examples provided above. The higher-ranking officer cried 
out over the radio and was not reprimanded whereas the lower-ranking employee was 
officially reprimanded and, furthermore, his case was communicated to all organization-
members via a fax explaining the circumstances surrounding his punishment.
121 The fax 
then became a symbol of power amongst the status-occupants, legitimizing the authority of 
the higher-ranking personnel over the lower-ranking employees. While Merton (1965) 
suggests that the distribution of power not so much between the status-occupants but 
between the members of the role-set generates those disturbances that prevent 
organizations from operating at considerably less than full-efficiency (Merton 1965: 380), 
the division-set indicates differently.  
 
 
I have argued in the introductory chapter and chapter 3 that Merton’s theory may be 
applied to inter-organizational communication. The outcome of this application is 
Thompson’s (1967) organization-set. Thompson’s approach refers to the role each first-
responder organization undertakes during emergency responses. Both the HFC and the 
LFB assume a protagonist role in operations. The police as well as the ambulance service 
do not interfere with the fire services’ tasks. In a major disaster in the UK, the BFRSs 
assume a secondary role in the management of the crisis, with the police being the 
coordinator of the responder-organizations involved. 
 
 
However, between Merton’s microscopic and Thompson’s macroscopic approach there is 
an intermediate approach – that I name division-set – that allows us to examine the 
relations between the different divisions of the same organization involved in the 
emergency response. These divisions occupy a different status in the organization but 
employ personnel with very similar – if not the same – role description. In the preceding 
chapters I examined the communicative interactions primarily amongst two divisions of 
the fire services: those virtually related to the emergency response CCC and those actually 
involved in the response operations’ units.  
 
 
The most substantive similarity between the different FRSs is the double setting: the set-
virtual and the dynamic-actual incident-scene. In the HFC, the BFRSs and the LFB, the 
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CCC is the set-virtual scene where their control-employees perform similar tasks. The role 
of the control personnel is to receive the incident information. The latter is the input that 
stimulates the reaction of the organization with regard to an emerging incident (figure 5). 
The control personnel engage in a significant decision-making process: they assess the 
incoming information so as to instigate the respective mobilization protocols. In essence, 
control personnel convert the incoming incident information into organizational 
information. Organizational information – the type and the number of appliances and the 
personnel responding to an emergency – is the reaction, or the output, of the organization 
to the incident information as the external stimulus, where the dynamic-actual scene is set. 
This conversion from one type of information to another is constant and continuous. As 
soon as the operations’ units are on the firegrounds, they attain more incident information 
which they convert to organizational information when they request additional or fewer 
resources than the ones mobilized on-scene.  
 
 
The problem with coordinating the actions of the organization-members on both scenes at 
the same time is that two sets of expectations are created within the same role-set: one set 
by the control employees; the other by the operations’ personnel. That happens because 
control employees deal with emergencies not in the background, but on another scene, 
away from the incident-grounds and, thus, are spatially distanced from what actually takes 
place during, for example, fire-fighting operations in industrial premises. Whereas in the 
control room fire-fighters are expected to answer telephone calls and forward any 
incoming information to dispatchers, officers or superintendents, on-scene they are 
expected to install the lines and extinguish the fire. The nature of their tasks differs. From a 
secondary task on the virtual scene they are expected to perform the primary task of the 
FRSs on the actual scene. On the virtual scene, expectations are set intra-organizationally, 
according to procedures. On the actual scene, extra-organizational factors such as the 
unanticipated parameters of the emergencies, other first-responders operating on-scene, 
and the presence of civilians or the media (Castells 2007) weigh on the organization-
members involved in the response.  
 
 
The BFRSs have another particularity. Next to the virtual and actual scene, there is a third 
stage that emerges in the division-set: the administrative personnel. Depending on 
whether they are uniformed or non-uniformed personnel, the actors performing on this 
stage may or may not be directly involved in emergency responses. If they are uniformed,   265
usually high-ranking officers, they act as incident commanders and do not deal with 
routine or set events. If they are non-uniformed, they may introduce regulations but they 
are not directly engaged in emergency responses. This stage came dynamically to the fore 
when the rank system gave way to the role system. Depending on the position they 
occupied in the reformed organization and regardless of their rank, personnel formed what 
could be defined as “coalitions of power” (Merton 1965: 373): operations’ personnel vs. 
administrative personnel as well as another, broader, “coalition of power” between 
uniformed personnel vs. non-uniformed personnel.  
 
 
As far as the first coalition is concerned, there were two fronts of players introduced: 
group A and group B. Group A, the administrators or managers (that is, higher-ranking 
uniformed or non-uniformed personnel), were perceived by group B, the operations’ 
personnel, as active participants in the reform process. This older conflict between 
“station officers and the watches they command [whose] are systematically isolated from 
– indeed in some respects, almost opposed to – higher levels of management” (Salaman 
1986: 48) and the higher levels of administration was re-introduced instead of being 
smoothed over. Group A agents perceived themselves not as active participants in the 
reformation process, but as those who by virtue of their position in the administration 
implemented the changes introduced. Characteristically, one higher-ranking employee 
maintained that the “auditing regime” that would define the financial support provided to 
FRSs forced them into implementing the new measures as quickly as possible:  
 
 
We are no longer giving you the choice; we are telling you and we will audit 
you, measure you […] The ultimate punishment would be to cut the funding to 
the local authority […] The auditors said that if the fire service did not 
modernize, the fire-fighters would not get the next stage of payment, regardless 
of who fault that [the “non-modernization”] was.
122 (….) 
 
 
In contrast, group B considered itself as being subjected to a process that directly involved 
its members. However, group B members were not formally invited as active participants 
in modernizing the BFRSs. Essentially, operations’ personnel felt that they were left out 
of the game and this imbalance in the distribution of power amongst BFRSs employees 
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provoked a “lot of bad feelings”
123 between group A and group B agents. Their 
resentment became obvious as their performance was audited during debriefs held after 
emergency responses had taken place:  
 
 
Whenever we [the administrators] ask why we did this or that [...] there is an 
invisible war: ‘you are managers, we are workers; we do not like you challenging 
what we’ve done […] because we don’t trust you; we think you don’t trust us’.
124  
 
 
Whichever were the changes that took place and however significant they were, personnel 
was unwittingly provided with an excuse to, as Burns and Stalker (1961: 140) eloquently 
put it, “find relief in attributing the difficulties to the wrong-headedness, stupidity or 
delinquency of the others with whom they had to deal or more mildly to irreconcilable 
differences in attitude and codes of rational conduct.” This summarises what one of the 
senior fire-officers of a BFRSs said:  
  
 
I have a bit of a philosophy […] people, when bored, tend to find small things to 
become important […] if we are able to use their time in training session, fill 
their day […] When I was fire-fighter the day went faster […] People don’t 
mind working harder doing risky things, but when you get to the dull day to day 
environment.
125  
 
 
Hence, what happened is that not all personnel were gradually introduced to the 
parameters of the modernized regime. Their conflict(s) occurred on pretexts rather than 
meaningful antitheses between the various actors of the same organizations. Group B 
agents agreed that even when being debriefed by members of group A, who evaluated 
their operational performance, they never told them “how to do the job, no.”
126  
 
 
The second “coalition of power” was formed between two slightly differently populated 
groups: uniformed vs. non-uniformed personnel. Two problematic issues appeared to 
emerge from this antithesis. Uniformed personnel are employees who enter the 
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organization as fire-fighters having received the necessary operational training. The non-
uniformed employees are generally specialized personnel that occupy positions in the 
administration and in some cases; they occupy the highest position in the organization. The 
problematic areas related to the fact that these key-positions in the administration of the 
organization were reserved for the fire-fighting personnel when they had reached a certain 
rank. For example, the position of the chief or the deputy officer of a fire-fighting 
organization was predominantly occupied by a male individual after having achieved a 
certain status in the organization.  
 
 
However, these sudden changes endorsed an underlying process that had already begun. 
For example, positions concerning the financial conduct of the FRSs would no longer be 
filled by fire-fighters who happened to know how to deal with these issues by virtue of 
having managed them over a long period of time. The new regime called for specialization 
and therefore supported and accelerated the changes introduced towards this end of 
employing specialized civilian personnel for specialized tasks. Nonetheless, this meant that 
uniformed personnel, fire-fighters who were expecting to upgrade their status within the 
organization, were not provided with this opportunity. What further appeared to aggravate 
the relationship between the civilians and the fire-fighting personnel is the fact that non-
uniformed personnel were appointed in positions created by the modernization agenda 
(Fitzgerald and Stirling 1999; Pyper 2003). Therefore, they became empowered players in 
the group A – group B game.  
 
 
Interestingly a third coalition emerged as in the past there was an underlying conflict 
between control personnel who were not either employed as fire-fighters or considered by 
operational fire-fighters as colleagues and fire-fighters. After the 2004 Fire Service Act, 
control personnel were wearing the same uniform as the fire-fighting personnel and formed 
a closer relationship with their former “opponents.”
127 These groups “vary in amounts of 
organizational power”. Therefore, they also vary “in their capacity to impose their view of 
the nature of the organization” (Salaman 1980: 244; Brandsen and van Hout 2006). Thus, 
the conflict amongst organization-members with different roles and statuses is inevitably 
perpetuated on the complex stage of organizational action. 
 
                                                 
127 Control employee, pers. comm., 12 April 2007.   268
8.3. From the expectations of the role-set to the demands of the system 
 
 
What type of organizations are we dealing with? Table 16 provides a categorization of the 
principle parameters in managing emergencies as they emerged from investigating the 9/11 
emergency response, the Greek episodes, the BFRSs and the LFB experience. The 
comparison between the HFC, the BFRSs and the LFB reveals that there are differences 
emerging from the role- and the rank-structure. The rank-structure refers to mechanistic 
systems whereas the role-structure represents an organic operation of organizations.  
  
 
In the introductory chapter I proposed the following classification of the incidents to which 
the fire and rescue organizations respond: emergencies, routine and set events. In theory, 
emergencies are best dealt with by organic systems that operate under the expectation of 
uncertainty, with a view to resolving and surviving the emergency (Robert and Lajtha 
2002). Routine- and set-events are anticipated. They do not erupt, they occur. For these 
expected events with anticipated parameters, adequate planning may be effectively 
provided by mechanistic systems. However, this mix does not always come out right. The 
9/11 episode indicated that the existing procedures had not anticipated the intensity of the 
crisis. Therefore, they could not respond to the needs created by the unanticipated incident. 
When the deputy fire safety director of the South Tower said that he would not order an 
evacuation procedure until he heard “from the boss, from the fire department or 
somebody” (Kean et al. 2004: 287), he allowed the routines of a mechanistic system to 
interfere with a more effective approach to encountering the crisis that an organic system 
could have dealt with. The testimony of one of the civilians who managed to evacuate the 
building that morning indicated how the mechanistic system collided with an organic 
approach in the crisis due to the existence of very few protocols defining the action of the 
first-responder organizations and the fact that the first-responder deliberated avoided 
assuming responsibility (Kean et al. 2004). So, the information the civilian intended to 
communicate went from one employee to another and consequently took a longer time to 
reach a destination, rather than its “final” destination, because the existing procedures, at 
the time, did not indicate who would be the recipient.   269
Table 36 – FRSs investigated and the 9/11 response: A comparative perspective of the communication conduct during emergency responses 
 
Communication during 
emergency management  
9/11 HFC BFRSs  LFB 
Congestion of emergency centres  Yes   Yes   Yes   Not challenged 
Emergency protocols  Detailed protocols  General guidelines of action/ 
specific protocols for high risk 
areas  
Detailed protocols for 
numerous types of incidents 
Detailed protocols. LFB 
expects to be provided with 
changes by those who 
introduce them 
Mobilization protocols  General guidelines  General guidelines   Specific protocols  Specific protocols  
Information assessment  Inexistent protocols – 
indecisiveness – panic  
Experience  and instructions 
issued by the command 
structure 
Specific parameters for 
assessing information 
Specific parameters for 
assessing information 
Information dissemination  Erroneous choice of technical 
channels 
Selective choice of receivers  Unobstructed disseminations 
of information 
Unobstructed dissemination 
of information  
Evacuation protocols  Existent but not rehearsed  Existent in some cases but 
rarely rehearsed 
Existent/ not often rehearsed Existent/  not  often 
rehearsed 
Public information protocols  Non existent, random or 
contradicting advice 
No such protocols. Few lists 
with ‘do’s and don’ts’ 
Some existent protocols   Not existent. General 
advice  
Structural failures  Yes: e.g. emergencies lighting 
etc  
Yes: e.g. hydrant network, road 
network 
Yes: e.g. hydrant network, 
road network, SPRINKLER 
systems 
Rarely. When such failures 
are detected the responsible 
parties are severely fined  
Equipment Interoperability  No interoperability   Little interoperability. 
Familiarity as the key concept 
of interoperability 
One of the principal goals. 
Achieved through protocols, 
liaison officers. Constant 
rehearsing also brings 
familiarity  
Selective (e.g. with the 
police not the ambulance) 
and achieved through 
familiarity not between 
individuals but between 
tasks performed by the 
various organizations 
Lack of equipment  Yes    Yes   Adequately  equipped  Little  
Radio frequencies  Lack of frequencies; lack of 
knowledge/ experience with 
Lack of knowledge/ experience 
with regard to their use 
Adequate spectrum and 
knowledge of its use. Often 
Adequate spectrum and 
knowledge of its use. Often   270
regard to their use  lack of repeaters in areas 
(e.g. tunnels) where the 
signal is weak or inexistent 
lack of repeaters in areas 
(e.g. tunnels) where the 
signal is weak or inexistent 
Communication  Pyramid command structure  Pyramid command structure  Team management   Team management  
Contradicting or unverified 
information 
Yes   Yes   Little   Little 
Inter-organizational cooperation 
ICS  Existent. Practiced according 
to the extent of the crisis and 
the familiarity of those who 
participate   
Existent. Rarely rehearsed or 
practiced  
Well rehearsed. Not always 
well practiced. 
Well rehearsed on a local 
level 
Actors and roles   Defined but not always 
respected depending on the 
participant actors 
Defined but not always 
respected depending on the 
participant actors 
Clearly defined  Clearly defined 
Allocation of command structure  Near the incident-grounds  On the incident-grounds  Near the incident-grounds  On the incident- grounds 
Allocation of resources 
On-duty 
Off-duty 
Problematic: management, 
self-dispatching (results in 
fatigue and lack of relieves) or 
unfamiliarity with the affected 
area/ premises  
Problematic: management,  
self-dispatching (results in 
fatigue and lack of relieves) or 
unfamiliarity with the affected 
area/ premises 
Occasionally problematic: 
management, self-
dispatching (results in fatigue 
and lack of relieves) or 
unfamiliarity with the 
affected area/ premises 
Occasionally problematic: 
management, unfamiliarity 
with the affected area/ 
premises  
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Organizations struggle to maintain or improve their ability to deal with these events. There 
is often confusion surrounding how organizations should adapt their modus operandi so as 
to cope with their tasks. In order to manage the increasing complexity of emergencies, 
organizations must decide whether they prefer flexibility to an extremely high level of 
regulation. It appears that FRSs favour over-elaborate mechanistic systems to organic ones, 
due to the fact that overregulation determines the actions of organization-members and 
minimizes unexpected behaviours and reactions on-site. During August 2007, a senior LFB 
officer undertook the task of investigating whether more detailed and standard procedures 
would enhance the performance of organization-members during emergency responses. 
Currently, the LFB is in the process of debating whether the recommendations that resulted 
from the experimentations during emergency responses will replace the old general 
guidelines of action.  
 
 
Similarly, the BFRSs have adopted detailed regulations in order to cope with emergencies. 
The BFRSs personnel perceive resilience as the “the capacity to cope with unanticipated 
dangers after they became manifest, learning to bounce back” (Wildavsky 1988: 16; Hills 
2000). Thus, they have used past experiences to lay out detailed emergency plans and 
mobilization procedures so as to, first, make an effort to change the unanticipated character 
of emergencies to potentially predictable events and, second, to create a cost-effective 
distribution of limited organizational resources. Their initial mobilization procedures are 
based on the description provided by civilians, which in turn control personnel match to 
the parameters of the emergency plans registered in their computer systems. 
 
 
According to the typology that Burns and Stalker proposed (1961; table 17) the HFC 
appears to be a mechanistic organization as compared to the BFRSs and – to a lesser extent 
– the LFB, which tend to acquire more organic than mechanistic characteristics. However, 
what becomes evident from table 17 is that FRSs are neither the one type nor the other. 
Some of the characteristics mentioned in the Burns and Stalker typology, such as the 
prescribed roles and the formalized modes of communication, may determine the character 
of the services more decisively than others. The BFRSs, for example, are seemingly 
organic systems. However their precise and prescribed communications practices prior to 
and during emergency responses (tables 19 and 20), the use of free-speech, the coded or 
verbal detailed reports, the status codes, and the extent of the detailed SOP indicate that 
they tend to regulate highly their operating procedures, a characteristic that defines an   272
elaborate mechanistic organization. During one of the conversations I conducted in May 
2007 with a control officer in the EFRS1, he commented:  
 
 
[…] We are having our medicals today, you see. […] A lot of people suffer from 
stress in the control […]. The fact is that we have to remember a lot more than we 
used to when I joined, years ago. For example, if somebody called [to open] a 
locked door 30 years ago, it meant that they were collapsed because they were old 
[…] today you’ve got to consider if there is some kind of gas that it is released, is 
it domestic gas (?) is it carbon monoxide from the boiler (?) or something more 
sinister (?); if it is one person we deal with it one way; if there are three or four or 
more you deal with it in other ways; we take different steps […].  
 
 
Before this conversation took place, I did not realize how these numerous procedures could 
affect the system other than improving the effectiveness of the BFRSs. However, the 
Independent Review as well as the 2004 Act referred to an organic change of the BFRSs 
that would replace the existent mechanistic organizational structures. According to the 
modernization agenda (FRSs Act 2004), an effort was made to clarify the purpose of the 
British services and generate a “culture which fosters organic change” (Bain et al. 2002: 
iv). In this context, the government thought it necessary to adopt national standards as far 
as the operational and administrative tasks were concerned, so as to create the basis for 
interoperability. According to the Independent Committee’s report: “The new 
arrangements for the Fire Service need to achieve at least the following two objectives: 
first, a clear articulation of roles so that each body, committee or institution has a clear 
relationship to the others, a well-defined responsibility for delivering particular aspects of 
reform, and accountability for its performance; and second, an organic change process 
which allows ideas and developments to occur at any time without the need for even minor 
details to be agreed centrally” (Bain et al. 2002: 57) as “the mechanistic approach […] 
failed to fill the policy vacuum” (Bain et al. 2002: 46).  
 
 
However, the typology suggested by Burns and Stalker does not coincide with the 
definition of the “organic” as mentioned in the Bain Report. The definition of the 
“organic” in the report that shaped the rationale of the 2004 Act that followed 
approximately two years later is the overcoming of the “archaic regulations which prevent 
employers doing more than making marginal or local changes” (Bain et al. 2002: 46) and   273
Table 47: Mechanistic and organic characteristics of the FRSs 
Mechanistic System  HFC  BFRS  LFB  Organic System   HFC  BFRS  LFB 
Hierarchical command structure  Y  -  Y  Stratification based on seniority and 
expertise or “best authority” (1961: 
122), that is the most informed and 
capable individuals. They are appointed 
by consensus. 
- Y - 
Specialization    - Y Y Knowledge/  experience  C  C C 
functionally isolated  
(self-contained action) 
Y  C Y functionally  collective  - C C 
Formalization  Y  Y Y de-formalization   
[the “chronically anxious quest for 
knowledge” (1961: 122)] 
- -  - 
Low commitment  
(loyalty/ obedience enforced) 
Y  -  -   High commitment  
(cultural consensus) 
- Y Y 
Action by instructions/ orders   Y  C  Y  Action  based  on  information  and 
advice 
- C Y 
Importance and prestige (status) attached to 
internal and not cosmopolitan knowledge/ 
experience/ skill. 
Y  C  C  Importance and prestige (status) 
attached to affiliations and expertise 
deriving from the industrial/ technical 
and commercial milieu external to the 
firm. 
- C Y 
Omniscience of the higher-raking/ static and 
prescribed roles/ status/ formalized modes of 
communication.  
Y  Y  C  Collective decision-making/ dynamic 
and negotiated roles and status/ non-
formalized modes of communication. 
- C C 
Importance of technical means rather than 
organizations’ ends. 
Y  -  -  Focus on the ends. Technical means to 
achieve the ends. 
- Y Y 
Y: affirmative/ the characteristic applies  
(C): contested/ the characteristic is detected in the function of the organization but it does not apply as such 
(-): negative/ the characteristic does not apply 
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the replacement of the quasi-militaristic hierarchical structure by a stratification based on 
seniority and expertise or, in other words, “best authority” (Burns and Stalker 1961: 122). 
According to the “best authority” principle, the most informed and capable individuals are 
appointed by consensus. This, in the BFRSs, is thought to be achieved through the 
transition from rank to role. These parameters alone cannot establish the turning from a 
mechanistic to an organic system. Evidence is provided during emergency communication 
to support the view that the transition from a mechanistic to an organic system is 
incomplete. The large number of procedures, the careful selection of the very detailed 
mobilization protocols, the thorough stratification of the ICS, and the meticulous definition 
of the roles undertaken by the various actors engaged in the emergency responses and 
finally the non-free-speech policy and the coded reports result in a mechanistic 
organization. 
 
 
In the BFRSs, the stratification is based on expertise rather than seniority in the service. 
So, the change from rank to role was introduced as a way to replace the quasi-militaristic 
command structure with a more flexible structure, where seniority gives way to expertise. 
That is the reason why the FRSs are no longer addressed as brigades. In the 
aforementioned context, orders are replaced by advice. The advice, according to the 
BFRSs personnel interviewed, is given by the higher to the lower-ranking personnel and 
vice versa, “whereas in the past the fire-fighters were executing the orders given by their 
superior officers”. Nonetheless, the interviewees also argued that during an emergency 
there may be very little time to contemplate the mode of intervention. Therefore the senior 
officer on-scene decides and the fire-fighters follow his/her advice. This indicates that it is 
the enunciation that changes rather than the process itself. Moreover, the existence and 
systematic rehearsal of the scenarios contradicts the collective decision-making parameter 
of an organic system. “The scenarios are so well rehearsed that the fire-fighters do not need 
to be told how to do their jobs.”
201 This quotation indicates, first, that there are scenarios, 
emergency plans, drafted by a higher authority of officers that are executed rather than 
negotiated on the incident-grounds. Any readjustment the operations’ units need to make is 
decided by the officer in charge of the emergency response. Second, these plans are 
rehearsed. So, the orders, the instructions and the assessment of the personnel’s 
performance are provided before the emergency response takes place. Each member of the 
group of fire-fighters participating in an emergency response assumes a different role on 
                                                 
201 British senior fire-officer, 11 May 2007.    275
the incident-grounds. This role is predetermined. It is neither negotiable, nor collective or 
functionally isolated. It is part of a well-orchestrated dramaturgy where each performs a 
role that affects the role that a co-actor undertakes. Each BFRS employee is assigned 
“specific bits of the total task, which is split up according to traditional or rational 
principles of the division of labour, and according to the technological equipment 
available” (Burns and Stalker 1961: 97). The officers in charge do not appear to be 
omniscient as its leading protagonist. 
 
 
The HFC, on the other hand, appears as a highly mechanistic system. In the HFC, 
operating procedures and modes of communication are not formalized and roles are neither 
distinct nor clear. The control personnel, for example, make the initial decisions with 
regard to the mobilization of the organizational resources based on: first, the few unofficial 
Memorandums of Action; second, the few, vague official guidelines. For example, the 
Service Order that refers to the communication procedures during emergency responses 
simply reads: “Dispatchers should address the operations’ personnel with courtesy”
202. 
Finally, control personnel make a decision based on the information provided by the 
callers, usually civilians or the police. So, the role of the CCC is dynamically defined by 
the parameters of the emergency: the perception of those who experience the incident (e.g. 
civilians); the assessment of the control personnel based on their experience, i.e. the tacit 
knowledge accumulated over the years; and the assessment of the operations’ personnel, 
once they are on the incident-grounds. Thus, the mobilization is widely instigated and 
sustained by the judgment of the personnel involved and the instructions provided by the 
command structure rather than preset procedures.  
 
 
Moreover, the HFC has another distinctive characteristic: informal networks often re-
define the requirements of the formal organization either prior to, during or after 
emergencies. Two picturesque examples depict how informal networks affect these 
practices. In the early 1990s a political decision was made to introduce female employees 
in the workforce of the HFC. The head of the legal department at the time introduced 
legislation favourable towards women with regard to the conditions of their employment. 
No more than a decade later, the new head of the legal department tried to abrogate this 
legislation. In the new re-draft he put forward, he suggested that female officers should be 
                                                 
202 Eggeklios (Service Order) 3, Regulations for Conducting Radio Communication, 15699, Φ.605.9, 
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restricted to conducting administration and not operational work so as to prevent female 
employees from being promoted to higher ranks. Although his proposal was contrary to 
EU legislation with regard to equality in the workplace, the leadership of the HFC agreed 
to support the redrafted parts. It was, eventually, the effort made by some of the female 
employees of the HFC that contributed significantly to the rejection of the proposed 
amendments.
203 This example demonstrates that, first, organizational structures are 
constantly under negotiation and, second, negotiations depend on the idiosyncrasies of the 
negotiators. Informal networks, such as the high-ranking male employees allying to 
exclude the female personnel from being promoted, or the female employees allying to 
counter the male personnel’s actions, penetrate and influence the formal structures.  
 
 
Another unorthodox, yet not uncommon, game between formal and informal aspects of 
communicative interactions amongst organization-members occurred in one of the local 
fire services. In a Hellenic local fire station in the early 1990s, employees were forced to 
spend more than 48 hours per week in their working place, due to lack of personnel. 
However they maintained the right to log-in their overtime and either receive financial 
compensation or time off work. Nevertheless, in order to receive either of these two kinds 
of rewards, a behest had to be issued. Headquarters’ financial services were unable to put 
forward such a behest due to lack of resources. Since the fire station’s employees thought 
that such compensation would not be granted soon, they decided to play a game: whenever 
they reached 100 hours overtime they would end the counting and begin all over again. 
However, a couple of months after they had introduced the game, the long anticipated 
behest was issued. According to the behest, employees who had worked overtime would be 
financially compensated. But the gambling employees lost their bets. They were not 
allowed to re-log their overtime.
204 
 
 
Such  games challenge the Weberian analysis according to which within the formal 
organization activities are regulated, distributed, and routinized on the basis of written 
documents (Weber 1947). In order to relieve their boredom, employees defied the formal 
structures of the organization. They made two false assumptions when initiating their 
game: first, that the formal organization would not fulfil its obligations towards the 
employees and thus the behest would not be signed; second, that even if it was signed, they 
                                                 
203 Fieldnotes, April 2006. 
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could reverse the parameters of the game. They would re-draft the log of the fire station 
and re-register their overtime. Past experiences had indicated that re-producing written 
documents was not an uncommon practice. Both assumptions made revealed that 
organization-members’ behaviour is “inextricably linked with a historically specific social 
structure and culture” (Mouzelis 1978: 175). The HFC becomes more or less mechanistic 
depending on the individuals in the command structure.  
 
 
As for the LFB, it has a hierarchical structure with highly specialized personnel. All 
personnel begin their service with similar expertise when they enter the LFB. Their 
relationship is highly formalized with prescribed roles and an effort to exclude the non-
LFB personnel human element from the organizational conduct. For example, control 
personnel instigate the mobilization process based on a few descriptive procedures that 
apply to a range of incidents. These procedures are not as detailed as the mobilization 
protocol followed by the BFRSs. Action is based on instructions and orders. Yet because 
the fire service is task-oriented, the hierarchical structure is adopted towards achieving an 
effective end. And because it is task-oriented, the opinion of lower-ranking personnel may 
be sought by higher-ranking officers. The high commitment of the LFB personnel is 
achieved due to the strictness of the regulations. The personnel’s status is more likely to be 
shaped by knowledge and expertise related to the organization. Nonetheless, expertise 
deriving from the industrial milieu is received, assessed and, when perceived necessary, 
adopted in the organizational conduct. The technical infrastructure is a means towards 
accomplishing the tasks set by the organization.  
 
 
The practices followed in the various FRSs examined (table 18) indicate that the most 
significant difference between the HFC, the BFRSs and the LFB lies in the dialectic game: 
procedures vs. experience or formalization vs. dynamic adaptation. In the BFRSs and in 
the LFB, professional knowledge is made explicit through formalized procedures. In the 
HFC, the practice is to use the tacit knowledge deriving from experience. In the cases of 
the BFRSs and the LFB, the knowledge must be explicit in order to be acknowledged as 
the basis for legitimate action. 
 
 
The BFRSs depend on the initial incoming information in order to search for the respective 
protocols of action. In this context, the services train the control operators first to develop a   278
friendly disposition and reassuring attitude towards those – usually civilians – who contact 
the CCC in order to announce an emergency and, second, to be able to promptly match the 
information provided with the protocols required. The intervention becomes ever more 
complex as the services adopt more detailed procedures with regard to responding to 
different situations in order to make the greater use of the available organizational 
resources. 
 
 
Table 18 
Emergency conduct in the FRSs 
HFC BFRSs LFB 
1. General unofficial 
mobilization procedures. 
Vague Service Orders. 
1. Detailed mobilization 
procedures. 
1. General official 
mobilization procedures. 
2. Procedures taken into 
account depending on the 
on-duty officers and the 
suggestions of the command 
structure. 
2. Rigorous distribution of 
organizational resources 
based on procedures.  
 
2. Procedures rigorously 
taken into account.  
 
3. Incoming information and 
tacit knowledge defines the 
mobilization procedures. 
 
3. Incoming information 
defines the implementation 
of the mobilization protocols 
drafted based on past 
experiences/risk 
assessments/cost-effective 
distribution of organizational 
resources. 
3. Incoming information 
evaluated/ranked according 
to the source. 
 
4. Control personnel are 
uniformed employees, i.e. 
operational fire-fighters. 
4. Control personnel are 
non-uniformed employees 
trained to manage those who 
announce an emergency and 
the mobilization protocols. 
4. Control personnel are 
uniformed employees, i.e. 
operational fire-fighters. 
 
 
Both the HFC and the LFB employ uniformed personnel whom they train as fire-fighters 
without providing them with additional training as to how to communicate with civilians. 
The LFB treats its sources of initial incident information as automatic-alarm systems. The 
HFC tends neither to extract as many information as possible from the initial callers nor to 
verify incoming information when follow-up calls that announce the same incident are 
placed to the CCC.  
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For the BFRSs and the LFB, the mobilization procedures indicate that formalization leads 
to instrumentality. The HFC control personnel initiate the mobilization and forward 
incident information via interpersonal communication. Both the BFRSs and the LFB have 
substituted interpersonal communication with automatic notification systems, thus 
substituting the human mediators with automatic procedures as indicated in table 19. 
 
 
Table 19 
The process for dispatching operations’ units on-site 
HFC BFRSs  LFB 
Control personnel either contact 
via telephone the station operators 
who in turn signal the operations’ 
units in the fire-station or radio 
the standing-by operations’ units 
providing the incident information 
orally. 
Receive, register the 
incident information, 
signal electronically the 
fire-station, announce the 
incident information and 
fax over the registered 
information. 
Receive, write down or 
register the information, 
signal the fire-station, 
announce and fax over 
the incident information. 
 
 
Overall, within the FRSs investigated one can find examples of each of the bureaucratic 
types proposed by Gouldner: mock, representative and punishment-centred bureaucracy 
(see table 20). In most of the cases, it is the punishment-centred type of bureaucracy that 
dominates the organizational conduct. In the HFC, the BFRSs and the LFB the rules are 
imposed by an outside agency, the government, the local governments and the city hall 
respectively (mock). These rules are enforced by the ranking officers (punishment-centred) 
who issue directives via which they offer their interpretation of the rules issued by the 
outside agencies. FRSs personnel may oppose to these rules and regulations and ask the 
administration of the FRS to revoke them (representative). Rules and regulations can and 
often are intentionally (punishment-centred) or unintentionally (representative) violated 
both on and off the incident-grounds. This rupture between structure and agency produces 
overt or covert conflict between the higher and the lower-ranking officers (representative 
or punishment-centred), between the officers and the sub-officers (in the HFC and the 
LFB), and the administrative and the operations’ personnel (in the BFRSs). 
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8.4. Summary  
 
 
In short, communicative interactions during emergency responses are the outcome of the 
negotiations between the organizational structure and agency that are constant and 
continuous. These negotiations are in themselves a coping mechanism that reflects how 
internal ruptures (Lagadec 1993) interfere with how the organization-members react to 
external emergencies. Internal ruptures are predominantly caused by disruptions in the 
role-set (Merton 1965). The role-set defines the expectations the organization-members 
develop during their interactions. External emergencies are either incidents with 
unexpected parameters, routine or set events. The FRSs as predominantly mechanistic 
organizations (Burns and Stalker 1961) sustain and develop a bureaucratic system that 
tends to routinize emergencies by introducing an elaborate set of procedures. Emergency 
procedures are the result of organization-members’ efforts to combine the available 
organizational resources with scenarios about potential emergencies. The more elaborate 
the procedures and the less the distance between the structure and the agency, the more 
effective the routinization of managing emergency, routine and set events. All these 
processes indicate that the fire and rescue organizations are communication events (Jablin 
et al. 1987; Pepper, 1995; Putnam, Phillips and Chapman 1996). As such, their structure is, 
to use a metaphor, under implicit or explicit siege by the actions of those who practice 
what the formal organization dictates as necessary in order to achieve its goals. 
  
 
Table 20: Gouldner’s typology of bureaucracies 
 
Principle characteristics of bureaucracies 
Mock Representative  Punishment-centered 
Rules imposed by an outside 
agency. Thus rules are not 
enforced by management or 
obeyed by workers. 
Rules are initiated by both 
strata, and both enforced by 
management and obeyed by 
workers.  
Rules are enforced by either 
stratum and evaded by the 
other one.  
Neither workers nor 
management can legitimate 
the rule 
Both workers and 
management can legitimate 
the rule  
Either workers or 
management can legitimate 
the rule 
Little conflict between 
workers and management  
Little overt conflict – few 
tensions between workers 
and management 
Conflict between the two 
groups 
Enforcement of rules: 
violates both workers’ and 
management’s interests 
Enforcement of rules: 
violates neither workers’ nor 
management’s interests 
Enforcement of rules: 
violates either of the groups’ 
interests   281
Deviating from the rules: 
expression of uncontrollable 
human nature 
Deviating from the rules 
expresses: ignorance or well-
intentioned carelessness 
Deviating from rules 
expresses: deliberate intent 
Transgression of the rules is 
status-enhancing for both 
workers and management 
Conforming to the rules is 
status-improving 
Status-gains for one group 
are status losses for the 
other.  
 
 
8.5. The dysfunction of the HFC bureaucracy: Reflections on a puzzle introduced  
  
 
Unlike the bureaucratic character of the BFRSs and the LFB, the HFC is an amalgam of 
pre-bureaucratic ethos and bureaucratic principles. It is somewhere between the pre-
bureaucratic ethos and the bureaucratic principles, the HFC organization fails to “correct 
its behavior by learning from its errors” (Crozier 1964: 187). Due to long-lived habitual 
practices, the organization seems to absorb its errors rather than reject or correct them. 
 
 
The episodes examined indicate that the emergence of phenomena such as favoritism, 
patronage, and clientelism counter the bureaucratic principles of meritocracy, impartiality 
and impersonality. Such phenomena are incubated and sustained by a network of informal 
relationships amongst organization-members that overpower the formal interactions as 
indicated by the letter of the law. HFC employees prefer informal to formal activities 
(Sotiropoulos 2004), the informal activities being patterns of social interaction deviating 
from the formal organizational conduct.   
 
 
It is evident that HFC employees develop the quid pro quo solidarity that allows 
operational or administration misconduct to remain unpunished. HFC fire-fighting 
personnel tolerate errors of judgment made during emergency responses. Trust in 
reciprocal tolerance becomes the ulterior motive of the organization-members. Thus 
reciprocity becomes the key element in sustaining the function of the informal routines 
and practices of the organization-members.  
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However, one may not assume that such trust is always the prerequisite for the practice of 
solidarity. Solidarity is sustained when the routine activities induce an acceptable degree 
of error, that is, in cases when error is contained within the organization. The solidarity 
breaks off when the error is unacceptable, that is, when it breaches the organization and 
enters the wider public sphere. Then those who fail “lose face” and are excluded. 
 
 
Informal relationships result in transgression of roles. Roles are not practiced as defined 
by rules and regulations and, therefore, the line of authority becomes unclear and the 
status attributed to the employees that hold specific roles becomes vague. Such ambiguity 
affects the bureaucratic hierarchies by engendering, first, insecurity with regard to the 
status of the organization-members and, second, arbitrariness in distributing the power 
amongst the HFC employees, which breaches the agreed expectations of the bureaucratic 
system. It is often the case that when a high-ranking employee decides to punish a 
member of the lower-ranking personnel, the latter may be able to avoid punishment by 
requesting the mediation of a higher-ranking official: either an HFC employee or a 
politician. In such cases, power is essentially shifted from the high-ranking officer to the 
lower-ranking personnel. Hence, the status of the high-ranking officer who has by law the 
discretionary power to punish the lower-ranking personnel is diminished by personnel 
holding a lower status.  
 
 
This whole puzzle appears to be forged on the political ethos of the Greek state that has an 
informal strength that exceeds the formal structure. The pre-bureaucratic ethos of the 
informal relationships was retained but the action of the HFC organization-members may 
be attributed to the socio-cultural and political milieu of the organization. It is the history 
of the organization that then fuels a discourse that attributes a specific clientelist network 
of meanings to the organization’s routines and practices. 
 
 
In 1832, the Administration of the newly formed Hellenic state attempted for the first time 
to create a public service that would mitigate emergencies, such as fires. From the 
moment of its conception in 1832, until 1931, when it assumed its current structure, the   283
Hellenic fire-fighting service underwent numerous changes that reflected the political 
instability of the Hellenic state (Mouzelis 1978; Charalambis 1989; Clogg 1999; 
Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002).  
 
 
Most of the changes were nominal rather than substantial and encountered a number of 
recurring crises. These superficial changes were introduced by the Hellenic state each 
time a major fire incident occurred. Despite the state’s intentions to form a system that 
would respond effectively to the increasing needs in fire-fighting, the representatives of 
the state merely reproduced the same structures of the first fire-fighting formations. The 
“political system” (Burns and Stalker 1961) of these cloned organizations bore similar 
characteristics. The Hellenic fire services employed people with common professional 
status: they all came from a military background, entered by defined channels of 
professional qualification, with common interests that developed during a usually 
prolonged military training and service. Every time they used similar equipment, scarcely 
adequate and rarely renewed. They operated according to rules and regulations similar to 
those introduced by the military and they administered according to clientelism and 
patronage, that is the selective promotion and distribution of privileges and rewards to 
certain individuals regardless of their qualifications (Perrow 1972; Charalambis 1989; 
Mouzelis 1978; Sotiropoulos 2004).  
 
 
The patron – client relationships “were a typical form of organization in oligarchic 
parliamentary politics” that later on shifted “from oligarchic/ traditional” where the 
empowered notables and the military chieftains of the Greek revolution (Mouzelis 1978; 
Clogg 1999; Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002) gradually gave way “to state/ bureaucratic 
forms of patronage” and meritocratic criteria for distribution (Mouzelis 1985: 332-333). 
These institutional and formal procedures of the Greek state were new to the recently 
liberated Greeks (Charalambis 1989). On the other hand, in non - institutional informal 
relations, the role of powerful patrons, such as the landholders, are familiar. New concepts 
like: “state”, “citizens”, “institutionalized rights”, laws”, etc, are placed in an old, feudal, 
context of power distribution in a state that is making a fresh start. Such a state has no 
previous experience as to the ways a government acts when it is facilitating the 
centralized authorities and new modes of production that had already served as the basis 
for the growth of capitalism and a strong nation-state in many European countries earlier.    284
Thus on the whole, between 1830 and 1880, the “huge state apparatus [was] controlled by 
the crown and by a more or less fragmented political oligarchy at the head of extensive 
clientelistic networks”. Until 1922, “the State apparatus and civil society [continued not 
to] operate so much in class as in clientelistic terms”. Between 1922 and until the Greek 
Junta (1967 – 1974), “the political conflict, contrary to the previous pre-capitalist period, 
took a more direct class character. This does not mean of course that clientelism ceased to 
play an important role in Greek politics or that political parties lost entirely their 
personalistic character […]” (Mouzelis 1978: 17-27)  
 
 
In the case of the HFC, the redefined patron-client relationship is manifested in the process 
of selecting the highest-ranking officials of the state institutions, such as the chief fire-
officer of the fire and rescue service. It is essentially the political authority of the state that 
selects and appoints individuals in such positions. In turn, these individuals, select, appoint 
or decide the retirement of the higher-ranking organization-members. It appears 
appropriate to conclude these reflections with a remark made by Nicos Mouzelis when he 
argued that “modernization  does not eliminate clientelism; patronage networks tend to 
persist, albeit in a modified, less traditional form, even after the decline of oligarchic 
politics and the development of industrial capitalism” (1985: 332-333). I have aimed in this 
thesis to show that the documentary sources and the evidence from participant observation 
reveal that this persistence is true of the HFC, as well. 
 
 
8.6. Afterward 
 
 
This thesis has examined the structure of the FRSs and the communication conduct of their 
organization-members during emergency responses. I have used case studies to indicate the 
routines and communication practices of the FRSs personnel and have provided a chronicle 
of the 9/11 and the Katrina emergency responses as benchmarks, in order to illustrate the 
similarities and differences in the FRSs conduct. 
 
 
Regardless of how elaborate their structure and function are, the FRSs always encounter 
problems during emergency responses. The human factor contributes to the emergence of 
the intra-organizational problems when dealing with external emergencies. The   285
bureaucratic structure sustains the effective administration of organizations and the 
practical aspect of the emergency management. This elaborate, but rigid, system of 
organizing conflicts with the human element and with the requirements of emergencies 
calls for improvisation. Improvisation is necessary to overcome problems which are bound 
to occur during a response.  
 
 
A number of problems that affect the management of the FRSs have been included: the 
absence of a unified command and the consequent un-coordination of actions of first-
responders; the insubordination and misinformation coming from the emergency services’ 
dispatch centres which, in some cases, led responders or civilians to their death; the 
inadequacy of governmental policies and the insufficient technological support. 
 
 
The absence of unified command and insubordination results from the disrespect for 
authority. Organization-members undermine the authority of those who acquire their status 
not by merit, experience or expertise, but by seniority, which does not necessarily imply 
experience. Moreover, the inadequacy of governmental policies is predominantly due to 
the fact that rules, regulations and procedures are designed on a strategic level by high-
ranking officers with, or without, expertise and may be inter-FRSs loans that have not been 
well-adopted to the needs of the organizations. When high-ranking personnel design these 
rules, regulations and procedures, they consider the ideal function of the organization, but 
often fail to indicate how these can apply so as to avoid frictions among the organization-
members in different departments of the same organization or the various FRSs on a 
European level. Essentially, the designers fail to understand the different ‘idiosyncrasies’ 
of the various organizations. For example, the administration of many of the European 
FRSs saw the development of the ICS and the mutual aid protocols as the desired solution 
(Duke 2002) to the problems displayed by the fire and rescue organizations. However, the 
solution to these issues does not primarily lie in adopting the same or similar protocols.  
 
 
The reason why common protocols may not be as effective on a tactical or operational 
level as expected on a strategic level is also due to the cultural differences of the various 
fire and rescue organizations. European services should take into account the human factor 
as empirical evidence indicates that some organizations may appear to fail to learn 
(Lagadec 1993), others refuse to learn (Perrow 1999), others learn only in symbolic ways   286
(Clarke 1999; Borodzicz and Van Haperen 2002) while many learn slowly (Boin 2005; 
Lintonen 2004). In the HFC, for example, organization-members would probably find 
ways to overcome regulations that would not suit their routines and practices developed 
and sustained over a long period of time. The initial step toward addressing these problems 
is to understand the variety of the modus operandi of the various fire services – the 
“cultural identity” (Falkheimer and Heide 2006) of these organizations – to realize that 
expectations differ to comprehend the reason why they differ, to take some time to explain 
to FRSs personnel why certain processes should exist and what are the stakes in case these 
procedures are not followed. This is an anti-mechanistic and time-consuming process, but 
explicit explanations with regard to how organization-members should act under certain 
circumstances may eventually lead to the creation of a new tacit knowledge that will 
gradually replace the existing one and, thus, facilitate the learning process (Lane and 
Lubatkin 1998). Thus, organizational boundaries may be allowed to become more 
permeable and invite collaboration (Ailon-Souday and Kunda 2003; Dahles and van Hees 
2004) compared to the ambitious aims which the bureaucracy of the European Union 
defines for cross-border collaboration.  
 
 
To work towards more effective policies on both the European and the national level, “pre-
existing plans, structures and arrangements for bringing together the efforts” of various 
agencies (Johnston 2003), as well as training and emergency planning must be addressed 
on an international level (Dayton 2004; McConnell and Drennan 2006). Thus, planning has 
been suggested as the most viable solution. And yet, although planning for crisis is almost 
a contradiction in terms, and even though contingency planning is necessary but not 
sufficient (Boin and McConnell 2007) some level of planning the organizational conduct 
and organizing the dissemination of information is imperative because it can secure the 
effectiveness of communication during emergencies.  
 
 
To this end, it is necessary that each organization frequently and regularly test their 
materials, equipment, information systems and their inter-dependent infrastructure. 
Working with communities, civilians, private owners and public organizations ensures that 
the inter-dependent infrastructure, such as bodies of volunteer fire-fighters or efficient 
hydrant or road networks, provide effective support to responding to emergency situations. 
But first and foremost, it is essential that organizations address the development of 
continuous-education programmes for their members by organizing seminars from experts   287
both from within the FRSs but also from industries, the government and other agents with 
whom they can co-operate. In order to diffuse such knowledge as effectively as possible, 
the creation of a personal development registry would help keep track of the training of 
each FRSs organization-member. This system for registering skills and competences may 
also enable a new reward structure, reconsider the promotion regulations by merit and not 
by seniority (Bain et al. 2002) and facilitate the circulation of the FRSs across services and 
countries. If such a change is to be introduced, the rank-structure will be inevitably 
redefined since the promotion and the rewards of the HFC personnel are, for the time 
being, based on seniority and good practice (Kostaras and Schuh 1990; Bain et al. 2002) 
may be achieved if those who perform are rewarded. However, the process may prove 
complicated, as criteria should be introduced and audits will be necessary to ensure the 
implementation of the process. Furthermore, FRSs should reconsider the value of 
volunteers as organizational resources. Volunteers may staff fire services in remote rural 
areas so to avoid dispersing the permanent employees from fire-stations that require more 
personnel than they employ. In order to give such responsibilities to the volunteers, it will 
be necessary to train them on a systematic basis. Moreover, planning, rehearsing and 
launching emergency responses are facilitated by up-to-date technologies. Such systems 
support the diffusion of the information and minimize the fragmentation of the decision-
making process. On the level of prevention, cooperating with local and central 
governments may adequately resolve issues such as traffic and lack of water supplies.  
 
 
This thesis is a comparative research project which has broken new empirical ground. It is 
a first effort to combine fieldnotes with recorded dialogues between operations’ centres 
and intervention units during emergency operations. Further research is necessary to shed 
more light on the different aspects of the organizational conduct. One way to explore such 
conduct would be to examine the interactions between the various hierarchical positions of 
the organizations both on an intra-organizational level and on an inter-FRSs, European 
level, for example the interactions among control employees. Gender and minority issues 
must also be explored in the FRSs. With the Equal Opportunity Acts, the BFRSs have 
begun to come to terms with the recruitment of female and non-white fire-fighters 
(Salaman 1986: 35-54). However, in the HFC, the issue of female employees is 
inadequately addressed whereas the issue of minorities it is not addressed at all because 
there are no non-white or non-Greek employees. In the LFB, the issue of minorities is 
inadequately addressed and the issue of female employees is not addressed because the   288
Brigade has no female fire-fighting personnel. Another issue to examine would be the 
structural relationships between the FRSs and other first-responder organizations in a 
wider social context from a historical point of view. However, this thesis represents a first 
step in examining the structural relationships between the FRSs and other first-responder 
organizations in a wider social context than usual and has demonstrated the fruitfulness of 
such an approach both theoretically and practically.   289
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